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Abstract. 
 
The present thesis does not, following the cautionary 
example of Dupuis and Cotonet, seek to define 
romanticism. The fatuity of their lexigraphical project, 
in light of Friedrich Schlegel’s expansive ‘theory’ of 
‘romantic poetry’, soon becomes clear. Schlegel’s 
‘theory’ aspired to elude categorisation and exceed 
definitive bounds. Dupuis and Cotonet had set out, to 
their foolish credit, to define the indefinable. However, 
it is possible to identify a characteristic motif of 
romanticism from Schlegel’s ‘inceptive’ theory. The 
critic extended his vision, somewhat fastidiously, to 
nature itself. His subject, the poet, was privy to its 
inestimable beauty; he shared a common delitescent 
principle, its ‘inmost’ being. The poet, like nature, was 
infinite and universal in scope and, ultimately, 
indefinable. Schlegel was not alone. Schopenhauer 
identified a similar quality, nature’s will; it was no 
less universal, infinite or explicable than that which 
resided in the ‘heart’ of Schlegel’s poet. It differed in 
one dramatic respect: it was loathsome. Nonetheless, 
Schlegel and Schopenhauer shared a common interest; it 
was of a decidedly visceral order. The value accorded to 
their respective subjects was determined by a universal 
force of nature which lurked about ‘within’ him. It bore 
little resemblance to anything remotely human. The 
question of romanticism was not, as Dupuis and Cotonet 
believed, purely a lexigraphical concern; it strayed into 
the realms of ontology. Schlegel and Schopenhauer’s 
spectral account, prioritising as they did, the subject’s 
mysterious ‘inmost nature’ did a disservice to the 
singular, bodily person. Max Stirner, on the other hand, 
abhorred all general notions and all talk of ‘universal 
 4 
natures’; nevertheless, he also regarded the subject as 
the wellspring of infinite potential. Unlike Schlegel and 
Schopenhauer, Stirner emphasised the subject’s 
determinate and definitive standing as a singular, 
egocentric ‘personality’. What, then, can one ascertain 
about the ‘true’ nature of the individual subject? 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 ‘INFINITY AND STARDOM’: THE WIDER QUESTION OF ROMANTICISM  
 
‘To understand things we must have been once in them and 
then have come out of them; so that first there must be 
captivity and then deliverance, illusion followed by 
disillusion, enthusiasm by disappointment. He who is 
still under the spell, and he who has never felt the 
spell, are equally incompetent. We only know well what we 
have first believed, then judged. To understand we must 
be free, yet not have been always free’.1 
 
Henri-Frédéric Amiel, ‘Amiel’s Journal’ 
 
‘Our minds are still haunted by that Abstract Man, that 
enlightened abstraction of a common humanity’.2 
 
Wyndham Lewis, ‘The Art of Being Ruled’ 
 
I. THE TROUBLES OF DUPUIS AND COTONET 
 
‘This is all nonsense’, Cotonet complained.3 His 
astonished companion, Dupuis, remained silent. They had 
taken the news badly. Not without good reason. Dupuis and 
Cotonet had reached the twelfth year of what had been, 
from the very start, an uncustomary and troubled 
lexicographical project. It had all started some years 
before when an unfamiliar word reared its head in 
conversation for the very first time. It quickly came to 
their attention that neither of them knew exactly what 
1 Henri-Frédéric Amiel, ‘Amiel’s Journal. The Journal Intime of 
Henri-Frédéric Amiel’ (1882 / 1901 p. 254). 
2 Wyndham Lewis, ‘The Art of Being Ruled’ (1926 / 1989 p. 375). 
3 Alfred de Musset, ‘Letters of Dupuis and Cotonet’ collected in ‘The 
Complete Writings of Alfred de Musset’ Volume 9 (1836 / 1908 p. 209). 
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was meant by the term. It left them at a complete and 
total loss. 
 
The word was spoken far too freely for their liking and, 
more often than not, was used, as far as they were able 
to tell, in the most arbitrary, perplexing of ways. Its 
meaning was neither consistent nor, in a number of 
instances, the least bit intelligible. Time and again, 
they ‘relapsed into uncertainty’.4 
 
To make matters worse, the problem had, over the years, 
grown to such a monstrous degree that it could no longer 
be described as a purely lexicographical concern. The 
mere mention of the word had started, in the widest 
possible sense, to make them feel very uncomfortable 
indeed. By the twelfth year of their investigations, it, 
the word, had a decidedly menacing ring to it.  
 
In a final effort to soften their anxiety and resolve the 
whole matter, as they shortsightedly hoped, for good, 
Dupuis and Cotonet decided to find out once and for all 
what precisely was meant by the term.  
 
The word in question was ‘romanticism’. 
 
A dozen years had come and gone and Dupuis and Cotonet 
had exhausted nearly as many definitions - one had simply 
supplanted another and neither of them were any the 
wiser. Their anxiety remained and, if anything, had 
sharpened and grown more acute.  
 
One question, above all others, remained unanswered: 
4 Alfred de Musset, ‘Letters of Dupuis and Cotonet’ collected in ‘The 
Complete Writings of Alfred de Musset’ Volume 9 (1836 / 1908 p. 198). 
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‘what, then, is romanticism?’, as Dupuis and Cotonet had 
repeatedly asked.5  
 
It was still unclear, very unclear, what exactly was 
meant by the term, a point that had just been made 
painfully aware to them both. By the very man, a nameless 
Clerk, whom had first introduced them to the word all 
those years before.  
 
‘Romanticism’, Dupuis and Cotonet had just been told, ‘is 
the weeping star; it is the sighing wind, the chilly 
night, the bird in its flight, and the sweet-scented 
flower; it is the refreshing stream, the greatest 
ecstasy, the well by the palm-trees, rosy hope and her 
thousand lovers, the angel and the pearl, the white robe 
of the willows!’. ‘It is’, the nameless Clerk continued, 
‘infinity and stardom; it is heat, refraction, cold; it 
is flat and round, the diametrical, pyramidal, oriental; 
it is an embrace, a clasp, a whirlwind’.6  
 
Given their patience, at this late stage, was at its 
thinnest, ‘infinity and stardom’ was the very last thing, 
one imagines, Dupuis and Cotonet wanted to hear. It 
certainly did not resemble, not even remotely, the 
‘definite conclusion’ they had so eagerly sought.7  
 
‘This is impossible’, the incredulous pair exclaimed. 
‘Something tells us that this can not be the result of 
such curious and assiduous researches! This can not be 
5 Alfred de Musset, ‘Letters of Dupuis and Cotonet’ collected in ‘The 
Complete Writings of Alfred de Musset’ Volume 9 (1836 / 1908 p. 208). 
6 Alfred de Musset, ‘Letters of Dupuis and Cotonet’ collected in ‘The 
Complete Writings of Alfred de Musset’ Volume 9 (1836 / 1908 p. 209 - 
210). 
7 Alfred de Musset, ‘Letters of Dupuis and Cotonet’ collected in ‘The 
Complete Writings of Alfred de Musset’ Volume 9 (1836 / 1908 p. 206). 
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so’.8 They did not react at all well to the Clerk’s 
bombastic explanation. In fact, Dupuis and Cotonet took 
it extremely badly. ‘To end the matter’, they concluded, 
‘we believe that romanticism consists in using all these 
adjectives, and not in anything else’.9 
 
‘The truth’, as Henri Peyre may have tried to console the 
pair in a study whose title would no doubt have their 
interest attracted their attention, ‘is that no brief 
definition - is valid for topics where the subjective 
point of view and inclination count so heavily. All one 
can do is describe, enumerate, eliminate, emphasize 
certain characteristics, and to do this every time one 
would need a volume’.10 ‘Romanticism’, as the painter and 
particularly astute critic, Wyndham Lewis, corroborated, 
‘is a word that covers a great deal of things differing 
among themselves very widely indeed’.11 And if one turns 
to a page of ‘Adolphe’ (1816), one comes across a 
particularly apt and cautionary note of advice: ‘The 
spoken word’, Benjamin Constant suggested, is ‘at best 
but a clumsy medium, though it may serve well enough to 
give them a name, is never capable of sharply defining 
them’.12  
  
Dupuis and Cotonet had listened attentively as the 
meaning of romanticism had been ‘described’ and 
‘enumerated’ countless times, but, just as Peyre had 
said, no ‘brief definition’ appeared to suffice. Not only 
that, the parameters of the term seemed to expand into 
8 Alfred de Musset, ‘Letters of Dupuis and Cotonet’ collected in ‘The 
Complete Writings of Alfred de Musset’ Volume 9 (1836 / 1908 p. 204). 
9 Alfred de Musset, ‘Letters of Dupuis and Cotonet’ collected in ‘The 
Complete Writings of Alfred de Musset’ Volume 9 (1836 / 1908 p. 222). 
10 Henri Peyre, ‘What Is Romanticism?’ (1977 p. 42). 
11 Wyndham Lewis, ‘The Diabolical Principle and The Dithyrambic 
Spectator’ (1931 p. 41 - 42). 
12 Benjamin Constant, ‘Adolphe’ (1816 / 1924 p. 39). 
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increasingly incomprehensible realms.  
 
It would not be completely true to say that romanticism 
had fallen short of their expectations; it had, in a 
certain respect, exceeded them. 
 
‘There is’, to heed Isaiah Berlin’s word of warning, ‘a 
kind of inverted pyramid. It is a dangerous and a 
confused subject, in which many have lost, I will not say 
their senses, but at any rate their sense of direction’.13 
And Berlin’s assessment certainly proved to be the case 
for Dupuis and Cotonet. The pair were faced, whether they 
liked it or not, with the shadowy prospect of ‘infinity 
and stardom’. Given the sheer immensity of the term, it 
was little wonder Dupuis and Cotonet lost their way. 
 
II. THE COURTSHIP 
 
Let me turn your immediate attention from Alfred de 
Musset’s satire, ‘The Letters of Dupuis and Cotonet’ 
(1836), to Friedrich Schlegel’s ‘Dialogue on Poetry’ 
(1799 - 1800) to consider the following passage. 
Schlegel, I should add at this introductory stage, was a 
critic whose contribution to literary history rests 
largely on his expansive, if horribly florid ‘definition’ 
of romanticism or, as he referred to it, ‘romantic 
poetry’. It was particularly significant, in a historical 
sense, as it constituted the first, initial attempt to 
outline the parameters of the literary form.  
 
‘The world of poetry’, as Friedrich Schlegel explained, 
‘is as infinite and inexhaustible as the riches of 
animating nature with her plants, animals, and formations 
13 Isaiah Berlin, ‘The Roots of Romanticism’ (1965 / 1999 p. 1). 
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of every type, shape, and color. Nor are the artificial 
or natural products which bear the form and name of poems 
easily included under the most inclusive term. And what 
are they, compared with the unformed and unconscious 
poetry which stirs in the plant and shines in the light, 
smiles in a child, gleams in the flower of youth, and 
glows in the loving bosom of women? This, however, is the 
primeval poetry without which there would be no poetry of 
words’.14 
 
Friedrich Schlegel and his parodic counterpart, de 
Musset’s Clerk, shared a common literary interest, but it 
was somewhat ‘deeper’ than that. It certainly led 
Schlegel on a path which descended very sharply indeed to 
a remote and largely inaccessible point: the substratum, 
not just of ‘romantic poetry’, but of nature itself. And 
things, as you might well imagine, were of an entirely 
different order ‘down there’. 
 
Schlegel, for instance, talked quite freely of an 
assortment of images in the same breath as they all 
expressed a single, underlying principle.15 That the 
‘plant that stirred’, the ‘light that shone’ and ‘the 
child that smiled’ ordinarily had little to do with one 
another was no longer strictly true: deep down they were 
all one and the same. The Clerk was also at liberty to 
talk, albeit for comic effect, of ‘weeping stars’, of 
‘sighing winds’, and ‘birds in flight’ in the same 
highfalutin and indiscriminate manner.16 
14 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 53 - 54). 
15 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 54). 
16 Alfred de Musset, ‘Letters of Dupuis and Cotonet’ collected in ‘The 
Complete Writings of Alfred de Musset’ Volume 9 (1836 / 1908 p. 209 - 
210). 
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Having plummeted to this elemental point - an all 
encompassing principle of nature, Schlegel and de 
Musset’s Clerk set out to aggrandise the standing of 
romanticism to an incalculable degree. It had, after all, 
unearthed certain relations, interrelations more 
specifically, that were not necessarily ‘common 
knowledge’. The literary form had struck up an 
affiliation with nature and was privy to its arcane 
practices. 
 
While de Musset capitalised on the kinship for satirical 
purposes, the same could not be said of Schlegel; he 
sought, in all seriousness, not only to appropriate, but 
exploit a number of nature’s characteristics for his own 
theoretical ends. It allowed the critic to talk of his 
romantic ‘theory’ as if it were as immeasurable and 
indefinable as nature itself.  
 
However, the range of its territorial advantage was 
offset by the crude bond that constituted its basis. The 
grounds, to take Schlegel’s unifying enterprise to hand, 
was founded on all that was ‘primeval’ and ‘unconscious’ 
- hardly the most helpful of qualities if, like Dupuis 
and Cotonet, one wishes to get to the bottom of 
romanticism in one respect or another; in fact, they 
rather impede the effort from the start.  
 
‘For this is the beginning of all poetry’, as Schlegel 
went on to explain, ‘to cancel the progression and laws 
of rationally thinking reason, and to transplant us once 
again into the  beautiful confusion of imagination, into 
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the original chaos of human nature’.17 Let us suppose 
Schlegel was entirely correct and the starting point of 
‘romantic poetry’ did indeed constitute the suspension, 
if not negation of ‘reason’, as he suggested, then the 
likes of Dupuis and Cotonet were, given their rational 
disposition, rather ill equipped to ever get to the 
bottom of the term.  
 
While Schlegel’s avid interest in all that was vegetal 
certainly worked to the advantage of his unitary aim, it 
did the likes of Dupuis and Cotonet absolutely no favours 
at all; it made the task of defining romanticism 
tremendously difficult, if not wholly impossible.  
 
‘We are’, as Schlegel attempted to explain in his own 
flowery way, ‘able to perceive the music of the universe 
and to understand the beauty of the poem because a part 
of the poet, a spark of his creative spirit, lives in us 
and never ceases to glow with secret force deep under the 
ashes of our self-induced unreason’.18  
 
Dupuis and Cotonet would not have appreciated, had they 
come across a copy of The Athenäum (a short lived 
periodical in which the ‘Dialogue on Poetry’ originally 
appeared), Schlegel’s talk of ‘secret’ forces, sparks of 
‘creative spirit’ and they certainly would not have 
welcomed his mention of ‘the ashes of our self-induced 
unreason’ very warmly at all. Nor, on the other hand, 
would Schlegel have been the least bit tolerant of their 
desire to contain the most ‘infinite and inexhaustible’ 
of ‘worlds’, as he called ‘romantic poetry’, within the 
17 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 86). 
18 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 54). 
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tight confines of a concise, straightforward 
explanation.19 ‘Defining’, as Frederick Hiebel warned, 
‘means to set down finite limits’.20 And setting down 
‘finite limits’ would have inhibited, if not completely 
compromised Schlegel’s ambitious plans. 
 
‘It is not necessary’, as Schlegel might have 
condescended to tell Dupuis and Cotonet, ‘for anyone to 
sustain and propagate poetry through clever speeches and 
precepts, or, especially, to try to produce it, invent 
it, establish it, and impose upon it restrictive laws’.21 
Schlegel, suffice to say, was a fine one to talk; his 
‘theory’ of ‘romantic poetry’ was itself something of a 
paragon of ingenuity. Nevertheless, given Schlegel’s 
apparent ‘hostility’ to rational thought, his 
disinclination to conform to ‘restrictive laws’, not to 
mention his ‘promiscuous’, if uncustomary concupiscent 
leaning to mingle and with all that was ‘unconscious’, 
Dupuis and Cotonet were never likely to fully comprehend 
the term. The pair had, in fact, been told something very 
similar indeed when the Clerk warned them: ‘You may try 
in vain to seize the butterfly’s wing’ but ‘the dust that 
colors it will be all you can hold in your fingers’.22 
After a dozen years of, in their words, ‘anxious 
thought’, Dupuis and Cotonet’s investigations realised an 
equally derisory return.23 
19 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 53 - 54). 
20 Frederick Hiebel, ‘Novalis and the Problem of Romanticism’ (1947 p. 
520). 
21 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 54). 
22 Alfred de Musset, ‘Letters of Dupuis and Cotonet’ collected in ‘The 
Complete Writings of Alfred de Musset’, Volume 9 (1836 / 1908 p. 
209). 
23 Alfred de Musset, ‘Letters of Dupuis and Cotonet’ collected in ‘The 
Complete Writings of Alfred de Musset’, Volume 9 (1836 / 1908 p. 
204). 
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Dupuis and Cotonet were not, like Schlegel, the least bit 
attuned to ‘the music of the universe’.24 It was not music 
they heard but a muddle of enigmatic noises and the dull 
racket left them dumbfounded. It may be tempting, if one 
is so inclined, to close ranks with Schlegel, as many 
have done, and level something Julian Green wrote in 
their direction: ‘The quality of their instruments’, 
turning to a page of his novel ‘The Closed Garden’ 
(1928), ‘corresponds poorly with the intentions of the 
composer’.25 But to say something as dismissive as that 
is, I believe, entirely unjustified. 
 
The problem had not so much to do with the ‘quality’ of 
Dupuis and Cotonet’s ‘instruments’, their intellectual 
faculties in this case, but rested solely on the 
‘intentions’ of a thoroughly irrational and insensible 
‘composer’, that is to say nature itself. To jump to 
their defence, Dupuis and Cotonet were not able to follow 
its ‘intentions’ nor appreciate its so called ‘music’ as 
they were faced with an indecipherable and senseless 
score. 
  
Romanticism could not be ‘enumerated’ in plain language; 
it was hostile to anything that was communicable, 
ordinary or determinate. The ‘secrets’ it had it impart 
were far more esoteric than that. The romantics in 
general, and Schlegel in particular, attributed an 
exorbitant amount of importance to that which was 
incommunicable, extraordinary and indeterminate. 
‘Romance, as currently used, then, denotes’, according to 
24 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 54). 
25 Julian Green, ‘The Closed Garden’ (1928 p. 132). Translated by 
Henry Longan Stuart. Harper & Brothers, New York.  
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Wyndham Lewis, ‘what is unreal or unlikely, or at all 
events not present, in contrast to what is scientifically 
true and accessible to the senses here and now. Or it is, 
in its purest expression, what partakes of the 
marvellous, the extreme, the unusual’.26 
 
The romantics had found in nature a perfect foil.  
 
‘The language of nature’, turning to a notable expert in 
the field, Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘is not understood 
because it is too simple’.27 Schopenhauer spoke with 
considerable authority on the subject; his own doctrine, 
as we will hear in one of the proceeding chapters, 
enthroned the most simpleminded and abhorrent of nature’s 
powers, the will, to prevail over it. Schlegel did not 
happen to share any of Schopenhauer’s reservations; he 
considered nature a thing of beauty, but, for all its coy 
smiles, it remained inexpressible: ‘The sublime because 
it is unutterable, can be expressed only allegorically’.28  
 
Whether it was Schlegel’s ‘theory’ of ‘romantic poetry’, 
de Musset’s wordsmith - the Clerk, or, indeed, Arthur 
Schopenhauer’s contemptible doctrine of will, romanticism 
could not be defined nor, for that matter, did it wish to 
be defined, as words struggled, if not failed to 
faithfully reflect its instrumental courtship with 
nature. ‘One cannot’, as Schlegel declared, ‘really speak 
of poetry, except in the language of poetry’.29 But as the 
‘language of poetry’ was said to take its cue from all 
that was ‘primeval’ and insensible it made it something 
26 Wyndham Lewis, ‘Time and Western Man’ (1927 p. 27).  
27 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘On the Will in Nature’ (1836 / 1992  p. 67). 
28 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 89 – 90). 
29 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 53 - 54). 
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of an onerous task to speak of it all. It is difficult, 
in this particular respect, not to harbour an enormous 
amount of sympathy for Dupuis and Cotonet. It hardly 
comes as much of a surprise they reached the end of their 
tether and arrived at their disheartening conclusion. 
 
While Friedrich Schlegel was intent to hide the meaning 
of ‘romantic poetry’ in an extensive and overpoweringly 
fragrant bed of flowers, or, in the case of de Musset’s 
Clerk, obscure it in the shadowy folds of the firmament, 
Dupuis and Cotonet were eager to expose the whole matter 
to sunlight. But romanticism, from the little one can 
tell at this early stage, was a wantonly heliophobic form 
that reveled, not only in its expansive, dimly lit 
surroundings, but also the dull, vegetal companionship it 
kept. 
 
Dupuis and Cotonet would have been far happier had they 
been told a clear, succinct explanation as to what was 
exactly meant by the term. It would have allowed the 
socialites, if the question were ever to rear its head in 
conversation again, to confidently repeat what they had 
been told word for word. Unfortunately, the matter at 
hand afforded them no such luxury, nor did it simply end 
there.  
 
Schlegel was not sufficiently satisfied to obscure the 
meaning of romanticism, as indeed the likes of Dupuis and 
Cotonet learnt to their cost; he was possessed by a far 
more ambitious desire and that desire was, as I 
suggested, to submerse ‘everything’, not just ‘romantic 
poetry’, in a murky ‘primordial’ pool. Then, and only 
then, was he able to speak of them as so many expressions 
of his totalising poetic vision. 
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‘Schlegel’s philosophical endeavors were guided’, as Hans 
Eichner wrote in an eponymous study of the critic, ‘by 
two vague but powerful concepts: that of the “absolute 
unity” of the universe and that of its “infinite 
plentitude” or variety’.30 Not that Schlegel was alone in 
his endeavours. Schopenhauer’s doctrine also entertained 
the two concepts, the ‘will’ and its ‘representation’ as 
he saw fit to call them, and sought, like Schlegel, to 
reconcile the ‘“absolute unity”’ of nature’s will with 
its ‘infinite variety’ by much the same means. And those 
means proved, in both examples, reductive in the extreme.  
 
III. TWO IMPEDIMENTS 
 
To that end, Schlegel and Schopenhauer induced, as it 
were, two prominent ‘impediments’. To say something to 
the effect that they were ‘afflicted’ with them would 
indubitably encourage the mistaken impression that they, 
the ‘impediments’, acted in a detrimental way. They 
almost certainly blunted the percipient and intellectual 
focus of their respective schemes, but that rather 
suited, even facilitated their unifying aims. 
 
The ‘impediments’, as I have called them, afforded the 
equally shrewd figures a number of extremely beneficial 
allowances; they can hardly be said, not by any stretch 
of the imagination, to have constituted an ‘affliction’ 
taking into account their primary objective. And that, to 
clarify matters, was to unify all that was disparate by 
means of a single mantle, be it poetic or philosophic. 
 
Schlegel and Schopenhauer exploited, most prominently of 
30 Hans Eichner, ‘Friedrich Schlegel’ (1970 p. 77). 
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all, a certain visual impediment; it was akin to a 
chronic ‘presbyopic’ condition that acted to soften the 
sharp divisions between one thing and another to such an 
extent that everything settled in an indeterminate and, 
in the example of Schopenhauer’s scheme, particularly 
noxious haze. ‘The romanticists’, as John C. Blankenagel 
wrote some decades ago in a nonetheless perceptive essay, 
‘The Dominant Characteristics of German Romanticism’ 
(1940), ‘were concerned less with a clear, visible world 
than with unfathomed depths, the unconscious, boundless 
emotions, and longing’.31  
 
The ‘condition’, to take an earlier example, made it 
extremely difficult, if not impossible to distinguish 
Schlegel’s ‘plants’ from the Clerk’s ‘stars’; they were 
regarded within such an enormous, opaque cloud that it 
effectively obliterated difference altogether. The 
‘plants’ and ‘stars’ may well have been expressions of a 
single principle, but whatever alliance they were said to 
have was certainly not of a visual or somatic variety. 
 
‘“Romance”’, turning once again to the painter, Wyndham 
Lewis, ‘is what is unusual, not normal, mysterious, not 
visible, perhaps not susceptible at all of visual 
treatment’.32 While their visual ‘impediment’ proved 
enormously efficacious in a theoretical sense – it 
allowed Schlegel and Schopenhauer, as we will hear, to 
talk of the world’s ‘unity’, it took a brazen liberty 
with all things of singular standing. Not least of all 
the individual subject, whose identity, as I intend to 
explain, was plunged, head first, into a gigantic and 
dispersonating common pool.  
31 John C. Blankenagel, ‘The Dominant Characteristics of German 
Romanticism’ (1940 p. 6). 
32 Wyndham Lewis, ‘Time and Western Man’ (1927 p. 23). 
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Neither Schlegel nor Schopenhauer appeared to value the 
subject, the individual person, in a singular sense, but 
a collective one that attributed an enormous amount of 
importance to what was often obliquely described as his 
‘inner-nature’. The term did not describe a coalescence 
of minds; it did not, to prevent you from drawing an 
abrupt and mistaken impression, appertain to the 
intellect at all, but an ‘unconscious’ power of nature - 
a completely unknown quantity, whose scope was said to 
exceed all known bounds. 
 
Secondly, Schlegel and Schopenhauer lapsed, at times, 
into something that, for all intent and purposes, 
resembled an ‘aphasic’ state. This particular 
‘impediment’, marked by convenient spells of 
obmutescence, proved just as beneficial as their impaired 
state of vision. Having identified an aphonic force of 
nature as their touchstone, Schlegel and Schopenhauer 
made it all too easy if, for whatever reason, they found 
themselves wanting in some respect or other, to roll out 
its lolling tongue for corroboration. It allowed them to 
excuse themselves on account of their reticent ‘muse’ 
whose ways, ultimately, remained a mystery. 
 
Both writers absolved themselves, as I intend to argue, 
from intellectual scrutiny through their beneficial  
‘courtship’ with nature. It was an extremely advantageous 
alliance to have at hand if one wished, as they did, to 
unite all worldly phenomena by means of its lowest common 
denominator: an unintelligible, invisible and infinite 
principle. As a direct result, it made it tremendously 
difficult to bring either of them to task, intellectually 
speaking, as the point of unity between nature and their 
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respective subjects was neither appreciable nor readily 
understood. The basis of their schemes was certainly 
profound, but remained indiscernible to both the 
intellect and naked eye. 
 
To have aligned, from its inception, the ‘sacred 
mysteries of nature and poetry’ was, to his credit, an 
ingenious stratagem on Schlegel’s part and an enormously 
beneficial ‘encumbrance’ for him to have had at hand.33  
 
Not that Schopenhauer was any less culpable. His doctrine 
of nature’s will, coming nearly twenty years after 
Schlegel’s romantic ‘theory’, also capitalised, to no 
less an extent, on its fundamental unintelligibility. ‘We 
are plunged’, as Schopenhauer surmised, ‘into a sea of 
riddles and incomprehensibilities and have no thorough 
and direct knowledge and understanding of either things 
or ourselves’.34 
 
While the joint force of their ‘presbyopic’ and ‘aphasic’ 
‘impediments’ approximated, to some degree, the 
meretricious ‘riches’ of nature and afforded Schlegel and 
Schopenhauer a fanciful ‘luxury’ (for their theories were 
now as large and insensible as ‘she’), it engendered a 
certain snobbishness, contempt even, towards things that 
were neither universal, infinite nor, as I recently said, 
readily apparent to either the intellect or eye. ‘Only in 
relation to the infinite’, as Schlegel haughtily claimed, 
‘is there meaning and purpose; whatever lacks such a 
relation is absolutely meaningless and pointless’.35 Their 
33 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 55). 
34 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘On the Will in Nature’ (1836 / 1992 p. 110). 
35 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Lucinde and the Fragments’ (1797 - 1799 / 
1971 p. 241). 
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supercilious attitude to all that was finite was most 
apparent of all in their estimation and evaluation of the 
individual subject. 
 
The question of romanticism was not, as I suggested in 
one of the opening paragraphs, strictly a 
‘lexicographical concern’. If one takes into account 
Schlegel’s poetic aim - to harmonise everything in nature 
by means of an arcane, delitescent principle - it threw, 
from the beginning, the customary distinctions between 
one thing and another into doubt. Not to say the basis, 
nor indeed objective of the critic’s consanguineous 
scheme was any more certain. Schlegel’s inceptive 
‘theory’ raises, if nothing else, a number of far wider 
philosophical problems which, as I will proceed to 
explain, are most keenly ‘felt’ in an ontological sense. 
 
Schlegel’s individual subject, the ‘romantic poet’, was 
not only implicated, but constituted the focus of his 
monistic scheme. ‘Indeed’, turning to Schlegel, ‘there is 
and never has been for us humans any other object or 
source of activity and joy but that one poem of the 
godhead of the earth, of which we, too, are part and 
flower’.36 ‘Aren’t there individuals’, as Schlegel asked 
elsewhere, ‘who contain within themselves whole systems 
of individuals?’.37 Schopenhauer was by no means an 
exception: ‘Every individual, every human apparition and 
its course of life’, as he wrote in ‘The World as Will 
and Representation’ (1818), ‘is only one more short dream 
of the endless spirit of nature’.38  
36 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 54). 
37 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Lucinde and the Fragments’ (1797 – 1799 / 
1971 p. 196). 
38 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. I 
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Neither Schlegel nor Schopenhauer appeared to value the 
subject on account of his singularity, bodily or 
otherwise, but by virtue of his commonality. That which 
they prized was a deep seated and somewhat unpleasant 
sounding limaceous quality, his ‘inmost’ nature, their 
respective subjects were said to share with one and all. 
In a certain respect, it afforded all people an 
incredible luxury, if one happens to consider flailing 
about in an anonymous, gigantic ‘primeval’ pool a 
luxurious prospect. In another, it reduced them to a 
coagulated mass, that is to say, their most rudimentary 
state. Schlegel called it, as we already know, the 
‘unconscious’ while Schopenhauer described it, perhaps 
more faithfully, as the ‘root point of existence’.39  
 
All that that was infinite, impersonal and insensate took 
precedence over that which was finite, definitive and 
personal. In prioritising one set of qualities over 
another, Schlegel and Schopenhauer widened the parameters 
of a thoroughly unappealing communal pool and opened its 
turbid waters to ‘all’. The latter with considerably more 
gusto than the former; Schlegel, as we will hear in the 
following chapter, could not bring himself to permit any 
more than a favoured few. 
 
If the monistic association between ‘one and all’ was 
secured by such crude and general ties what possible 
value could it be said to have had? It could hardly be 
described as the most intellectually rewarding of 
associations if, as seemed likely, it was motivated by 
the prospect of ‘gaining’ the ‘meretricious riches’, as I 
(1818 / 1966 p. 322). 
39 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 /  1966 p. 325). 
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described them, of a grandiose, if insensate vision of 
nature (presuming one is that way inclined and suitably 
impressed by big and vacuous things).40 What cost, one may 
well ask, did Schlegel and Schopenhauer’s fervid desire 
for unification exact? 
 
It is my contention that the individual subject - the 
‘corporeal man with hide and hair’ as a certain writer 
described him, came out of the association most poorly of 
all.41  
 
IV. THE GROUNDS OF THE PRESENT STUDY 
 
Allow me take this opportunity to narrow the scope a 
little in an effort to clarify my own particular interest 
in the subject. I should start by making it absolutely 
clear that I do not, not even remotely, share Dupuis and 
Cotonet’s desire to ‘define’ romanticism. It is 
impossible or, at any rate, improbable given its 
favourable predisposition towards all that was 
‘universal’, ‘infinite’ and ‘insensible’. I have no 
intention, if it is not already too late in the day, to 
follow in their particular footsteps. 
 
To define romanticism and, at the same time, satisfy the 
exacting standards of a Dupuis or a Cotonet almost 
certainly exceeds my ability. Not that I particularly 
identify or, for that matter, agree with Schlegel, de 
Musset’s effusive Clerk or Arthur Schopenhauer, but I 
recognise, if not always appreciate, their desire to 
transgress customary bounds. 
 
40 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 53). 
41 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 28). 
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In one respect, the present study has taken a great deal 
of heart from Schlegel’s romantic vision, at least in its 
preliminary stages. The critic aspired to unite all 
literary forms whether they were poetic, philosophic, 
dramatic or prosaic; nor, to Schlegel’s further credit, 
did the passage of time engender any particular reverence 
for ‘movements’ and the like.  
 
Schlegel wished to break down all borderlines, generic, 
chronological or otherwise, between one form and another. 
They were all expressions of the ‘world spirit’ and the 
‘world spirit’ was indivisible. ‘Everything 
interpenetrates everything else’, Schlegel suggested, 
‘and everywhere there is one and the same spirit, only 
expressed differently’.42 Schlegel’s aim was, in a 
literary sense, extremely admirable even if it spiraled 
out of control and eventually got the better of him. 
 
The present thesis is best described as a thematic and 
interpretative study. While my aspirations are rather 
more modest, to put it mildly, than Schlegel’s the thesis 
can be said, in a literary sense, to work towards a 
similar objective. I intend to draw from various sources, 
regardless of their origination, not for the sake of 
anything as arcane or grandiose as the ‘world spirit’, 
but in the hope of presenting a more rounded picture, 
simply speaking, of the particular ‘problem’ at hand. 
 
‘It is the right of a new age’, as René Wellek made a 
point of saying in ‘Concepts of Criticism’ (1963), ‘to 
look for its own ancestors and even to pull passages out 
of their context’.43 In one sense, Wellek describes 
42 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry’ (1968 p. 82). 
43 René Wellek, ‘The Concept of Romanticism in Literary History’ 
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something of the ‘interpretative allowances’ I have 
granted myself. While I am eager to identify, not only 
‘ancestors’, but progeny, as it were, of Schlegel and 
Schopenhauer’s legacy, I am reluctant to ‘pull passages’ 
completely out of ‘context’, even if it amounts, in 
certain instances, to a thematic interpretation of the 
term (most obvious of all in my various references to 
works of ‘fiction’ which proffer, in my opinion, certain 
‘pictorial’ benefits which, as I hope, aid 
understanding). 
 
I will refer, from time to time, to a disparate 
collection of writers, many of whom, as I said, are 
novelists - not because I wish to satisfy a gratuitous 
personal whim, but in an effort to emphasise the extent 
to which a problem, emanating from their respective 
schemes, has exceeded not only the bounds of their times, 
but also the circle of discussion that ordinarily 
accompanies a critique of Schlegel and Schopenhauer’s 
work. The ‘problem’, as I have called it, is not confined 
to one area of thought nor, for that matter, one period 
of time; it has troubled philosophers, novelists, 
painters and poets alike regardless, to put it very 
simply, of their actual date of birth or ‘intellectual 
allegiance’ they may, in certain cases, be said to have 
had. 
 
I believe it is insightful to ‘emphasize’, as you may 
remember Henri Peyre saying a little earlier, ‘certain 
characteristics’ in an effort, not only to identify a 
notable motif of romanticism, but trace its, I hesitate 
to say ‘evolution’, but change of emphasis in the work of 
three writers, two of whom I have already mentioned - 
collected in ‘Concepts of Criticism’ (1963 p. 158). 
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namely Friedrich Schlegel (1772 – 1829) and Arthur 
Schopenhauer (1788 - 1860), but also another whose name, 
until now, has remained undisclosed; his name, rather 
penname, was Max Stirner (1806 / 1856).44  
 
I intend, with this aspiration in mind, to follow, not 
strictly a ‘characteristic’ per se, but a figure, that of 
the individual subject. The said writers - Schlegel, 
Schopenhauer and Stirner have certainly made the present 
task somewhat easier than it might otherwise have been as 
each of their theses revolved, to no less an extent, 
around a central ‘figure’. Schlegel’s subject was, as I 
have already mentioned, the ‘romantic poet’, Schopenhauer 
called his, rather misleadingly in light of his 
questionable judgment, the ‘subject of knowledge’ and 
Stirner, objecting to the all too general tone of the 
term ‘man’ saw fit, betraying, at the same time, 
something of his particular weakness for things of a more 
determinate and contrary standing, to name his subject 
the ‘un-man’. 
 
The three figures attributed an equally privileged 
position, within each of their schemes, to the individual 
subject. Their understanding of ‘individuality’, though 
varying wildly in emphasis, was of fundamental importance 
to Schlegel, Schopenhauer and Stirner alike. The subject 
was, in all three examples, the linchpin and key to their 
work.  
 
‘It is individuality’, turning immediately to Schlegel, 
‘which is the original and eternal within man’.45 
Schopenhauer was similarly emphatic: ‘Man carries the 
44 Henri Peyre, ‘What Is Romanticism?’ (1977 p. 42). 
45 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 155). 
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ultimate fundamental secrets within himself, and this 
fact is accessible to him in the most immediate way. Here 
only, therefore, can he hope to find the key to the 
riddle of the world, and obtain a clue to the inner 
nature of all things’.46 On another page of the same 
volume, we hear Schopenhauer say: ‘nature has her centre 
in every individual for each one is the entire will’.47 
And the importance Stirner attributed to his own 
individuality was no less ardently expressed: ‘I too 
cannot get out of my skin, but have my law in my whole 
nature, in myself’.48 
 
All three writers may well have attributed a similarly 
supreme value to the individual subject, but none of them 
would have agreed as to what actually constituted his 
‘real’ nature; nevertheless, it was something they all 
sought to identify in an attempt to substantiate their 
broader claims. 
 
‘Starting with the romantics’, as Henri Peyre wrote in 
another of his books, ‘Literature and Sincerity’ (1963), 
‘man set himself up, in literature, as the measure of all 
things’.49 ‘The self’, he wrote a page or two before, ‘was 
the ultimate reality for all the romantics, from which 
all else radiated’.50 We hear, if we turn to Wyndham 
Lewis’ insightful, amusingly opinionated and largely 
neglected philosophical work - ‘Time and Western Man’ 
(1927), a similar sentiment: ‘For our only terra firma in 
46 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 179. 
47 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 599). 
48 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 146). 
49 Henri Peyre, ‘Literature and Sincerity’ (1963 p. 120). 
50 Henri Peyre, ‘Literature and Sincerity’ (1963 p. 118). 
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a boiling and shifting world is, after all, our “self”’.51 
Quickly turning to H. G. Schenk’s ‘The Mind of the 
European Romantics’ (1966), we hear, once again, much the 
same sort of thing. ‘When all ideas and ideals were once 
again in the melting pot’, Schenk wrote, ‘it was not 
unnatural that the individual self might seem to be the 
only firm anchor’.52  
 
While Peyre’s estimation of the subject’s ascendant 
position in the work Schlegel, Schopenhauer and Stirner 
certainly rings true, the ‘self’ of which he confidently 
spoke, along with Lewis and Schenk, was by no means an 
agreed or certain idea among them. Quite the opposite, in 
fact. The ‘ultimate reality’, as Peyre described it, was 
not something that was necessarily agreed upon among the 
romantics. If, for instance, we turn to Max Stirner, we 
hear him tell us in one ear: ‘only the un-man is a real 
man’;53 while, in the other, we hear Schopenhauer tell us 
something entirely different: the ‘will alone is real’.54 
It was an opinion he reiterated on another page of the 
same work: ‘the will is what is real and essential in 
man’.55 As for Schlegel, he believed: ‘Man is Nature 
creatively looking back at itself’.56 
 
The ‘question of self’, for want of a better expression, 
was highly contentious and very much open to debate. 
 
Stirner, Schlegel and Schopenhauer all claimed to have 
51 Wyndham Lewis, ‘Time and Western Man’ (1927 p. 5).  
52 H. G. Schenk, ‘The Mind of the European Romantics’ (1966 p. 50). 
53 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 159). 
54 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 500). 
55 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 215).  
56 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Lucinde and the Fragments’ (1797 - 1799 / 
1971 p. 243). 
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discovered the subject’s ‘true’ nature; for the former, 
it had an entirely physical, if creaky standing of its 
own that came to its abrupt and almost hysterical 
conclusion at the tips of his fingers and toes; while 
Schopenhauer and Schlegel described, overlooking the 
divergent question of its temperament, an elemental, 
imperishable and collective force of nature that was said 
to lurk about ‘within’ the subject as indeed it lurked 
about ‘within’ everything else. ‘What presents and 
maintains the phenomenon of the world’, as Schopenhauer 
wrote, ‘is the will that also lives and strives in every 
individual’.57 If one turns to Schlegel, one hears: ‘no 
man is merely man, but that at the same time he can and 
should be genuinely and truly all mankind. Therefore, man 
in reaching out time and again beyond himself to seek and 
find the complement of his innermost being in the depths 
of another’.58  
 
While Schlegel and Schopenhauer attributed an exorbitant 
amount of importance to the subject’s ‘inner-nature’ -  a 
reputedly ‘infinite’ quality that, to reiterate the 
point, extended well beyond the outer extremities of his 
own person into the world at large, Stirner valued that 
which was finite: his bodily presence and personality. 
The ‘ultimate reality’, as Stirner saw it, assumed a 
wildly distorted image of its own bearer – the ‘Stirner 
personality’ itself; whereas Schopenhauer firmly believed 
it represented an underlying, all encompassing ‘essence’ 
of nature. The same was true of Schlegel; he also talked, 
as we have heard, of ‘individuality’ as an ‘eternal’ 
quality found, somewhere or other, ‘within’ the ‘romantic 
57 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘Parerga and Paralipomena’, Vol. II (1851 / 
1974 p. 218). 
58 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 54). 
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poet’ and nature alike.59  
 
Stirner’s ontology certainly did not, like Schlegel or 
Schopenhauer’s, extend, as I suggested, beyond the cuffs 
of his sleeves or the tips of his shoes or, for that 
matter, beyond the span of his lifetime, but it 
harboured, nonetheless, a similar intent. All three 
writers aspired to distend the subject’s ‘true’ nature, 
wherever it was to be found, to an incalculable, all 
encompassing degree. 
 
Opinions were wholly divided as to what exactly 
constituted the aforementioned ‘self’; nor, to take 
particular issue with Lewis and Schenk, can it be said to 
have constituted any sort of ‘terra firma’ or firmly 
secured ‘anchor’. The very question of ‘self’ was, as I 
hope to illustrate, hotly contested and a matter of the 
utmost uncertainty. None more so, I propose, than its 
presentation in the work of Friedrich Schlegel and Arthur 
Schopenhauer and portrayal in Max Stirner’s highly 
theatrical work of political philosophy, ‘The Ego and its 
Own’ (1844).  
 
The question of ‘self’ was certainly not restricted to 
the three writers I have mentioned; it appeared to 
unsettle and perplex a great many of them, not all of 
whom, to repeat the point, were affiliated, in a 
chronological sense, with romanticism. While the problems 
associated with pinpointing the basis of ‘selfhood’ or 
individuality endured well beyond the handful of decades 
allotted to romanticism, its emergence can almost 
certainly be traced back, I believe, to a number of 
59 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 155). 
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writers associated with it. 
 
V. A CAPTIVE OF THE EARTH? 
 
Let me take this opportunity to take a general, if rather 
cursory ‘survey’, so to speak, among a handful of 
‘romantic’ writers not only to set a ‘common scene’, but 
to substantiate my broader claim that the question of 
‘self’ represented a ‘notable motif’ of the literary 
form. It certainly proved a significant stumbling block 
for a greater majority of them. 
 
One question, above all others, comes to the fore; it 
was, I believe, the quintessential question Schlegel, 
Schopenhauer and Stirner all hoped to answer in the 
course of their respective studies. 
 
In the first and earliest reference, taken from the first 
volume of Étienne Pivert de Sénancour’s desultory but, at 
times, brilliantly piercing collection of letters, 
‘Obermann’ (1803), we read the following: ‘I questioned 
my problematic destiny, my storm-tossed heart, and that 
incomprehensible Nature which includes all things and yet 
seems not to include the satisfaction of my desires. What 
in the world am I? said I to myself’.60  
 
Turning quickly to the second point of reference, taken 
from Gérard de Nerval’s ‘Aurelia’ (1855), we hear him 
ask: ‘“How can I have existed so long”, I said to myself, 
“outside Nature and without identifying myself with her? 
Everything lives, everything acts, everything 
corresponds; the magnetic rays emanating from myself or 
60 Étienne Pivert de Sénancour, ‘Obermann’, Vol. I (1804 / 1910 p. 22 
– 23).  
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others traverse unimpeded the infinite chain of created 
things; it is a transparent network which covers the 
world, and its fine threads communicate from one another 
to the planets and the stars. I am now a captive on the 
earth, but I converse with the choiring stars, who share 
my joys and sorrows!”’.61 
 
Thirdly, I would like to draw your attention to an entry 
from Henri-Frédéric Amiel’s posthumous ‘Journal’ (1882). 
On the 12th September, 1870 Amiel asked: ‘At bottom, what 
is individual life? A variation of an eternal theme – to 
be born, to live, to feel, to hope, to love, to suffer, 
to weep, to die. Some would add to these, to grow rich, 
to think, to conquer; but in fact, whatever frantic 
efforts one may make, however one may strain and excite 
oneself, one can but cause a greater or slighter 
undulation in the line of one’s destiny. Supposing a man 
renders the series of fundamental phenomena a little more 
evident to others or a little more distinct to himself, 
what does it matter? The whole is still nothing but a 
fluttering of the infinitely little, the insignificant 
repetition of an invariable theme. In truth, whether the 
individual exists or no, the difference is so absolutely 
imperceptible in the whole of things that every complaint 
and every desire is ridiculous. Humanity in its entirety 
is but a flash in the duration of the planet, and the 
planet may return to the gaseous state without the sun’s 
feeling it even for a second. The individual is the 
infinitesimal of nothing’.62  
 
With the fourth point of reference, taken from an 
unaccountably neglected novel - at least in translation, 
61 Gérard de Nerval, ‘Aurelia’ (1855 / 1931 p. 51 - 52). 
62 Henri-Frédéric Amiel, ‘Amiel’s Journal. The Journal Intime of 
Henri-Frédéric Amiel’ (1882 / 1901 p. 176). 
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Alfred de Musset’s ‘The Confession of a Child of the 
Century’ (1836), an equal, in its way, of both 
Lermontov’s far more well known ‘A Hero of Our Times’ 
(1840) and Constant’s ‘Adolphe’ (1816), we read: ‘And we, 
poor nameless dreams, pale and sorrowful apparitions, 
helpless ephemera, we who are animated by the breath of a 
second, in order that death may exist, we exhaust 
ourselves with fatigue in order to prove that we are 
living for a purpose, and that something indefinable is 
stirring within us’.63 Earlier in the novel, Octave – de 
Musset’s protagonist asks: ‘Are we that which is in 
us?’.64  
 
Turning to my fifth point of reference -  Maurice de 
Guérin’s ‘Journal’ (1842), a work which has all the 
piercing introspection of Sénancour near his best and all 
the floweriness of Friedrich Schlegel at his worst, we 
read: ‘this immense circulation of life within the broad 
bosom of Nature, this life which springs from an 
invisible fountain and swells the veins of the universe; 
obeying its upward impulse, it rises from kingdom to 
kingdom, ever becoming purer and nobler, to beat at last 
in the heart of man, the centre in to which flow form all 
sides its thousand currents’.65 A little later in his 
‘Journal’, de Guérin asked: ‘Of what, then, is my nature 
made?’.66  
 
The preceding array of citations present a characteristic 
and quite typical picture not the least bit unfamiliar to 
63 Alfred de Musset, ‘The Confession of a Child of the Century’ (1836 
/ 1908 p. 330 - 331). 
64 Alfred de Musset, ‘The Confession of a Child of the Century’ (1836 
/ 1908 p. 34). 
65 Maurice de Guérin, ‘The Journal of Maurice de Guérin’ (1842 / 1891 
p. 78). 
66 Maurice de Guérin, ‘The Journal of Maurice de Guérin’ (1842 / 1891 
p. 167). 
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those acquainted with the work of Schlegel or 
Schopenhauer. The subject finds himself at the foot of a 
vast and intimidating backdrop, a temporal and spatial 
setting adopted by many romantic writers - not just 
Schlegel and Schopenhauer - which makes it incredibly 
difficult for him, the subject, to establish anything, 
not least of all his own person, with any degree of 
clarity. Everything around him conspires to imperil the 
effort from the start. The subject is engulfed by his 
looming surroundings and made to feel, by comparison, 
very small indeed. 
 
The subject is clearly implicated, so he imagined, in an 
‘infinite’ scheme, but the basis of the association 
leaves him puzzled and bewildered. Maurice de Guérin 
spoke very much in the same tones as Sénancour and de 
Musset; he talked of the ‘immense circulation of life 
within the broad bosom of Nature’; it sprang from an 
‘invisible fountain’ and swelled in ‘the veins of the 
universe’ as it did ‘in the heart of man’.67 Whatever 
affiliation the subject was said to have with nature, it 
mystified de Guérin as greatly as it had mystified 
Sénancour and de Musset before him. Faced with such 
immense and ‘incomprehensible’ forces what value could 
Octave, Obermann, de Guérin and Amiel imagine themselves 
to have had? Compared to nature, the individual came a 
poor second best: he seemed, by comparison, diminutive, 
ephemeral and insignificant - an ‘infinitesimal of 
nothing’, as Amiel described him.68  
 
We see, in the flurry of references, not only something 
67 Maurice de Guérin, ‘The Journal of Maurice de Guérin’ (1842 / 1891 
p. 78). 
68 Henri-Frédéric Amiel, ‘Amiel’s Journal. The Journal Intime of 
Henri-Frédéric Amiel’ (1882 / 1901 p. 176). 
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of Schlegel and Schopenhauer’s bleary eyed impediment, 
their ‘presbyopia’ as I referred to it, which tended to 
favour sweeping, whole scale views (most recognisable in 
Amiel’s contribution when he said: ‘In truth, whether the 
individual exists or no, the difference is so absolutely 
imperceptible in the whole of things’), but also the 
onset of their ‘aphasic’ complaint.69 If we turn, in this 
respect, to Alfred de Musset, he certainly appeared to 
struggle to account for the ‘indefinable something’, as 
he described it, which apparently crept about inside of 
him. 
 
The question of self was not so easily answered. It posed 
a formidable problem.  
 
‘What in the world am I? said I to myself’, as Obermann 
asked.70 Alfred de Musset seemed more than a little 
uncertain too: ‘Are we that which is in us?’, as Octave 
wondered.71 ‘At bottom’, as Amiel also asked, ‘what is 
individual life?’.72 Not that Gérard de Nerval was any 
sort of exception. ‘“How can I have existed so long”’, as 
he asked himself, ‘“outside Nature and without 
identifying myself with her?”’.73 And Maurice de Guérin 
was equally perplexed: ‘Of what, then, is my nature 
made?’.74  
 
The ‘problem’ raises a number of pressing questions 
69 Henri-Frédéric Amiel, ‘Amiel’s Journal. The Journal Intime of 
Henri-Frédéric Amiel’ (1882 / 1901 p. 176). 
70 Étienne Pivert de Sénancour, ‘Obermann’, Vol. I (1804 / 1910 p. 22 
– 23). 
71 Alfred de Musset, ‘The Confession of a Child of the Century’ (1836 
/ 1908 p. 34). 
72 Henri-Frédéric Amiel, ‘Amiel’s Journal. The Journal Intime of 
Henri-Frédéric Amiel’ (1882 / 1901 p. 176). 
73 Gérard de Nerval, ‘Aurelia’ (1855 / 1931 p. 51 - 52). 
74 Maurice de Guérin, ‘The Journal of Maurice de Guérin’ (1842 / 1891 
p. 167). 
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concerning the identity and presence of the individual 
subject within a ‘universal’ scheme. What, for instance, 
constituted his ‘inmost’ nature? Was it, as Octave 
suggested, a ghostly sounding ‘something’ which ‘stirred 
within’ him and, presumably, continues to ‘stir’ within 
us?75 Are we, then, to believe it was a means by which the 
subject, the individual person, was able to ‘commune’, in 
spirit, with an infinite and ‘incomprehensible’ force of 
nature? What advantage did it afford him? And what, more 
importantly, was its capital drawback? The emphasis 
placed on his delitescent nature, collective in scope and 
elementary in character, appeared to do a tremendous 
disservice to his singular standing as an individual 
person. What of his more definitive qualities, his 
personality for example? Was it not simply effaced for 
the sake of universal ideal, a conjectural and purely 
theoretical concern? 
 
Let us now turn to the way in which Schlegel, 
Schopenhauer and Stirner all addressed the question of 
the subject’s ‘true’ nature. 
 
VI. THE THREE SUBJECTS 
 
The subject begins his life, as far as the present thesis 
is concerned, in Schlegel’s ‘theory’ of ‘romantic poetry’ 
as a willing, an all too willing, participant in a 
monistic scheme: Schlegel’s syrupy and discerning idea of 
nature itself. ‘Whoever doesn’t come to know Nature 
through love’, as Schlegel credulously imagined, ‘will 
never come to know her’.76 
75 Alfred de Musset, ‘The Confession of a Child of the Century’ (1836 
/ 1908 p. 330 - 331). 
76 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Lucinde and the Fragments’ (1797 - 1799 / 
1971 p. 250). 
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Schlegel aligned his romantic subject with a poeticised 
and thoroughly fastidious idea of nature. It was, if only 
on the surface, a happy and uncomplicated union; it 
allowed, the ‘romantic poet’, Schlegel’s subject, to feel 
at one with its ‘infinite riches’ as he shared, deep 
down, its poetic and, in his particular example, 
perfumatory ‘essence’: ‘Beautiful is what reminds us of 
nature and thereby stimulates a sense of the infinite 
fullness of life’.77 Schlegel’s affiliation with nature, 
selective though it was, was not, given his predilection 
for monumental and irresolvable ideas, without its 
rewards. 
 
Irrespective of the heavy costs the association 
eventually came to exact, Schlegel’s subject did not 
object in the least to submerging his identity with that 
of nature as it distended his compass to an inordinate 
degree. He was, so to speak, the sun, the moon and the 
stars; his ‘inmost nature’, if nothing else about him, 
was on a ‘universal’ scale. ‘No man is merely man’, 
Schlegel imagined, ‘but that at the same time he can and 
should be genuinely and truly all mankind. Therefore, man 
in reaching out time and again beyond himself to seek and 
find the complement of his innermost being in the depths 
of another, is certain to return ever to himself’.78  
 
Whether Schlegel’s subject had any intention of ever 
snapping out his reverie and returning to himself, as it 
were, was questionable to say the very least; 
nevertheless, he certainly found his ‘compliment’ in 
77 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Lucinde and the Fragments’ (1797 - 1799 / 
1971 p. 248). 
78 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 54). 
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nature and the affinity, hospitable and generous as it 
was, filled Schlegel’s verdant poet with ‘joy’. 
 
In the third chapter, the subject finds himself, to his 
immediate horror, in Schopenhauer’s doctrine. It was a 
far cry from Schlegel’s ‘theory’. While his affinity with 
nature was no less as strong – for he too was implicated, 
in the most elemental sense, in its universal scheme, the 
prospect was not nearly so enticing. 
 
Schopenhauer’s subject also had the ‘luxury’, 
significantly less alluring in his case, of extending his 
reach to an untold degree; he was no less privy to the 
nature of the world for he also happened to share its 
inherent character, the will. ‘The inner being itself’, 
turning to Schopenhauer, ‘is present whole and undivided 
in everything in nature, in every living being’.79 Unlike 
the ‘romantic poet’, the association struck him as 
anything but complimentary. 
 
Schopenhauer’s ‘subject of knowledge’ did not regard 
nature, as Schlegel was particularly prone to do, as a 
mawkish collection of fragrant flowers, but a fierce, 
deranged force which conspired, in the most predatory 
sense, to derail, if not devour him. ‘How frightful is 
this nature to which we belong!’, as the philosopher 
exclaimed.80 
 
Schopenhauer’s subject, having arrived at his terrifying 
conclusion early on, thought it best, initially, to stick 
his head in the sand and drown out, as best he could, its 
79 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 129). 
80 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 356).  
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disturbing caterwaul with a wall of violins, flutes and 
bassoons. When his first attempt at reprieve - his 
immersion in music, came up short, as all temporary 
solutions inevitably tend to do, Schopenhauer’s subject 
set about the rather more conclusive task of dissolving 
the relationship for good to secure his personal escape 
from nature’s imbecilic will, no matter the cost. 
 
Stirner’s ‘un-man’, quite unlike Schlegel or 
Schopenhauer’s subject, did not, from the very start, 
wish to be implicated in any sort of monistic or communal 
scheme whether it happened to emanate from nature or not. 
‘To be a man’, as Stirner stated, ‘is not to realize the 
ideal of man, but to present oneself, the individual’.81  
 
Stirner’s objections, as we will hear in the fourth 
chapter, went several steps further down the line than 
those expressed by Schopenhauer’s ‘subject of knowledge’. 
The ‘un-man’ cut all ties, with immediate effect, with 
every groupish affiliation that came his way. The 
‘individual’, as Stirner maintained, ‘is the 
irreconcilable enemy of every generality’.82  
 
The ‘un-man’ did not seek his compliment anywhere as it 
simply could not be found. To identify himself with an 
extrinsic or adventitious idea would, ultimately, be to 
his detriment; at best, it would only reflect a paltry 
portion of himself, his ‘inner-spirit’, while the larger, 
far more significant remainder – all that which Stirner 
considered exclusively his ‘own’, would be left 
unaccounted for and entirely ignored: ‘In all this the 
individual, the individual man, is regarded as refuse, 
81 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 163). 
82 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 192). 
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and on the other hand the general man, “man”, is 
honoured’.83  
 
The ‘un-man’ demanded, above all else, to be regarded as 
a tangible, autonomous and ‘unique’ figure not a ghostly 
‘spirit’ or generalised ‘essence’ (for that would do an 
unpardonable injustice to his demonstrable bodily 
presence and irrepressible ‘personality’). Stirner’s 
subject did not care in the least for whatever ‘higher’ 
reward his ‘inmost-nature’ was reputed to afford him. 
‘Stirner does not deny the existence of external causes’, 
as John Welsh recently said, ‘He denies their legitimacy. 
He rejects the claim that external causes are the 
absolute source of meaning and allegiance. He rejects the 
claim that external causes are everything and that the 
person is nothing’.84 
 
Stirner did not wish to convene in spirit with anything 
if it was to the exclusion of his body and personality. 
It would be tantamount to wishing himself away and 
effacing his own identity for little more than the sake 
of an extraneous idea. ‘If somebody told you you were 
altogether spirit’, as a chest beating Stirner wrote, 
‘you would take hold of your body and not believe him, 
but answer: “I have a spirit, no doubt, but do not exist 
only as spirit, but as a man with a body”’.85  
 
Not to say that Stirner did not entertain a similarly 
heightened belief in himself, in his own individuality, 
but unlike Schlegel’s ‘romantic poet’ or Schopenhauer’s 
‘subject of knowledge’, it did not sneak about ‘within’ 
83 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 182). 
84 John F. Welsh, ‘Max Stirner’s Dialectical Egoism. A New 
Interpretation’ (2010 p. 48).  
85 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 31). 
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him as a benign or, in Schopenhauer’s example, malign 
monoousious entity. Stirner’s ‘might’ was anything but 
vicarious; it did not emanate from a second hand source - 
nature in their case, but the corporeal, if overblown and 
clownish caricature Max Stirner intently made of himself. 
‘He is himself’, as Amiel might well have said of 
Stirner’s ‘un-man’, ‘principle, motive, and end of his 
own destiny; he is himself, and that is enough for him’.86 
 
It is possible, I believe, to ‘chart’ the subject’s 
‘passage’ from his initial entry into the flowery and 
seemingly endless maze of Schlegel’s romantic ‘theory’ 
through to the sinister underbelly of Schopenhauer’s 
doctrine and eventually onto the rickety funfair of ‘The 
Ego and Its Own’ and see him emerge from the study an 
altogether different figure, in a sense, from the one who 
entered it.  
 
‘Within the modern period’, turning to Peter McCormick, 
‘the shift from one ideology to another can be explained 
as a new answer given to the same basic question’.87 The 
question, need I say, was put most accurately of all by 
Maurice de Guérin when he asked: ‘Of what, then, is my 
nature made?’.88 Stirner’s ‘answer’, compared to that of 
Schlegel or Schopenhauer, was certainly novel, but not so 
novel that it could be considered entirely ‘new’. Certain 
traits, for all Stirner’s novel innovations, remained. 
 
In moving from one subject to another one is able to 
detect, not only his gradual transformation from willing 
86 Henri-Frédéric Amiel, ‘Amiel’s Journal. The Journal Intime of 
Henri-Frédéric Amiel’ (1882 / 1901 p. 17). 
87 Peter McCormick, ‘The Concept of Self in Political Thought’ (1979 
p. 691).   
88 Maurice de Guérin, ‘The Journal of Maurice de Guérin’ (1842 / 1891 
p. 167). 
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monist (Schlegel’s naive, snooty poet) to unwilling 
monist (Schopenhauer’s jumpy and understandably desperate 
subject) to confirmed somatist (the recalcitrant figure 
of the ‘un-man’), but his growing hostility to universal 
schemes and eventual ‘liberation’ from them. Not only 
does one become aware of the subject’s emerging 
independence, but also an incremental sense of his 
presence and physical statue. By the end of the thesis, 
the subject - Stirner’s ‘un-man’ has apparently 
‘liberated’ himself from all the universal, brooding 
powers ‘within’ and, without any outside ‘help’ or 
influence but his own, taken his first few unsteady 
steps. 
 
Stirner may well have successfully clambered out of one 
gigantic ‘sea of riddles’, to use one of Schopenhauer’s 
expressions, but he found himself, all the same, in a no 
less troubling, if rather more exclusive paddling pool of 
his own.89 The source of Stirner’s ‘might’ - his ‘ego’, 
unlike Schopenhauer’s will, may well have been an 
entirely autogeneous quality, but it remained, for all 
his insistence to the contrary, equally arcane. ‘The 
tangled web’, as Herman Broch might have said of the 
subject’s gradual transformation from universal essence 
to egocentric personality, ‘unraveled itself only to be 
knotted in fresh tangles’.90  
 
The three figures placed, as I have said, a similarly 
supreme value on the subject’s nature; however, the three 
would certainly not have agreed, as their schemes 
unfolded, as to where it actually resided. ‘To say that 
89 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘On the Will in Nature’ (1836 / 1992 p. 110). 
90 Herman Broch, ‘The Sleepwalkers’ (1932 / 1996 p. 105). Translated 
by Edwin & Willa Muir. Vintage International, NYC.  
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the Romantic “believed” in the individual’, turning to 
Margaret Scalan’s perceptive essay, ‘Le Vide Intérieur: 
Self and Consciousness in René, Atala, and Adolphe’ 
(1979), ‘is to say what almost everyone will accept and 
no one understand, for the attitude toward the self is by 
no means consistent among the Romantics’.91 
 
Stirner’s would have flatly rejected Schlegel’s 
ontological account as well as its far more detailed 
exposition in Schopenhauer’s doctrine of will on the 
grounds that it was not only fallacious, but escapist in 
the extreme. They claimed to speak of one thing, the 
individual subject, when, in actual fact, they were 
speaking of his ‘inner-nature’ which did not exclusively 
belong to him or anyone else for that matter: it was 
anything but individual. The subject’s personal 
qualities, on the other hand, hardly aroused, in an 
affirmative sense, their curiousity or interest, rather, 
it was ‘his’ universality which captivated them. 
 
If one tries to imagine what their ‘subdermal’ subject 
might look like, one gets little, if any, sense of his 
terrenity. This, I believe, is exactly where the pinch 
can begin to be felt. It is only with the greatest 
difficulty that one is able to picture either Schlegel’s 
‘romantic poet’ or Schopenhauer’s ‘subject of knowledge’ 
at all. Even then, one is faced with a phantasmagorical, 
featureless ‘everyman’ not a distinct, corporeal or 
remotely recognisable person. 
 
Schlegel and Schopenhauer afforded significantly less 
value to the subject’s integumental qualities, his ‘hide 
91 Margarat Scalan, ‘Le Vide Intérieur: Self and Consciousness in 
René, Atala, and Adolphe’ (1979 / 80 p. 30).  
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and hair’ as Stirner has already described them.92 
Schlegel and Schopenhauer’s emphasis on all that was 
diffuse and visceral ‘within’ expressed, as Stirner would 
no doubt have said, ‘a concern for man as man, not as a 
person’.93 
 
The kernel outweighs the shell: this, to put it very 
simply indeed, is what one learns from Schlegel and 
Schopenhauer. It may well, of course, be true, but only 
in the sense that the Venus de Milo is also, 
petrologically speaking, little more than a glorified 
lump of stone. The subject was supremely important to 
Schlegel and Schopenhauer, not because he was a distinct, 
singular figure, but on account of his amorphous make up: 
his ‘inner-nature’. It was a stark, quite featureless 
generality which reflected little, if a single definitive 
thing, of the subject concerned. It was common to one and 
all. Not that Stirner’s objections to Schlegel and 
Schopenhauer would have ended there. 
 
Their ontology pointed in a single direction and that 
direction led towards a tight exit through which the pair 
hoped to escape themselves, albeit for different reasons, 
to reconvene with all that was universal. Schlegel and 
Schopenhauer wished to leave the ‘limitations’ of their 
individuality behind for the greener, less involved 
pastures of ‘life’ eternal. 
 
‘Rid, rid!’, Stirner shouted, ‘That is its battlecry, get 
rid even of yourselves’.94 That which Schlegel and 
Schopenhauer valued was nothing more than a very handy 
92 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 28). 
93 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 28). 
94 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 148). 
 48 
                                                 
means of escape that allegedly ‘liberated’ their 
respective subjects from all that was bodily, earthly and 
essentially his in favour of whatever ‘riches’ were to be 
found elsewhere. 
 
To put it another way, it is somewhat like the owner of a 
grand house talking very fondly, not strictly about the 
house itself – its upkeep, after all, is a continuous 
burden of brightly coloured bills, but a little known 
backdoor which opens out, if you happen to be ‘lucky’ 
enough to find it, onto an extensive and unimaginably 
peaceful communal garden. That which Schlegel and 
Schopenhauer coveted was precisely the backdoor through 
which they could eventually bid farewell to all that was 
individual, personal and taxing. ‘Longing and hope 
everywhere, and nothing but these’, as Stirner would 
indubitably have said. ‘For me, call it romanticism’.95 
Their ontology was extremely escapist in character.  
 
Regardless of the broad stretch of water one might 
mistakenly assume would separate the monism of Schlegel 
and Schopenhauer on one bank and the solipsism of Stirner 
on the other, there are a series of stepping stones 
which, I believe, enable one to successfully cross from 
one side of the water to the other. 
 
All three writers sought to distend the subject’s 
‘nature’, as they saw it, to encompass all things, albeit 
by an entirely different set of means. Schlegel and 
Schopenhauer emphasised the universal scope of his 
‘inner-nature’, while Stirner glorified his finite and 
particular standing as a ‘transitory’ and egocentric 
‘personality’. 
95 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 284). 
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It is as well to bear in mind, at this particular point, 
two observant remarks made by the bullish English critic, 
T. E. Hulme in the course of his posthumous collection of 
essays, ‘Speculations’ (1924), ‘Here is the root of all 
romanticism’, Hulme wrote, ‘that man, the individual, is 
an infinite reservoir of possibilities’.96 Turning to the 
second of Hulme’s contributions, one reads: ‘The romantic 
because he thinks man infinite must always be talking 
about the infinite; and as there is always the bitter 
contrast between what you think you ought to be able to 
do and what man actually can, it always tends, in its 
later stages at any rate, to be gloomy’.97  
 
While Hulme’s second observation certainly holds true of 
Arthur Schopenhauer’s cheerless doctrine, the same cannot 
so readily be said of his ebullient counterpart, Max 
Stirner nor, for that matter, the odorous critic, 
Friedrich Schlegel. 
 
It is my contention that all three writers believed, to 
no less a degree, in the ‘infinite’ wealth of the 
individual subject. ‘For Schlegel’, turning, firstly, to 
the critic Elizabeth Millán-Zaibert for corroboration, 
‘self-consciousness is consciousness of an I, which is 
not a solitary cogito or Ich, but rather part of an 
organic unity, part of something greater’.98 ‘Man’s 
essence’, as Dennis Rasmussen said of Schopenhauer’s 
doctrine, ‘consists in his insatiable desire or will 
96 T. E. Hulme, ‘Romanticism and Classicism’ collected in 
‘Speculations’ (1924 / 1977 p. 116). 
97 T. E. Hulme, ‘Romanticism and Classicism’ collected in 
‘Speculations’ (1924 / 1977 p. 119). 
98 Elizabeth Millán-Zaibert, ‘Friedrich Schlegel and the Emergence of 
Romantic Philosophy’ (2007 p. 149). 
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which can never in time reach a final goal’.99 ‘Stirner is 
the philosopher’, as another critic, John Carroll, 
claimed, ‘of the infinitely possible. The egoist is the 
limitless one; his freedom lies in his ability to create 
his own infinity’.100  
 
Schlegel, Schopenhauer and Stirner similarly believed the 
subject had, in one sense or another, a legitimate claim 
to an all determining quality of colossal proportions. 
Hulme was almost certainly correct when he said it 
presented them all with a certain difficulty -  a ‘bitter 
contrast’ as he described it. It rested on their ability, 
not only to identify and successfully communicate 
whatever heightened ideas they entertained, but reconcile 
it with the subject’s physical standing. 
 
The ‘problem’ certainly left the otherwise loquacious Max 
Stirner at something of a loss for words. Schopenhauer 
also struggled and, ultimately failed, to satisfactorily 
explain the catastrophic conflict between his physical 
state and universal ‘inner-nature’, nature’s inimical 
will. Not to say that Schlegel’s ‘preliminary account’, 
establishing, as he did, the ever receding parameters of 
‘romantic poetry’, was the least bit successful either. 
It, Schlegel’s account, was not only over perfumed, but 
compromised by a bewildering use of language and giddying 
fixation with ‘time eternal’ that left one, in the end, 
nauseated (the overpowering floral smell), disorientated 
(the spin of time) and none the wiser (the critic’s 
macrology). 
 
99 Dennis Rasmussen, ‘Immortality: Revolt Against Being’ (1975 p. 68). 
100 John Carroll, ‘Break-Out from the Crystal Palace. The anarcho-
psychological critique: Stirner, Nietzsche, Dostoevsky’ ((1974 p. 
41). 
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Dupuis and Cotonet, to cast your mind back to that 
particular pair, could certainly count themselves 
fortunate they decided to call it a day and abandon their 
investigations before they got tangled up in the 
ontological questions surrounding the romantic subject. 
The dilettantes would have faced a problem that even 
Schlegel, Schopenhauer and Stirner all failed, in the 
end, to adequately explain. 
 
VII. THE INSUFFERABLE LOVEGOAT 
 
Max Stirner was not your customary sort of romantic. All 
the same, to say something to that effect implies, that 
he was, to some extent or other, a sort of a romantic. 
Given my largely contrary estimation of Max Stirner’s 
affinity with Schlegel and Schopenhauer it may well 
strike you as odd, if not thoroughly foolish that I 
consider him any sort of romantic writer at all. 
 
There is a temptation, as I suggested, to draw very sharp 
line between Max Stirner, on one side, and Schlegel, 
Schopenhauer and, without wishing to sound the least bit 
dismissive, a number of ‘secondary writers’ on the other. 
Not to say the temptation, on the face of it, is entirely 
unwarranted. 
 
Stirner did not share, for instance, their monistic 
leanings; his particular outlook was not clouded by the 
thick somnambulistic fog that hung over their work; he 
was also insusceptible to the mesmeric influence of ‘time 
eternal’ nor, for that matter, were his percipient 
faculties ‘impaired’ by anything resembling a 
‘presbyopic’ condition. If anything, the opposite was 
true. Stirner’s focus was entirely ‘myopic’ and centred 
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on one thing: the ostensible, brawny and obstreperous 
presence of the ‘un-man’. 
 
Nevertheless, I am still inclined, whether it is 
foolhardy or not, to consider Max Stirner a romantic 
writer, if a rather uncommon one. I say ‘uncommon’ as 
Stirner had an extremely ambivalent and intricate 
relationship with a number of writers, especially 
Schopenhauer, and a rather antagonistic one with 
romanticism as a whole. If, I should immediately add, his 
ideas are considered in an interpretative and thematic 
sense. What makes Stirner a ‘sort of romantic’, as I 
inelegantly put it, is that he tried to confront, as best 
he could, a question that had not, in his opinion, been 
answered ingenuously by religion, political philosophy 
or, as I intend to argue, a handful of romantic writers 
who preceded him. 
 
‘Clearly, the one thing that unifies men in a given age’, 
as Jacques Barzun wrote in ‘Romanticism and the Modern 
Ego’ (1943), ‘is not their individual philosophies but 
the dominant problem that these philosophies are designed 
to solve’.101 And following Barzun’s lead, the fundamental 
problem Stirner, along with Schlegel and Schopenhauer, 
sought to address, if not exactly ‘solve’ was the very 
nature of the subject’s ‘real’ identity. 
 
Max Stirner’s intemperate treatise on the prevailing 
political and religious beliefs of his time can 
legitimately be directed towards wider philosophical 
targets. Stirner had little patience for the 
dispersonating nature of all ideological forms including 
101 Jacques Barzun, ‘Romanticism and the Modern Ego’ (1943 p. 21 - 
22). 
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those, as I intend to argue, clouded by the generalising 
tendencies associated with romanticism.  
 
Stirner wished to stamp out the unsavoury and unwelcome 
intrusion of all dogmas, abstractions and speculative 
theories in intellectual life. ‘And so’, as Pierre Drieu 
la Rochelle wrote in ‘Will o’ the Wisp’ (1931), ‘for want 
of being held together by ideas, the world was so 
inconsistent that it offered him no means of support. 
Only solid things kept their form for him’.102 Fixed ideas 
not only inhibited one’s ability to think freely, but 
exerted a despotic hold over one’s attention and, 
ultimately, warped one’s immediate concerns: ‘with so 
many a man’, as Stirner maintained, ‘a thought becomes a 
“maxim”, whereby he himself is made prisoner to it, so 
that it is not he that has the maxim, but rather it that 
has him’.103 ‘As psychologically concrete entities’, as 
Lawrence Stepelevich, in his study of Stirner, 
corroborated, ‘these abstract essences such as Man, God, 
Mankind, State, Truth, stand over and against the 
individual thinker in their hostile demands to be served 
and worshipped. In short, they have turned against their 
creator’.104  
 
Stirner’s fears certainly proved to be well founded as 
far as Arthur Schopenhauer was concerned. The philosopher 
came under the increasing pressure of his own doctrine - 
it ganged up on him in the most conspiratorial of ways; 
so much so that by the time it reached its conclusion, it 
was very much in the driving seat and had almost 
102 Pierre Drieu la Rochelle, ‘Will o’ the Wisp’ (1931 / 1966 p. 23). 
Translated by Martin Robinson. Calder and Boyars, London. 
103 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 59). 
104 Lawrence S. Stepelevich, ‘The Revival of Max Stirner’ (1974 p. 326 
- 327). 
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completely done away with him altogether. Schopenhauer’s 
concerns, at the final stage of his scheme, were almost 
entirely theoretical and rang very hollowly indeed.  
 
Schopenhauer’s doctrine ‘afforded’ his subject one last 
throw of the dice and the ‘opportunity’ certainly had one 
incentive in its favour – his expectant release from the 
philosopher’s horrendous theory even if it was cut short, 
as we will eventually hear, by one major, unavoidable 
drawback. 
 
All zealots - regardless of their particular 
philosophical, social or religious cause, no longer 
openly expressed their personal opinion nor particularly 
cared to hear one expressed in return. The said ‘types’, 
Stirner believed, far preferred to have ‘conceptual’ 
goals on their hands and work, instead, towards the 
fulfillment of those. Whatever end they purported to 
champion, no matter what it happened to be, invariably 
proved antithetical - in complete contrast to their 
normal ‘day to day’ affairs. Their concerns, so Stirner 
believed, were purely conceptual.  
 
If we turn briefly to the novelist, Robert Musil, we may 
begin to develop a clearer impression of exactly the type 
of hypocrisy Stirner sought to confront in ‘The Ego and 
Its Own’. Directing your attention to a page of Musil’s 
stupendous novel – ‘The Man Without Qualities’ (1930 – 43 
/ 1997), we come across the following passage: 
‘Feuermaul, for instance, was an industrious young man 
who could be quite unpleasant in the struggle for his own 
advantage, but his lovegoat happened to be “man”, and the 
moment he thought of man in general, there was no 
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restraining his unsatisfied benevolence’.105  
 
Musil perfectly expressed the impersonal and remote 
concern, to take the example at hand, of 
‘humanitarianism’ - the ‘human religion’ as Stirner 
derisively referred to it.106 Stirner would, I believe, 
have said Feuermaul’s attitude was quite typical of the 
kind of hypocrisy that was rife, if not pandemic in the 
intellectual world at large. In this instance, it was 
exemplified by Feuermaul’s unbridled ‘theoretical’ 
concern for ‘man’ which was not, in practice, matched by 
the young man’s ‘unpleasant’ behaviour towards them. ‘To 
be sure, he cares for each individual’, as Stirner would 
have sarcastically said of Feuermaul, ‘but only because 
he wants to see his beloved ideal realized everywhere’.107  
 
Feuermaul’s ‘lovegoat’, as Musil put it, was not ‘man the 
person’, but, in stark contrast, ‘man the non person’: 
the collective ‘idea’ of mankind. And the difference 
between the two, Stirner believed, was not only 
appreciable, but irreconcilable. The former did not 
pertain, in any meaningful way, to the latter. A vast 
gulf had come to distinguish ‘man’, the all too general 
term, from the person himself. What had ‘man’ have to do 
with Stirner, after all? What business was it of his? It 
clearly did not concern him, not in personal capacity at 
105 Robert Musil, ‘The Man Without Qualities’ (1930 - 43 / 1997 p. 
1122). 
106 Stirner wrote: ‘The human religion is only the last metamorphosis 
of the Christian religion. For liberalism is a religion because it 
separates my essence from me and sets it above me, because it exalts 
“man” to the same extent as any other religion does its God or idol, 
because it makes what is mine into something otherworldly, because in 
general it makes what it is mine, out of my qualities and my 
property, something alien - namely, an “essence”; in short, because 
it sets me beneath man, and thereby creates for me a “vocation”’. See 
‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 158). 
107 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 72). 
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any rate. 
 
It was almost certainly a lofty and magnanimous sounding 
cause to champion, but Feuermaul’s ‘humanitarianism’ did 
not extend, not with anything like the same degree of 
strength, to a single human example. Stirner would 
certainly have had the measure of Feuermaul: ‘He asks 
very little about your private opinions and private 
follies, if only he can espy “man” in you’.108 And, as 
Stirner would have added, ‘he loves in you not Hans, of 
whom he knows nothing and wants to know nothing, but 
man’.109 Feuermaul was not the least bit interested in 
‘Hans’, to coin Stirner’s turn of phrase, but showered 
his untold ‘benevolence’ on an impersonal and 
insubstantial idea: ‘man in general’, as Musil described 
it.110 
 
‘Man’ had gone awry. The term no longer pertained to that 
which was extant or determinate: it was a billowing 
abstraction. ‘Man’, as Stirner believed, ‘is not the 
individual, but man is a thought’.111 He vehemently 
refuted such notions as they debased, as I will explain, 
the individual person. ‘Stirner’s fundamental critique of 
humanism’, as Saul Newman corroborated, ‘shows such 
identities to be mere apparitions or “spooks”; and yet, 
these spooks have a powerful effect on the individual, 
incarcerating him within a discursive prison, reducing 
his difference and uniqueness to abstract, totalizing 
uniformity, and sacrificing his autonomy on the altar of 
Man. That is why the individual must distance himself 
108 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 155). 
109 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 155). 
110 Robert Musil, ‘The Man Without Qualities’ (1930 - 43 / 1997 p. 
1122). 
111 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 292). 
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from Man and Humanity, why he must free himself from 
essence’.112  
 
Who or what, then, was to blame? Stirner firmly believed 
a certain double standard was at play at the heart of 
theoretical thought and the blame lay squarely at the 
feet of none other than theoreticians themselves. If one 
failed to redress the balance, there was a distinct 
danger, if it was not already too late, that 
philosophical thought would, at best, become entirely 
meaningless or, as seemed more likely, take a pernicious 
turn for the worse. 
 
Critics and philosophers alike, with Schlegel and 
Schopenhauer firmly in mind, prioritised the elemental 
‘essence’ of ‘mankind’ rather than any one particular 
figure; it may well have afforded them, in light of its 
universality, a far more profuse topic to wax lyrical 
about, but it did not pertain to the Christopher, the 
Peter or the Paul of them, but the ‘essence’ which 
resided ‘within’ all three of them. ‘When the “higher 
essence” is mutually recognized’, as John Welsh astutely 
said, ‘persons do not actually recognize, respect, or 
revere each other, but only the “higher essence” that is 
hidden within them’.113 
 
But, of course, ‘man’ was anything but individual, 
Stirner believed; it was a hollow abstraction which 
pertained to everyone in general rather than anyone in 
particular. It ‘merely’ described the least definitive of 
common qualities: man’s all too precious ‘spirit’. But 
112 Saul Newman, ‘Introduction: Re-encountering Stirner’s Ghosts’ 
collected in ‘Max Stirner’ (2011 p. 8). 
113 John F. Welsh, ‘Max Stirner’s Dialectical Egoism. A New 
Interpretation’ (2010 p. 64).  
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neither Christopher, Peter nor Paul could say, in all 
honesty, that it belonged solely to them yet, when the 
discussion turned to ‘man’, the ‘spirit’ – their 
collective spirit, was hallmarked as their all 
determining factor. The turn of events heralded a 
‘splitting in two’ of the subject and the individual 
person - the Christopher, the Peter or the Paul - came 
off the worse for wear. Each one of them, without 
exception, came a poor second to ‘their’ universal 
essence. 
 
To compound matters, the expression was bandied around 
philosophical circles as if it were something else 
entirely. The intelligentsia saw fit, in their perverse 
wisdom, to accord supreme value not to man - the person, 
but to ‘man’ - the pithy idea. There was, to reiterate 
the point, a sharp and discernible difference between the 
one and the other. And, as far as Stirner was able to 
tell, what was fit for the goose was not necessarily fit 
for the gander. ‘When one looks to the bottom of 
anything, searches out its essence’, as Stirner 
complained, ‘one often discovers something quite other 
than what it seems to be; honeyed speech and a lying 
heart, pompous words and beggarly thoughts’.114 
 
Philosophers and critics were perfectly entitled and at 
complete liberty to talk of ‘man’ in absolutely any terms 
they pleased as it no longer pertained to ‘the human’ but 
the ‘essence’, an all encompassing idea. And if something 
is so very far removed from one’s immediate concerns or 
personal interests, one is naturally more inclined to say 
and do whatever one wants with it; ‘man’ has so little 
bearing on oneself, after all. They not only neglected 
114 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 40). 
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the very thing they purported to prioritise, man himself, 
but managed, along the way, to undermine and diminish his 
very standing in favour of a theoretical principle. The 
resultant effect of this upturn of events acted to set 
‘man the idea’ against the person himself. The 
demonstrable lost out to the intangible, the singular to 
the universal and, ultimately, the person to an idea.  
 
The theoretical ‘interest’ for ‘man’ was not only 
misleading, but injurious in the extreme.  
 
The subject and the ‘essence’ were evidently not the same 
thing and the latter, to Stirner’s amazement, took 
precedence over the former by virtue, if nothing else,  
of its universality. It was, to put it simply, a far 
‘larger’ concern. Doctrinal lines ruled the roost, not 
man’s so called ‘concern’ for ‘man’, not as a person at 
any rate. ‘The one-sided search for essences’, to refer 
to Welsh once again, ‘subverts the realm of everyday life 
in which persons have a “this worldly”, material reality 
and interact with each other as physical beings. In 
everyday life, individuals are not essences to each 
other. But, in modernist systems of knowledge, they have 
a “higher essence” hidden within’.115 The same was true, I 
believe, not only of ‘modernist systems of knowledge’, 
but also the epistemology, not to mention the ontology of 
romanticism itself. Both of which pandered to paraphrase 
Welsh, the ‘higher essence within’. It was most evident 
of all, as we will hear, in Schopenhauer’s doctrine of 
nature’s unpleasant and nonsensical will.   
 
The ‘intellectual’, preoccupied as it was by remote and 
115 John F. Welsh, ‘Max Stirner’s Dialectical Egoism. A New 
Interpretation’ (2010 p. 64).  
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impersonal concerns, clearly did not coincide with the 
‘private’. Stirner not only exposed the vast gulf and 
glaring contradiction between the one and the other, but 
came up, as we will hear, with a novel way to counteract 
his reservations and fears. If ‘man’ did not appertain to 
that which was readily apparent, singular or definitive 
then Stirner would celebrate its opposite, hence his ‘un-
manning’ of man, as it were. 
 
If one takes an interpretative liberty with Stirner’s 
censorious political critique it may also, I believe, be 
said to encompass a critique of romanticism; it too can 
legitimately be counted among the fields of thought 
Stirner objected to. More especially, if one considers 
the spectral, impersonal and thoroughly escapist 
character of Schlegel and Schopenhauer’s ontology.  
 
Stirner’s ideas are not the least bit dogmatic and lend 
themselves rather well to the interpretive allowances I 
intend to make of them. Stirner’s work cannot only be 
understood in this light, but it is, I believe, extremely 
informing to do so. 
 
Having said that, I ought to declare, before continuing, 
that what I fancy to be ‘Stirner’s critique of 
romanticism’, as you might have already guessed by my use 
of the term ‘interpretive allowances’, is, if taken 
literally, no such thing at all. Stirner hardly mentions 
‘romanticism’ (the word crops up twice in passing and he 
refers to it, on both occasions, in a dismissive sense) 
let alone provide a specific critique of it.  
 
In the same breath, there is absolutely no evidence to 
suggest that Stirner was acquainted with the work of 
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Arthur Schopenhauer or Friedrich Schlegel or had even 
heard of them; nor, for that matter, does he make any 
mention of any of the other figures such as Sénancour, 
Amiel and de Musset who will ghost in and out of the 
present thesis. 
 
To subject romanticism to the short tempered and fiery 
polemics of Max Stirner is not, as it may initially seem, 
such a completely foolish or erroneous thing to do. I 
believe aspects of Stirner’s work are invaluable with 
regards to the present study, especially in light of 
Schopenhauer’s doctrine of will. The affirmative tone, to 
take one notable quality of ‘The Ego and Its Own’, 
provides a particularly revealing counterpoint to 
Schopenhauer’s ronunciative scheme. To consider the two 
works, in a comparative sense, can be said to be mutually 
rewarding if one wishes to develop a greater critical 
appreciation of their respective schemes. What makes the 
relationship between the two writers, namely Schopenhauer 
and Stirner, particularly fruitful is that within each of 
their schemes resides a rich critique of one as there is 
of the other.  
 
My own particular interest in Max Stirner is not, as 
usually seems the case, limited to the political 
radicalism of his thought, I am eager to present a more 
‘open’ interpretation of his work. Consequently, I am not 
going to discuss his critique of liberalism or 
Christianity, his influence on libertarianism nor, for 
that matter, am I going to talk about his relationship to 
the theories of Hegel or Marx. This has all been done 
many times before and, in particular instances, very well 
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indeed.116  
 
Stirner’s work of ‘political philosophy’ and I use that 
term a little hesitantly (I believe that the wholly 
idiosyncratic figure had little patience for ‘political 
thought’ just as he had, as I will argue, little patience 
for the universalism associated with the theories of 
Schlegel and Schopenhauer), can be thought of as an 
important and contemporaneous, if largely unheralded 
critique of romanticism. 
 
When one is writing a study of this sort there is, I dare 
say, yet another temptation one is best advised to ignore 
and that is to say something to the effect of ‘by the 
time one gets to Max Stirner in the 1840’s the individual 
subject finally came of age’ or something equally trite 
and meaningless. 
 
I do not wish, with this danger firmly in mind, to 
suggest, not for a single moment, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ 
represented something as significant as a definitive 
‘rupture’ in the way in which the individual subject was 
regarded in literature or philosophy. Even Stirner, who 
was at odds with many of Schlegel and Schopenhauer’s 
principal tendencies, cannot, at the risk of belaboring 
the point, be said to have been entirely free of them 
himself. Stirner’s affinity with romanticism was 
refractory and complex.  
 
Certain leanings, fashions, tendencies - call them what 
you will, do not adhere to red or green lights; they do 
not necessarily stop dead in their tracks or surge 
116 For instance, Saul Newman’s (ed) recent collection of essays, ‘Max 
Stirner’ (2011). 
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forward at convenient periodic junctures. One need only 
look, for instance, at the novels of Hamsun, Hesse or 
Lawrence or, for that matter, take into account the work 
of Bergson, Groddeck or Freud to see the interest in all 
that was visceral did not simply stop with Stirner but 
soldiered on, if you will, well into the following 
century.117 
 
Rather than regard Stirner’s book as a ‘definitive 
breaking point’ that heralded the end of this or 
anticipated the beginning of that, I prefer to regard the 
‘The Ego and Its Own’ as an anomalous, provocatively 
playful, but ultimately flawed work that actively sought 
to break away from all the abstruse, rudimentary forces 
at play ‘within’ the subject to establish his presence in 
a far more substantial and personal light even if,  
as I suggested, it fell someway short of the mark. 
 
Stirner was of the firm opinion that theories and the 
like not only acted to transmogrify the intellectual 
world, but, in a far more immediate and injurious sense, 
the individual himself. ‘Stirner believed’, turning to 
Isaiah Berlin’s ‘Karl Marx. His Life and Environment’ 
(1939) to reiterate the point, ‘that all programmes, 
ideals, theories, are so many artificially built prisons 
for the mind and the spirit, means of curbing the will, 
of concealing from the individual the existence of his 
own infinite creative powers, and that all systems must 
therefore be destroyed, not because they are evil, but 
117 Take Georg Groddeck’s ‘The Book of the It’ (1923) by means of an 
example: ‘I hold the view that man’, as he wrote, ‘is animated by the 
Unknown, that there is within him an “Es,” an “It,” some wondrous 
force which directs both what he himself does, and what happens to 
him. The affirmation “I live” is only conditionally correct, it 
expresses only a small and superficial part of the fundamental 
principle “Man is lived by the It”’ (1923 / 1935 p. 16). C. W. Daniel 
Co, London.  
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because they are systems; only when this has been 
achieved, would man, released from his unnatural fetters, 
become truly master of himself and attain to his full 
stature as a human being’.118 With these fears firmly in 
mind, Stirner deliberately sought to confront the reader, 
not with an abstract set of ideas, but a vociferous, 
irreverent, if somewhat contrived ‘personality’. Not that 
it was unaccompanied. The reader is also confronted with 
an unavoidable, if not always intentionally comic 
‘muscular presence’.  
 
The crudity, certainly in tone, of ‘The Ego and Its Own’ 
belies, to be fair to Stirner, the subtlety and 
forethought that informed, what might otherwise be 
adjudged - and wrongly I believe, to be his inadvertent 
churlishness.  
 
While Schlegel and Schopenhauer envisioned a conceptual 
subject who exemplified their respective schemes, 
Stirner, wary of impersonal abstractions and convoluted 
theories, went about - albeit with mixed success - the 
highly fraught task of personifying his own line of 
argument. ‘I never execute anything human in the 
abstract’, as Stirner warned, ‘but always my own things; 
my human act is diverse from every other human act, and 
only by this diversity is it a real act belonging to 
me’.119 
 
Stirner’s brusque bearing, his churlishness in other 
words, was anything but inadvertent. His very manner was 
itself something of a calculated ploy; it was a means by 
which Stirner ‘stepped in’ to ‘The Ego and Its Own’ and 
118 Isaiah Berlin, ‘Karl Marx. His Life and Environment’ (1939 p. 137 
- 138).  
119 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 161). 
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invested something of himself, caricature or not, within 
its pages in a bold, if contrived, effort to distinguish 
his work from the impersonal and ‘deadening’ schemes he 
berated. 
 
The degree of sophistication - certainly in a stylistic 
sense, at play in Stirner’s robust and boisterous 
egocentric ‘display’ is worthy of greater attention than 
it has been paid in circles beyond those of political 
theory. Even if, to concede something of my point, it is 
all too easy - especially when one’s patience has come 
its end, to forget all about the considered and 
particularly admirable efforts Stirner made on this 
front.  
 
Stirner’s treatise certainly exceeded, if only in design, 
the outline of a conventional theoretical project. ‘The 
Ego and Its Own’ was, if nothing else, a novel and 
uncommon philosophical enterprise.  
 
VIII. NAME CALLING 
 
Stirner’s work is extremely idiosyncratic and it hardly 
comes as much surprise that commentators and critics 
alike have struggled to describe it in an unanimous way. 
 
Stirner has, over the years, been called all sorts of 
strange and, in some cases, particularly nasty names. If 
one turns to one critic, Stirner is apparently a 
‘nihilistic egoist’, if not a complete ‘paranoid 
schizophrenic’,120 while another critic has seen fit to 
call him a ‘weak anarchist’,121 and, in one famous book, 
120 R. W. K. Paterson, ‘The Nihilistic Egoist’ (1971 p. 18). 
121 David Leopold, ‘The State and I: Max Stirner’s Anarchism’ 
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he has even been sarcastically referred to as a 
‘Saint’.122 At the risk of adding another misleading 
nomenclature to the growing list, I cannot help but think 
of Max Stirner as an adolescent. 
 
Again, I do not mean to sound too dismissive when I 
refer, on this occasion, to Stirner as an ‘adolescent’. 
An adolescent is, if one thinks of them in biological 
terms, in a maturescent state and I certainly prefer to 
think of Stirner, primarily, in this light. 
 
The ‘Ego and Its Own’ took, at the risk of contradicting 
myself, something of what can best be described as a 
‘maturescent turn’. It did not, to clarify the point, 
signal the subject’s ‘final coming of age’ (Stirner was, 
I fear, in a prolonged, if not permanent spell of 
adolescence) nor did it herald, in any particularly 
significant sense, an intellectual breakthrough. It 
presented, in itself, an entirely familiar set of 
problems that were, regardless of their change of 
emphasis and innovative stylistic form, no less 
troublesome or explicable. 
 
The one significant developmental aspect of Stirner’s 
work, if one compares it to that of Schlegel and 
Schopenhauer, was that the individual subject, the ‘un-
man’, had suddenly become acutely conscious of his body 
and ‘inimitable’ personality and they were no longer 
qualities he wished to readily forsake.  
 
Any ‘advance’ Stirner made was not, ultimately speaking, 
collected in ‘The New Hegelians. Politics and Philosophy the Hegelian 
School’ (2006 p. 199).  
122 See Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, ‘The German Ideology’ (1845 / 
1932).   
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startlingly insightful; it was an ‘awakening’, of sorts. 
An immediate apprehension of himself as himself rather 
than a universal ‘essence’. It was akin, as I like to 
think of it, to one of those absolutely arbitrary 
pubescent spurts of growth. For the normal teenager, it 
results in the sudden disproportionate appearance of, let 
us say, his feet or hands. Thankfully for him the 
condition is temporary; the rest of his body will, given 
time, catch up with him even if, in the intervening 
period, he has to endure a spell of clumsiness on account 
of his cumberments. 
 
Stirner was somewhat less fortunate. He was pushing forty 
and the rest of his body had yet to catch up with his 
disproportionately large biceps and ‘ego’ (the swaggering 
tone and force of his ‘might’). Stirner’s ‘top heaviness’ 
made him something of a clumsy, unwieldy thinker whose 
footing, to say the very least, was precariously 
balanced. Needless to say, I also happen to consider 
Stirner an ‘adolescent’ for a number of less flattering 
reasons. 
 
Stirner’s manner too often comes across like that of a 
particularly strepitant, irresponsible and boastful 
teenager and like any right minded teenager it is more 
than a little difficult to take everything he says 
without first taking a very deep breath and large pinch 
of salt. There is, as a word of warning, a considerable 
amount of testosterone, muscle-flexing and bluster to be 
found in the pages of ‘The Ego and Its Own’. Half of 
which, if not more, comes across as sounding very 
spurious indeed. ‘The Ego and Its Own’ is an often 
testing work.   
 
 68 
Stirner may well have made a radical and, initially, 
welcome departure from the likes of Schlegel and 
Schopenhauer, but it quickly descended into something of 
a tedious and farcical novelty. ‘It is’, as George 
Santayana said, ‘a bold, frank, and rather tiresome 
protest against the folly of moral idealism, against the 
sacrifice of the individual to any ghostly powers such as 
God, duty, the state, humanity, or society; all of which 
this redoubtable critic called ‘spooks’ and regarded as 
fixed ideas and pathological obsessions’.123 
 
Stirner is a terribly repetitive writer and often takes 
an awfully long time to say the simplest of things. He 
also has an unpleasant tendency to raise his voice and 
shout. On other occasions, he lost his tongue completely 
and lapsed, as I have already mentioned, into a state of 
speechlessness in his inability and frustration to 
articulate the illimitability of his own ‘might’, as he, 
rather unfortunately, saw fit to describe his ‘ego’. I 
say ‘unfortunately’ as he met his end, for all his ‘he-
mannish’ bravado, at the intervention of an insect.  
 
Max Stirner’s work, if you are not familiar with it, is 
like a very loud and colourful firework; it just so 
happens the impression is the first firework of an 
extremely noisy and draining display. 
 
IX. A PAEAN TO THE BODY 
 
‘It would not be an exaggeration’, as John E. Atwell 
believed, ‘to dub Schopenhauer the philosopher of the 
body. To a greater extent than anyone before his time, 
123 George Santayana, ‘The German Mind: A Philosophical Diagnosis’ 
(1968 p. 99). 
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and even since then, he makes the body – that is, one’s 
own body (der eigene Leib) – the primary focus and 
indispensable condition of all philosophical inquiry. If 
required to give a single answer to the philosophizing 
subject’s question, “What am I?” Schopenhauer would 
surely reply, “I am body”, though, he would just as 
surely add, “in more than one way”’.124  
 
Atwell was someway off the mark. Schopenhauer was not, as 
he imagined, the so called ‘philosopher of the body’. The 
subject’s actual body was, in and of itself, of little 
concern to the philosopher; it was an entirely secondary 
matter. It was ‘merely’ a ‘vehicle’ or ‘representation’ 
as Schopenhauer described it – one among a numberless 
array of others, through which nature’s will chose, 
whatever its reason, to exhibit itself.  
 
‘The whole body’, turning to Schopenhauer, ‘is the 
visible expression of the will’.125 ‘The body’, as he made 
absolutely clear elsewhere, ‘is the will itself 
objectively perceived as spatial phenomenon’.126 ‘The 
whole body, including the brain’, if one turns, for a 
second opinion, to a recent critic, ‘is objecthood of the 
will’.127 
 
Given, what can only be described, as his monomaniacal 
obsession with nature’s universal will, Schopenhauer 
could equally be dubbed the ‘philosopher of the ant’, 
124 John E. Atwell, ‘Schopenhauer on the Character of the World’ (1995 
p. 81).  
125 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 403). 
126 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 609). 
127 Christopher Janaway, ‘The real essence of human beings: 
Schopenhauer and the unconscious will’ collected in ‘Thinking the 
Unconscious. Nineteenth-Century German Thought’ (2010 p. 148). 
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‘cat’, ‘mouse’ or any other phenomenal form one can 
possibly call to hand. It hardly mattered. ‘I see that 
everywhere in nature’, if one turns to the third volume 
of the philosopher’s ‘Manuscript Remains’, ‘each 
particular phenomenon is the work of a universal force 
that is active in a thousand similar phenomena’.128 
 
Schopenhauer had absolutely no claim to Atwell’s title. 
He did not champion the body, the subject’s somatic state 
at all; the philosopher, as I will go on to explain in a 
following chapter, was, if anything, its arch enemy. 
‘Finally, if death comes, which breaks up the phenomenon 
of this will’, to convey something of Schopenhauer’s 
complete disregard towards the subject’s physical 
standing, ‘... it is most welcome, and is cheerfully 
accepted as a longed-for deliverance’.129 Schopenhauer did 
not place any intrinsic value on the subject’s 
corporality; it was ‘merely’, as he maintained, an 
illusory ‘phenomenon’ of will and a hindrance at that; it 
was something from which the subject was best 
‘delivered’. Schopenhauer was not, as Atwell fancifully 
imagined, the ‘philosopher of the body’, but nature’s 
incorporeal will. ‘His god (or Will, as he prefers to 
call it)’, as Wyndham Lewis far more insightfully said of 
the philosopher, ‘is a vast, undirected, purposeless 
impulse: not, like us, conscious: but blind, powerful, 
restless and unconscious’.130 
 
Atwell’s title, given the choice between Schlegel, 
Schopenhauer and Stirner, unquestionably belonged to the 
latter. Max Stirner was the only one out of the three who 
128 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘Manuscript Remains’, Vol. 3 (1989 p. 643). 
129 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818/ 1966 p. 382).  
130 Wyndham Lewis, ‘Time and Western Man’ (1927 p. 332).  
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placed any significant value on the subject’s 
determinate, bodily standing. ‘The Ego and its Own’, 
unlike Schopenhauer’s ‘The World as Will and 
Representation’, is an unequivocal paean to the body; it 
was no longer considered a tightly bound circle out of 
which the subject wished to transgress. Its needs were 
neither denied nor renounced, as the will beaten 
Schopenhauer deemed necessary, but celebrated and 
affirmed in strength as well as weakness. 
 
X. CHEST BEATING 
 
Let me now turn your attention, very briefly, to the way 
in which Stirner went about answering the, by now, 
familiar ‘philosophizing subject’s question’, as Atwell 
awkwardly described it.131 Turning to ‘The Ego and Its 
Own’, we read: ‘“What am I?” each of you asks himself. An 
abyss of lawless and unregulated impulses, desires, 
wishes, passions, a chaos without light or guiding 
star!’.132 And, if we refer to an earlier page, we get a 
far clearer impression of the particular way Stirner 
sought to address the aforementioned question: ‘From the 
moment when he catches sight of the light of the world a 
man seeks to find out himself and get hold of himself out 
of its confusion, in which he, with everything else, is 
tossed about in motley mixture’.133  
 
Stirner’s attempt to ‘get hold of himself’ was the very 
thing that can be said to have distinguished him from the 
likes of Schlegel, Schopenhauer, Sénancour and de Musset 
et al. Stirner’s subject, the ‘un-man’, was no longer 
131 John E. Atwell, ‘Schopenhauer on the Character of the World’ (1995 
p. 81).  
132 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 146). 
133 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 13). 
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regarded as a ‘poor nameless dream’ or mere ‘apparition’, 
but a very particular, distinct corporal being.134 ‘By 
bringing the essence into prominence one degrades’, as 
Stirner argued, ‘the hitherto misapprehended appearance 
to a bare semblance, a deception’.135 His response was 
quite unlike the more customary view held by the 
collection of other writers to whom I have referred. The 
‘un-man’ was anything but an illusory or deceptive 
phenomenal form. He alone, as we heard earlier, was 
‘real’. 
 
If, to underline the point, we turn to page 244 of the 
second volume of Sénancour’s ‘Obermann’ we read, ‘I am 
like a walking shadow on the earth, which sees but can 
grasp nothing’.136 Turning to Amiel’s ‘Journal’ we come 
across a similar sentiment: ‘He does not even believe his 
body his own; he feels the vital whirlwind passing 
through him, - lent to him, as it were, for a moment, in 
order that he may perceive the cosmic vibrations... He is 
fluid as a phantom that we see but cannot grasp; he 
resembles a man, as the manes of Achilles or the shade of 
Creusa resembled the living. Without having died, I am a 
ghost. Other men are dreams to me, and I am a dream to 
them’.137 ‘He was not’, as Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder, 
an associate of Schlegel, wrote, ‘capable of stretching 
out his arm toward any object or reaching for anything 
with his hand; he couldn’t take a step with his feet like 
other people. A trembling anguish flew through all his 
nerves whenever he wanted to try to interrupt the giddy 
134 Alfred de Musset, ‘The Confession of a Child of the Century’ (1836 
/ 1908 p. 330 - 331). 
135 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 40). 
136 Étienne Pivert de Sénancour, ‘Obermann’, Vol. II (1804 / 1910 p. 
244). 
137 Henri-Frédéric Amiel, ‘Amiel’s Journal. The Journal Intime of 
Henri-Frédéric Amiel’ (1882 / 1901 p. 279). 
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whirlwind even a single time’.138  
 
All this ghoulish sort of talk would have been anathema 
to Max Stirner: ‘to the extent of my powers I let a bit 
of daylight fall in on the nocturnal spookery’.139 He did 
not wish to relinquish himself so cheaply and readily nor 
for so little return. Stirner had, quite unlike Schlegel, 
Schopenhauer, Sénancour, Amiel and Wackenroder, a far 
firmer grip of his bodily self: ‘it is only through the 
“flesh” that I can break the tyranny of mind; for it is 
only when a man hears his flesh along with the rest of 
him that he hears himself wholly’.140 Stirner’s response 
was certainly a significant departure from the way in 
which Schlegel and Schopenhauer evaluated the individual 
subject. 
 
Stirner was not the least bit eager to commune with 
‘everything else’, but struggled, in contrast, to 
extricate himself from the ‘motley mixture’ in which he, 
along with everything else, was apparently ‘tossed 
about’.141 Rather than align the ‘un-man’ with a murky 
common pot, Stirner aspired to distinguish him from it. 
Then, and only then, could he be regarded, so he 
imagined, as a truly autonomous, liberated and singular 
figure: ‘I am not an ego along with other egos, but the 
sole ego: I am unique. Hence my wants too are unique, and 
my deeds; in short, everything about me is unique’.142  
 
Schopenhauer’s doctrine also worked its way, somewhat 
unexpectedly – in light of the philosopher’s lowly 
138 Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder, ‘A Wondrous Oriental Tale of a Naked 
Saint’ collected in ‘Confessions and Fantasies’ (17** / 1971 p. 176). 
139 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 263). 
140 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 60). 
141 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 13). 
142 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 318 - 319). 
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estimation of his subject’s volitional powers - towards a 
similar point; in the concluding phase of his doctrine, 
Schopenhauer’s ‘subject of knowledge’ was no longer in a 
fit state to be ‘tossed about’ by any force of nature, 
let alone an actively malevolent one, and sought, as a 
measure of last resort, to abscond from its clutches in a 
final bid to be left alone and in peace from its desires.  
‘Those who restrain desire’, as William Blake 
perceptively said, ‘do so because theirs is weak enough 
to be restrained’.143 And having been ‘softened up’, as it 
were, by the philosopher’s arduous and traumatic scheme, 
the ‘subject of knowledge’ was only too ‘happy’, as it 
reached its end, to ‘restrain’ the desirous force of 
nature, the will, by absolutely any means, if, as 
Schopenhauer promised, it liberated him from all its 
imbecilic and wanton urges. 
 
Overlooking the catastrophic measures Schopenhauer’s 
raddled subject took to ‘liberate’ himself from nature’s 
will, the climax of the philosopher’s doctrine took 
something of a ‘Stirnerian twist’ of its own. For all of 
the philosopher’s dismissive and derisory talk of 
individuality, the culmination of his doctrine hinged, 
unquestionably, on the sole word - albeit ronunciative 
word, of his beleaguered ‘subject of knowledge’. But 
unlike Stirner, Schopenhauer arrived at this point by 
handing his subject a white flag and knowing full well, 
given his abhorrent and otherwise inescapable account, he 
would not have to be asked twice to wave it if, as the 
philosopher promised, it secured salvation from his 
doctrine of nature’s will. To put it more simply, 
Schopenhauer, unlike Stirner, came to more or less the 
143 William Blake, ‘The Marriage of Heaven and Hell’ (1825 – 27 / 1927 
p. 5).  
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same sort of point - and came very close indeed, by 
denying rather than affirming his inherent nature. This, 
however, remains a matter for a later stage of the study.  
 
Stirner, to return your attention to ‘The Ego and Its 
Own’, was absolutely assured that he was his own 
property; what he ‘saw’ he could also ‘grasp’. ‘Not until 
I am certain of myself’, as Stirner wrote, ‘and no longer 
seeking for myself, am I really my property’.144 The ‘un-
man’ was apparently in full possession of himself. He was 
now ‘the owner’ of all his qualities whether they were 
spiritual, conceptual or corporeal.145 As a ‘whole’ man, 
rather than a bit part figure, he was neither answerable, 
nor played second fiddle to his ‘inmost nature’. It was 
‘merely’ one of his qualities and hardly, for all that, 
the most important among them.  
 
‘Before any sort of political liberation from the 
external forms that oppress us can take place’, as Saul 
Newman said of Stirner, ‘we must first dispense with the 
internalized forms of domination and subjectification 
whereby we cling to fixed, established identities, and 
where we are induced to seek within ourselves a stable 
essence in which we see a reflection of universal 
Humanity and the God-like image of Man’.146 The ‘un-man’ 
was ‘his own property’ and shaped entirely by his own 
hand. ‘I am I’, as Stirner wrote stumbling, as he was 
often prone to do, over his own tongue, ‘only by this, 
that I make myself; that it is not another who makes me, 
but I must be my own work’.147  
144 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 283). 
145 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. ***). 
146 Saul Newman, ‘Introduction: Re-encountering Stirner’s Ghosts’ 
collected in ‘Max Stirner’ (2011 p. 8). 
147 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 207). 
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Whatever incalculable scope the ‘un-man’ was said to 
possess was found far closer to home; it existed in the 
flesh, in the present, in his effusive personalism – it 
was not shrouded by an extensive cloud or obscured by the 
wish wash of ‘time eternal’, but existed visibly and 
vocally as the subject, the ‘un-man’ himself. The Swedish 
novelist, Hjalmar Söderberg, perfectly expressed the 
reasoning behind Max Stirner’s demonstrative performance 
when, in ‘Doctor Glas’ (1905), he wrote: ‘I’ve learned to 
feel and understand that my body is me. There is no joy, 
no sorrow, no life at all, except through it’.148  
 
What Stirner prized neither led to, nor was found in, a 
point outside himself. It did not exist as a monistic 
‘essence’ nor an expectant, unrealisable ideal, but was 
conveyed, in its entirety, by his singular person. The 
subject must defend, rather than relinquish, the grounds 
of his individuality. ‘Stirner’s egoism springs’, as 
Lawrence Stepelevich also believed, ‘from a conscious and 
total atheism, with this playful indifference and apathy 
to any higher essence being the prerequisite for 
encountering one’s own being, one’s uniqueness’.149 
‘Mankind’ no longer, to paraphrase Schlegel, required a 
sense for ‘something beyond mankind’ as that ‘something’ 
was, so Stirner believed, in his immediate possession.150  
 
If there was a single lesson to be learnt from ‘The Ego 
and Its Own’ it was something along the lines of the 
following: the individual subject must, first and 
148 Hjalmar Söderberg, ‘Doctor Glas’ (1905 / 1963 p. 115).  
149 Lawrence S. Stepelevich, ‘The Revival of Max Stirner’ (1974 p. 
326). 
150 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 154). 
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foremost, be of his own making. ‘Yourself must be your 
own caste’, as Wyndham Lewis similarly beseeched readers 
in one of his early essays.151 The subject must not 
surrender himself so willingly to abstract ideas or 
general notions, however tantalising the prospect may 
sound on paper. The desire to universalise oneself is, 
ultimately, a desire for dissolution; it spells the end, 
to put it simply, of oneself. One would be better 
advised, if Stirner was to be believed, not to hanker 
after ideals, least of all universal ideals, as they 
invariably worked to one’s disadvantage, if not complete 
downfall. 
 
Stirner implored the reader to refute all universal 
notions and pursue his or her own ends for their own 
good, whatever that might entail; they must begin from 
themselves with the clear intention of ending up with 
themselves and not lose sight, in the process, of their 
primary and immediate concern: their own preservation, 
affirmation and pleasure. ‘Stirner’s psychological 
approach’, if one turns to John Carroll, ‘takes the 
individual psyche as the only coherent and meaningful 
unit of analysis... Thus the external world is 
differentiated according to whether it generates ego-
enhancing or ego-degrading forces’.152 ‘The ideals of 
religion, philosophy, and science are not’, as John Welsh 
corroborated, ‘uplifting and do not inspire persons to be 
more than they are, happier than they are, smarter than 
they are, and more powerful than they are. The contrary 
is true, they browbeat persons into aspiring to be less 
151 Wyndham Lewis, ‘Imaginary Letters’, Little Review (July, 1917 p. 
4). 
152 John Carroll, ‘Break-Out from the Crystal Palace. The anarcho-
psychological critique: Stirner, Nietzsche, Dostoevsky’ ((1974 p. 
22). 
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than they are. But the unique one resists the modernist 
reduction of persons to abstract categories’.153 And, to 
repeat the point, the ‘unique one’ – Stirner’s ‘un-man’ 
would have objected, no less vehemently and, for that 
matter, on exactly the same grounds, I believe, to 
Schlegel and Schopenhauer alike as their schemes were 
neither ‘uplifting’ nor ‘ego enhancing’, to paraphrase 
Welsh and Carroll, but worked, instead, to the ultimate 
undoing, dissolution - destruction even, of their 
respective subjects. 
 
The subject must, if he does not relish the prospect of 
being hounded out himself, go about the task of 
establishing and preserving his presence in the face of 
such hostile, ‘outside’ forces. Accordingly, Stirner 
implored people, all people, to abandon their foolish and 
misplaced mania for universalism and begin to recognise 
and affirm their singular and exclusively private selves 
as the wellspring of all conceivable potential. ‘Owness’, 
as Stirner wrote, ‘calls you back to yourselves, it says 
“come to yourself!”’.154  
 
Stirner’s call for ‘owness’ constituted a ‘wake up call’ 
- a call intended to bring the intellectual world to its 
senses and, ultimately, the individual subject back to 
himself. ‘The need to raise itself above humanity’, 
according to Schlegel, ‘is humanity’s prime 
characteristic’.155 But as Stirner would no doubt have 
retorted: ‘if the individual lifts himself above the 
limits of his individuality, this is rather his very self 
153 John F. Welsh, ‘Max Stirner’s Dialectical Egoism. A New 
Interpretation’ (2010 p. 94).  
154 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 148). 
155 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Lucinde and the Fragments’ (1797 - 1799 / 
1971 p. 243). 
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as an individual; he exists only in raising himself, he 
exists only in not remaining what he is’.156   
 
Stirner’s subject no longer felt compelled to escape the 
so called ‘confines’ of his individuality to discover 
whatever peace, salvation or heightened state he aspired 
to find elsewhere. Everything was, fundamentally, at 
hand. ‘Therefore’, as Stirner implored, ‘turn to 
yourselves rather than to your gods or idols. Bring out 
from yourselves what is in you, bring it to the light, 
bring yourselves to revelation’.157 The individual subject 
was now an entirely ‘self-contained’, autogeneous figure; 
his singular, finite state was no longer something to be 
lamented, cursed, least of all renounced. His reappraised 
state was not simply a source of solace, but, so Stirner 
ultimately believed, ataraxia.158 
 
XI: AN EXTREMELY BRIEF OVERVIEW  
 
Having attempted, in the introductory chapter, to bring 
your attention to something that resembles a ‘starting 
point’ and excused my methodological ‘excesses’ to some 
degree or another, I hope to have made, if nothing else, 
my own particular interests in the subject a little 
clearer. 
 
I have described, in an effort to ‘set the scene’, the 
fatuity of Dupuis and Cotonet’s desire to define 
romanticism in light of Friedrich Schlegel’s inceptive 
156 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 163). 
157 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 146). 
158 In ‘The Concept of the Self in Political Thought’ (1979),  
Peter McCormick made a similar point: ‘The complete lack of content 
makes the concluding epigram take on Stoic overtones, adopting apathy 
toward an external world in order to enjoy life more fully the 
freedom of an internal world’ (1979 p. 707). 
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and, admittedly, in certain respects, cleverly contrived 
‘theory’ of ‘romantic poetry’. It was not, from the very 
beginning, purely a matter of literary definition. Given 
Schlegel’s expansive theoretical ambitions, the meaning 
of romanticism extended well beyond the parameters of 
literature into philosophical realms, more specifically 
those of ontology. 
 
Given the predominant and apparently unavoidable presence 
of a looming, insensate force of nature and the subject’s 
alignment with it, for better or worse, his definitive 
person, that is to say, his bodily self and personality 
were completely lost to the cause. His ‘inner-nature’ may 
well have expanded into the shadowy realms of ‘infinity 
and stardom’, but his finite, physical form fared rather 
less well.159 All that was integumentary, singular and 
personal wilted and withered under the conditions that 
proved so expedient to that which was universal, 
hebetudinous and found somewhere ‘within’.  
 
The individual subject was lost. He was part of a ‘whole’ 
he could not possibly begin to understand or readily 
discern. It was, as I have said a number of times, all 
extremely mysterious. 
 
To extend oneself to nature was, in all likelihood, a 
vain and wholly destructive theoretical pursuit, as I 
said; one that almost certainly came to exact its cost in 
Schopenhauer’s calamitous description of its will. Max 
Stirner aspired to redress the balance: to bring the 
subject’s, up till now, neglected personal and somatic 
standing to light and fruition. 
159 Alfred de Musset, ‘Letters of Dupuis and Cotonet’ collected in 
‘The Complete Writings of Alfred de Musset’ Volume 9 (1836 / 1908 p. 
209 - 210). 
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In the course of the present chapter, I have also 
attempted to emphasise, primarily to underline a key 
motif of romanticism and the largely irresolvable nature 
of the problems it posed, the extent to which the 
question of ‘self’ troubled a number of ‘secondary 
writers’ in whom I have expressed an equal interest. Some 
of whom were indeed affiliated with romanticism, others 
were not, but, nevertheless, still grappled with a number 
of uncertainties that, I believe, came to fore with the 
emergence of the literary form. The need to identify the 
subject’s ‘true’ nature was not, not by any stretch of 
the imagination, exclusive to Schlegel, Schopenhauer or 
Stirner – it was far more widely ‘felt’ than that and 
across many more disciplines and chronological periods 
than may customarily be acknowledged. 
 
Rather than concentrate solely on any one of the three 
writers, I have seen fit to identify the ‘individual 
subject’ as the focus of the present study. Principally, 
to ascertain not only his standing and value as it was 
presented, even depicted in their work, but to critically 
evaluate the subject’s ‘maturation’, as I described it, 
from an inchoate, ‘general spirit’ to ‘singular 
personality’ as he is ushered through the ‘climatic’ and 
dramatic changes of the three respective schemes.  
 
Allow me to turn your attention to the second chapter and 
the overweening figure of Friedrich Schlegel; his 
‘theory’ of ‘romantic poetry’ was, I believe, the point 
where the subject entered the initial stage of his 
developmental ‘growth’. Schlegel’s romantic vision was a 
hotbed of dull organic forces that enjoyed the most 
favourable of temperate conditions. The clammy and 
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decidedly stuffy air of Schlegel’s ‘theory’ constituted a 
perfect of environment for the subject’s vegetal ‘inner-
nature’ to grow, as we will hear, to a wild and tumescent 
degree. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
FRIEDRICH SCHLEGEL’S HOTHOUSE 
 
‘What a writer! Like a cuttle-fish in water, every 
movement produces a cloud of ink which shrouds his 
thought in darkness!’.160 
 
Henri-Frédéric Amiel, ‘Amiel’s Journal’ 
 
‘I need limitless illusions, receding before me to keep 
me always under their spell. What use to me is anything 
that can end? The hour which will arrive in sixty years’ 
time is already close at hand. I have no liking for 
anything that takes its rise, draws near, arrives, and is 
no more. I want a good, a dream, in fact a hope that is 
ever in advance, ever beyond me, greater than my 
expectation itself, greater than the things which pass 
away’.161 
 
Étienne Pivert de Sénancour, ‘Obermann’ 
 
‘In analysing “romance” the first definition required, 
perhaps, is to this effect: the “romantic” is the 
opposite of the real. Romance is a thing that is in some 
sense non-existent. For instance, “romance” is the 
reality of yesterday, or of tomorrow; or it is the 
reality of somewhere else’.162  
 
Wyndham Lewis, ‘Time and Western Man’ 
 
160 Henri-Frédéric Amiel, ‘Amiel’s Journal. The Journal Intime of 
Henri-Frédéric Amiel’ (1882 / 1901 p. 190). 
161  Étienne Pivert de Sénancour, ‘Obermann’, Vol. I (1803 / 1910 p. 
73). 
162 Wyndham Lewis, ‘Time and Western Man’ (1927 p. 22). 
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‘Happy projects of future joy, you are, perhaps, the only 
true happiness known to man’.163 
  
Alfred de Musset, ‘The Confession of a Child of the 
Century’ 
 
I. THE CUTTLE-FISH 
 
‘Obscurantism is a sin perhaps not against the Holy 
Spirit, but certainly against the human. Therefore we 
ought never to forgive it, but always and everywhere 
implacably hold it against the person who has made 
himself guilty of it, and take every opportunity of 
showing our contempt for him, as long as he lives, and 
even after he is dead’.164 Arthur Schopenhauer wrote these 
words in 1844 in the second volume of ‘The World and Will 
and Representation’ and the person in question was a 
certain Friedrich Schlegel. 
 
Schlegel was indeed dead at this point and had been for a 
good fifteen years, but no less ‘guilty’ of having 
committed a ‘sin’, as Schopenhauer regarded it, against 
‘the human’ which, as he emphatically and rather harshly 
maintained, should never be forgiven. 
 
The philosopher had something of a cheek to speak of 
Schlegel in this light; his own doctrine of will dealt 
‘the human’ all sorts of painful and nasty little pinches 
before he finally saw off his own humanity with a 
particularly grievous and conclusive blow. Nonetheless, 
Schopenhauer saw fit to talk of Schlegel’s ‘disgraceful 
163 Alfred de Musset, ‘The Confession of a Child of the Century’ (1836 
/ 1908 p. 250). 
164 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 525). 
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obscurantism’ in precisely these unforgiving terms.165 Not 
to say that Schopenhauer was entirely unjustified. 
 
Friedrich Schlegel was not the clearest of writers; he 
was, more often than not, a dreadful pleonast. The number 
of words he used far too frequently outweighed the number 
of ideas he wished to convey. Schlegel used far too many 
of one and entertained too few of the other. At least, 
that is the abrupt conclusion one is tempted to come to 
when Schlegel was at his most effusive.  
 
Having called him a ‘pleonast’, there were other 
occasions, most notably in his aphoristic pieces, 
‘fragments’ as Schlegel called them, when he did not seem 
to use nearly enough words to convey the meaning he 
wished to express. Schlegel was, in these particular 
instances, extremely sparing in his use of them. ‘A 
work’, to take one example, ‘is cultivated when it is 
everywhere sharply delimited, but within those limits 
limitless and inexhaustible; when it is completely 
faithful to itself, entirely homogeneous, and nonetheless 
exalted above itself’.166  
 
When faced with such a dense, impenetrable collection of 
words, it is hardly the easiest of things to discern what 
meaning they were actually intended to convey. It all 
sounds conspicuously obscure and one may even come around 
to Schopenhauer’s way of thinking very quickly indeed, if 
not start to believe the philosopher was somewhat kinder 
to Schlegel than he might otherwise have been.  
 
165 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 525). 
166 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Lucinde and the Fragments’ (1797 - 1799 / 
1971 p. 204). 
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It is hard to judge whether Schlegel should really, at 
times, have gone to such trouble to write many of these 
‘fragments’ of his in the first place. The majority of 
them sound so very lofty, pious and intentionally 
profound that one cannot help feel letdown, even annoyed, 
by the sudden realisation that they, the grand sounding 
fragments, express little, if a single illuminating point 
at all.  
 
It is tempting, in these moods, to believe Schlegel’s 
fragments were written purely for effect and nothing 
more. ‘In truth, and particularly in the case of 
Friedrich Schlegel’, as Maurice Blanchot pointed out in 
an essay, ‘The Athenaeum’ (1983), ‘the fragment often 
appears as a means of complacent self-indulgence, rather 
than an attempt to elaborate a more rigorous mode of 
writing’.167  
 
Initially, one is never quite sure where exactly one 
stands with the infuriating critic. Schlegel is an 
extraordinarily difficult writer to get to grips with; he 
wins one’s favour as quickly as he loses it. We see too 
little of the Schlegel who perfectly balances what he 
wishes to say with terms of expression that entirely suit 
their intended meaning and far too much of the other 
Schlegel, the diffusive one, who frequently sounds far 
too fond of his own voice for his own good. The reader, 
presuming they harbour similar reservations, may even 
start to object to certain aspects of his work. 
 
Schlegel had, to warn you again, an exceedingly ‘sweet 
tooth’ and was prone to express himself in an extremely 
affected and patronising manner. He also seemed to have 
167 Maurice Blanchot, ‘The Athenaeum’ (1983 p. 171 - 172). 
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something of an unhealthy obsession with flowers; 
consequently, his ‘Dialogue on Poetry’ exudes a somewhat 
fumitory, off putting smell that can hardly be said to 
readily ingratiate the reader to his work.168  
 
Schlegel’s aphoristic pieces, the ‘fragments’ I 
mentioned, had a thoroughly indigestible, if not inedible 
quality to them; they were not willing to divulge their 
meaning and ‘go down the hatch’ - to put it very 
simplistically, with the least bit of ease. Even the more 
digestible ones leave something of an unpleasant 
aftertaste in one’s mouth. ‘They are often written’, as 
Robert Wernaer wrote in an extremely perceptive essay, 
‘Romanticism and the Romantic School in Germany’ (1910), 
‘in such compact language, and, at times, designedly with 
such fallacious subtlety that many of them cannot be 
understood taken by themselves’.169  
 
Schlegel’s fragments had an irresolvable air about them; 
it was a quality that certainly belied, as he no doubt 
intended, their brevity. Even so, it is particularly 
exasperating to find that so few words are able to 
inflict such sharp and unpleasant pangs of dyspeptic 
pain. The critic’s fragments stick in one’s throat like a 
sickly assortment of congealed sweets. 
 
What makes matters twice as worse than they need 
necessarily have been is that one, however dimly, begins 
168 On page 53, for example, of Schlegel’s ‘Dialogue on Poetry and 
Literary Aphorisms’ (1797-1800 / 1968) we hear him talk about the 
‘flower and kernel of other minds’; on page 81, the ‘first flower of 
youthful imagination’; turning to page 101, he spoke of the 
‘eternally fresh flowers of the imagination’ and on the 153rd page we 
are confronted with another ‘fresh flower’, this time it was attached 
to a ‘living stalk’. 
169 Robert M. Wernaer, ‘Romanticism and the Romantic School in 
Germany’ (1910 p. 68). 
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to suspect that there may well have been a form of ‘wit’ 
at play within some of his aphoristic contributions. 
Sadly, Schlegel had little flair for comedy. If we turn, 
in this respect, to his ‘Dialogue on Poetry’, we come 
face to face with Schlegel’s ‘wit’ and it throws an 
otherwise perfectly understandable sentence into 
disarray. Having successfully made one’s way through two 
thirds of it, we reach the final third and Schlegel’s 
‘wit’ not only impedes our way, but encourages the 
thoroughly dispiriting impression that one has somehow 
missed the point of the epigram altogether. ‘An 
aphorism’, as Schlegel wrote, ‘ought to be entirely 
isolated from the surrounding world like a little work of 
art and complete in itself like a hedgehog’.170  
 
It all seems, at times, to be something of a laborious, 
uphill struggle with Schlegel. In these bleak moments, 
one has to fight every urge not to hold a lasting grudge 
against Schlegel for intentionally making one feel like 
Dupuis or Cotonet. One becomes increasingly suspicious 
whether in fact Schlegel did not simply set out with the 
intentional purpose of leaving the reader completely in 
the dark.  
 
If one is in a more forgiving mood, one may even begin to 
doubt one’s judgement and entertain the belief that there 
must surely have been a certain ‘light’ and ‘playful’ air 
to Schlegel’s work that has, in the course of time, 
simply been lost somewhere along the way. In much the 
same way, the human digestive system was once said to 
have been able to cope quite easily with wild berries 
without making him delirious and sick.  
170 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 143).  
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Perhaps it was intended as a private joke, one might 
continue to imagine, that Schlegel shared with his older 
brother August, his sister in law, Caroline, Novalis, 
Ludwig Tieck, Friedrich Schleiermacher or any of the 
other figures associated with The Athenäum. It was, or so 
we have been led to believe, if one reads Lacoue-Labarthe 
and Nancy’s bombastic study, ‘The Literary Absolute’ 
(1978), conceived in a ‘communal’, homely sort of spirit 
after all. 
 
However, the word ‘playful’ insinuates there is, to some 
degree or other, an amount of pleasure to be derived from 
Schlegel’s ‘Dialogue on Poetry’. I say ‘playful’ as it 
quite possibly describes Schlegel’s ‘pleasure’ rather 
more faithfully than it does our own and Schlegel’s 
‘pleasure’, for all of its flowery homeliness and 
abundance of jellied sweets, was not without its own 
sadistic peculiarities. 
 
Schlegel’s sugariness should not be underestimated; he 
may well have adorned his inceptive ‘theory’ of ‘romantic 
poetry’ with flowers and bunting but, like a funeral 
procession, it worked its way, if one takes 
Schopenhauer’s doctrine into consideration, towards a 
very uninviting and inhospitable place indeed.   
 
Everything about Schlegel’s work tends, if one is not 
careful, to make one slightly dizzy and short of breath. 
‘The perfume of the flowers was bewildering’, as Rilke 
might have said of him, ‘like many voices sounding all at 
once’.171 Schlegel’s work is more than just a little 
171 Rainer Maria Rilke, ‘The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge’ (1910 
/ 2008 p. 147). Translated by Burton Pike. Dalkey Archive Press, 
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disorientating. It is not just the abundance of flowers 
with which one is assaulted, but Schlegel’s contrived 
enthusiasm for ‘the unconscious’ and ‘infinite’, his 
patronising air, his ‘disregard’ for the rules of the 
house whose ‘chaos’, as one begins to suspect, was of the 
most fussily ordered nature, and, when one hears about 
his cliquey little coterie in Jena, it almost becomes too 
much to stomach. 
 
Schlegel’s work has all of the clammy atmosphere of an 
elderly and unpredictable relative’s conservatory on a 
particularly long and muggy Sunday afternoon. We are 
invited to ‘make ourselves at home’ just so long as we 
take off our shoes and do not ‘dare’ touch a thing; 
Schlegel commands us, in a raised voice, to ‘relax’. At 
least, that is the distinct impression one gets from much 
of the critic’s ‘Dialogue on Poetry’. It is difficult not 
to harbour the growing suspicion that Schlegel’s 
overbearing floweriness was not simply a front to 
disguise something very unpleasant and unsavoury indeed. 
However, one must repeatedly tell oneself that it may not 
be immediately clear, but like all expansive and sweeping 
views, Schlegel’s work involves an enormous of patience 
and a great deal of fortitude to get to the top. 
 
II. THE MILDLY CHARGED FRAGMENTS  
 
One would do very well to remind oneself, when one’s 
patience is at its thinnest, that Schlegel fancied 
himself as a polemicist; in the 300th fragment he hinted 
as much himself. ‘When reason and unreason touch’, as one 
of Schlegel’s more understandable sayings goes, ‘there’s 
London. 
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an electric shock. It’s called polemics’.172  
 
Schlegel was tremendously fond of dishing out these, not 
exactly deadly, but certainly modest and irritating 
‘electric shocks’ in the most liberal of ways. If 
Schlegel’s objective was to trouble readers with his 
indigestible and mildly charged array of fragments then 
he can be said to have been extremely accomplished at his 
task. 
 
Schlegel wished, I imagine, to unsettle, even perplex  
readers rather than mollify or reassure them in an effort 
to ‘engage’ them, in the most active sense of the word, 
with his work. If indeed that was his objective, then 
Schlegel can be said, if one is so inclined, to have been 
a first rate and supremely gifted polemicist.  
 
However, one must seriously begin to question the long 
term health effects of these minor ‘shocks’ which are 
continually delivered to one’s system. ‘At its best’, as 
René Wellek observed in an eponymous chapter devoted to 
Friedrich Schlegel in the second volume of ‘A History of 
Modern Criticism’ (1955), ‘he can open, with a glimpse, 
wide vistas; at its worst he can note down pretentious 
witticisms and even trivialities’. ‘But one’, as Wellek 
quickly added, ‘must be literal-minded indeed not to 
recognize that Schlegel was engaged in warfare, that he 
wanted and needed attention at the price of paradox and 
offence, and that he loved the grandiose, mysterious, and 
irrational too much to suppress it’.173 It is best, as 
Wellek advised, not be too ‘literal-minded’ when one 
172 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Lucinde and the Fragments’ (1797 – 1799 / 
1971 p. 204). 
173 René Wellek, ‘Friedrich Schlegel’ in ‘A History of Modern 
Criticism: 1750 - 1950. Volume 2: The Romantic Age’ (1955 p. 35). 
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reads Schlegel’s work. Even so, it is something of a 
strain.  
 
Novalis, whose most well known poem - ‘Hymns to the 
Night’ (1800) appeared, like the 116th fragment, in the 
third and final volume of The Athenäum, summed up 
Schlegel’s intentions far better than Schlegel could 
possibly have done himself. ‘Fragments of this kind’, as 
Novalis wrote in ‘Grains of Pollen’ (1798), ‘are literary 
seeds: certainly, there may be many sterile grains among 
them, but this is unimportant if only a few of them take 
root’.174 Novalis’ assessment was almost certainly true of 
Friedrich Schlegel’s contributions to the periodical.  
 
One comes across dozens and dozens of ‘sterile grains’, 
very few of which appear the least bit eager to show any 
real sign of life however attentively one prods or waters 
them, so to speak. Many, as Wellek pointed out, were 
little more than blighted buds, ‘witticisms’ and 
‘trivialities’ as he referred to them, that drop away 
from one’s memory very sharply indeed; however, that is 
not to say, I feel somewhat obliged to add, that 
Schlegel’s work was completely barren or bereft of life, 
if only in a gestatory sense.175  
 
There are a few important, if ultimately hazardous things 
to be found among Schlegel’s horticultural display of 
words. For all the criticisms and cheap shots one can 
level at it, Schlegel’s romantic vision certainly prised 
open up a huge vegetal environment that was open to 
manipulation – certainly at the hands of Schopenhauer. 
 
174 Novalis, ‘Grains of Pollen’ (1798/ 19** 2: 463). 
175 René Wellek, ‘Friedrich Schlegel’ in ‘A History of Modern 
Criticism: 1750 - 1950. Volume 2: The Romantic Age’ (1955 p. 35). 
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III. THE GRAND ‘THEORY’ 
 
Having spoken a little about the often maddening, 
slightly painful way in which Friedrich Schlegel 
expressed himself, let us now say something about what he 
struggled to say. 
 
Let me turn your attention, with this objective in mind, 
to Schlegel’s ‘theory’ of ‘romantic poetry’. One should, 
however, be a little wary of even using the term ‘theory’ 
when talking of Schlegel’s romantic vision for fear of it 
representing one of the ‘deadening generalizations’ of 
which he claimed to disapprove.176 But Schlegel largely 
ignored his own advice and propagated, in the course of 
the third and final volume of The Athenäum, his own 
‘theory’ very cleverly indeed.  
 
Schlegel’s understanding of ‘romantic poetry’ constituted 
a ‘theory’ of sorts. It was, to put it somewhat 
awkwardly, a ‘non theory’ theory; it was of a decidedly 
‘dressed down’ order - sporting, as it were, the loosest, 
most casual of clothes even if, as one increasingly 
suspects, a tightly drawn girdle kept everything in the 
strictest order underneath them. 
 
Before we can begin to look at this particular matter in 
any sort of depth, I should perhaps clarify what exactly 
Schlegel understood by the term ‘romantic poetry’. We 
have, after all, already familiarised ourselves, in the 
introductory chapter, with the regrettable experience of 
Dupuis and Cotonet. It is necessary, at this point, to 
refer at some length, to one of Schlegel’s more tumid 
176 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1799 - 1800 / 1968 p. 55). 
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‘grains’ - I am referring to the ‘116th fragment’ of his 
‘Dialogue on Poetry’.  
 
While I am a little hesitant to call it Schlegel’s ‘most 
successful fragment’, it would appear to be his most 
discussed and celebrated. The 116th fragment has, over the 
years, been interpreted, rightly or wrongly, as the very 
cornerstone of romanticism. ‘This fragment’, as indeed 
René Wellek wrote, ‘has been quoted over and over again 
and has been made the key for the interpretation of the 
whole of romanticism’. ‘But’, as he insightfully added, 
‘one should recognize that it is only one of his 
deliberately mystifying pronouncements and that in it 
Schlegel uses the term “romantic” in a highly 
idiosyncratic way which he himself very soon 
abandoned’.177  
 
Wellek, I believe, was entirely correct in this respect; 
one should not ‘restrict’ one’s attention, if indeed that 
is an appropriate term, to Schlegel’s 116th fragment, 
instead one should take it onboard and consider it 
alongside Schlegel’s many other ‘deliberately mystifying 
pronouncements’, as Wellek called them.  
 
‘Romantic poetry’, as Schlegel maintained, ‘...does not 
manifest itself in individual conceptions but in the 
structure of the whole’.178 Schlegel’s visual impediment, 
his ‘presbyopia’ as I referred to it in the introductory 
chapter, always tended to be focused on the ‘whole’ 
rather than any one particular aspect of it. One ought, 
177 René Wellek, ‘Friedrich Schlegel’ in ‘A History of Modern 
Criticism: 1750 - 1950. Volume 2: The Romantic Age’ (1955 p. 12 - 
13). 
178 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1799 - 1800 / 1968 p. 86). 
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in this respect, not to concentrate one’s attention too 
intently on the 116th fragment but consider it, as indeed 
Wellek advised, along with all his others.  
 
Turning immediately to the fragment in question, we read: 
‘Romantic poetry is a progressive, universal poetry. Its 
aim isn’t merely to reunite all the separate species of 
poetry and put poetry in touch with philosophy and 
rhetoric. It tries to and should mix and fuse poetry and 
prose, inspiration and criticism, the poetry of art and 
the poetry of nature; and make poetry lively and 
sociable, and life and society poetical; poeticize wit 
and fill and saturate the forms of art with every kind of 
good, solid matter for instruction, and animate them with 
the pulsations of humor’.179  
 
Schlegel went on to say: ‘It embraces everything that is 
purely poetic, from the greatest systems of art, 
containing within themselves still further systems, to 
the sigh, the kiss that the poetizing child breathes 
forth in artless song. It can so lose itself in what it 
describes that one might believe it exists only to 
characterize poetical individuals of all sorts; and yet 
there still is no form so fit for expressing the entire 
spirit of an author: so that many artists who started out 
to write only a novel ended up by providing us with a 
portrait of themselves. It alone can become, like the 
epic, a mirror of the whole circumambient world, an image 
of the age. And it can also - more than any other form - 
hover at the midpoint between the portrayed and the 
portrayer, free of all real and ideal self-interest, on 
the wings of poetic reflection, and can raise that 
179 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1799 - 1800 / 1968 p. 140 – 141). 
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reflection again and again to a higher power, can 
multiply it in an endless succession of mirrors. It is 
capable of the highest and most variegated refinement, 
not only from within outwards, but also from without 
inwards; capable in that it organizes - for everything 
that seeks a wholeness in its effects - the parts along 
similar lines, so that it opens up a perspective upon an 
infinitely increasing classicism. Romantic poetry is in 
the arts what wit is in philosophy, and what society and 
sociability, friendship and love are in life. Other kinds 
of poetry are finished and are now capable of being fully 
analyzed’.180 
 
At this point, we see Schlegel – resorting, in spite of 
myself, to something of a ‘Schlegelism’, in full 
‘verbicidinal’ flight; it was in this elevated mood the 
critic made what was, quite possibly, his most 
extravagant pronouncement.  
 
‘The romantic kind of poetry’, as Schlegel claimed, ‘is 
still in the state of becoming; that, in fact, is its 
real essence: that it should forever be becoming and 
never be perfected. It can be exhausted by no theory and 
only a divinatory criticism would dare try to 
characterize its ideal. It alone is infinite, just as it 
alone is free; and it recognizes as its first commandment 
that the will of the poet can tolerate no law above 
itself. The romantic kind of poetry is the only one that 
is more than a kind, that is, as it were, poetry itself: 
for in a certain sense all poetry is or should be 
romantic’.181  
180 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1799 - 1800 / 1968 p. 140 – 141). 
181 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 140 – 141). 
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One can begin to ascertain a number of telling things 
about Schlegel’s ‘theory’ from the dense 116th fragment. 
Firstly, it had an unambiguous unitary aim and a very 
honorable aim it was too - at least, in its initial 
stage.  
 
Schlegel talked of joining up all the various generic 
strands of literature to form a ‘literary whole’. The 
critic wished to unite poetry with philosophy, rhetoric, 
prose, and criticism. They were no longer to be viewed as 
rigidly distinct forms separated along purely artistic or 
intellectual lines. ‘All streams of poetry’, as Schlegel 
surmised, ‘flow together into the one vast sea’.182  
 
One need only look, in this respect, at the variety of 
Schlegel’s contributions to The Athenäum; they ranged 
from essays, a letter, a series of dialogues and a 
collection of aphorisms, to see that he faithfully 
reflected his unitary aim, if not in content then 
certainly in form.  
 
‘The Romantic genre of poetry’, as Schlegel maintained, 
‘is the only one which is more than a genre, and which 
is, as it were, poetry itself’.183 In an earlier 
periodical, the Lyceum der schönen Künste (1797), 
Schlegel tentatively suggested, ‘Perhaps then we would 
have to get along with a single theory of the genres’.184 
Swiftly returning your attention to the Athenäum, we read 
in the 113th fragment: ‘A classification is a definition 
182 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 53). 
183 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 141).  
184 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 127).  
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comprising a system of definitions’.185  
 
The ‘romantic genre’, then, was a ‘single’ classification 
which contained within it a ‘system of definitions’. The 
prospect, it goes without saying, would obviously have 
horrified Dupuis and Cotonet. One may also see in 
Schlegel’s unifying literary ideal some of the 
generalising tendencies that were to balloon to such 
monstrous and destructive proportions in his ontology of 
the individual subject, the ‘romantic poet’. 
 
The ‘romantic genre’ certainly would appear, at first 
glance, to have represented, as Schlegel imagined, the 
broadest, most inclusive understanding of poetry he could 
have possibly formulated. ‘It embraces everything that is 
purely poetic’, as we heard Schlegel say, ‘from the 
greatest systems of art, containing within themselves 
still further systems, to the sigh, the kiss that the 
poetizing child breathes forth in artless song’.186 
Schlegel did not, so he imagined, deem it necessary to 
restrict or delimit the meaning of ‘romantic poetry’; he 
even talked, at one point, of ‘the universe of poetry’.187  
 
Schlegel’s romantic vision appeared to be gloriously free 
from all the sorts of restrictions the likes of Dupuis 
and Cotonet would, if only to placate their worries, have 
happily have placed on it. ‘The romantic poets, first in 
Germany and then in France’, as another critic made a 
point of saying, ‘were the poets who, scorning and 
rejecting the models of the past and the received rules 
185 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 140).  
186 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 140 – 141). 
187 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Lucinde and the Fragments’ (1797 – 1799 / 
1971 p. 237). 
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of composition, prided themselves on their freedom from 
law, and on their own artistic spontaneity.’188  
 
Schlegel’s ‘theory’ certainly sounded like it championed 
artistic and intellectual freedom above all else; if it 
was nothing more than impression, it was certainly an 
impression that acted to the favour of his lasting 
credit. It represents, if only in intention, the 
important, if slim source of ‘encouragement’ I have taken 
from Schlegel’s work.  
 
‘I always shudder’, as Schlegel claimed, ‘when I open a 
book where the imagination and its works are classified 
under headings’.189 Schlegel’s apparent attitude, as I 
mentioned in the introductory chapter, has almost 
certainly informed, without wishing to sound too 
pretentious or self righteous, my own ‘open’ methodology. 
To that end, I similarly believe that lines should not 
too keenly or pedantically be drawn between one work and 
another simply to appease the fraught and somewhat 
ridiculous desire to pigeonhole things for the convenient 
sake of pigeonholing them. In a certain sense, I admire 
and warmly welcome Schlegel’s ‘presbyopia’, but only on 
the grounds that it acted, purely and simply, to soften 
the all too ludicrous distinctions that tend to isolate 
‘the artistic’ from ‘the intellectual’. The 116th fragment 
comes, in this respect, as an enormous relief from the 
dozens of other ‘sterile grains’ Schlegel all too 
carelessly sowed.  
 
Sadly, the relief is all too short lived. Schlegel’s 
‘presbyopic condition’ knew no bounds and what started 
188 Logan Pearsall Smith, ‘Words and Idioms’ (1925 p. 87). 
189 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 76). 
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its life as an admirable literary aim rapidly turned 
against its laudable ends and obscured ‘everything’ in a 
poisonous, sickly smelling cloud.  
 
Schlegel attributed the loftiest, farthest reaching 
qualities to ‘romantic poetry’. In doing so, he extended 
its scope to an immeasurable degree and it certainly 
exceeded the bounds one might ordinarily associate with a 
literary concept. Schlegel aspired to poeticise the world 
and make poetry worldly. His ‘theory’ constituted, so he 
imagined, ‘the true world system of poetry’.190 
 
‘Friedrich Schlegel asserted’, as John C. Blankenagel 
wrote, ‘that poetry and philosophy are an inseparable 
whole; they share the whole range of great, exalted human 
nature’.191 And turning to another critic, Hans Eichner, 
we hear: ‘Just as Schlegel envisaged the Roman as a 
combination of all possible forms, so he felt that it 
should encompass every possible subject matter. It was 
the one form through which the poet could present a 
comprehensive view of the world in a single work, and 
thus it was its sacred task and privilege to effect the 
reunion of all the faculties, trends and functions whose 
isolation from each other in modern life Schlegel so 
greatly deplored’.192  
 
Schlegel’s poetic vision would indeed appear to have 
encompassed all things. We might even be tempted to agree 
with Blankenagel and Eichner on this particular matter 
and similarly conclude that there was nothing Schlegel’s 
190 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Lucinde and the Fragments’ (1797 – 1799 / 
1971 p. 237). 
191 John C. Blankenagel, ‘The Dominant Characteristics of German 
Romanticism’ (1940 p. 4). 
192 Hans Eichner, ‘Friedrich Schlegel’s Theory of Romantic Poetry’ 
(1956 p. 1027). 
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‘theory’ was not able to assimilate. ‘For they regarded 
life’, as Blankenagel said of Schlegel’s coterie, ‘as one 
and inseparable, as a unit’.193 
 
Schlegel’s ‘theory’ aspired to open out the literary form  
to such an extent that it was able to embrace, as he 
claimed, ‘everything’. ‘Romantic poetry’ need not 
necessarily have been ‘poetry’ at all; not, that is, in 
the strictest sense of the term. Schlegel’s ‘theory’ 
appeared to encompass nature in its entirety and 
poeticise it in turn. It was, on one hand, a tremendously 
bold and adventurous idea to have entertained; it 
certainly represented one of Schlegel’s more frutescent 
‘literary seeds’, as Novalis put it, that he can be 
adjudged to have ‘planted’. You have already heard me say 
‘on the one hand’ Schlegel’s idea was a ‘bold’ and 
‘adventurous’ idea, let me now bring your attention to 
the considerable number of reservations balanced in the 
other. 
 
If there was so little justification to divide up 
literary expressions according to their particular 
generic form, why should one, taking several seven league 
strides down the line, draw any distinction at all, as 
Schlegel logically concluded, between one thing and 
another -  man, beast or plant, if they were all, at 
heart, ‘purely poetic’?194 Schlegel’s literary ideal, 
admirable as it may have been in its initial stage, 
constituted, nevertheless, the germinating seed from 
which his own sweeping and dispersonating visual and 
intellectual ‘impediments’ sprang. 
193 John C. Blankenagel, ‘The Dominant Characteristics of German 
Romanticism’ (1940 p. 4). 
194 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 140 – 141). 
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It is one thing to unify a collection of literary forms 
in an open, all inclusive bracket, but quite another to 
subject all people to a universalising and thoroughly 
elemental ‘theory’. What, after all, can possibly be said 
to be left of them in their decorticated common state? 
‘This immanent, “historical” doctrine’, as Wyndham Lewis 
might have said of Schlegel’s ‘theory’, ‘like any other 
form of pantheism, has its capital drawback that it 
leaves very little room indeed for the individual, the 
person – that is if you regard that as a drawback’.195  
 
IV. THE MONUMENTAL FUSSPOT 
 
Having extended the ‘embrace’ of ‘romantic poetry’ so 
hospitably to ‘all things’, Schlegel opened an enormous 
double door through which anyone or anything could 
stumble just as long as Schlegel had first given them the 
once over - a good look up and down to assess whether or 
not they were suitably ‘poetic’, better still ‘purely 
poetic’ and satisfy his firm and discerning terms of 
entry.196 Schlegel rather recklessly opened the flood 
gates to all and sundry and extended an open invitation, 
whether he approved or not, to countless other guests – 
many, if not all but the prettiest of whom, were 
immediately turned away from his ‘theory’, but 
nevertheless returned, well past midnight and a little 
worse for wear, in Schopenhauer’s addled doctrine of 
will.  
 
It may well strike you as odd, if not unlikely – bearing 
in mind Schlegel’s ‘eagerness’ to welcome ‘everything’ in 
195 Wyndham Lewis, ‘Time and Western Man’ (1927 p. 237). 
196 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 140 – 141). 
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such a generous, warm ‘embrace’ that his ‘theory’ proved 
extremely selective in what it sought to poeticise.  
 
Given its reputation as an ‘open house’, Schlegel’s 
‘theory’ was far more discerning than Schopenhauer’s 
doctrine could ever adjudged to have been. Unlike 
Schlegel, he received an entourage of vile and rowdy 
guests and their ringleader, the will, presided over the 
evening’s proceedings, to Schopenhauer’s immediate 
consternation, with alarming indifference to all the 
customary rules of the house.  
 
Schlegel, on the other hand, was only willing to extend 
his hand to guests - the prompt arrivals, on the 
strictest of conditions; they had to be, first and 
foremost, ‘purely poetic’ before he could bring himself 
to take their hand in his.197 But where on earth, one 
might be tempted to ask oneself, did this idea of being 
‘purely poetic’ begin and end? What made something 
‘purely poetic’ rather than, for the sake of argument, 
‘partially poetic’ or even ‘barely poetic’? 
 
Schlegel’s romantic vision did not, to reiterate the 
point, ‘merely’ refer to poetry; he broadened its social 
circle, courtesy of a RSVP it turns out, to a number of 
other things: ‘the sigh’, ‘the kiss’ and the ‘poetizing 
child’, but he did not dare extend the invitation to a 
single thing that might jeopardise the purity of his 
‘pleasant’ ideal and muddy its clean carpet.198 Why, after 
all, did everything Schlegel deem ‘purely poetic’ always 
tend to be sighing to itself when it was not busy 
197 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 140 – 141). 
198 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 140 – 141). 
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puckering and painting its lips? It can hardly be said to 
faithfully reflect the true ‘spirit of universality’ with 
which the critic claimed to grace the poetic form. One 
cannot say something to the effect that it constituted 
‘the idea of ideas’, as Schlegel had done, and 
selectively restrict their number if the ‘ideas’ in 
question were not particularly complimentary or suited to 
one’s sugary palate.199  
 
Schlegel sought his compliment in nature, but only on the 
most selective of terms. It accounts, to some degree, for 
his ‘obsession’, as I described it, with ‘flowers’, 
‘smiles’, ‘bosoms’ and all the rather more picturesque 
things life is rumoured to offer.200 ‘Beautiful is what 
reminds us of nature’, as Schlegel liked to think, ‘and 
thereby stimulates a sense of the infinite fullness of 
life’.201 But what Schlegel saw when he looked admiringly 
at nature was not a faithful image of nature itself - its 
violent and, more often than not, bloody struggle for 
plain and simple survival, but a clouded reflection, not 
necessarily of himself but his better, ‘purely poetic’ 
self. Needless to say, that particular reflection was no 
less beautiful nor any less ‘infinite’ in depth. ‘Human 
beings’, as Pär Lagerkvist perceptively made a point of 
saying in ‘The Dwarf’ (1944), ‘like to see themselves 
reflected in clouded mirrors’.202 Lagerkvist’s observation 
certainly holds true, I rather suspect, of Friedrich 
Schlegel. 
 
199 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 150). 
200 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 53 - 54). 
201 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Lucinde and the Fragments’ (1797 - 1799 / 
1971 p. 248). 
202 Pär Lagerkvist, ‘The Dwarf’ (1944 / 1945 p. 172). 
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The ‘mirror’ into which Schlegel all too casually and 
discerningly peered was the kindest of mirrors; it 
beautified, embellished and aggrandised all that it 
reflected. Not least of all, Schlegel’s ‘handsome’ and 
‘awe inspiring’ image of the ‘romantic poet’ in whom, one 
suspects, he liked to see an all too familiar, simpering 
reflection.  
 
The critic’s understanding of term, ‘purely poetic’, may 
well have referred to anything at all just so long as it 
was polite enough to wipe its feet, part its hair and 
reciprocate his pleasantries. All that failed to flatter 
his priggishness - that which swore, spat and urinated in 
public, Schlegel kept well away at arm’s length. Without 
having any inclination to defend boorish behaviour - 
least of all aspire to poeticise it, Schlegel 
entertained, to clarify my point, a very funny idea of 
‘universalism’ indeed. It was so comely and vain that one 
cannot help but grow increasingly suspicious of it.  
 
Schlegel betrayed something of his fussiness when he 
wrote: ‘Therefore, man, in reaching out time and again 
beyond himself to seek and find the complement of his 
innermost being in the depths of another’.203 And, if we 
turn another page of the ‘Dialogue on Poetry’, Schlegel, 
once again, gave something of his true intentions away: 
‘Love needs a responding love’, as he wrote.204 Turning to 
yet another page, we hear Schlegel talk in the most 
favourable of terms of the ‘beautiful self-mirroring’ of 
Pindar’s poetry in which he must, yet again, have seen 
something of his own desire to distort, for the better, 
203 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 54). 
204 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 55). 
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whatever image he preferred to see of himself in the 
reflection of another.205 
 
Schlegel’s ‘all encompassing’ romantic vision was not, 
then, the least bit eager to embrace ‘everything’ at all. 
His ‘godhead’, nature, was somewhat less welcoming than 
Schlegel purported it to be: it simply reflected his own 
floriated and horribly fumitory disposition. ‘It wasn’t 
so difficult’, as Hermann Broch might have said of 
Schlegel’s finicky roitelet, ‘to have God with one in 
these circumstances’.206  
 
Schlegel’s understanding of nature was woefully 
shortsighted, if not more than just a little childish. It 
may well come as something of a surprise that Schlegel, 
given his apparent interest in ‘nature’, entertained such 
a staggeringly facile understanding of its ways. Schlegel 
clearly had no intention to identify either himself or 
his ‘poet’ with nature. The critic by far preferred the 
company of a fanciful ‘Mother Nature’, but only on the 
strict understanding that ‘she’, so to speak, wore her 
best clothes, caked her puckered face with makeup and was 
good enough to flatter his conceit and pamper his 
indulgent tastes. He certainly was not the least bit 
interested in anything ‘she’ had to say for herself, 
least of all anything which was likely to upset him. 
Given his apparent squeamishness, it was, I imagine, an 
all too easy line to cross. 
 
Schlegel did not initiate his ‘courtship’ with ‘Mother 
Nature’ to gain anything more from her than the company 
205 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 145). 
206 Hermann Broch, ‘The Sleepwalkers’ (1932 / 1996 p. 67). Translated 
by Edwin & Willa Muir. Vintage International, NYC. 
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of her ‘inestimable’ beauty. A significant portion of 
which, he indubitably imagined, rubbed off on himself. 
Schlegel’s ‘relationship’ with nature was certainly 
vicarious, if not somewhat parasitic. 
 
‘Nature’, if one turns to a page of Maurice de Guérin’s 
‘Journal’, ‘has decked herself with all her jewels’.207 
And the de Guérin’s image faithfully describes one’s 
first impressions of Schlegel’s ‘godhead’. Not that it is 
always the case, but in this instance, first impressions 
prove telling in the extreme. Schlegel’s ‘bejeweled’ muse 
made all sorts of agreeably enigmatic noises and Schlegel 
returned the compliment and spoke of ‘her’ in the most 
wheedlesome of tones. But whether ‘she’ was in any sort 
of position to reveal anything of particular note to 
Schlegel and he, in turn, to us seems less and less 
likely. 
 
Schlegel’s ‘universal’ ideal, focusing as it did on all 
that was ‘beautiful’ and conveniently turning a blind eye 
to that which was not, was all so very decorous and 
applausive that it hardly encourages one to hold out much 
hope of learning very much from him at all, not in an 
instructive or insightful sense. Schlegel may well have 
betrayed his extremely selective and fair weathered 
affinity with ‘nature’ but also, along the way, his... 
well, there is a ‘choice’: 
 
1. grave shortcomings as particularly insightful thinker. 
 
2. great flair and adroitness for sophistry.  
 
207 Maurice de Guérin, ‘The Journal of Maurice de Guérin’ (1842 / 1891 
p. 95). 
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Given the ‘choice’ between option 1 and option 2, it is 
almost completely impossible to plum for either one or 
the other. Both, in their own way, are equally credible. 
Schlegel was beset as much by option 1 as he was blessed 
by option 2.  
 
‘But’, as Schopenhauer might have asked, with option 1 
firmly in mind, of Schlegel’s woefully obtuse 
understanding of nature, ‘is the world, then, a peep 
show? These things are certainly beautiful to behold, but 
to be them is something quite different’.208 Schlegel 
failed, I believe, to fully appreciate the significant 
difference between the two – that is, between ‘beholding’ 
and ‘being’. Nature was little more to the nescient 
critic than the most congenial, family orientated of 
‘peep shows’ and perfectly in keeping with his anodyne 
tastes. 
 
To put it more simply still, Schlegel pointed 
enthusiastically at the stage, but only on the odd 
occasion it was graced by a particularly handsome actor 
whom he thought resembled him the most. For all of 
Schlegel’s grand talk of ‘romantic poetry’ - for all its 
apparent ‘universality’, the critic spelt out, quite 
clearly, the limits of the allegedly ‘limitless’ form. 
Schlegel was not the least bit eager to soil the soles of 
his shoes in excrement and filth as Schopenhauer went on, 
perhaps a little too enthusiastically, to do.  
 
Schlegel was simply too fussy and picky about the company 
he wished to keep but having claimed to have opened the 
doors so widely he had absolutely no grounds to be so 
208 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’ Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 581). 
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pernickety.  
 
Schlegel was clearly beset by innumerable shortcomings 
that hardly made him, by any stretch of the imagination, 
a ‘particularly insightful thinker’. Option 1 has many 
merits. 
 
But the all too entitled Schlegel, now bearing in mind 
option 2, appeared to want it both ways. ‘It is not 
necessary’, as he had the nerve to say, ‘for anyone to 
sustain and propagate poetry through clever speeches and 
precepts, or, especially, to try to produce it, invent 
it, establish it, and impose upon restrictive laws as the 
theory of poetics would like to’.209  
 
Schlegel was clearly reluctant to openly espouse a 
‘theory’ - they are horribly ‘restrictive’, after all; 
nonetheless, the critic had an acute realisation that he 
must have some sort of firm ‘outline’ in place to keep 
all the ‘unpoetic’ rabble out. ‘It is equally deadly for 
a mind’, as indeed Schlegel said, ‘to have a system or to 
have none. Therefore it will have to decide to combine 
both’.210 Schlegel’s ‘theory’, regardless of the pains he 
went to to disguise it, still had the firmest of 
boundaries, a perimeter fence - if you like, and however 
widely one was encouraged to roam one would eventually 
find oneself confronted by a formidable gate officiated 
by a pedantic little man, clipboard and pen ready, who 
impeded the progress of all but a fey few. 
 
‘What Schlegel wanted’, as Hans Eichner observantly said 
209 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 54). 
210 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 136). 
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of the critic, ‘was neither reckless irrationalism, nor 
total disregard of form’.211 ‘It was sufficient for his 
theory’, Eichner added, ‘that there should be the 
semblance of limitations being violated, of untrammeled 
caprice, and of confusion’.212 Schlegel felt ‘the 
obligation’, if one turns to listen to Maurice Blanchot, 
‘to be systematic’ and express, at the same time, a 
‘horror of system’.213 But whatever ‘horror’ Schlegel 
expressed was purely for dramatic effect – it was not, as 
all too often proved the case, the least bit convincing. 
 
Schlegel’s ‘theory’ may well have been billed as a 
‘universal’ theory or the ‘semblance’ of such, but it 
had, securely in place, the strictest of door policies. 
His ‘theory’ was as restrictive as any of the unspecified 
‘theories’ he claimed, in the most epideitic of ways, to 
disapprove. 
 
Schlegel’s universal ‘theory’ had its limits after all.  
 
When Schlegel said it was not necessary ‘for’, in his 
words, ‘anyone to sustain and propagate poetry through 
clever speeches and precepts’ one can only conclude he 
was not speaking in a personal capacity and what he 
actually meant to say was that is was not the least bit 
necessary for anyone else to ‘sustain and propagate 
poetry’ through those means as he was well on the way to 
doing an excellent, if not matchless job of it himself.214 
 
Schlegel was almost certainly blessed with a ‘great flair 
211 Hans Eichner, ‘Friedrich Schlegel’ (1970 p. 63). 
212 Hans Eichner, ‘Friedrich Schlegel’ (1970 p. 63). 
213 Maurice Blanchot, ‘The Athenaeum’ (1983 p. 171). 
214 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 54). 
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for sophistry’. There is certainly no shame in choosing 
option 2, it too has its merits.  
 
It is difficult, bearing in mind his insuperable ‘gifts’, 
not to see something of the worst sort of school teacher 
in Friedrich Schlegel. A teacher who, for all intent and 
purposes, advocates all manner of wildly irreverent and 
anarchic ideas about ‘freedom’ and ‘flaunting the bounds 
of convention’, but, at the same time, sees absolutely no 
conflict in putting his pupils in detention, for a very 
punctual hour, in order to fully instruct them in the 
said principles. 
 
It is precisely this sort of double talk that one may 
well begin to object to most vehemently of all; more 
especially when one remembers the irreverence Schlegel 
encouraged one to have for literary ‘laws’ and the like 
in the first place. It is fairly disappointing to say the 
least. 
 
‘Combine the extremes’, as another of Schlegel’s sayings 
went, ‘and you will have the true centre’.215 In a certain 
sense, one may well, for a change, be tempted to agree 
with the critic and say: ‘how very true’. Schlegel’s 
‘theory’ was, to no small extent, characterised by half 
measures; a ‘theory’ falsely billed as a ‘non theory’ 
whose tenets one ‘dare’ not question and whose 
‘generosity’ one could all too easily fall foul of if one 
fell in, as it were, with the wrong crowd.  
 
For all of Schlegel’s disregard for rules and the like, 
he comes across as unbearably bossy and sanctimonious. 
215 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 155). 
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The reader may, understandably, start to feel somewhat 
swindled and short changed, if not even a little bullied 
by Schlegel. I will return to address this particular 
matter shortly. 
 
V. FAR LOFTIER MATTERS 
 
‘Romantic poetry’ was said, at least on paper, to be the 
‘cradle’ of all things - the finite as well as the 
infinite, the sensible as well as the insensible. It was 
‘the infinite poem concealing’, as Schlegel imagined, 
‘the seeds of all other poems’.216 It was, to put it 
another way, an enormous Russian doll in whose heart, 
indeed hearts, all sublimity, artistry and spirituality 
duly ‘throbbed’. The embryonic rhythm pulsated, no less 
resonantly, in the breast of the poet as it did in the 
bosom of ‘Mother Nature’; the synchronous chest note left 
the all too susceptible critic captivated, not 
necessarily by his piercing ‘insight’ into the 
machinations of nature, but the enormous opportunity it 
afforded him to display his sophistic craft. 
 
Schlegel’s ambitions did not stop there - they were on a 
far ‘grander’ scale than that. His concern was not 
limited to that of ‘art’, ‘genius’, ‘literature’ and the 
like, but the rather more lofty matter of the ‘world 
spirit’ and the ‘world spirit’, if Schlegel could not 
honestly and truly say it of himself, embraced 
everything. ‘Given this form and this spirit’, as Hans 
Eichner wrote, ‘the work of art will be a true microcosm; 
it will mirror the essential structure of nothing less 
216 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 82). 
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than the universe itself’.217 
 
Schlegel sought to capture life’s ‘universal’ quality 
and, having taken certain measures, as I will explain, to 
distil it from life itself, the critic put the ‘prized’ 
quality at the heart of his poetic vision. It was, if one 
takes Schlegel’s ambition at face value, the grandest of 
ideas. It was certainly a means by which, keeping one’s 
gnawing reservations firmly at bay, Schlegel 
‘aggrandised’, not only his own poetic vision, but also 
the subject’s ‘inmost’ nature to an ‘inestimable’ degree.  
 
The ‘romantic poet’ was no less privy to life’s 
universal, if ‘primordial power’ and, in light of certain 
procedures, he would be perfectly attuned to express its 
‘unfathomable’ murmurings if, indeed, he followed 
Schlegel’s lead. And perfectly in keeping with the 
example he wished to set, Schlegel’s obscure turns of 
phrase coupled with his conspicuous ‘back to front’ 
thinking neither helped to develop a clearer 
understanding of his ‘theory’, his ‘bejeweled’ muse nor, 
indeed, his poetic subject. But Schlegel, need I remind 
you, was no ordinary literary critic, his ‘theory’ was no 
ordinary theory, and the ‘romantic poet’ was anything but 
your ‘average Joe’ in the street. As for Mother Nature, 
she bore absolutely no resemblance to nature as it is 
commonly found beyond the outskirts of Jena. Schlegel’s 
‘insights’ were anything but ordinary. 
 
‘The life and vigor of poetry’, as Schlegel admitted, 
‘consists in the fact that it steps out of itself, tears 
out a section of religion, and then again withdraws into 
217 Hans Eichner, ‘Friedrich Schlegel’ (1970 p. 68). 
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itself by assimilating this part’.218 Schlegel almost 
certainly tore a very selective number of pages out of 
‘religion’ - its most mystical and pantheistic sounding 
ones, whatever their creed, and ‘assimilated’ them, if 
indeed ‘assimilated’ is not simply a polite expression 
for exploiting them, to heighten the effect of his own 
‘theory’ to a similar degree. ‘Religion is absolutely 
unfathomable’, Schlegel surmised. ‘Always and 
everywhere’, he added with, I suspect, more than just a 
touch of envy in his voice, ‘one can dig more deeply into 
infinities’.219 Taking this as his cue, Schlegel went 
about the task - with more than just a fair degree of 
success, of making his own ‘theory’ preeminent, profound 
and equally ‘unfathomable’. 
 
Schlegel sought to deify poetry. It was a ‘Godhead’ from 
which ‘everything’ was said to emanate. The critic 
enthroned his very own tightlipped and fussy roitelet - a 
nature god, ‘the godhead the earth’, as Schlegel called 
‘her’, whose ‘one poem’ hung on the lips, muzzle and 
petal of man, beast and plant alike.220  
 
All that was languid, gurgled and completely incapable of 
speech was no less expressive, to Schlegel’s ears, as the 
‘genteel’ poet who composed and recited verse. ‘Every art 
or discipline which does not manifest its nature through 
language’, as Schlegel said, betraying, at the same time, 
the high esteem in which he held his reticent godhead, 
‘possesses an invisible spirit: and that is poetry’.221 
218 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 151).  
219 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 152). 
220 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 54). 
221 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
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‘Romantic poetry’ need not have been the ‘poetry of 
language’ but the ‘poetry of spirit’ and as ‘everything’, 
so Schlegel claimed, was spiritualised it was also 
‘poetic’.  
 
Any poet worth his salt aspired to express, Schlegel 
imagined, the ‘mysterious’ contralto of all that was deep 
seated, suspirious and aphonic: it was ‘the invisible 
primordial power of mankind’, the orchestral pit of 
nature itself.222 ‘Actually’, as Schlegel supposed, ‘every 
work should be a new revelation of nature’.223 But whether 
the monumental fusspot was willing to arbitrarily reflect 
the entire spirit of nature and not simply cherry pick 
and glean its more tempered elements still remained 
highly improbable. 
 
The greatest of all poetic achievements, if Schlegel was 
to be believed, was to reflect that which was without 
intellect, sense of self or readily appreciable power of 
language. But Schlegel’s poetic vision was evidently the 
outcome of a considerable amount of intellectual effort 
and took, along the way, a number of deft and seasoned 
linguistic liberties of its own. 
 
Why was Schlegel so eager to denounce the sophisticated 
and verbose methods he employed to concoct his ‘theory’ 
in the first place? I have already called it, if you 
happen to remember, a ‘paragon of ingenuity’. Why did the 
‘intellect’ hold so little charm for him, of all people? 
Schlegel’s talents were, as far as I can tell, almost 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 76). 
222 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 54). 
223 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 92). 
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completely limited to his slippery, ‘evasive’ form of 
intellectualism. 
 
Schlegel was extremely guileful. He was well versed in 
the art of conjuration and trickery and had all the 
dexterous handiwork one associates with a professional 
stage magician. ‘Poetry is the finest branch of magic’, 
as Schlegel announced, ‘and the isolated individual 
cannot rise up to magic. But where any human instinct 
functions in alliance with human spirit there is magical 
power’.224 Schlegel was full of the fallacious sort of 
‘profundity’ one tends to associate, not necessarily with 
a mystic, but a critic playing, when it suited him, at 
being a mystic. The former is positively less 
straightforward to deal with, one can but hope, than your 
average incarnation of the latter. A mystic is certainly 
not answerable, in the same way, to the exacting and 
rather more prosaic standards imposed on a literary 
critic. Schlegel knew this only too well.  
 
Schlegel went about the ‘feat’ of making the intellect 
‘vanish’, and, in a corresponding shuffle of the hands, 
swiftly replaced it with ‘instinct’ and ‘spirit’. It was, 
however, an elaborate contrivance. ‘If he was now a 
romanticist’, as Robert W. Wernaer suggested, ‘it was not 
merely for temperamental reasons, but because he had 
thought it out’.225 ‘Intellectual supremacy’, as the same 
critic wrote on an earlier page, ‘may be called the 
master passion of his best years’.226 If we turn to 
Maurice Blanchot for a second opinion he had something 
224 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 80). 
225 Robert M. Wernaer, ‘Romanticism and the Romantic School in 
Germany’ (1910 p. 67). 
226 Robert M. Wernaer, ‘Romanticism and the Romantic School in 
Germany’ (1910 p. 65). 
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similar to say. ‘Romanticism is excessive’, Blanchot 
wrote, ‘but its primary excess is one of thought - an 
abuse for which one cannot hold Schlegel solely 
responsible, since the same intellectual fever, the same 
dizzying passion for theoretical penetration’, as he 
somewhat unfairly added, ‘motivates Novalis’.227  
 
Schlegel’s attempt to pass off his ‘theory’ as an 
irrational ‘theory’, if one could even call it a 
‘theory’, was purely a notional gesture. The critic 
pursued an entirely conceptual ideal and disavowed, in 
accordance with its goal, its intellectual basis. Not 
without good reason. His ‘theory’ could not be defended 
on intellectual grounds alone; it was absolute necessary, 
rational even, for Schlegel to resort to ‘magic’, pseudo-
mystical tones and the like to defend his otherwise 
indefensible aims. 
 
‘For this is the beginning of all poetry’, as you may 
well remember Schlegel claiming in the introductory 
chapter, ‘to cancel the progression and laws of 
rationally thinking reason’.228 But Schlegel had 
absolutely no intention to ‘cancel’ any such ‘laws’, he 
was too much of a prude for that. It was all something of 
a decoy - a red herring, if you will. 
 
‘The Dialogue on Poetry’ was not the work of a writer who 
pursued, come what may, his ‘spiritual and intellectual 
interests’, to paraphrase Stirner, ‘as he pleased’; 
rather, it was the work of a calculating theorist who 
manufactured, as best he could, an impression of 
‘irrationalism’ to achieve his conceptual goal. 
227 Maurice Blanchot, ‘The Athenaeum’ (1983 p. 165). 
228 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 86). 
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Schlegel’s intellectual craft remained, in spite of his 
insistence to the contrary, his ‘master passion’, as 
indeed Wernaer quite rightly said.  
 
VI. THE IMMEASURABLE SNOB 
 
Schlegel’s appreciation of ‘romantic poetry’ had, lest we 
forget it, an unquestionably ‘majestic’ air about it. We 
are rather forced to face that fact whether we wish to or 
not. Schlegel spoke of his ‘theory’ in such toady and 
reverential tones that one may well start to become 
utterly contemptuous of the whole thing altogether. ‘It 
can be exhausted by no theory’, as Schlegel sternly 
warned us, ‘and only a divinatory criticism would dare 
try to characterize its ideal’.229  
 
At this point, Schlegel shows something of his true 
colours and begins to turn on the reader in a mean and 
snooty little way. I have already described him, rather 
too kindly on reflection, as an ‘overbearing host’.  
 
Schlegel’s ‘hospitality’ gives way to something far more 
aggressive and unpleasant. He was not only an extremely 
shrewd if fussy theorist, but also, it appears, something 
of a cliquey and outright bully. One is almost certainly 
able to get a clearer picture, if nothing else, of the 
ruthlessness with which he pursued his specious ends.  
 
‘Other kinds of poetry’, as Schlegel sniffed, ‘are 
finished and are now capable of being fully analyzed’.230 
Are we then to assume that his ‘theory’, in complete 
229 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 140 – 141). 
230 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 140 – 141). 
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contrast to ‘other kinds of poetry’, was actually beyond 
criticism? It was not, as Schlegel claimed, ‘capable of 
being fully analyzed’? And why not? Simply because he 
intentionally failed to put a full stop at the end of his 
‘theory’? It was more than a little rich coming from a 
critic who claimed to value artistic and intellectual 
freedom as greatly as we had been led to believe. 
 
If we turn, in the hope of getting a clearer answer, to 
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy’s ‘The 
Literary Absolute’ (1978), a study I have already 
described as ‘bombastic’, we find the authors  
somewhat in awe of Schlegel’s seasoned trickery. 
 
To understand what Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy had to say 
for themselves is not the easiest of things to do; they 
tended, more often than not, to drown each other out. One 
not only gets the distinct impression that Lacoue-
Labarthe and Nancy were talking at precisely the same 
time during ‘The Literary Absolute’, but had actually, in 
the process, surpassed Schlegel’s verbal excesses and 
surpassed them by some distance. It was, if it needs 
saying, no mean feat.  
 
Nevertheless, if one carefully and patiently picks one’s 
way through Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s jumbled words one 
slowly begins to sense something of the alarming and 
hostile united front which faced Dupuis and Cotonet when 
they asked, rather ‘stupidly’ as it turns out: ‘what, 
then, is romanticism’.231  
 
Talking of the said question – the one that got Dupuis 
231 Alfred de Musset, ‘Letters of Dupuis and Cotonet’ collected in 
‘The Complete Writings of Alfred de Musset’ Volume 9 (1836 / 1908 p. 
208). 
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and Cotonet so worked up in the first place, Lacoue-
Labarthe and Nancy deigned to say: ‘the important thing 
is first that the question should persist and insist’, 
they both said at the same time, ‘and that its answer, 
obviously, should be awaited’. ‘It means’, they added a 
little further on, ‘that literature, as its own infinite 
questioning and as the perpetual positing of its own 
question, dates from romanticism and as romanticism. And 
therefore that the romantic question, the question of 
romanticism, does not and cannot have an answer or, at 
least that its answer can only be interminably deferred, 
continually deceiving, endlessly recalling the question 
(if only by denying that it still needs to be posed). 
This is why romanticism, which is actually a moment (the 
moment of its question) will always have been more than a 
mere “epoch”, or else will never cease, right up to the 
present, to incomplete the epoch it inaugurated’.232  
 
‘The important thing’, as Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy may 
have patronised to tell Dupuis and Cotonet, ‘is first 
that the question should persist and insist, and that its 
answer, obviously, should be awaited’.233 ‘Romanticism, in 
other words’, as Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy blurted, 
having finally reached, one would like to think, their 
wits’ end, ‘could never have protected, defended, or 
preserved itself from its “unworking” - its incalculable 
and uncontrollable incompletion: its incompletable 
incompletion’.234 
 
Once again we are faced, not only with Schlegel’s 
232 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The Literary 
Absolute’ (1978 / 1988 p. 83). 
233 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The Literary 
Absolute’ (1978 / 1988 p. 83). 
234 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The Literary 
Absolute’ (1978 / 1988 p. 59). 
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verbosity, but also the same haughty and patronising tone 
that we might have hoped had stopped, if not with 
Schlegel, then certainly with de Musset’s Clerk nearly a 
century and half before ‘The Literary Absolute’ was 
published in the mid 1970’s. One gets the familiar, 
sinking feeling of ever getting oneself involved and 
meddling with the ‘business’ of romanticism at all; ‘the 
inability to be defined or delimited’, as Lacoue-Labarthe 
and Nancy said, probably belongs to the very essence of 
genre’.235  
 
The question of romanticism would appear to bring out the 
very worst in some people. It certainly brought the worst 
out of Schlegel, de Musset’s Clerk and Lacoue-Labarthe 
and Nancy to name but a few. All of whom saw fit to look 
down their noses on those impertinent enough, like Dupuis 
and Cotonet, to have asked such ‘facile’ and ‘vulgar’ 
question in the first place. 
 
One may even start to feel unaccountably protective 
towards Dupuis and Cotonet and find it increasingly 
difficult not to instinctively jump to their defence 
purely, if nothing else, to express one’s antipathy for 
all the snooty, gangish and verbose form of bullying the 
pair would have almost certainly been subjected to at the 
hands of Schlegel and his clique. ‘I felt a strong 
inclination’, to quote Benjamin Constant’s exceptionally 
sharp novel ‘Adolphe’ (1816), ‘to contradict them; not 
because I was necessarily opposed to their opinions, but 
from exasperation at convictions so stolid and 
unshakable’.236 The grounds of Constant’s objections 
certainly begin to characterise something of my own; not 
235 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The Literary 
Absolute’ (1978 / 1988 p. 90 - 91). 
236 Benjamin Constant, ‘Adolphe’ (1816 / 1924 p. 34). 
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just towards Schlegel but also, with a few exceptions, 
the all too forgiving ‘critical’ reception the ‘charmed’ 
critic has received in more ‘contemporary’ circles. 
 
On these occasions, when one’s indignation is at its 
strongest, it is more than tempting, to immediately throw 
one’s lot in with de Musset’s dilettantish pair, declare 
the whole matter ‘nonsense’ and wash one’s hands of it 
for good.237 Life, as the well worn cliché goes, is simply 
too short. The adage, however trite, is particularly apt 
with Schlegel’s example in mind. 
 
The likes of Dupuis and Cotonet ‘obviously’ had to wait, 
as Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy put it, and wait for an 
extremely long time - if not an eternity, before 
Schlegel’s ‘theory’ reached any sort of conclusive 
outcome. In the meantime, one, presumably, has little 
choice but to hold one’s tongue - for fear of it being 
bitten off and impatiently drum one’s fingers in the 
vague and rather fatuous belief that Schlegel’s ‘theory’ 
would honour his word in the long run.  
 
But, surely, one can guarantee to do almost anything if 
one has been granted an indefinite amount of time to 
accomplish it. And having shrewdly granted himself an 
eternity, Schlegel promised the world without any sort of 
pressing necessity to deliver it.  
 
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy described the ‘fragment’ as 
‘the romantic genre par excellence’.238 Understandably so, 
237 Alfred de Musset, ‘Letters of Dupuis and Cotonet’ collected in 
‘The Complete Writings of Alfred de Musset’ Volume 9 (1836 / 1908 p. 
209). 
238 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The Literary 
Absolute’ (1978 / 1988 p. 40). 
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given their predilection for suspense. The soil need not 
give a fraction of an inch to any of Schlegel’s 
embryonic, half-formed ideas; it was rather by the bye 
whether they manifested their meaning or not. What was of 
far greater importance to Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy - 
what really got them going was the possibility that 
something entirely unprecedented and hitherto unknown 
could emerge, any second now, from Schlegel’s vegetal 
hothouse. The prospect certainly kept the expectant pair 
on tenterhooks. 
 
‘Analysis’, as an incalculably more insightful critic 
observed, ‘kills spontaneity. The grain once ground into 
flour springs and germinates no more’.239 And the ‘grain’, 
as Amiel just described it, must, as Schlegel also 
realised, remain exactly how it is - in a fallow,  
languorous state if it is to preserve any sense of 
futurity. Schlegel’s fragments were permanently ‘on hold’ 
and suspended - as indeed they have remained for over two 
centuries, but, at any given moment, they could, as if by 
‘magic’, burst forth from their gestatory state and 
reveal their latent splendor. 
 
‘Finally, it should be kept in mind’, turning to Hans 
Eichner, ‘that Schlegel’s idea of romantische Poesie was 
conceived by him as the goal of an infinite progression, 
subject to “divinatory criticism” rather than to 
historical research’.240 ‘Even here, however, at his most 
immanental’, as another critic - this time Kate Rigby 
wrote: ‘Schlegel reserves a space for transcendence. For 
if the divine is eternally in the process of becoming, it 
239 Henri-Frédéric Amiel, ‘Amiel’s Journal. The Journal Intime of 
Henri-Frédéric Amiel’ (1882 / 1901 p. 254). 
240 Hans Eichner, ‘Friedrich Schlegel’s Theory of Romantic Poetry’ 
(1956 p. 1031).  
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can never be fully present in the world at any one 
moment’.241  
 
Having graced the form with a sense of all of these 
pseudo-mystical sounding qualities: ‘infinite 
progression’ (Eichner), ‘eternal processes of becoming’ 
(Rigby) and ‘infinitization of waiting’ (Lacoue-Labarthe 
and Nancy) -  all of which have, if you happen to agree, 
a decidedly purgatorial ring to them, Schlegel extricated 
himself, in what must surely constitute something of a 
masterstroke, from unwelcome criticism.242  
 
The ‘essence’ of ‘romantic poetry’ was, presumably still 
is, in an endless ‘state of becoming’ and anything in a 
so called ‘state of becoming’ is not, as Rigby said, 
‘fully present’ and proves much harder to pin down and 
examine than your ‘average’ grounded concept.243 In their 
enthusiasm to legitimise Schlegel’s stupendously 
heightened idea - his ‘mystifying pronouncements’ as 
Wellek faithfully described them, nearly all of these 
‘critics’ adjudged it ‘fair game’ to treat the reader in 
a cursory and somewhat shoddy way.  
 
Before one knows what’s what, one is immediately referred 
back to Schlegel’s 116th fragment and solemnly advised, if 
one heeds Eichner’s otherwise insightful advice, to 
resort to ‘“divinatory criticism”’, whatever that might 
entail, to discern the ‘profundity’ of the critic’s 
arcane and pretentious fragments.244 
241 Kate Rigby, ‘Topographies of the Sacred. The Poetics of Place in 
European Romanticism’ (2004 p. 49). 
242 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The Literary 
Absolute’ (1978 / 1988 p. 102). 
243 Kate Rigby, ‘Topographies of the Sacred. The Poetics of Place in 
European Romanticism’ (2004 p. 49). 
244 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
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Schlegel legitimised his ‘theory’ by appealing to the 
least definite or comprehensible of things - ‘the 
infinite’, the ‘unconscious’, the ‘magical’, the ‘half 
formed’ and the so on and so forth; it was an ingenious, 
if rather duplicitous means, by which Schlegel put his 
‘pronouncements’, had one the nerve to ‘dare’, beyond 
critical examination. Schlegel’s ‘calling’, as I have 
said, exceeded the bounds of ‘mere’ literary criticism - 
it was far loftier than that. 
 
Schlegel distanced himself, all too opportunely, from 
‘mere’ literary criticism and extricated himself, in the 
process, from the sobriety of its invective. If his 
‘theory’ was ‘unfathomable’ it was ‘unfathomable’ for a 
very good reason. That it left one none the wiser was not 
Schlegel’s fault, the blame lay squarely with the reader; 
they were clearly insensitive to his ‘poetic’ and 
‘numinous’ insights. Schlegel’s ‘mysticism’, for all its 
calculated profundity remained, just like his 
‘universalism’, entirely implausible.  
 
In a certain sense, it must surely come as an enormous, 
if somewhat onerous compliment to Schlegel’s sophistry 
that after the best part of two centuries it still had 
the strength to entrance critics as powerfully as it 
appeared to have entranced Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy et 
al.    
 
The reader is certainly able to develop - I hesitate to 
use the word ‘appreciation’ but certainly a far keener 
estimation of Schlegel’s ‘intellectual evasiveness’; a 
sense, in other words, not only of how inscrutable he 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 140 – 141). 
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believed his own ‘theory’ to be but also the extent to 
which other critics, from the 1970’s onwards, have all 
too willingly indulged Schlegel’s fancies.  
 
One cannot help, in this particular respect, but 
reluctantly admire Schlegel’s ingenuity. Having placed a 
dormant seed at the heart of his ‘theory’ Schlegel made 
it extremely difficult to pass judgment on it for fear of 
‘jumping to conclusions’. His ‘theory’ could not be 
‘analysed’ as analysis, to some extent or another, 
implies that something is complete and capable of being 
analysed in the first place. Schlegel’s ‘theory’, 
however, was not complete. The all too precious ‘seed’ 
had yet to germinate. 
 
‘A romantic movement’, if one listens to T. E. Hulme’s 
all too optimistic hope, ‘must have an end of the very 
nature of the thing. It may be deplored, but it can’t be 
helped – wonder must cease to be wonder’.245 But in 
Schlegel’s example, the otherwise sound Hulme would seem 
to have missed the point entirely. Schlegel’s romantic 
‘theory’ showed absolutely no sign that it was ever 
likely to reach a conclusive ‘end’. And that, indeed, 
seemed its sole and portentous point. ‘Wonder’ would 
continue to be ‘wonder’ if Friedrich Schlegel and his 
clique had any say in the matter.  
 
‘One may wonder’, as another critic, Peter Szondi, 
postulated, ‘whether his choice of the fragmentary form 
is not simply a sign that Schlegel recognizes his 
inability to solve these problems’.246 Szondi was, I 
245 T. E. Hulme, ‘Romanticism and Classicism’ collected in 
‘Speculations’ (1924 / 1977 p. 140). 
246 Peter Szondi, ‘Friedrich Schlegel’s Theory of Poetical Genres: A 
Reconstruction from the Posthumous Fragments’ (1986 p. 82). 
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believe, well on his way to making an extremely observant 
point before he jumped in and cut his better self short.  
 
Schlegel had no intention - absolutely none at all, to 
‘solve’ any ‘problem’. His work proffered little in the 
way of genuine answers, big or small. It was largely 
barren. But one must not forget the fact that Schlegel 
fancied himself as a polemicist. ‘When reason and 
unreason touch’, as you may remember him saying, ‘there’s 
an electric shock. It’s called polemics’.247 Schlegel was 
duty bound, in that respect, to manufacture a series of 
niggling ‘problems’ and leave them hanging in the air. 
Each ‘mildly charged fragment’ may not have been harmful 
in itself, but as Schlegel delivered the little jolts 
with such rapidity, one repeatedly after the other, they 
constituted a steady and formidable war of attrition. 
 
I would not, presuming I was in any sort of position to 
do so, have encouraged Szondi to entertain the thought, 
even mention the word ‘solution’ with regard to 
Schlegel’s polemics. Not out of any particular deference 
for the critic’s ‘magisterial’ scheme, but, purely and 
simply, out of consideration of the insurmountable 
distance Schlegel intentionally placed between the all 
too contrived one (the said ‘problem’) and the ever 
receding chance of the other (the reputed ‘solution’). It 
is not the least bit advisable to entertain even the 
remotest hope of discerning a ‘solution’ as the ‘problem’ 
has, is and will always be several steps in its advance. 
To put it plainly, the ‘solution’ has not presented 
itself in the 1800’s, the 1970’s nor, indeed, the 2010’s; 
consequently, one should not only severely doubt the 
247 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Lucinde and the Fragments’ (1797 – 1799 / 
1971 p. 204). 
 128 
                                                 
likelihood of a ‘solution’ ever appearing, but also be 
extremely wary of the very ‘problems’ Schlegel posed in 
the first place. 
 
The critic’s ‘choice of the fragmentary form’ was an 
extremely beneficent means through which Schlegel was 
able to absolve himself from any duty to ‘solve’ a single 
thing. Schlegel shirked the rather unenviable 
responsibility of ‘filling in the gaps’ to the reader 
whom he left completely in the lurch. Some of whom, in 
their growing desperation, have even seen fit, not 
wishing, presumably, to appear unpoetic, to accord 
profound importance to the derisory scraps left to them. 
Schlegel’s rather sadistic sounding ‘electric shocks’ had 
far more disorientating effects on some than they had on, 
in a manner of speaking, a ‘less grounded’ collection of 
others.  
 
It is sorely tempting, in this particular respect, to 
level a warning of sorts in the direction of Lacoue-
Labarthe and Nancy et al: ‘Even in the organic kingdom’, 
as Schopenhauer wrote, ‘we see a dry seed preserve the 
slumbering force for three thousand years, and with the 
ultimate appearance of favourable circumstances grow up 
as a plant’.248 One has, I fear, an equal wait on one’s 
hands if one has any inclination at all - let alone the 
patience or even, to put it very plainly indeed, the 
lifespan to see Schlegel’s ‘profound’ fragments finally 
reach their fruition. The ‘favourable circumstances’, as 
Schopenhauer described them, have not been, in Schlegel’s 
case, the least bit forthcoming.  
 
248 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 136 - 137). 
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One must seriously begin to question the patience - the 
all too saintly patience of the likes of Lacoue-Labarthe 
and Nancy whom, one fears, are still eyeing the soil in a 
masochistic state of expectancy.  
 
As for the few cynics amongst us who are reluctant to 
readily accept the ‘profundity’ of Schlegel’s pretentious 
and dubious ‘theory’ nor willing to pander to his fancies 
- if indeed one has the time to spare, are simply made to 
feel incapable of fully appreciating the magnitude and 
sublimity of his poetic vision. One has little choice but 
to make do with Schlegel’s fallacious, half-baked ideas 
in the vain hope, that given time (and an awfully long 
stretch of time at that), they would eventually come to 
mean something in the long run. 
 
The novelty and value of Schlegel’s romantic ‘theory’ was 
based entirely upon the most extravagant and hollow of 
promissory notes whose authenticity one ‘dare’ not 
question and whose debts, one sorely suspects, Schlegel 
could never possibly square. His ‘theory’ was 
irresolvable. It was, as Pär Lagerkvist might have said 
of it: ‘A riddle which is intended not to be solved, but 
to exist. To exist for us always. To trouble us 
always’.249  
 
Schlegel’s fragments alluded, in an all too abstruse way, 
to a far greater ‘whole’ whom one was not encouraged to 
talk about directly for fear of undermining its 
authority, offending his ideal in some way or another and 
betraying, as a result, one’s ‘plebian’ insensibility for 
poetry. It was obviously not for the likes of us. 
 
249 Pär Lagerkvist, ‘The Sibyl’ (1958 p. 148).  
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Schlegel’s self-regarding and snobbish attitude has all 
of the meek ‘do’s and don’ts’ one may well associate with 
meeting a member of the Royal Family. One is not 
encouraged to engage in direct eye contact and certainly 
not advised to touch it - let alone ruffle its hair, slap 
its back or begin to subject it to any sort of sensitive  
personal questions.  
 
But one must remind oneself, to provide a brief interval 
to the proceedings, that Schlegel, for all of his 
bombastic talk and supercilious, bullying tone did not 
get anywhere near honouring his ‘promissory note’. 
Schlegel certainly did not go on to write the complete 
work of which he spoke in such reverential tones; 
instead, he ended his days in the far more fitting 
luxuriance of embassage where everything, no doubt to his 
extreme delight, ‘gleamed’ and ‘glowed’ in his 
inestimable company. 
 
‘You may try in vain to seize the butterfly’s wing’, as 
you may remember, to return your attention to the matter 
at hand, the Clerk’s condescending words of warning to 
Dupuis and Cotonet in the introductory chapter, but ‘the 
dust that colors it will be all you can hold in your 
fingers’.250 And, no doubt, to the approval of de Musset’s 
Clerk, Schlegel’s ‘theory’ was also based on irresolution 
and indeterminacy. It had all of the qualities of the 
most maddening and irritating butterfly whom one cannot, 
however hard one tries, appear to be able to net and pin 
down. 
 
‘Romantic poetry invariably deals with longing’, as 
250 Alfred de Musset, ‘Letters of Dupuis and Cotonet’ collected in 
‘The Complete Writings of Alfred de Musset’, Volume 9 (1836 / 1908 p. 
209). 
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Hjalmar Hjorth Boyesen wrote in ‘Novalis and the Blue 
Flower’ (1892), ‘not a definite, formulated desire for 
some attainable object, but a dim, mysterious aspiration, 
a trembling unrest, a vague sense of kinship with the 
infinite, and a consequent dissatisfaction with every 
form of happiness which the world has to offer’. ‘The 
blue flower’, Boyesen added - alluding to Novalis’ 
unfinished, fairy tale ‘Heinrich von Ofterdingen’ (1802), 
‘like the absolute ideal, is never found in this world; 
poets may at times dimly feel its nearness, and perhaps 
even catch a glimpse of it in some lonely forest glade, 
far from the haunts of men, but it is vain to try to 
pluck it’.251  
 
Schlegel’s exalted ‘theory’ absolved itself from 
intellectual scrutiny - ‘historical research’ as Eichner 
called it, as it had simply not reached the point where 
it could actually be scrutinised; if, indeed, one had 
plucked up enough courage to suggest such an unthinkable 
thing in the first place.252 Having intentionally left 
everything ‘half-done’ and extending what he had done to 
an insensate, infinite and fussy ‘godhead’ – ‘Mother 
Nature’, Schlegel not only betrayed his ‘inability to 
solve these problems’, but also excused himself from that 
duty as ‘these problems’, if you remember Peter Szondi 
calling them, were distended to such a nonsensical degree 
that they were put well beyond one’s grasp, if not one’s 
complete comprehension. Schlegel ‘longed’, to repeat a 
line from J. P. Jacobsen’s novel, ‘Niels Lyhne’ (1880), 
‘for colors that life did not possess, for a beauty that 
251 Hjalmar Hjorth Boyesen, ‘Novalis and the Blue Flower’ collected in 
‘Essays on German Literature’ (1892 p. 324 - 25). 
252 Hans Eichner, ‘Friedrich Schlegel’s Theory of Romantic Poetry’ 
(1956 p. 1031).  
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the earth could not ripen’.253  
 
Schlegel’s ‘theory’ had yet to reach its completion, if 
indeed it was ever likely to reach such a conclusive 
point. ‘But in the universe of poetry’, as Schlegel 
imagined, ‘nothing stands still, everything is developing 
and changing and moving harmoniously; and even the comets 
obey invariable laws of motion. But until the course of 
these heavenly bodies can be calculated and their return 
predicted, the true world system of poetry won’t have 
been discovered’.254 The ‘true world system of poetry’ had 
yet to be discovered; man, as Schlegel faithfully said, 
had far more chance of fathoming the workings of the 
universe than he had of fathoming his own poetic 
‘theory’.255  
 
Schlegel may well have talked of ‘flowers’ and ‘bosoms’, 
but he talked of them through clenched teeth. His 
wheedlesome tone was little more than a ruse. The critic 
practiced a very sharp and unsavoury form of intimidation 
by means of scope and scale. ‘Only in relation to the 
infinite’, as we have heard Schlegel snort, ‘is there 
meaning and purpose; whatever lacks such a relation is 
absolutely meaningless and pointless’.256  
 
Not that Schlegel was the only who resorted to these sort 
of ‘intimidatory tactics’. Schopenhauer, as we will hear 
in the proceeding chapter, was no less culpable -  
possibly worse, in fact. But if we turn, putting the 
253 Jens Peter Jacobsen, ‘Niels Lyhne’ (1880 / 19** p. 93 - 94). 
254 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Lucinde and the Fragments’ (1797 – 1799 / 
1971 p. 237). 
255 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Lucinde and the Fragments’ (1797 – 1799 / 
1971 p. 237). 
256 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Lucinde and the Fragments’ (1797 - 1799 / 
1971 p. 241). 
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philosopher to one side for the time being, to the second 
volume of Sénancour’s ‘Obermann’ (1803) we hear very much 
the same thing: ‘Nothing is worth consideration that is 
not lasting’.257 ‘I need limitless illusions’, as the same 
writer said in the first volume of his lengthy series of 
soliloquies, ‘receding before me to keep me always under 
their spell. What use to me is anything that can end?’.258 
And turning to another work we hear: ‘What I felt as I 
plunged my gaze into this infinitude’, as Maurice de 
Guérin wrote - expressing something of Schlegel’s 
particular bent, ‘it would be difficult to express. This 
vision is too great for the soul; she is terrified at 
this mighty apparition and no longer knows whither she 
goes’.259  
 
It is, I feel obliged to add, something of a minor 
injustice to cast Sénancour and, to a lesser degree, 
Maurice de Guérin in exactly the same light as Friedrich 
Schlegel. For all of their own browbeating by means of 
the ‘infinite’, Sénancour in particular, was a far more 
ingenuous and thoughtful writer than the fraught and 
pompous Schlegel could ever faithfully have said to have 
been. One is certainly more tolerant of Sénancour’s 
excesses than Schlegel’s as there are a great deal of 
genuinely insightful things to be gained from his work 
which one cannot so readily say, if at all, of 
Schlegel’s. 
 
Even in the hands of a far greater talent, the 
fragmentary form, in light of its proliferous nature, was 
257 Étienne Pivert de Sénancour, ‘Obermann’, Vol. II (1804 / 1910 p. 
251). 
258 Étienne Pivert de Sénancour, ‘Obermann’, Vol. I (1804 / 1910 p. 
73). 
259 Maurice de Guérin, ‘The Journal of Maurice de Guérin’ (1842 / 1891 
p. 87). 
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somewhat flawed, as indeed Novalis suggested. But it 
mattered less if a dozen or so fragments failed to 
capture one’s attention - proved ‘sterile’ as Novalis put 
it, if one or two of them actually succeeded in their 
aim; they, at least, made up for the shortcomings of the 
others.260 But in the regrettable event of coupling the 
form’s inherent weakness – its decidedly hit and miss 
nature, with a writer of Schlegel’s obscurant bent the 
resultant experience is dramatically less rewarding.  
 
There is little in the way of a ‘counterbalance’, as it 
were. The form’s weakness is not complimented by 
occasional flashes of fulgurant light. Schlegel’s 
fragments were largely without fuel or flint and failed 
to ignite, least of all sustain one’s interest or 
curiosity. Schlegel simply did not have the presence of 
mind nor the penetrating insight, in anything like the 
necessary proportions, to bring very much to light at all 
– presuming, somewhat naively, that was his aim. One 
comes across one ‘sterile’ grain after another with far 
greater frequency than one might, initially, have hoped.  
 
Leaving that matter for good, one can nonetheless, to 
return your attention to ‘loftier’ matters, begin to 
recognise the importance the likes of the ‘infinite’ and 
‘universal’ had for the romantics in question. 
‘Infinitude’ has, if one happens like Schlegel, to be 
impressed by big and fanciful things, a far more elevated 
and rarefied ring to it than its less fruitful 
counterpart, finitude. The ‘infinite’ certainly had a 
very special appeal for Friedrich Schlegel - a sophist 
with a particular soft spot for all that was big, 
perfumatory and, as René Wellek said a little earlier, 
260 Novalis, ‘Grains of Pollen’ (1798/ 19** 2: 463). 
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‘grandiose’.261  
 
The fanaticism for all that was big and esoteric 
engendered a certain, if peculiar form of snobbishness 
towards all that was ‘merely’ finite, singular and 
demonstrable. And Schlegel, for one, certainly 
capitalised on the disproportionate size difference 
between the one and the other. Schlegel used the 
‘infinite’ as a yardstick, which he beat rather 
menacingly in his hand, to intimidate the reader, to make 
him or her ‘terrified’, as indeed de Guérin’s ‘soul’ was 
‘terrified’, by the thoroughly daunting sight of ‘this 
mighty apparition’.262 The ‘mighty’ vision was, in 
Schlegel’s case, his own ‘theory’ of ‘romantic poetry’. 
 
Schlegel bullied the reader, if he or she did not wish to 
appear insensitive, ‘unpoetic’ or too vulgar into 
submitting to his claims. The reader is simply not up to 
the task of comprehending Schlegel’s regal, if thoroughly 
specious ‘theory’, yet alone begin to subject it to any 
sort of analysis. ‘This vision’, as we heard de Guérin 
say, ‘is too great for the soul’.  
 
To put it a little more simply, Schlegel exploited the 
idea of ‘the infinite’ to shoo away critics in the most 
intimidating and belittling sort of ways.263 They were 
simply not up to the task of analysing something so very 
grand: it was clearly beyond them. 
 
Wyndham Lewis certainly recognised the unsavoury and 
261 René Wellek, ‘Friedrich Schlegel’ in ‘A History of Modern 
Criticism: 1750 - 1950. Volume 2: The Romantic Age’ (1955 p. 35). 
262 Maurice de Guérin, ‘The Journal of Maurice de Guérin’ (1842 / 1891 
p. 87). 
263 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The Literary 
Absolute’ (1978 / 1988 p. 59). 
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disdainful form of bullying generally at play. The 
‘individual, in short’, as the refulgent painter wrote, 
‘is dwarfed by these perspectives’.264 ‘Everywhere’, as he 
said some pages before, ‘the snobbery of scale is 
employed to drive home these doctrines’.265 Lewis’ 
observation not only proved pertinent with regards to 
Schlegel’s ‘theory’ but also, with one eye on the 
following chapter, Schopenhauer’s doctrine of nature’s 
will. Schlegel ran, all too eagerly, into the oafish arms 
of the so called ‘infinite’ to overawe and frighten 
readers into submission; it was another tremendously 
clever, if rather cheap means by which Schlegel ‘kept 
trespassers out’. 
 
But one must seriously begin to question whether 
‘romantic poetry’ did not simply represent an inviolable 
‘golden rule’ that Schlegel exploited in a brazen, if 
vain attempt to cover up his grave and innumerable 
shortcomings. 
VII. THE CONCUSSIVE DIALECTIC 
 
While it may again sound improbable, given his reluctance 
to leave his comfort zone or associate himself with 
anything that was not of a likeminded temperament, 
Schlegel continued to test, not just one’s credulity and 
patience, but, if he was to be believed, ‘ideas’ 
themselves to their absolute limits. His ‘theory’ had a 
dialectical aim; it sought, as you may remember hearing 
in one of the earlier passages, to ‘combine the extremes’ 
in order to ascertain the ‘true’ centre.266 
 
264 Wyndham Lewis, ‘Time and Western Man’ (1927 p. 241).  
265 Wyndham Lewis, ‘Time and Western Man’ (1927 p. 182).  
266 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 155). 
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‘An idea’, as Schlegel elaborated, ‘... is an absolute 
synthesis of absolute antitheses, the continual self-
creating interchange of two conflicting thoughts’.267 
‘Only by being individual and universal’, if we swiftly 
turn to another of his epigrams, ‘does a work become the 
work’.268 But ‘the work’, as Schlegel emphatically 
described it, acted to the advantage of one at the 
expense of the other. The ‘extremes’ were not on anything 
that could be described as an equal footing.  
 
Schlegel hardly talked of the ‘individual’ as fair game 
for the ‘universal’; the ‘centre’ was not the least bit 
true, it was way off the mark and played more to the 
advantage of the latter than it did to the former. ‘Only 
through the relationship to the infinite’, as the 
immeasurable snob imagined, ‘do content and utility 
arise; that which is not related to it is merely void and 
useless’.269 It was a wholly imbalanced and one sided 
affair and one party - the smaller, least ‘useful’ of the 
two, inevitably lost out to the other. 
 
The so called ‘dialectic’ of Schlegel’s ‘theory’ had all 
the disorientation and confusion associated with the 
immediate aftermath of a particularly violent collision. 
The result of the head on encounter meant all that was 
‘individual’ was now ‘universal’ and all that was 
‘universal’ had suddenly become ‘individual’. The former 
was, inexplicably, a byword for the latter and the 
interplay between the two was said, if only in a nominal 
sense, to be commutative.  
267 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Lucinde and the Fragments’ (1797 – 1799 / 
1971 p. 176). 
268 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 92). 
269 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 149). 
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Schlegel betrayed something of his concussive state when 
he asked: ‘But are not nature and the world 
individuals?’.270 On the following page, Schlegel had 
still not fully recovered his senses: ‘Through artists 
mankind becomes an individual’.271 And one severely begins 
to doubt, turning to another work, whether he was ever 
likely to recover them at all - presuming, of course, he 
had them to lose in the first place. ‘Aren’t there 
individuals’, as Schlegel asked, ‘who contain within 
themselves whole systems of individuals?’.272  
 
The ‘universal’, from the little one is able to gather, 
engulfed all that was ‘individual’ within an enormous, 
capacious cloud. Having done so, Schlegel saw absolutely 
no reason to prevent him from talking of the ‘universal’ 
as if it were indeed ‘individual’. Given its ‘infinite 
scope’, Schlegel no doubt felt entitled to refer to his 
‘theory’ in any which way he pleased. It subsumed 
‘everything’, after all. But whether anything of singular 
standing actively contributed an influence of its own in 
the reputed ‘interchange’ with the ‘universal’ was, if 
one considers Schlegel’s aversion to all that was not 
monumental, again highly improbable.273  
 
‘We are concerned only with the meaning of the whole’, as 
Schlegel corroborated. And, as he immediately added, 
‘things which individually excite, move, occupy, and 
delight our sense, our hearts, understanding, and 
270 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 154). 
271 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 155). 
272 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Lucinde and the Fragments’ (1797 – 1799 / 
1971 p. 196). 
273 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Lucinde and the Fragments’ (1797 – 1799 / 
1971 p. 176). 
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imagination seem to us to be only a sign, a means for 
viewing the whole at the moment when we rise to such a 
view’.274 On another page we hear him say much the same 
sort of thing: ‘Every conscious link of an organism’, 
Schlegel wrote, ‘should not perceive its limits without a 
feeling for its unity in relation to the whole’.275 
 
Schlegel was not the least bit interested in anything 
that was ‘individual’, least of all ‘human’. It had, 
first of all, to be implicated with, if not submersed in 
a mysterious ‘whole’ before he could bring himself to 
talk of it with any degree of enthusiasm at all. ‘For 
they regarded life’, if you remember what Blankenagel had 
to say about Schlegel’s coterie, ‘as one and inseparable, 
as a unit’.276 And if one happens, like Schlegel, to 
consider ‘life’ as a single, featureless and ‘inseparable 
unit’ then one is, understandably, disinclined to 
tolerate anything which acts to inhibit that aim with the 
least degree of patience. 
 
VIII. EFFACING MEASURES 
 
Central to the critic’s inceptive ‘theory’ was the 
beleaguered ‘romantic poet’ and he found himself, rather 
a miniscule fraction of himself, in the thick of the 
action. Unlike the comprehensive statue of Schopenhauer’s 
doctrine and, to a lesser degree, Max Stirner’s ‘The Ego 
and Its Own’, Schlegel’s artful ‘theory’, as we well know 
by now, was of a decidedly piecemeal character.  
 
274 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 89). 
275 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 154). 
276 John C. Blankenagel, ‘The Dominant Characteristics of German 
Romanticism’ (1940 p. 4). 
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The reader, if he or she wishes to patch together 
something that resembles, if only in name, an ‘image’ of 
Schlegel’s subject, will be faced with puzzle whose 
numerous pieces are scattered throughout the ‘Dialogue on 
Poetry’. To that end, we are compelled to sift through 
Schlegel’s fragments to get - to use something of a 
misnomer, a ‘clearer’ estimation of his subject. 
Nonetheless, it is possible to detect, if only dimly, a 
billowing impression of the ‘romantic poet’. One 
certainly develops a far keener estimation of the 
destructive nature of Schlegel’s objectives and the 
‘ruthlessness’, as I described it earlier, with which he 
pursued them. 
 
If we turn our attention to the aforementioned subject, 
the romantic poet, we will ‘appreciate’ certain effacing 
measures, if Schlegel was to successfully achieve his 
aim, had first to be performed. The critic’s eye, rather 
mind’s eye, was ‘focused’ on an ‘invisible’, ‘magical’ 
and ‘unconscious’ principle which was said, as we know, 
to exist ‘within’ the heart of the poet and nature alike. 
If Schlegel was to successfully prise out this visceral 
quality then clearly something had to be done about his 
integument. It was something of an inconvenience and 
rather got in the way of Schlegel’s aims. The same went 
for any of the poet’s other definitive features. All of 
which acted to distinguish him, to Schlegel’s 
disapproval, from the likes of any other. 
 
‘It is individuality’, as a still concussed Schlegel 
wrote, ‘which is the original and eternal within man’ 
but, as he conceded, ‘personality doesn’t matter so 
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much’.277 The value Schlegel accorded to the poetic 
subject was determined by that which was ‘universal’ and 
unifying ‘within’ him; all that was particular to him – 
his ‘personality’ for instance, did not, by comparison, 
stand up at all well. It acted to differentiate the 
subject from the ‘the whole’ and upset the trim, even 
outline of Schlegel’s uniform and perfectly hollow 
vision. 
 
The critic by far preferred to work with an insubstantial 
‘essence’; it was ‘invisible’ and ‘unconscious’ and, to 
its further credit, proved incomparably more open to 
manipulation than the poet’s bodily person. It allowed 
Schlegel to take certain liberties with it that he was 
simply not able to do with his determinate form. The 
latter, that is to say, the essence, was certainly not 
accountable to any of the ‘restrictive laws’ which 
presided over the former, the flesh. It was an enormous 
‘advantage’. Schlegel was now able to magically 
transgress the ‘obstacles’ which would otherwise have 
impeded his ideal.  
 
And, as a matter of due course, all the poet’s 
peculiarities and distinguishing features were 
whitewashed. Then, and only then, was Schlegel’s subject 
ideally positioned to express, not simply his ‘limited’ 
self but the lumpish whole of ‘humanity’ not to mention 
the entirety of nature itself, within reason of course. 
The poet was now an ‘essence’, a sweeping generality at 
one with the world rather than an individual person at 
variance with it. 
 
277 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 155). 
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The poet’s somatic state as well as all the intricate 
qualities which accompanied it were ‘void’ and ‘useless’; 
they did not serve Schlegel’s purposes nearly as well as 
his ‘essence’. In ridding, as a matter of utmost urgency, 
the poet of his ‘personality’, his sense and other 
‘encumbrances’, Schlegel reduced the poet to his lowest 
possible condition. And, in this state, he was a far more 
profitable proposition for Schlegel to entertain.  
 
The very standing of the ‘romantic poet’ had been 
whittled away to such a violent degree that he was no 
different from the most insensate of things. Finally, 
Schlegel was able to extend something, though not very 
much, of the poet to the world at large. ‘Man’, as 
Schlegel enthused, ‘is Nature creatively looking back at 
itself’.278 He is, Schlegel gushed, ‘the flower of the 
earth’.279 ‘Think of something finite moulded into the 
infinite’, as the critic imagined, ‘and then you think of 
man’.280 ‘And is not this soft reflection of the godhead 
in man’, as Schlegel asked of the subject’s 
disfiguration, ‘the actual soul, the kindling spark of 
all poetry’.281 What did the ‘romantic poet’ not resemble 
in this rudimentary state? Absolutely ‘everything’ was 
common to him. 
 
Schlegel was determined to push squares through circular 
holes, but he forced them through with such violence they 
eventually yielded and slotted into an uncustomary mould. 
278 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Lucinde and the Fragments’ (1797 - 1799 / 
1971 p. 243). 
279 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Lucinde and the Fragments’ (1797 - 1799 / 
1971 p. 253). 
280 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 157). 
281 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 85). 
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But if one wishes, like Schlegel, to make circles out of 
squares, as it were, then one is obliged to cut them down 
to size, round off each one of their crisp, unwieldy 
corners and mutilate their very form to do so. Having 
adopted a similarly crude technique, Schlegel made ‘all 
things’ fit into his unifying scheme; even if it left a 
jumble of ‘distinguishing features’ at the critic’s feet. 
 
To put it more simply still, Schlegel valued all that was 
homogeneous and uniform rather than that which was 
heterogeneous and distinct; Schlegel discarded all of 
these ‘pointless’ things as they conflicted with his 
primary objectives.282 And those, need I say, were not 
only entirely conceptual, but somewhat barbaric.  
 
If Schlegel were to see ‘homogeneity’ in ‘heterogeneity’, 
to see the ‘universal’ in the ‘individual’, to see 
circles in squares as I rather clumsily put it, ‘all 
things’ must first be decorticated and dispersonated; in 
other words, they had to be stripped of skin and divested 
of personality. These measures, drastic as they may 
sound, were of paramount importance to Schlegel and paid, 
if he was to be believed, certain ‘dividends’. 
 
‘If you cast your life into a human mould’, as Schlegel 
patronised to tell us, ‘you’ve done enough; but you’ll 
never’, he was quick to add, ‘reach the heights of art 
and the depths of science without some portion of 
divinity’.283 Whatever ‘truth’ Schlegel’s ‘theory’ 
afforded the poet, would not present itself to him if 
remained as he was. Of course, it was perfectly 
282 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Lucinde and the Fragments’ (1797 - 1799 / 
1971 p. 241). 
283 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Lucinde and the Fragments’ (1797 - 1799 / 
1971 p. 247). 
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acceptable if he derived ample satisfaction from all that 
was humdrum and banal; if that was the case, the soaring 
‘heights’ of ‘art’, given his obvious insusceptibility to 
such things, were probably not for him - not in any 
circumstance. 
 
If, on the other hand, he aspired to reach such exultant 
‘heights’ then he was expected to pay, as is common 
practice, at least something for the ‘pleasure’ and, 
quite in keeping with the seemingly inescapable status 
quo, the ‘romantic poet’ was made to pay a hefty price 
for the privilege of Schlegel’s ‘revelatory’ view.  
 
While the procedure afforded him a certain advantage in 
span (he was now able to ‘reach’ the exclusive and 
otherwise unobtainable ‘heights’ of ‘art’ etc.,), it left 
the poet somewhat disfigured. He was certainly not the 
same man, if indeed be could be described as anything 
resembling a ‘man’ at all. The critic brutalised the 
poet’s ‘human’ form by putting it through a grindstone of 
sorts and, having done so, compressed the little that 
remained into a elementary, single mould. Needless to 
say, it accommodated all shapes and sizes. The poet was 
now in an ideal state to appreciate all that was 
‘celestial’ and otherworldly as he no longer resembled 
anything that was faintly human. ‘One mentions many 
artists’, as Schlegel pontificated, ‘who are actually art 
works of nature’.284  
 
Schlegel, as we well know by now, had far wider concerns 
on his hands; he was not dealing with anything as secular 
or ordinary as a corporeal human figure, but the spirit. 
284 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 121). 
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And the latter should not be encouraged in any way 
whatsoever if any significant inroads were to be made 
with regards to the former. Certain sacrifices had to 
made, after all. ‘But’, as Max Stirner might have 
pertinently added, ‘truth is spirit, stuff altogether 
inappreciable by the senses, and therefore only for the 
“higher consciousness”, not for that which is “earthly-
minded”’.285 And, quite in keeping with Stirner’s fears, 
Schlegel’s revelations were certainly not for the 
‘earthly minded’, but those of ‘higher’, more rarefied 
tastes.  
 
The poet’s very standing was jeopardised, put in utmost 
peril, by Schlegel’s ‘theory’. The needs of an anonymous 
‘essence’ superceded his own. The two were at 
loggerheads. The inflexible state of one conflicted with 
the ‘higher’, more expansive demands of the other. And 
the poet politely and somewhat foolishly acceded and gave 
way to the bigger of the two parties. 
 
Schlegel saw it differently.  
 
The poet, as the critic warned, ‘must not allow himself 
to be robbed of his own being, his innermost strength by 
a criticism that wishes to purge and purify him into a 
stereotype without spirit and without sense’.286 But if 
one takes into consideration the decidedly skewed nature 
of Schlegel’s ‘dialectics’ – working, in the most 
preponderant way, to the favour of the ‘universal’ at the 
expense of the ‘individual’, the critic’s ‘theory’ did 
exactly that. It ‘robbed’, as a matter of necessity, the 
poet ‘of his own being’ as well as his ‘sense’ as these 
285 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 76). 
286 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 54). 
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were the very qualities that prevented him from communing 
with Schlegel’s aloof and standoffish muse: ‘Mother 
Nature’.  
 
What mattered to Schlegel, in a further attempt to 
clarify the point, was the poet’s ‘innermost being’, but 
it did not, as we know, solely belong to him; it was 
common property and, given the satisfaction of certain 
criteria, belonged to one and all. Schlegel was only able 
to extend his subject to ‘all things’ by destroying the 
very qualities which constituted his ‘individuality’ in 
the first place. 
 
The ‘romantic poet’ was little more to Schlegel than a 
soporific force of nature, no different from the likes of 
dormant seed. And, somewhat unsurprisingly, Schlegel’s 
ontology faithfully mirrored the fragmentary and 
bewildering means the critic chose to express himself. 
His subject was also a ‘fragment’ in whom, as Schlegel 
imagined, ‘the whole’ was conflated: an ‘infinite poem 
concealing the seeds of all other poems’.287 The ‘romantic 
poet’ was the microcosm in which the macrocosm duly 
resided. And, no doubt to the sophist’s delight, the 
‘romantic poet’ was no less fathomable than his ‘theory’. 
‘We will know man’, as Schlegel cautioned his readers, 
‘when we know the center of the earth’.288 Elsewhere he 
said, ‘mankind struggles with all its power to find its 
own centre’.289  
 
The ‘romantic poet’ certainly came out of Schlegel’s 
287 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 82). 
288 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Lucinde and the Fragments’ (1797 – 1799 / 
1971 p. 250). 
289 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 83). 
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‘theory’ the worse for wear. Whatever gains he made on 
the universal front, the poet lost out in a personal 
capacity. Schlegel’s mind’s eye was ‘focused’, in the 
most calculating of ways, on the ‘infinite’, ever 
receding expanse of his ‘theory’ rather than that which 
was immediately present. And the same was equally true of 
his subject. The ontology of the ‘romantic poet’ was 
ghoulish in the extreme.  
 
‘Everyone’s view of poetry is true and good as far as 
that view itself is poetry’, as Schlegel wrote. ‘But 
since one’s poetry’, he added, ‘is limited, just because 
it is one’s own, so one’s view of poetry must of 
necessity be limited. The mind cannot bear this; no doubt 
because, without knowing it, it nevertheless does know 
that no man is merely man, but that at the same time he 
can and should be genuinely and truly all mankind. 
Therefore, man in reaching out time and again beyond 
himself to seek and find the complement of his innermost 
being in the depths of another, is certain to return ever 
to himself’.290  
 
Taking the above passage into consideration, the poet was 
given, as one may appreciate, something of an almighty 
and unenviable undertaking. His ‘creative spirit’, if he 
harboured any inclination to express it (in view of the 
severe drawbacks), was spread very thinly indeed; it was 
the music of the ‘universe’, a poem of ‘the earth’ that 
resided in ‘us’ all. The poet is ‘obviously’ limited in 
himself - he is ‘merely’ an individual, after all. 
Schlegel talked, at one point, of ‘man’s feeling for 
290 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 54). 
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something beyond man’.291 And, at another, he claimed: ‘It 
is peculiar to mankind to transcend mankind’.292 In turn, 
the poet was compelled, as a matter of necessity, to 
trawl the absolute ‘depths’ of ‘mankind’ if he wished to 
capitalise on the extreme ‘good fortune’ Schlegel 
afforded him and express, not necessarily his, but its so 
called ‘transcendent’ spirit. 
 
‘The I’, as Elizabeth Millán-Zaibert spoke on Schlegel’s 
behalf, ‘is only one part of what forms the essence of 
philosophy. More important is the whole that transcends 
any particular I, and indeed, without which each 
individual I would be without meaning’.293 Presuming 
Millán-Zaibert was correct and Schlegel’s poet 
‘transcended any particular I’, one must surely cast 
doubts as to whether he was in any fit state, having 
stooped so very low in a desperate bid to find a common 
point of contact with ‘all and sundry’, to express very 
much at all.  
 
The poet’s ‘innermost being’ was spread so far and wide 
and, for that matter, hit such lowly depths that he was, 
for all intent and purposes, absolutely defunct as an 
individual person. But, once again, it hardly mattered. 
He was ‘only’ a single part of a far greater ‘whole’ of 
which Millán-Zaibert spoke with all the customary 
deference one associates with the likes of Lacoue-
Labarthe and Nancy et al. One can only conclude that 
somewhere ‘within’ the poet lay an incalculable number of 
other slumbering ‘individualities’ and they were, in a 
291 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Lucinde and the Fragments’ (1797 – 1799 / 
1971 p. 246). 
292 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 151). 
293 Elizabeth Millán-Zaibert, ‘Friedrich Schlegel and the Emergence of 
Romantic Philosophy’ (2007 p. 150). 
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quantitative sense, far more important to Millán-Zaibert 
as indeed they were to Schlegel, than the poet’s own. The 
subject was not only outnumbered, but overpowered by the 
collective presence of the spirit. 
 
It was always that which was ‘whole’, ‘infinite’ and 
‘universal’ and, for that matter, completely inhuman that 
was of most importance to the theoretically minded 
critic. As for the question of the poet ever ‘returning 
to himself’, it hardly seemed likely. On his current 
trajectory it was far more probable that he would return 
to the communal, ‘unconscious’ cradle from which his 
vegetal ‘essence’ originated - that is to say, the 
‘primordial’ bosom of nature.294 
 
The romantic subject was valued only by virtue of his 
relationship to ‘the whole’, the ‘infinite’ and 
‘universal’ not by anything that might be said to have 
distinguished him from the likes of these stark and 
foreboding sounding things. He was merely a ‘hint’, as 
Schlegel put it - an allusion, one is encouraged to 
believe, to ‘something higher’. ‘It is’, as Schlegel said 
of his poetic principle, ‘an infinite being and by no 
means does it cling and attach its interest only to 
persons, events, situations, and individual inclinations; 
for the true poet all this – no matter how intensely it 
embraces his soul – is only a hint at something higher, 
the infinite, a hieroglyph of the one eternal love and 
the sacred fullness of life of creative nature’.295  
 
Schlegel’s use of the term ‘higher’ was, to say the 
294 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 54). 
295 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 99 - 100). 
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least, extremely questionable. The only reason, as far as 
I can gather, the poet was able to witness for ‘himself’ 
the sacrosanct ‘glory’ of nature, rather ‘Mother Nature’, 
was that a certain number of reductive measures had been 
taken. The term ‘higher’ hardly describes the means by 
which Schlegel ‘enabled’ the poet to ‘reach’ or, as I am 
inclined to believe, stoop to that end. As a ‘hieroglyph’ 
of ‘creative nature’ rather than a corporeal or distinct 
figure, the ‘romantic poet’ had, after all, been robbed 
of his personality, singularity and bodily presence.296 
The term ‘lower’, given the number of effacing measures 
taken, was surely more appropriate.  
 
The ‘romantic poet’ paid dearly for all of the 
theoretical liberties, outrages even, Schlegel took with 
him. His stature was not heightened a single notch by 
Schlegel’s ‘theory’, but cut down, in brutal fashion, to 
its dullest, most vegetal level. Only in this disfigured 
state were ‘all things’ common to him. The subject’s 
characteristic qualities, those personal to him, were of 
far less use to Schlegel; they got in the way and 
hindered, to reiterate the point, the critic’s ‘process’ 
of extension and, ultimately, mutilation.  
 
The ‘universal’ ideal was an enormous ‘dispersonating 
pool’, as I described it in the introductory chapter, 
into which the individual subject was thrown and sank 
without trace. ‘All streams of poetry’, as indeed 
Schlegel maintained, ‘flow together into the one vast 
sea’.297 But no clear cut distinction could possibly be 
drawn between one measure of water or another; it was 
296 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 99 - 100). 
297 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 53). 
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rather by the bye whether it was led to the sea by a 
tributary or fell violently from a cloud in the sky. It 
was, as proved the case time and time again, of 
absolutely no consequence.  
 
Schlegel was solely concerned with the fathomless sea 
into which the water, whatever its source, was directed. 
The subject was merely a droplet in an expansive 
‘primordial’ ocean and, as one may well appreciate, it is 
hardly possibly to distinguish a single droplet from the 
voluminous element into which it has immediately merged. 
 
Schlegel even had the nerve to speak of ‘the spiritual 
sphere as a firm point from which the creative energy of 
man can safely expand, developing in all directions, 
without losing itself’.298 I disagree. The bonds of the 
said ‘spiritual sphere’ were secured by the loosest, not 
the ‘firmest’ of anchors. As for the subject’s ‘creative 
energy’ - well, that certainly ‘expanded’, but, like a 
modest measure of concentrate in umpteen thousand gallons 
of water, it expanded in the most dissolvent and 
dissipated of ways.  
 
The subject’s ‘immeasurable sense of being’ emanated, not 
from him or her self, but the murky waters into which the 
he or she, not that it particularly mattered, had been 
plunged. The poet was neither man nor woman but the 
elemental ‘essence’ from which ‘the him’ and ‘the her’ 
sprang. 
 
Schlegel’s subject was not a person, but a poetic essence 
and as an essence – in fact, only as an essence, was he 
298 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 82 - 83). 
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able to transgress his earthly state; even then, it was 
on the strict proviso that he first disrobe, neatly fold 
up his vestiture and put, while he was at it, all of his 
other ‘belongings’ to one side - they would, if he still 
wished to immerse himself in nature’s communal pool, no 
longer be of any use to him.  
 
Schlegel’s ‘theory’ managed to prise his subject’s nature 
out of himself and, having stripped it down to its bare 
minimum, it no longer possessed any characteristic 
attributes; they did not ‘matter so much’, after all. The 
poet’s ‘spirit’ may well, as a ‘base element’, have found 
itself a component part in a countless array of other 
phenomenal forms, but it was no longer remotely human. 
Having divested himself of himself, the ‘romantic poet’ 
was cast to the high seas and completely lost to 
Schlegel’s totalising ‘theory’. 
 
Schlegel’s ideal was completely hollow from top to toe, 
but even then it worked to the charmed critic’s 
advantage. 
 
IX. THE BLANK PAGE 
 
Schlegel was enormously fond of half-formed ideas. They 
alluded, in some way or another, to something infinitely 
larger than themselves and vastly superior to one’s 
intellectual prowess, whatever its strength, to 
comprehend. The critic’s ‘theory’, rather what it alluded 
to, was certainly beyond one’s ability to communicate or 
envisage in its entirety. 
 
You will possibly remember what Schlegel said in one of 
the previous passages: ‘In poetry, too, all that is whole 
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might be only half-done, and yet all half-done might 
actually be whole’.299 And Schlegel turned the ‘half-done’ 
and ‘whole’ on their head just as he had done with the 
‘individual’ and ‘universal’. The ‘half-done’ was no less 
‘whole’, no less ‘complete’ than the ‘individual’ was 
said to be ‘universal’. Schlegel’s concussive condition 
was, it seems, irreversible.  
 
The sketchy and inconclusive nature of Schlegel’s 
fragmentary work suggested a ‘whole’ whose scope and 
magnitude was far greater than any complete work could 
ever possibly hope to be. The critic aspired to conflate 
the ‘poetic whole’ within a few short and utterly 
confusing sentences. 
 
Schlegel churned out an arcane array of fragments in some 
sort of attempt to allude to a ‘whole’ whose magnitude 
and revelatory ‘truth’ he deemed beyond one’s ken to 
grasp or successfully articulate; it was certainly not 
for the ‘earthly-minded’, as Stirner put it. In the turn 
of events, the reader is made to feel extremely small and 
inadequate compared to Schlegel’s inflated, quasi-
mystical ‘theory’. ‘And’, as Wyndham Lewis might have 
said, ‘feeling very, very small indeed, after that, in 
the ensuing discouragement almost any “truth” can be put 
across’.300 
 
Schlegel’s ‘theory’, as we know, emphasised all that was 
‘becoming’, ‘primordial’, ‘invisible’ and, as he 
described it, ‘half-done’.301 Whatever its meaning, it was 
299 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 122). 
300 Wyndham Lewis, ‘Time and Western Man’ (1927 p. 182).  
301 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 122). 
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certainly not found in its actual content rather the 
sense of expectancy and potentiality it engendered. His 
pretentious ‘theory’ was founded upon that which was, as 
it were, ‘without’. Whether it was without presence 
(although something big, colourful and revelatory was, 
any second now, rumoured to be on its way), without a 
tongue (the mute array of flowers), without sense and 
personality (the poor old ‘romantic poet’), without any 
definite shape or form (true of both the poet as well as 
Schlegel’s ‘boundless’ ‘theory’), and without anything 
that was ever likely to reach an end – presuming, of 
course, it came into existence in the first place (again, 
the specious ‘theory’).  
 
The fact that Schlegel was only able to allude to his 
ideal elevated, all too artfully, its ‘gravity’ and 
‘mystique’. That words failed him, as the smug critic no 
doubt imagined, was to his enormous credit.  
 
Silence spoke volumes. 
 
Schlegel’s ‘theory’ hinted at something far grander than 
itself; his ideal was, in a word, ineffable. Its 
inexpressibility rather suited and complimented the 
critic’s aims. His ‘theory’ was characterised, if it can 
be described as such, by something of an ‘anti-quality’ 
quality. Its fundamental value lay, in no small part, on 
that which was missing – on in its ‘absence’, on its 
complete and utter vacuity. 
 
While Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, to cast your mind back 
to that purgatorial pair, were not the least bit free of 
Schlegel’s ‘Schlegelisms’, they certainly had the measure 
of him in one respect. ‘Romantic criticism’, as they 
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wrote, ‘... occupies the place of the absence of the 
work’.302 ‘It is the work of the absence of work’, as 
Maurice Blanchot similarly said of Schlegel’s hollow 
efforts, ‘poetry affirmed in the purity of the poetic 
act, affirmation without duration, freedom without 
realization, power that is exalted as it disappears, in 
no way discredited if it leaves no traces’.303  
 
The gravity of Schlegel’s fragments, as I have already 
said, were supposedly ‘heightened’ on account of that 
which was ‘missing’ and ‘without’ and very much the same 
thing could be said about his subject. The poetic 
‘figure’ - and I use that term with a fair amount of 
reservation, was apparently ‘without’ a body, ‘without’ a 
personality, ‘without’ consciousness, and ‘without’ any 
of the other qualities one tends to ordinarily associate 
with a normal person. But Schlegel’s subject was, as we 
know, anything but normal and ideally placed to reflect 
the critic’s dispersonating ideal. 
 
The English novelist, Thomas Hardy, reputed to be 
something of a Schopenhauerian, perfectly expressed 
Schlegel’s intentions when, in ‘Tess of the 
D’Urbervilles’ (1891), he wrote: ‘corporeal presence is 
sometimes less appealing than corporeal absence; the 
latter creating an ideal presence that conveniently drops 
the defects of the real’.304 And Schlegel’s ontology 
similarly created, in the most contrived sense, an ‘ideal 
presence’, as Hardy described it, that all too 
‘conveniently’ dropped the ‘defects of the real’ purely 
302 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The Literary 
Absolute’ (1978 / 1988 p. 102). 
303 Maurice Blanchot, ‘The Athenaeum’ (1983 p. 164 - 165). 
304 Thomas Hardy, ‘Tess of the D’Urbervilles’ (1891 / 2001 p. 279). 
Modern Library, New York.  
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to serve his ‘grandiose’ conceptual aims. The absence of 
these ‘unpoetic’ qualities, the ‘real’ in other words, 
intimated the presence of something far more profound and 
extraordinary than your average corporeal being or, for 
that matter, your average theoretical scheme.   
 
Schlegel’s ‘theory’ asked far too much of the ‘romantic 
poet’. If he was to reflect the ‘poetry of nature’, he 
had to allow himself to be ‘extended’, ‘grindstoned’ and 
‘processed’ if you will, to an insensate and impersonal 
‘godhead’ whom Schlegel encouraged he ape. In turn, the 
poet, all too naively, strove towards all that was 
aphonic, oscitant and ‘unconscious’ in the hope of 
fulfilling his master’s objective. It was reductive in 
the extreme. He was foolish to take Schlegel’s lead as it 
spelt his end.  
 
The foreboding powers of the ‘unconscious’ and the 
‘unintelligible’ were very much in the ascendancy. And 
the poet all too happily accepted the terms on offer in 
the expectant, if vain hope they proffered ‘higher’ 
rewards. He may well have hit rock bottom but, far more 
importantly, Schlegel’s subject had mastered the perverse 
Esperanto of nature itself. He was now able to ‘commune’ 
on a universal scale - an unthinkable prospect had he not 
followed Schlegel’s lead and remained as he was. But 
having successfully shed his ‘defects’, he was perfectly 
attuned to Schlegel’s ‘ideal’, if he was not fit for very 
much else. 
 
The critic hardly had his subject’s best interests at 
heart nor did he display, intellectually speaking, very 
much in the way of genuine ambition. Schlegel’s subject 
may well have made gigantic territorial ‘advances’, as it 
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were, but they were confounded by the sacrificial 
measures which secured them. Having taken so many 
destructive and injurious steps to align his subject’s 
‘inmost’ being with an all too haughty ‘Mother Nature’, 
Schlegel reduced the poet’s status to its sleepiest, most 
slumberous state. Schlegel sacrificed not only his 
subject’s bodily form but all of his ‘intellectual 
faculties’ to achieve his all too precious ‘universal’ 
goal. 
  
Once again, the intellect suffers the same fate as the 
personality; neither of which enter the fray to exert any 
significant influence on the slumberous scheme, least of 
all any resistance to it. The ‘weighty’ significance 
attributed to all that was atramental, petrous and 
rudimentary ‘within’ did a grave disservice to the 
intellect as well as the personality, not to mention the 
subject’s somatic state. All of which receded well into 
the background and retired for the longest, most 
interminable of nights. 
 
Maurice de Guérin expressed something of the stupefying 
and utterly torpid ‘conclusion’, has one the audacity to 
use such a term with regards to Schlegel’s ‘theory’, when 
he wrote: ‘The soul also becomes insensibly filled with a 
languor which deadens all the activity of the 
intellectual faculties, and lulls it into a half-sleep, 
void of all thought, in which it still feels the power to 
dream of the most beautiful things’.305 But, as Wyndham 
Lewis might have asked, ‘what happens to the personality  
- and all its unique, precious, delicate, fugitive, 
incommunicable self-hood...? Surely the essence of a 
305 Maurice de Guérin, ‘The Journal of Maurice de Guérin’ (1842 / 1891 
p. 129). 
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personality, or of an “individual consciousness”, is that 
it should be stable. And how can it be stable if its 
resistances are overcome, and if it is “sent to sleep”? 
If it is reduced to “a condition of perfect docility,” in 
which anything that is “suggested” to it it accommodates, 
in which it sympathizes ecstatically with its dear 
hypnotist  - that may or may not  be very agreeable for 
it; but we cannot claim, except with our tongue in our 
cheek, that, if we are the hypnotist, we are liberating 
it from oppression, or that we are enhancing its 
“individuality”’.306 
 
Schlegel exploited his highly advantageous ‘presbyopic’ 
and ‘aphasic’ conditions to ‘heighten’, in his opinion,  
the effect of his ‘theory’ as well as the ‘statue’ of his 
subject. But whether, as Lewis suggested, it ‘enhanced’ 
or ‘heightened’ his subject’s standing in any meaningful 
way again remained entirely unlikely. ‘Even in art’, as 
Henri Peyre said of the romantics, ‘their ideal seemed 
inaccessible to them as it was so far above them, and the 
deficiencies of linguistic or pictorial resources in 
relation to their dream led them to despair’.307  
 
Schlegel’s romantic vision undoubtedly capitalised on 
certain ‘linguistic’ and visual ‘deficiencies’, as Peyre 
astutely described them, in an ingenious effort to 
‘aggrandise’ his aims and put them ‘beyond’ one’s reach. 
They were certainly ‘inaccessible’, not because they 
were, as Peyre believed, ‘so far above them’, but because 
they had plummeted to such ‘unfathomable’ depths.  
 
Given his emphasis on all that was subdermal, 
306 Wyndham Lewis, ‘Time and Western Man’ (1927 p. 192). 
307 Henri Peyre, ‘What Is Romanticism?’ (1977 p. 80). 
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inframundane and limaceous, Schlegel’s vision can hardly 
be described as ‘transcendental’. He accorded far too 
much value to that which was missing, absent, deep seated 
and vegetal. Schlegel appealed to all of these insensate 
things in a desperate bid to align his poet, by the 
crudest possible means, with the dull thud of nature’s 
embryonic, if ‘beautifully’ measured rhythm.  
 
But ‘Mother Nature’, if you remember what Schlegel said a 
little earlier, was not only ‘beautiful’ - her beauty 
stimulated, in response, a ‘sense of the infinite 
fullness of life’. Not that her ‘qualities’ ended there. 
She was also, as Schlegel went on to say before I saw fit 
to cut him short, ‘organic’. ‘And whatever’, as he added, 
‘is most sublimely beautiful is therefore always vegetal, 
and the same is true of morality and love’.308 As, indeed, 
it was true of ‘everything’ else. In reciprocal fashion, 
Schlegel’s ‘theory’ cordoned off an enormous clearing - a 
completely fallow, unoccupied space for all that was 
‘vegetal’ and ‘organic’. The clammy atmosphere of his 
‘theory’ was perfectly in keeping with the necessary 
conditions to maintain, for an indefinite period of time 
and to exactly the right degree, all that was ‘vegetal’ 
in an incubative state. 
 
Schlegel’s ‘theory’, at risk of belabouring the point, 
was an anticipatory ideal. It was crafted by the critic’s 
sophistry, his linguistic evasiveness, his firm and 
rather intimidating form of brow beating by means of the 
‘infinite’, ‘unconscious’ and ‘unfathomable’. As for the 
‘despair’ Peyre mentioned, it quite possibly describes 
our own, having trawled through the laborious ‘ins and 
308 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Lucinde and the Fragments’ (1797 - 1799 / 
1971 p. 248). 
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outs’ of his theoretical scheme, rather more faithfully 
than it did Schlegel’s. He was not, like Sénancour, Amiel 
or de Guérin, the despairing type. Schlegel was a 
distinctly dispassionate writer with little in the way of 
charisma or genuine presence. His ‘master passion’, as 
you may recall Robert W. Wernaer saying earlier in the 
chapter, was of a decidedly intellectual order.309 ‘If he 
was now a romanticist’, if you remember what Wernaer said 
of Schlegel, ‘it was not merely for temperamental 
reasons, but because he had thought it out’.310  
 
Schlegel’s ‘theory’ was completely hollow from top to 
toe. It was riddled with holes, but rather than make any 
sort of effort to cover them up, Schlegel glorified the 
unfathomable depths of what were, in actuality, little 
more than a collection of shallow and miserly puddles. 
Schlegel cleverly turned all these ‘negatives’ upside 
down and transformed them into ‘pluses’. All of these 
things were missing for an extremely good reason.  
 
Absence intimated a presence far greater than presence 
itself.  
 
One, then, may well begin to get a sharp sense of the 
value Schlegel accorded to that which had been left 
unsaid. A distinct impression of Schlegel’s passion for 
all that which was incommunicable and bereft of language 
-  for all that ‘thumped’ and ‘throbbed’, in the most 
‘mesmeric’ of ways, in the imbecilic and, with one eye on 
Schopenhauer, none too pleasant heart of nature. Schlegel 
achieved the ‘effect’, not through the use of his tongue 
309 Robert M. Wernaer, ‘Romanticism and the Romantic School in 
Germany’ (1910 p. 65). 
310 Robert M. Wernaer, ‘Romanticism and the Romantic School in 
Germany’ (1910 p. 67). 
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but by conveniently losing it. It all hung on the dubious 
‘promissory note’ he ‘issued’, so to speak, in the 116th 
fragment – on its ‘infinite’ state of ‘becoming’.311 
Schlegel’s emphasis was not on that which was present, 
but on that which was absent - on all that had yet to 
come into ‘being’. 
 
Schlegel’s ‘mystical streak’ served, as I said earlier, a 
‘higher calling’ than the plain and mundane ‘callings’ of 
literary criticism; his was more than simply a literary 
‘theory’ - it exceeded those restrictive bounds and 
strayed, opportunely, into the more exalted and 
incomprehensible realms of ‘spirit’. Its expectant claims 
were based purely on absence - on the expansive clearing 
Schlegel had reserved, in the largest of capital letters, 
for all that was revelatory, should it decide at some 
point in the far flung future, to occupy it. 
Schopenhauer, for one, certainly capitalised on the empty 
expanse Schlegel prised open and given Schlegel’s 
reluctance to occupy it in any substantial or meaningful 
way, the philosopher went about the business of 
populating it with a singularly unpleasant force of 
nature. 
 
Let me now turn your attention to the third chapter and 
the ‘watershed’ philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer. I say 
‘watershed’ as Schopenhauer’s subject, quite unlike 
Schlegel’s ‘romantic poet’, was highly suspicious of 
‘Mother Nature’s’ intrusion into his affairs; she had, in 
the intervening years, gone from bad to worse. She no 
longer resembled the ‘beautiful’ figure Schlegel 
‘courted’ in an earlier period and, as a measure of last 
311 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 140 – 141). 
 162 
                                                 
resort, Schopenhauer set out, from the beginning, to 
dissolve the relationship in the hope of getting away 
from her for good. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE WORM IN THE APPLE: NATURE’S WILL AND SCHOPENHAUER’S 
CONSPIRATORIAL SUBJECT 
 
‘And of what importance is it to eternally creative 
nature if this mass of flesh which today presents the 
shape of a woman, would tomorrow reproduce itself in the 
guise of a thousand different insects? Would you dare to 
claim that the construction of individuals such as we, 
costs more effort than the construction of a worm, and 
that she ought, in consequence, to take a greater 
interest in us?’.312 
 
Marquis de Sade, ‘Justine or The Misfortunes of Virtue’ 
 
‘“How is the permanence of mere dust, of crude matter, to 
be regarded as a continuance of our true inner nature?”. 
Oh! do you know this dust then? Do you know what it is 
and what it can do? Learn to know it before you despise 
it. This matter, now lying there as dust and ashes, will 
soon form into crystals when dissolved in water; it will 
shine as metal; it will then emit electric sparks. By 
means of its galvanic tension it will manifest a force 
which, decomposing the strongest and firmest 
combinations, reduces earths to metals. It will, indeed 
of its own accord, form itself into plant and animal; and 
from its mysterious womb it will develop that life, about 
the loss of which you in your narrowness of mind are so 
nervous and anxious. Is it, then, so absolutely and 
entirely nothing to continue to exist as such matter?’.313  
312 Marquis de Sade, ‘Justine or The Misfortunes of Virtue’. 
Translated by Alan Hull Walton (1787 / 1791 / 1797 / 1964 p. 138). 
Corgi Books, London. 
313 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 472). 
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Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, 
Vol. II 
 
‘There are two men within him: one believed in his theory 
with a fanatic obstinacy, desiring annihilation and 
death; the other feared them, choked with detestation and 
vented his own cowardice and despair on every one 
else’.314 
 
Michael Artzibashef, ‘Breaking-Point’ 
 
I. THE FALLING OUT 
 
Having spent the greater part of the previous chapter in 
the company of Friedrich Schlegel, we will spend the 
majority of the present one in that of Arthur 
Schopenhauer. In turning one’s attention from Schlegel to 
Schopenhauer, a number of things become quite clear. Most 
clearly of all, one gets the sharp impression that 
Schlegel’s romantic vision had, in certain respects, 
turned sour, very sour indeed. Having led something of a 
charmed life, comparatively speaking, in Schlegel’s 
‘theory’, the individual subject discovered, to his 
disgust, that nature was far from the flowery godhead 
Schlegel had mistaken her for.  
 
Mother Nature may not have been the hospitable friend she 
was to Schlegel, but that it not to say she had frozen 
Schopenhauer out completely. That was not the case at 
all. What was hers was still very much his. ‘Man is 
nature herself’, as Schopenhauer wrote, ‘and indeed 
nature at the highest grade of her self-consciousness, 
314 Michael Artzibashef, ‘Breaking-Point’(1915 p. 266).  
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but nature is only the objectified will’.315  
 
Schopenhauer’s ‘subject’ was still at liberty to see in 
her a complete, if fragmented picture of himself, but the 
picture was not nearly as pretty or alluring as the one 
‘she’ presented to Schlegel. It certainly did not depict 
a cheery assortment of ‘flowers’ and vacant grins. She 
continued to smile, but her smile now expressed something 
far more menacing than simple joy; it was an unnerving, 
corrupt sort of smile that made Schopenhauer extremely 
uncomfortable and agitated in ‘her’ presence. It had a 
malevolent quality to it that was disconcerting to say 
the least. It resembled more of a rictus than an ordinary 
smile and, if Schopenhauer was not mistaken, it appeared 
to broaden at the sight of misfortune and folly. It was a 
sickening sight and his thoughts quickly turned, 
understandably, to matricide. 
 
In that respect, Schopenhauer’s doctrine marked a 
transition - a dramatic change of heart, if you will. 
‘Schopenhauer was a transitional thinker’, as Barbara 
Hannan wrote in the ‘The Riddle of the World’ (2009), 
‘bridging the gap between nineteenth-century and 
twentieth-century paradigms. It is typical of such 
transitional thinkers that they are officially working 
within a framework that they are also (half-consciously) 
trying to overturn’.316  
 
The subject’s ‘inner-being’ or ‘will’, as Schopenhauer 
preferred to call it, was still very much part and parcel 
of that which dominated nature, but it had not, up until 
315 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 276). 
316 Barbara Hannan, ‘The Riddle of the World: A Reconsideration of 
Schopenhauer’s Philosophy’ (2009 p. 15). 
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this point, started to terrorise it. The ‘substratum of 
all appearances and consequently of the whole of nature’, 
if one turns to Schopenhauer, ‘is nothing but what we 
know immediately and very intimately and find within 
ourselves as will’.317 Schopenhauer’s doctrine of will had 
a far nastier side to it than the prudish Schlegel would 
have dared to imagine. ‘We may be nature through and 
through’, as Rüdiger Safranski warned in his study of 
Schopenhauer, ‘- to this extent he agrees with the 
Romantics – but for that very reason we are at the mercy 
of its mercilessness, its jungle-like struggles’.318 
 
His affiliation with nature no longer filled 
Schopenhauer’s subject with anything that could be said 
to resemble the ‘joy’ Schlegel’s ‘romantic poet’ had 
described. ‘He was possessed’, as Bryan Magee said of 
Schopenhauer, ‘by the idea that there is something 
inherently evil, monstrous, wicked about the ultimate 
force that constitutes the world’.319 Leaving that matter 
to one side for a moment or two, Schopenhauer’s doctrine 
would not have been, in other respects, a wholly 
unfamiliar one for Schlegel to have entertained. 
 
Nature’s will remained identical, in every possible way, 
to that which bore the name of man’s own. It is, I am 
well aware, something of a misnomer to call it ‘nature’s 
will’ for it was, strictly speaking, the will’s nature 
made manifest.320 But it must be said Schopenhauer’s use 
of the term ‘will’ did not, as it may mistakenly imply, 
317 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘On the Will in Nature’ (1836 / 1992 p. 20). 
318 Rüdiger Safranski, ‘Schopenhauer and The Wild Years of Philosophy’ 
(1989 p. 228). 
319 Bryan Magee, ‘The Philosophy of Schopenhauer’ (1983 p. 146).  
320 The expression, ‘nature’s will’, has certain advantages which, I 
believe, emphasise its universalism in a way that the simple use of 
the word ‘will’ may not and, for that reason, I will continue, for 
the sake of clarity, to use the expression. 
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describe a person’s ‘free will’ (if indeed they could be 
said to have had such a thing); the philosopher’s use of 
the term was far more profound than that.  
 
‘We must be careful’, as Christopher Janaway cautiously 
advised us in a recent essay, ‘with the concept will. 
Schopenhauer asks us not to think of wanting, desiring, 
or intentionally acting as constitutive of will in his 
sense, but to stretch the concept much more widely. So we 
must think away its traditional associations with 
rationality and consciousness, and indeed with mentality 
as such’.321 ‘He never meant’, if one turns immediately to 
something another critic, Frank Copleston, said of 
Schopenhauer, ‘to postulate a willing subject: the 
metaphysical Will was for him entirely impersonal, a 
fundamental energy, that lies at the base of, and forms, 
the world’.322  
 
Friedrich Schlegel, as we have know, regarded ‘romantic 
poetry’ as a dormant ‘seed’ and Schopenhauer similarly 
described his own unitary scheme of will in much the same 
terms. But the will was not, in Schopenhauer’s 
estimation, a profuse array of seeds but the elemental 
seed, the ‘root point of existence’ as he described it, 
from which all things, without exception, had sprung. ‘It 
is’, as Schopenhauer said, ‘the most real thing we know, 
in fact the kernel of reality itself’.323  
 
Schopenhauer’s doctrine of will would certainly not have 
321 Christopher Janaway, ‘The real essence of human beings: 
Schopenhauer and the unconscious will’ collected in ‘Thinking the 
Unconscious. Nineteenth-Century German Thought’ (2010 p. 145). 
322 Frederick Copleston, ‘Arthur Schopenhauer. Philosopher of 
Pessimism’((1975 p. 191). 
323 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 351). 
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precluded Schlegel from identifying with his aphonic 
‘godhead’ in the least; it would still have afforded the 
squeamish critic, not exactly the pleasure, but certainly 
the unsettling experience of encountering nature’s 
primitive powers for himself. If one knew no better, 
Schlegel may even have momentarily been mistaken for 
Schopenhauer when he talked, if you remember, of ‘the 
invisible primordial power of mankind’.324 If one 
immediately refers to Schopenhauer’s description of will, 
he talked of it in almost identical terms. ‘The will’, as 
the philosopher professed, ‘is that primary and original 
force itself’.325  
 
The temporal scope of Schopenhauer’s doctrine would not 
have struck Schlegel as unfamiliar; it too was said to be 
infinite and had also embarked on a similarly Quixotic 
pursuit of an end it was never likely to reach. ‘In 
fact’, as Schopenhauer wrote in ‘The World as Will and 
Representation’ (1818), ‘absence of all aim, of all 
limits, belongs to the essential nature of the will in 
itself, which is an endless striving’.326 ‘It always 
strives’, he wrote on earlier page, ‘because striving is 
its sole nature, to which no attained end can put a 
goal’.327  
 
Nature’s will sought its object in all yet, to its 
constant frustration, found its satisfaction in none. No 
sooner than it had reached what it took, rather mistook, 
to be its ultimate aim, the will set on, with immediate 
324 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 54). 
325 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 293). 
326 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 164). 
327 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 308). 
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effect, another course seeking a fresh and more alluring 
end. Once that had been attained, the same sorry thing 
happened to it all over again. ‘No possible satisfaction 
in the world’, Schopenhauer explained, ‘could suffice to 
still its craving, set a final goal to its demands, and 
fill the bottomless pit of its heart’.328 Nor did it learn 
a single lesson from its previous mistakes. The will 
simply eyed, in the most feverish way, the same old 
opportunities to affirm itself as if they were brand new 
and novel. 
 
‘To be, for Schopenhauer’, as David Cartwright wrote in 
‘Schopenhauerian Optimism and an Alternative to 
Resignation’ (1985), ‘is to be will. And to be will 
entails constant desire, want, striving, and wishing’.329 
The subject’s ‘inner-being’, the will, may well have set 
its sights on an ever receding end, but it was something 
that had become quite ominous in the hands of Arthur 
Schopenhauer. Even though his scheme resembled Schlegel’s 
‘theory’ in outline, it was no longer anything like as 
hospitable or welcoming. Nor, for that matter, did 
Schopenhauer’s doctrine afford one the hope that, given 
time, the will’s desires would abate. Not if it were left 
to its own devices. 
 
Schopenhauer’s emphasis, concentrating as it did, on all 
that was rudimentary, universal and infinite ‘within’ 
engendered an attitude that resembled, if not surpassed 
Schlegel’s haughtiness towards the subject’s finite 
state. Schopenhauer too regarded it with little more than 
condescension which bordered, if one considers his 
328 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 573). 
329 David E. Cartwright, ‘Schopenhauerian Optimism and an Alternative 
to Resignation’ (1985 p. 155).  
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estimation of individuality, the point of derision. 
‘Schopenhauer’s philosophy’, as Bertram M. Laing wrote in 
an essay, ‘Schopenhauer and Individuality’ (1917), ‘is 
one which fails in a remarkable degree to do justice to 
individuality. Whether it be examined in its theory of 
knowledge, in its metaphysics of the will, or in its 
ethical doctrines, it is found to assign no value to 
individuality. The latter is viewed as an illusion, and 
everything tainted with it is held to be defective’.330  
 
Laing was not entirely correct in his evaluation of 
Schopenhauer’s doctrine. The value accorded to 
individuality in his philosophical scheme may be said to 
have rested, ultimately, in the symbolic act of exerting 
it; even if it had, as the case may have been, dire 
consequences for the subject who felt compelled, appalled 
as he was by his affiliation with nature’s inveterate 
will, to exert it in that particular fashion. It was a 
‘ronunciative’ and wantonly destructive act through which 
Schopenhauer’s ‘subject’ aspired to register his disgust 
and distinction, symbolically speaking, with nature’s 
odorous will. 
 
Be that as it may, it was almost certainly true that 
individuality, for a greater majority of its content 
fared poorly, as indeed Laing had said, in Schopenhauer’s 
scheme. It was not until its late ‘rally’ that it reaped 
its own ‘victorious’, if decidedly meretricious rewards.  
 
One need not have to expend much in the way of time or 
energy if one wishes to discover Schopenhauer’s 
evaluation of individuality. ‘What value, indeed’, as the 
misanthropic philosopher asked, ‘can a being have who is 
330 Bertram M. Laing, ‘Schopenhauer and Individuality’ (1917 p. 171). 
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no different from millions of his kind?’.331 The 
‘individuality of most people’, he wrote in an earlier 
work, ‘is so wretched and worthless that they lose 
absolutely nothing when, at the end of their lives, they 
are eventually deprived of it’.332 Schopenhauer spoke of 
individuality in the most shadowy of language; he 
referred to an individual as a ‘wavering and unstable 
phantom.333  
 
Schopenhauer attributed little in the way of credence, 
let alone anything of true value, ‘insignificant’ as he 
thought it was, to individuality at all.334 It was an all 
out ‘delusion’ manufactured by nature’s conniving will.335  
 
Schopenhauer was reluctant to give individuality any 
tangible or ‘real’ value; it was not something that 
could, on strictly philosophical grounds, be regarded as 
the least bit tenable, let alone worthy of prizing in and 
of itself. Not if Schopenhauer wished, as he did, to 
maintain the structure of his thoroughly dispersonating 
scheme and keep, as best he could, its deterministic line 
intact. The will monopolised not only Schopenhauer’s 
system, but all forms of life including that of man. ‘The 
will alone’, as Paul Gottfried wrote, ‘is the “primum 
mobile” of all human activity’.336  
 
331 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘Parerga and Paralipomena’, Vol. II (1851 / 
1974 p. 598).  
332 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 491). 
333 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 278). 
334 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 279). 
335 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 280). 
336 Paul Gottfried, ‘Arthur Schopenhauer and the Heritage of 
Pessimism’ (1975 p. 27). 
 172 
                                                 
Nature’s will ruled the roost. It had secured and 
continued to safeguard its majestic position in the 
wiliest of ways. It was, by all accounts, embroiled in an 
arch and stupendous act of self-deception, not that it 
had always been that way. The will must surely have found 
itself, initially, at something of a disadvantage and it 
was a considerable disadvantage at that. It resembled, in 
its inchoate state, as one may well be tempted to 
imagine, a desultory and indignant spirit. Its ghoulish 
absence of shape or substance ran in alarming contrast 
with its apparent mania for exhibitionism.  
 
II. TOM AND JERRY 
 
The ‘primordial’ and gaseous entity, then, was under an 
enormous amount of pressure to objectify itself as 
quickly as possible if it had any hope at all of clearing 
the first hurdle and making itself apparent. The will 
clearly needed ‘lackeys’ on whom it could impress, if not 
inflict its ambitious desires; it was compelled, as a 
matter of utmost urgency, to embark on the most 
inquilinous of schemes if it was to make any sort of 
headway in the pursuit of its desirous ends. 
 
To its extreme good fortune, for it seldom happened very 
often, the will gratified its own wishes and granted 
itself corporeal form. With this exceptional stroke of 
luck, the will found itself with an abundance of 
‘lackeys’ at its disposal. Capitalising on the rare 
opportunity it had afforded itself, the will donned all 
manner of fanciful and brightly coloured costumes with 
relish. It had an unimaginably vast wardrobe at its 
disposal; it was as limitless as its fancies and its 
fancies were so plentiful they could not be numbered.  
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The will made its sudden and startling appearance in the 
world, not as a noxious cloud, but as nature itself. 
 
The world was ‘merely’ a vehicle through which the will, 
not exactly practiced its art, but almost certainly 
pursued its artful practice of dissimulation and 
subterfuge. Its magical transformation from a plume of 
transpicuous smoke into an unquantifiable number of 
feathered, furry and scaly creatures proved so successful 
that it had even started to entertain second thoughts 
about the actuality of the very beings that it had 
conjured up. 
 
What it had in the way of inventive flair, the will 
evidently lacked in common sense; it was hardly the 
smartest of forces. The will played each ‘role’ with such 
attentive detail and aplomb that it had even taken itself 
in and been fooled by its own aliases. So much so, the 
will no longer saw anything of itself in its own 
creations; they had assumed an ‘independent’ life of 
their own and, more often than not, they were at odds 
with one another. 
 
The desires of one frustrated, if not completely 
conflicted with those of another. A cat, to take an 
obvious example, may well be dead set upon catching and 
devouring a mouse and the mouse in question would no 
doubt object, not unsurprisingly, in the strongest 
possible way to the cat’s unwelcome interest and, in 
swift response, turn about heel and take flight; however, 
in Schopenhauer’s doctrine, the cat - Tom say, and the 
mouse - Jerry, were ‘merely’ pandering to the will’s 
desire to simultaneously experience all the thrill of the 
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chase in both its pursuit and evasion. It ‘acts out’, as 
Schopenhauer said of will, ‘the great tragedy and comedy 
at its own expense’.337 Not that that news would have 
calmed the racing heart of any fleeing mouse nor, for 
that matter, silenced the rumbling stomach of any 
starving feline. 
 
‘It is so closely concealed behind all these masks’, as 
Schopenhauer explained, ‘that it does not recognize 
itself again and thus treats itself harshly’.338 The will 
had clearly not given the outcome of its machinations 
much in the way of thought; it had not, in fact, given 
its expansive material enterprise any consideration at 
all. It was not a reflective will, far from it; it was a 
will that purely and simply willed and there would have 
been nothing more foreign to it than the prospect of 
stopping to calculate and weigh up the pluses and minuses 
of its willing. ‘The will, which constitutes our being-
in-itself’, Schopenhauer explained, ‘is of a simple 
nature; it merely wills and does not know’.339 It was 
simply enlivened, if not delighted by the antagonistic 
and warring illusion it had, somewhat miraculously, spun 
out of itself. 
 
Nature’s will entertained an adversarial and wholly 
schizophrenic position with itself; it was pimp and 
prostitute alike, the huntsman and the startled pheasant 
in his sights. The will had found the apparent 
satisfaction of its desires in its own fractured image. 
One of which, to take an example, might simply have 
337 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 358). 
338 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 /  1966 p. 318). 
339 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 499).  
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tickled its fancy, as indeed Jerry had done, when its 
attention, in the feline form of Tom, turned to meal 
time. The will, in another instance, may well have been 
struck by a quality so sexually arousing in another of 
its appearances, so impossible to ignore, that it found 
itself strutting and prancing in its direction until it 
caught its eye and won whatever sensual reward that was 
to be found in the fleeting encounter. In another 
example, the will may have simply detested its appearance 
in another creature and longed for nothing more than the 
pleasure of not being subjected to such an off putting 
and repellent sight ever again.  
 
Take Hjalmar Söderberg’s anecdote, for example. ‘One 
evening the austere philosopher’, as Söderberg said of 
Schopenhauer in his novel ‘Doctor Glas’ (1905), ‘was 
sitting, alone as usual, in a corner of his café, when 
the door opens and in comes a person of disagreeable 
mien. His features distorted with disgust and horror 
Schopenhauer gives him one look, leaps up, and begins 
thumping him over the head with his stick. All of this, 
merely on account of his appearance!’.340 But if one were 
to reinterpret the novelist’s anecdote along the lines of 
Schopenhauer’s doctrine, the philosopher’s ‘disgust’ and 
‘horror’, as Söderberg described it, were directed, not 
necessarily at his nameless victim, but the will in whom 
it had obviously made a strong and particularly 
objectionable appearance. 
 
If one takes into consideration the universal quality of 
nature’s will, Schopenhauer was doing nothing more 
productive than thumping himself over the head with his 
own stick. ‘We recognize ourselves in every human being, 
340 Hjalmar Söderberg, ‘Doctor Glas’ (1905 / 1963 p. 13). 
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no matter who it is’, as Thomas Bernhard might have 
reminded the stick brandishing philosopher, ‘and we are 
condemned to be each of these human beings for as long as 
we continue to exist’.341 Barbara Hannan also made a 
similar point when she wrote: ‘since we are all 
manifestations of a single will, tormentor and tormented 
are one; in harming others, we ultimately harm 
ourselves’.342  
 
All individual figures, whatever form they assumed, were 
little more than phantasmic images of nature’s repulsive 
will. Schopenhauer referred to it, in one of his books, 
as the ‘lord of the worlds’ and it was a lord who, by all 
accounts, reigned with all of the tyranny and 
unpredictability of an absolute madman.343  
 
Let us suppose, for a moment or two, that a guest at a 
fancy dress party forgets all about the party, he has 
helped himself, I should have said, to one too many 
bottles of red wine, and finds himself so taken aback by 
his own uncustomary reflection, so shocked and disgusted 
by the sight of it, that he decides to take it on and 
fight it there and then in the toilet. His reflection 
had, in its defence, obstinately refused to stand down 
and take its leave, as indeed it had been commanded to do 
in the most forcible of language. 
 
The intentionally crude example is not so very far 
removed from Schopenhauer’s grotesque depiction of a will 
hell bent on picking a fight with itself. ‘Thus in the 
341 Thomas Bernhard, ‘Gathering Evidence’ (198* p. 212). Translated by 
****. 
342 Barbara Hannan, ‘The Riddle of the World: A Reconsideration of 
Schopenhauer’s Philosophy’ (2009 p. 139). 
343 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 501). 
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fierceness and intensity of its desires’, as Schopenhauer 
wrote in the first volume of ‘The World as Will and 
Representation’ (1818), ‘it buries its teeth in its own 
flesh, not knowing that it always injured only itself’.344 
It was a sentiment he echoed twenty six years later in 
the second volume of the same work. ‘At bottom’, he 
explained, ‘this springs from the fact that the will must 
live on itself, since nothing exists besides it, and it 
is a hungry will’.345 And if one turns to another of his 
works, ‘On the Will in Nature’ (1836), one reads: 
‘wherever a living thing breathes, another has at once 
appeared for the purpose of devouring it’.346  
 
Nature’s will was its own worst enemy: it defiled itself 
at every given opportunity and by every imaginable means.  
 
The will had not only pulled the wool over the eyes of 
its ‘lackeys’ but it had, all too blatantly, pulled the 
wool over its own. Since there was little in the way of 
company besides itself, the will had to amuse itself as 
fruitfully as it could; one may even begin to harbour the 
grave, if rather outlandish suspicion that it had 
concocted the world and its inhabitants simply to ward 
off an acute, if not incurable case of cabin fever. 
 
Wyndham Lewis, sensed something of the will’s ‘apparent’ 
purposelessness: ‘The Will that “objectifies” itself in 
this way is a will to what? To nothing, Schopenhauer 
replies... the picture of the Will that just goes on for 
some reason “objectifying” itself, resulting in the 
344 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 354). 
345 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 154). 
346 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘On the Will in Nature’ (1836 / 1992 p. 58). 
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endless rigmarole in which we participate, and of which 
(qua Will) we are witnesses’.347 ‘It is’, Lewis added, ‘a 
quite aimless, and, from our limited point of view, 
nonsensical, Will’.348 While one may or may not agree with 
Lewis, his curious turn of phrase, describing as he did 
‘our limited point of view’, may strike one as more than 
a little strange. Not that Lewis was expressing his own 
opinion, I should add; he was aping Schopenhauer and his 
tongue was planted firmly in his cheek.  
 
Lewis may well have admired Schopenhauer’s work in 
certain respects; the philosopher’s high regard for 
‘objectivity’, exemplified by his lifeless ideal, 
indubitably appealed to Lewis’ own disdain of gratuitous 
emotional displays, but he certainly did not share the 
philosopher’s enthusiasm for languorous, dimly-lit forces 
that were said to mysteriously bungle about ‘within’ 
one’s person nor did Lewis welcome his assault on the 
visual sense, illusory as Schopenhauer thought it was, 
with any degree of warmth. Lewis had the interests of his 
own vocation very much at heart, he was a painter, after 
all; and it was in defence of those ocular ends, that his 
critique, if not all out attack of the ‘time-mind’, his 
brilliantly skewed interpretation of romanticism, was 
directed.  
 
Be that as it may and putting Lewis’ preference for 
space, solidity and exteriority of form over the 
disorientating wish wash of time and the visceral 
‘insides of things’ to one side, what, one may well be 
tempted to ask, did the somewhat haemophobic painter 
347 Wyndham Lewis, ‘Time and Western Man’ (1927 p. 332).  
348 Wyndham Lewis, ‘Time and Western Man’ (1927 p. 332).  
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actually mean when he said ‘our limited point of view’?349 
Why, indeed, should one’s point of view be considered 
‘limited’ in any way whatsoever? Let me direct your 
immediate attention to Schopenhauer’s disdainful opinion 
of one’s percipient faculties. 
 
III. THE UNDERTOW 
 
The will may not have been the brightest will 
Schopenhauer could have possibly come up with, but it 
was, by all accounts, an extremely crafty and mendacious 
one. It is as well to remind you that one underestimated 
the will at one’s peril; it was insidious in the extreme 
and reveled, from the little one can tell, in subterfuge 
and conflict. 
 
The will kept one thing tucked securely up its sleeve and 
it was, presumably, its most closely guarded secret. The 
will did not let on, not to any of its ‘lackeys’, other 
than one notable exception - Schopenhauer himself, that 
they were all one and the same thing beating itself about 
the head with exactly the same stick. Schopenhauer 
referred to this hapless bunch of flagellants as 
‘manifestations’, more commonly known to you and I as 
people, and the philosopher’s decidedly ghoulish term 
betrayed something of the prejudice he harboured against 
them.  
349 The following passage reflects what I described as Lewis’s 
‘haemophobic’ condition: ‘I am not an anatomist. I enjoy the surface 
of life, if not for its own sake, at least not because it conceals 
the repulsive turbidness of the intestine. Give me the dimple in the 
cheek of the Gioconda or of St. John the Baptist, and you can have 
all the Gothic skeletons or superealist guts you like! And what 
applies to the body applies likewise to the mind. I do not like all 
these doctors. Give me the surface of the mind, as well. Give me the 
outside of all things, I am a fanatic for the externality of things’. 
See Wyndham Lewis, ‘Blasting and Bombardiering. Autobiography 1914 – 
1926’ (1937 p. 9). 
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It was only by dint of a certain principle, that of 
‘sufficient reason’ as Schopenhauer called it, that Tom, 
given my recent example, did not recognise himself as 
Jerry. Were the will to be granted three wishes, its very 
first, one imagines, would be to safeguard this very 
secret; it did not, not at any cost, relish the prospect 
of being ‘unmasked’ and forsaking the grim and rather 
alarming amusement of its self-spun illusion.  
 
Were that to happen all creatures -  be they cat, mouse 
or man, would finally recognise the falsity of their 
cathood, mousehood and manhood. They would no longer 
regard themselves as distinct creatures with a range of 
conflicting interests (presuming, of course, you happen 
to agree that a cat or mouse senses, however dimly, 
something of its inherent and singular state of Tomdom or 
Jerrydom), but as manifest forms of nature’s single will. 
They would be little more than a collection of ghosts and 
ghouls, illusions of matter and form, that an inherently 
dishonest will had mischievously planted in each one of 
the objectified brains concerned. 
 
It is hard to imagine the will would have been the least 
bit eager to entertain such an unwelcome prospect, not in 
any of its manifest forms let alone one in possession of 
Schopenhauer’s acumen and matricidal intent. Nature’s 
will, at the risk of belaboring the point, was the most 
scheming and artful of wills and the likelihood of it 
spilling out its heart to Arthur Schopenhauer, of all 
people, remained remote if not entirely improbable. It 
would not only have been imprudent, but potentially 
fatal; the philosopher, from what one can gather, 
actively detested it and would no doubt have exploited 
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any sign of weakness, absolutely any opportunity that 
came his way to undermine, if not destroy it. 
 
If the principle were to fall it would be ruinous for 
nature’s will. It would not only spell the end of its 
‘lordly’ reign , but also herald the end of whatever form 
of perverse entertainment it derived from biting and 
spitting out its own finger nails. The will would be 
thrown back to its solitary confinement where it would, 
given its enterprising nature, indubitably contrive of 
another means to distract itself from its endless tedium 
and want. But, it as well to remind you, nature’s will 
had broken countless promises and there was absolutely no 
reason to suppose its ‘word’ was to be taken at face 
value. Schopenhauer would have done well to have heeded 
such advice as he reached the end of ‘The World as Will 
and Representation’ where he appeared to have been taken 
in and completely duped by his own deceitful creation.  
 
For all the talk of cats and mice, it was only the 
individual subject and only the most exceptional among 
them at that, that had any ‘hope’ of seeing through the 
‘principium individuationis’, an expression Schopenhauer 
used to describe the piecemeal and thoroughly disjointed 
way in which the human brain registered the world around 
it. It could only take things in, according to 
Schopenhauer, by means of time and space. These 
‘categories’ were not only wholly divisive but also 
completely illusory, Schopenhauer believed; they simply 
acted to chop up all that was whole (I am referring to 
the nature’s collective will) into smaller, more 
comprehensible ‘bit parts’ (I am referring to people, 
plants, animals and the like) the human brain could 
actually register and begin to understand.  
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The ‘brain with its consciousness’, Schopenhauer 
believed, ‘isolates human individuals’.350 Individuality, 
then, was a ‘mere’ neurological phenomenon and our 
apprehension, the very means by which such a thing was 
able to exist in the first place, a decidedly prejudiced 
and ‘limited’ function that purely served and secured the 
will’s interests. I say ‘limited’, as indeed Wyndham 
Lewis had done, as the principle in question acted to 
impede, if not completely compromise the stark, if 
extensive canvas of Schopenhauer’s universal ideal. It 
certainly spoilt the thoroughly robotic view the 
philosopher aspired to take of the world. 
 
What made matters incalculably worse for Schopenhauer was 
that the will engendered all manner of secondary off 
shoots which further separated him from his barren ideal. 
It cluttered it up with spools of annoying data and all 
of this annoying data, abundant and frivolous as he 
thought it was, proved even more annoying by virtue of 
its erroneous claim on reality. To make matters more 
annoying still, every single ‘item’ of data defended its 
own particular ream of numerical information in the most 
assertive and aggressive of ways as if it had something 
truly precious to protect and valuable to reveal. Not so, 
Schopenhauer believed.  
 
People, for instance. Schopenhauer, whom I have already 
called a misanthrope, was hardly their most loyal 
champion. Each one of these ‘fleeting dreams’, as he 
referred to them, did not necessarily share the 
philosopher’s lowly estimation of their ontological 
350 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 326). 
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state. While they valued, in most examples, their 
‘particular’ standing as independent, individual figures 
Schopenhauer believed whatever value they had certainly 
did not reside there. It lay, instead, in their 
‘universal’ inner-nature, in his own totalising 
conception of nature’s will. This, however, was not a 
positive attribute at all. It was something one was 
better advised to immediately turn one’s back on in a bid 
to flee and make one’s determined escape. The phenomenal 
world did not simply conspire against Schopenhauer’s 
sweeping ‘presbyopic’ dream state but, in a more 
immediate and predaceous sense, against the philosopher 
himself.  
 
The secondary phenomena, in turn, gave rise to all manner 
of tertiary phenomena which proved, again, to be even 
more annoying than either the first or the second. Noise, 
for instance. Schopenhauer actively detested that. It 
disrupted, mercifully one may well be tempted to believe 
at times, the train of his dispersonating thought. 
History, to cite another example. Putting Herodotus to 
one side, Schopenhauer did not think very much of that 
either.351 Science, again Schopenhauer was not, by and 
large, its keenest advocate. He may well have sought its 
corroboration in, what I consider his strongest, most 
clearly written work, ‘On the Will in Nature’ (it 
includes the particularly concise and impressive chapter, 
‘Comparative Anatomy’ p. 47 - 67), but it was little more 
than an instrumental method Schopenhauer employed to 
substantiate his own ghoulish claims. Lastly, academia. 
He never spoke of it with anything other than derision. 
It resembled a snake pit in the philosopher’s brief and 
351 ‘If we have read Herodotus’, Schopenhauer wrote, ‘we have already 
studied enough history from a philosophical point of view’. See ‘The 
World as Will and Representation’, Vol. II (1844 / 1966 p. 444).  
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unsuccessful skirmish with it. Full of Hegelians in his 
time, motivated, not by the ‘truth’, as Schopenhauer saw 
it, but their advantageous contortion of it for their own 
professional ends.  
 
Why did Schopenhauer care so little for the preceding 
flurry of examples? The answer was extremely simple. They 
expressed, with the obvious exemption of ‘noise’, an 
erroneous interest in ‘phenomena’, a ‘mere’ array of 
images, and, subsequently, ignored the very thing whose 
expression they were: nature’s inalterable will.  
 
Schopenhauer did not care for any of these tertiary 
manifestations for exactly the same reason and it 
betrayed the monomaniacal and thoroughly deterministic 
character of what he even called his ‘single thought’.352 
The philosopher only had eyes for one thing: his own 
totalising, if utterly repellent conception of will. It 
certainly coloured, as we will see, his estimation of 
individuality and everything else of ‘mere’ phenomenal 
standing. 
 
‘When once the time comes for me to be read’, as a rather 
pompous sounding Schopenhauer wrote, ‘it will be found 
that my philosophy is like Thebes with a hundred gates. 
One can enter from any direction, and through each gate 
arrive at the direct path to the very centre’.353 Needless 
to say, there was only one thing to be found at the dead 
centre of Schopenhauer’s philosophy and that one thing, 
not too unsurprisingly, was a shadowy will. And it was to 
his very own omnipotent pocket god, the will, 
352 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. xii). 
353 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘On the Basis of Morality’ (1840 / 1965 p. 
4). 
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Schopenhauer repeatedly returned one’s attention. His 
philosophy was extremely predictable in that respect. 
‘There can’, as he wrote, ‘be no matter without a 
manifestation of will’.354 If one turns, for a second 
opinion, to Ladislav Klíma’s ‘My Autobiography’ (1924), 
one hears much the same thing: ‘Everything, every little 
thing’, as Klíma wrote, ‘is subject to Will alone’.355 And 
with that sentiment, Klíma can be said to have expressed 
the way in which Schopenhauer viewed all material or 
phenomenal forms whatever their ‘particular’ 
manifestation may have been, past or present. 
 
With regards to history, to take one example, it 
invariably focused on events and dates as if the events 
and dates in question had actually revealed something 
‘unprecedented’ and entirely ‘new’ which had not, as 
indeed Schopenhauer thought more likely, already been 
witnessed tens of dozens, if not tens of thousands of 
times before. That one scene transpired in the valleys of 
South Wales during the 1980’s and another in down town 
Manhattan in 2001 was, again, inconsequential. 
Schopenhauer’s chief gripe with history was that it 
tended to ‘isolate’ events by means of the calendar and 
map. But the calendar and map, depictions of its 
objectified state, simply reflected the will’s reluctance 
to reveal its ‘true’ identity. In every instance, no 
matter the continent or century, the will was singularly 
culpable.  
 
The ‘march’ of time, in particular, encouraged the 
misguided belief in such things as ‘teleology’, 
354 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘On the Will in Nature’ (1836 / 1992 p. 19). 
355 Ladislav Klíma, ‘My Autobiography’ collected in ‘The Sufferings of 
Prince Sternenhoch’ (1924 / 2000 p. 199). Translated from the Czech 
by Carleton Bulkin. Twisted Spoon Press, Prague. 
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‘progress’, ‘evolution’ and the like. There was little or 
no room in Schopenhauer’s scheme for any ameliorative 
notion; the will’s ways were set in stone. ‘It does not’, 
as Schopenhauer said of nature’s will, ‘grow weary or 
old; it does not learn or improve with practice, and is 
in the child what it is in the old man, always one and 
the same; and in everyone its character is 
unalterable’.356  
 
‘Schopenhauer’, as Henri-Frédéric Amiel noted in his 
‘Journal’ (1882), ‘believes in the unchangeableness of 
innate tendencies in the individual, and in the 
invariability of the primitive disposition. He refuses to 
believe in the new man, in any real progress towards 
perfection, or in any positive improvement in a human 
being. Only the appearances are refined; there is no 
change below the surface’.357 And that, just as Amiel 
said, was exactly where Schopenhauer’s fundamental 
interest proved to reside; his attention was entirely 
focused on the vortical undertow that swept historical 
phenomena along an imaginary temporal current.  
 
The philosopher’s patience ran little more than a course 
of forty years. What more, he asked, could one possibly 
hope to see that one had not already seen over the span 
of four decades? Whatever event history recounted, it was 
largely irrelevant to Schopenhauer as it ‘merely’ 
described, in his opinion, the machinations of a will 
hell bent, as I have said, on mutilation and self-harm.  
 
Schopenhauer’s interest did not extend to the particular 
method, you have, by means of an example, your own pick 
356 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘On the Will in Nature’ (1836 / 1992 p. 43). 
357 Henri-Frédéric Amiel, ‘Amiel’s Journal. The Journal Intime of 
Henri-Frédéric Amiel’ (1882 / 1901 p. 160). 
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of atrocities to chose from, the will may have chosen to 
exhibit its vice. One massacre served to illustrate, just 
as well as any other, the callous, deceitful and 
harrowing way men went, quite literally, about their 
business. The very suggestion that one could actually 
learn a single corrective or edifying lesson from history 
was evidently untrue. ‘This world’, Schopenhauer 
believed, ‘is the battle-ground of tormented and agonized 
beings who continue to exist only by each devouring the 
other’.358 With its emphasis on novelty, history had 
turned a blind eye to the very thing that was solely 
responsible for each one of the ghastly tales historians 
invariably had to tell. 
 
Again, the blame lay squarely, as it always did, with one 
culprit: nature’s will. Unnerving politicians and smarmy 
statesmen came and went, but the will remained in office. 
And it shouldered all responsibility for everything that 
was despicable, corrupt and sinister in the world. ‘In 
Schopenhauer’s view’, as Iulii Isaevich Eichenwald 
bluntly if no less astutely concluded, ‘nature is 
guilty’.359 It hardly helped diffuse the situation, in 
fact it inflamed it to an uncomfortable and extremely 
neurotic degree, that Schopenhauer need not have looked 
very far to find the guilty party: the despot was far 
closer to home than one dared imagine. As for the rare 
and sublime examples of genuine benevolence and 
selflessness, nature’s will could not take credit for 
those. They were exceptional instances indeed, 
Schopenhauer thought; inspired, as he believed, by an 
358 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 /  1966 p. 581). 
359 Iulii Isaevich Eichenwald, ‘A Note on Schopenhauer’ (1910) 
collected in Eric von der Luft (ed), ‘Schopenhauer. New Essays in 
Honor of His 200th Birthday’(1988 p. 147). 
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acute awareness of the inherent powers at play within the 
world and the terrible realisation of one’s complicity 
with them. They almost always proved to be an individual 
stand - a symbolic, if self-annulling ‘gesture’ against 
the dreadful power the philosopher envisaged in his 
concept of will. And it was to that very end his own 
doctrine claimed to work. 
 
And so it went on. One phenomenal form gave rise to 
another and the principle in question, that of sufficient 
reason, condemned Schopenhauer, one imagines, to a 
sensory hell. It conspired against the ‘pure’ vision he 
wished to have of the world. It proved so ‘pure’, in 
actual fact, as to border the brink of complete 
sterility. Be that as it may and putting Schopenhauer’s 
‘ideal’ temporarily to one side, the principle, returning 
to the matter at hand, divided one large, if invisible 
monster, nature’s will, into a countless variety and 
number of more vocal, familiar and ‘petty monsters’; all 
of which stridently and forcibly proclaimed their 
‘independence’ from each other.  
 
The will spawned off shoot after off shoot and each off 
shoot proceeded to animalise and personify whatever 
latent desire the will wished to express through it. ‘The 
animal’s body’, as Schopenhauer wrote, ‘is simply its 
will itself seen as a representation in the brain, and 
therefore under the forms of space, time, and casuality, 
and hence the mere visibility, objectivity of the 
will’.360 Consequently, its need to squawk or bray at the 
top of its voice was made manifest by the cockatoo and 
donkey. Its desire to sing in more melodious tones was 
granted to it in the form of the blackbird and thrush. 
360 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘On the Will in Nature’ (1836 / 1992 p. 64). 
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Its wish to stop all the incessant and repetitive fuss 
emanating from the blackbird and thrush gave rise to the 
sparrow hawk. Its predilection for bombast was delivered 
to it, and quite possibly satisfied one suspects, by its 
unveiling of Friedrich Schlegel. Another of its wishes 
may have been to glorify its own manifest ‘might’ and for 
that express reason Max Stirner suddenly appeared. 
Another of its desires, for the little we know, may have 
been to undermine its manifest ‘might’ and, in the weeks 
preceding Stirner’s death, the will conjured up an insect 
whose sole purpose in life was, as we will hear in the 
following chapter, to address that particular matter. 
 
The will was despicable in its primary state, its 
secondary state, as well as its tertiary state and the 
interplay between all of its states was ultimately, like 
the rest of its contrivances, an unknown quantity. 
 
IV. AN UNHEALTHY DISTANCE 
 
Schopenhauer regarded the world at arm’s length, as one 
tends to do with foul and sickly smelling things. The 
resultant effect was that only its crudest, most 
rudimentary features were made apparent to him. ‘We must 
always try to preserve large views’, Schopenhauer 
implored. ‘If we are arrested by details’, he snobbishly 
and unreasonably feared, ‘we shall get confused, and see 
things awry’.361 But an indistinct lump seen from afar is 
fundamentally removed from one’s immediate and active 
concern. Some writers have even seen fit to single out 
Schopenhauer’s impediment, a ‘presbyopic’ condition as I 
described it an earlier chapter, and heap an undue amount 
361 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘On the Wisdom of Life’. Aphorisms. French 
book. Find ref P & P. 
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of praise on it.  
 
Take, for example, Friedrich Nietzsche. In his 
commendatory and uninformative essay, ‘Schopenhauer as 
Educator’ (1874), Nietzsche wrote: ‘His greatness lies in 
having set up before him a picture of life as a whole, in 
order to interpret it as a whole’.362 Consequently, all of 
life’s more intricate ‘details’, mostly the more 
agreeable ones, given Schopenhauer’s pessimistic 
disposition, were completely lost to the ‘whole’; they 
were, by comparison, microscopic in the extreme and 
barely appreciable to the philosopher on account of his 
‘impediment’. 
 
In one sense, Schopenhauer’s indiscriminate take on life 
may be seen, albeit mistakenly, to have let a gallery of 
rogues off the hook. They were ‘merely’ acting, as a 
sophist in their ranks might have argued in their 
collective defence, in abeyance to the will’s diabolical 
demands. But Schopenhauer did not wish to absolve anyone 
who actively affirmed the will’s desires; instead, the 
philosopher held everyone to account, rogue or not, who 
did so. 
 
Individuals resembled little more than a predictable and 
rather unpleasant collection of organisms, swarming this 
way and that, at the bottom of an enormous petri dish, 
but as they were all phenomena of the active agent in the 
dish even the most modest among them who simply went 
about their business in the least obtrusive of ways were 
no less an exception. The same basic desire was at play 
‘within’ them as it was in the will’s most infamous 
362 Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ collected in 
‘Untimely Meditations’ (1874 / 1983 p. 141). 
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manifestation. 
 
Schopenhauer was completely enthralled by the scope and 
stature of the ‘whole’. It was not, contrary to 
Nietzsche’s opinion, a laudable quality. It depreciated, 
in the most belittling way, all ostensible belief in the 
subject’s standing as a distinct, singular and 
independent figure. If one happened to share 
Schopenhauer’s disinclination to be ‘arrested by details’ 
then every single person would be lumped together in an 
indeterminate, unsightly and odorous heap. And that 
reflected, one fears, Schopenhauer’s ambitions. The 
philosopher’s ‘impediment’ engendered, as indeed Wyndham 
Lewis keenly observed, ‘an ecstatic stupefaction at the 
picture of the colossal, of a ready contempt for a mere 
“individual”’.363 Every single person was ‘merely’ a 
manifestation of an omnivorous and inherently loathsome 
will that was, in the simplest of terms, far bigger and 
more persistent than them.  
 
Appearances were of the most deceptive order; they were 
little more than so many illusory forms a wholly 
duplicitous will had strategically placed in one’s path 
to cover up its own predilection for self-harm. They 
encouraged the belief, the absolutely ‘delusional’ belief 
that its manifestation in one objectified form had 
little, if any relation to its manifestation in another. 
This, however, was not true at all; every single one of 
these ‘illusory forms’, according to Schopenhauer, were 
not simply the will’s doing but were, in actual fact, 
nothing other than the will itself. 
 
‘The body is the will itself’, as Schopenhauer said, 
363 Wyndham Lewis, ‘Time and Western Man’ (1927 p. 241).  
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‘objectively perceived as spatial phenomenon’.364 
Consequently, one could not see, in a literal sense, the 
unified nature of the world, the glorified ‘whole’, as 
the will, expressing its fervent and libidinous wish to 
expose itself in public, had taken matters into its own 
hands and hampered the effort from the very start; when, 
in other words, it first set foot out of its primordial 
hiding spot and cluttered up the world with its manifold 
and distracting image.  
 
The will may well have hogged the limelight with its 
manifest display, but the true, largely uncelebrated 
performance actually took place in the wings. The 
performance on stage was little more than an elaborate 
ruse that capitalised, if by way of allegory, on the 
favourable seating arrangements of the tiered auditorium 
as well as the strict running time of the performance. 
The number of apparent wills on stage did little more 
than mouth and repeat the lines prompted to them by the 
authoritative will in the wings. But one could not see 
the all important impresario, the ‘true’ will, as it was 
off stage and one’s eye, in any case, was immediately 
drawn to the illuminated pool of light that encircled the 
‘performance’. One was enthralled not by the impresario, 
but the dancing figures at the centre of the stage. The 
impresario’s unified vision, then, largely passed one by.  
 
‘We are nothing else in the universe’, as a clearly none 
the wiser Sénancour suspected, ‘but marionettes worked by 
a showman, set in opposition, whirled here and there, 
made to laugh, to fight, to weep, to jump, for the 
364 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 609). 
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entertainment of - whom?’.365 Again and again, time and 
space, the unavoidable arrangements of the auditorium 
acted to conceal from everybody, except Schopenhauer, the 
‘true’ identity of the ‘showman’ in question. ‘In outer 
as well as in inner teleology of nature’, Schopenhauer 
revealed to the reader, ‘what we must think of as means 
and end is everywhere only the phenomenon of the unity of 
the one will so in agreement with itself, which has 
broken up into space and time for our mode of 
cognition’.366 But having apparently gained unprecedented 
access to all areas of the auditorium, front and back of 
the house, Schopenhauer had not only seen the ‘showman’ 
for what he was, but also identified him as the ‘real’ 
villain of the piece: ‘that which exhibits itself in a 
million forms of endless variety and diversity, and thus 
performs the most variegated and grotesque play without 
beginning and end, is this one essence’.367 Needless to 
say, the impresario, the ‘showman’ and troupe of 
beleaguered performers were all one and the same thing: 
nature’s will.  
 
Schopenhauer described the will, several moments ago, as 
unitary whole ‘in agreement with itself’, but it is as 
well to remind you that his use of the term ‘agreement’ 
was somewhat idiosyncratic.368 It described an agreement 
of sorts but it was not the sort of harmonious agreement 
that would have struck a chord with the likes of 
Friedrich Schlegel nor, for that matter, was it readily 
apparent to anyone other than the ‘privileged’ figure 
365 Étienne Pivert de Sénancour, ‘Obermann’, Vol. I (1804 / 1910 p. 
177). 
366 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 161). 
367 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 318). 
368 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 161). 
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whom, unaccountably, had been granted the revealing view 
in the first place. 
 
Unlike Schopenhauer, the ‘agreement’ was completely 
beyond one’s customary powers to discern or readily 
appreciate and hardly boded at all well for the 
‘performers’ concerned. Not, I should add, if one dared 
consider the world from a ‘feeble’ phenomenal 
perspective. 
 
Schopenhauer’s unifying principle, the will, was ‘held’ 
together by means of disharmony and discord. That 
summation, however, was only superficially true. If one 
forgets all about the diversity of beings and imagines 
the world as a whirling, noxious plume of smoke the 
robotic Schopenhauer was quite correct, it did represent 
a self-adjudged ‘agreement’. One creature, as we have 
heard him say, was born, as indeed seems very likely, for 
the sole purpose of utilising, if not devouring another. 
But as one creature was simply the same thing made 
manifest in another image it hardly made any difference 
whether Tom ever managed to corner and consume Jerry or 
not. The two creatures were ‘only’ manifestations of 
nature’s single will, after all. In that sense, the will 
had indeed reached an ‘agreeable’, if purely utilitarian 
arrangement with itself, costly as it may have been for 
Jerry, to provide for its own sustenance.  
 
The entire world, then, was ‘only’ an evanescent image 
that expressed, not only its fanaticism for display but 
the sharp and constant pangs of the will’s hoggish and 
cannibalistic appetite. ‘It is a hungry will, insatiable 
and unassuageable’, as Bryan Magee said, ‘and the will’s 
phenomena have only each other to feed on, for there is 
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nothing else in the world. In this sense the will 
devours, and can devour only, itself’.369  
 
The will not only satisfied its hunger by chewing on its 
own tail, but appeased its sexual urges by similarly self 
administered means. Thankfully, the principle of 
sufficient reason spared us the sight of this 
particularly lurid spectacle and kept the will’s 
‘agreeable’ habits to itself. Even so, it is hard to say, 
if one is pushed, what strikes one as worse:  
 
1). The sight of an enormous, slobbering, and self-
consuming will defiling itself in public.  
 
2). The sight of its ‘lackeys’ abasing themselves in 
accordance with its wishes.  
 
Schopenhauer, for one, decided that he could not possibly 
choose between the first and second option; both were, in 
their own way, equally appalling. And, in tune with a 
sentiment articulated by Pechorin in ‘A Hero of Our Own 
Times’ (1840): ‘“The world’s all nonsense. Nature’s a 
fool. Fate is an idiot. Life is not worth a farthing’”.370 
Schopenhauer, accordingly, aspired to put an end to both 
options, 1 as well as 2. 
 
One was only afforded, by dint of the principle in 
question, the spectacle of option 2. In turn, all that 
was universally ‘true’, authentic and veritable (the 
will, I mean), had, Schopenhauer believed, been chopped 
up, individuated and fed an unshakable belief - an 
369 Bryan Magee, ‘The Philosophy of Schopenhauer’ (1983 p. 155).  
370 Mikhail Lermontov, ‘A Hero of Our Own Times’ (1840 / 1958 p. 247). 
Translated from the Russian by Eden and Cedar Paul, Oxford University 
Press, London. 
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egotistical belief, in its own fleeting ‘illusion’ of 
form (true of all individuals, including Schopenhauer), 
by nothing other, I should add, than the masochistic and 
counterplotting will itself.  
 
Cannibalism did not appear as cannibalism, but the 
pressing appetent need of one animal satisfied by the 
consumption of another; nor did its sexual habits appear 
as a forlorn and utterly solitary preoccupation, but 
foredoomed procreative acts bearing all manner of fine 
sounding, amative names - ‘soap-bubbles’, as the tin 
hearted Schopenhauer described them.371 As a result, that 
which was genuine, the will, no longer appeared to be 
genuine at all, but a ridiculous and outlandish idea. In 
the world of representation, only its manifestations were 
credible even if they were little more than unknowing 
expedients of the will’s autophagous appetite. 
 
The ‘principle of sufficient reason’ determined, as 
Schopenhauer described it, ‘the restricted method of 
knowledge of individuals’.372 It referred to the 
percipient faculties of an objectified will and, 
understandably, pandered to its pretences and served to 
protect its treasured illusion. ‘The principle of 
sufficient reason’, as Schopenhauer maintained, ‘is the 
universal form of every phenomenon, and man in his 
action, like every other phenomenon, must be subordinated 
to it’.373 Given its purely submissive position, the 
intellect was unable to comprehend the will in and of 
itself, but only its manifest and wholly misleading array 
371 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 535).  
372 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 181). 
373 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 113). 
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of images. The brain, then, encouraged one to take a 
misguided belief in things.  
 
If we take, for instance, a figure - any old figure, a 
Patrick for example, and ask this Patrick character what 
exactly constitutes the basis and make up of any one 
person, he would not reply: ‘The individual subject is 
purely a spatial and temporal phenomenon, objectified in 
one’s brain by means of nature’s conniving and lascivious 
will’. Rather, he would be more likely to say, presuming, 
of course, he was unfamiliar with Schopenhauer’s doctrine 
and not, for that matter, prone to being awkward: ‘The 
subject is a many number of things and they are too 
countless to name’ or, at least, something to that 
effect.  
 
The principle of which Schopenhauer spoke magically 
‘transformed’ nature’s will from an inapprehensible, 
impersonal, eternal essence into a number of apparently 
intelligible, egocentric and finite somatic forms. It 
was, as Schopenhauer wrote, ‘only as phenomenon that an 
individual is distinguished from the other things of the 
world’.374 And it certainly described how the world 
appeared not only to Patrick but to Tom, to Jerry, Max 
Stirner, and every other creature and character one is 
able to think of.  
 
It was, as Schopenhauer explained, ‘the ultimate 
principle of all finiteness, of all individuation, and 
the universal form of the representation as it comes to 
the knowledge of the individual as such’.375 However, this 
374 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966  p. 364). 
375 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 169). 
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Patrick character of mine would have been no different, 
Schopenhauer would have said, to any other Tom, Dick or 
Harry. There was nothing the least bit original or 
singular about him at all. Patrick was ‘merely’, as 
Schopenhauer was prone, more often than not, to phrase 
it, a changing form in which nature’s will revealed 
itself to the world and was hardly worthy of his 
attention as he was more than familiar with its 
despicable ways.  
 
Individuality was not worthy of Schopenhauer’s praise as 
it was an all out ‘delusion’; it was only by virtue of 
one’s ‘limited’ and wholly compromised percipient 
faculties that such a thing existed at all. Individuality 
was meagre in comparison to that which informed it and 
gave it substance. It was only a representational ‘image’ 
that was as sharp as the pair of eyes that perceived it, 
as smelly as the nose that smelt it, and, as a loud as 
the set of ears that were subjected to all of the 
tremendous noise the will invariably wished to make. 
One’s senses, then, were in league with one’s brain and, 
in turn, pandered to the desires of an exhibitive will. 
 
The world of representation, the will’s vast array of 
images, was a world in which each bridge was apparently 
burnt; a world in which no two things appeared to have 
the least bit in common. All people ‘appeared’ to be 
entirely self-contained, autonomous creatures with little 
affinity with the rest of the world that surrounded them. 
If any single one of them were told, in no uncertain 
terms by Schopenhauer, that he was Tom, that he was Jerry 
and a whole host of other characters, his reply would be 
expressed, above all else, by adamant shakes of the head, 
by ‘nos’ and ‘certainly nots’; an endless series of 
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‘nothing to do with mes’. 
 
The common ground between one thing and another, if one 
took a customary view of the world, came to a quick and 
rather abrupt end. An oak tree, for instance, was simply 
an oak tree and nothing more than that. The birds that 
chirped in its branches, were again, something quite 
different indeed. They had, between them, only the 
faintest of things in common, namely the birds, whatever 
their reasons, chose to spend large amounts of their time 
in the oak’s branches. Apart from that, the tree and the 
birds perched in it had little else to do with one 
another. They certainly had nothing in common with a 
naturalist who may have happened to be observing them 
from below. They were simply things that one might 
happen, if one was in the right mood, to take some 
pleasure in looking at, but, beyond that, they had little 
more to do with oneself. ‘For all that we perceive under 
these conditions’, as Schopenhauer emphasised, ‘is mere 
phenomenon’.376 If one were asked if one shared a single 
thing with the oak tree and the birds fluttering about in 
it, one would again reply, without hesitation, ‘No’.  
 
The representational world was a world of colourful 
shapes and sharply defined outlines; a world of trees and 
birds and countless other things and creatures of 
individual standing. But their singularity all hung at 
the mercy of an individuating principle planted in one’s 
brain; ultimately, it was all little more than an 
illusion, not only of the highest order, but also of the 
most compelling. ‘It lies merely in the individual’s mode 
of cognition and has’, as Schopenhauer added, ‘reality 
376 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘Parerga and Paralipomena’ Vol. II (1851 / 
19** p. 270). 
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only for that individual’.377  
 
Beyond the individuating principle, in the ‘primordial’ 
fog of will, the naturalist was not only the oak tree, 
but also the number of birds in its branches. ‘In this 
root-point of existence’, as Schopenhauer explained, ‘the 
difference of beings ceases’.378 They all reflected, 
albeit it in gradatory degrees, the stages of his own 
inborn nature. And with this principle Schopenhauer 
sliced man’s figure, cleanly across the middle, in two.  
 
V. ONE IS DOUBLE 
 
The individual subject now found himself as will, 
primarily, and, by means of an apparent neurological 
twist of fate, its somewhat less significant objectified 
image. ‘Everyone’, as Schopenhauer said, ‘finds himself 
to be this will, in which the inner nature of the world 
consists, and he also finds himself to be the knowing 
subject, whose representation is the whole world’.379  
 
One side of him, the latter, was said to be ‘real’, while 
the former, his manifest and specific image, was not. To 
compound the matter, the will was inherently evil, if 
Schopenhauer’s skewed account was to be believed, but as 
it constituted the nature of all things including his 
own, he too, at heart, was no less loathsome.380 And, 
377 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 182). 
378 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 /  1966 p. 325). 
379 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 162). 
380 Having established the will as evil, Schopenhauer argued that it 
had the effect of a beneficial, if rather severe homeopathic remedy: 
‘if the existence of evil is already interwoven with that of the 
world in the foundation of a system, then it need not fear that 
specter like a vaccinated child need not fear smallpox’. See Arthur 
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reflecting a fear expressed by Gérard de Nerval, 
Schopenhauer’s subject had ‘doubled’. ‘A terrible idea 
came to me’, as Nerval wrote in ‘Aurelia’ (1855). “Man is 
double”, I said to myself’.381 And Nerval’s fears 
certainly proved to have catastrophic consequences for 
Schopenhauer’s ‘knowing subject’ who was struck by the 
same terrifying, revelatory ‘idea’.382  
 
‘We distinguish in man’, as Paul Deussen, founder of the 
Schopenhauer Society, similarly observed in ‘The Elements 
of Metaphysics’ (1894), ‘a twofold character, that of the 
species and that of the individual’.383 But the 
relationship between the one and the other was neither 
the most amicable, sympathetic nor balanced of unions. 
Patrick, to take a recent example, appeared to be 
straddled, in the most precarious way, between the 
conflicting demands of his, by now, divided and 
grotesquely mismatched person. Patrick’s will, the 
weightier side of him which pertained to the ‘species’, 
seemed intent on little more than tormenting him, the 
phenomenal Patrick, with its desires (faithfully 
performing the villainous role assigned to it by 
Schopenhauer), while the ‘paltry’ leftovers which 
constituted Patrick’s ‘individual’ character, objected to 
its unreasonable and hostile intentions. But as the two 
sides of Patrick emanated from the very same source, one 
can only derive a meagre amount of solace in the 
confirmation of one’s worst fears.  
 
Schopenhauer, ‘On the Will in Nature’ (1836 / 1992 p. 142). 
381 Gérard de Nerval, ‘Aurelia’ (1855 / 1931 p. 26).  
382 ‘Every being in nature’, as Schopenhauer asserted, ‘is 
simultaneously phenomenon and thing-in-itself’. The ‘sudden’ and 
unpleasant realisation of one’s ‘double state’ constituted the basis 
of the ronunciative process. Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘Parerga and 
Paralipomena’ Vol. II (1851 / 19** p. 91).  
383 Paul Deussen, ‘The Elements of Metaphysics’ (1894 / 19** p. 202). 
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The will was clearly intent on pursuing the most 
destructive and calamitous of ends.   
 
That is not to say that the will found itself at the 
sharpest end of the stick; its rather less fortunate 
‘manifestations’ - the ‘lackeys’ of whom I have spoke, 
bore the brunt of its caprice. Needless to say, they did 
not happen to share, not in any substantial way, its 
immortal nature and paid dearly for all the grotesque and 
reckless liberties the will took with them. They were 
‘merely’ playthings of its umpteen million desires and it 
expended with them accordingly. ‘One of Schopenhauer’s 
major themes’, as Christopher Janaway quite rightly 
identified, ‘is that the will in nature is greater than 
the individual living being, and has the individual at 
its mercy’.384  
 
The will toyed with generation after generation; no 
sooner than it had exhausted one, it turned its attention 
to the next and set about it in exactly the same ravenous 
way. ‘Every time a man is begotten and born’, as 
Schopenhauer wrote, ‘the clock of human life is wound up 
anew, to repeat once more its same old tune that has 
already been played innumerable times, movement by 
movement and measure by measure, with insignificant 
variations. Every individual, every human apparition and 
its course of life, is only one more short dream of the 
endless spirit of nature... is only one more fleeting 
form, playfully sketched by it on its infinite page, 
space and time; it is allowed to exist for a short while 
that is infinitesimal compared with these and is then 
384 Christopher Janaway, ‘The real essence of human beings: 
Schopenhauer and the unconscious will’ collected in ‘Thinking the 
Unconscious. Nineteenth-Century German Thought’ (2010 p. 153). 
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effaced, to make new room’.385 Max Scheler described 
nature’s will as ‘that thrusting, covetous, demonic 
power, throwing out new forms of existence in ever 
greater profusion’.386 But all the ‘new forms of 
existence’ it threw out simply replaced those it had lost 
to its grim and alarming form of ‘entertainment’.  
 
Nature’s will imparted its most concupiscent and 
gluttonous of desires to each and every person; they were 
not welcome gifts, but damnable ones. The will found 
itself, ‘to its astonishment’, cooped up within each of 
these people like a gigantic, if lithe contortionist in 
an impossibly small box. ‘If anyone asks me what it is’, 
as Schopenhauer explained, ‘I refer him to his own inner 
being, where he will find it complete, and indeed of 
colossal magnitude’.387 Even the most intent and wildly 
licentious of personal endeavours to satisfy its desires 
would leave the will in a state of want. Why? Because no 
single person, not even the most voracious or dissolute 
among them, could possibly satisfy the sum total of its 
desires. And, by proxy, they all felt an indeterminate 
sense of its dissatisfaction. ‘The will is often inflamed 
to a degree far exceeding the affirmation of the body’, 
as Schopenhauer wrote.388 Elsewhere, the philosopher 
talked of ‘life’s inadequacy to satisfy the spirit’.389  
 
A pool of sea water cut off at high tide might, one 
imagines, feel much the same way. Having grown used to 
385 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 322). 
386 Max Scheler, ‘On the Eternal in Man’ (1921 / 1960 p. 116). 
387 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘On the Will in Nature’ (1836 / 1992  p. 
142). 
388 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 328). 
389 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 322). 
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its former abundance, the Atlantic ocean for example, it 
now finds itself confined to a dismal rock pool. It still 
feels the enormous swell of the Atlantic’s waves but, to 
its dismay, it is no deeper than a puddle and, 
understandably, frustrated by the severe limitations 
inflicted on it. It may well wish to roll unimpeded 
across vast stretches of water, but it can do no more 
than vent its frustration in the form of pitiful little 
ripples. And, like the pool of sea water, every 
individual person felt, however indistinctly, the 
immeasurable scope of one (the universal will of which 
they were a part) and the confinement of the other (the 
‘paltry’ rock pool, the body in this case, in which the 
will was confined). But if the Atlantic ocean and the 
remaining six seas proved an insufficient paddling pool, 
one can possibly sense something of the will’s 
‘astonishment’, if not complete horror, when it found 
itself interned within the ailing frame of any old body. 
 
‘There is’, as Bryan Magee wrote, ‘something horror-
stricken about Schopenhauer’s view of the world’.390 And 
‘that something’ was nothing other than the parasitic 
worm in the apple, his own inborn enemy: nature’s will. 
It was a monstrous libidinal power in complete 
dictatorial control of its ‘hosts’. They not only sang 
but danced to its tune like so many servile idiots and 
fools; they were at its constant beck and call and it led 
them, as often proved the case, on the wildest, most 
perilous of goose chases. A person was led this way and 
that by the will’s senseless desires over which he had 
little, if any control. Nor can Schopenhauer be said, as 
we will hear, to have helped disabuse his readers of that 
impression. 
390 Bryan Magee, ‘The Philosophy of Schopenhauer’ (1983 p. 154).  
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The will urged man on, often in the most ruinous of ways, 
to fulfill its impossible callings. Sénancour had 
something of, what can only be described as, an 
extraordinary presentiment of Schopenhauer’s doctrine of 
will, when, in the second volume of ‘Obermann’, a good 
fifteen years before the philosopher’s disturbing scheme 
made its appearance, he wrote the following startling and 
profound sentence: ‘I am the sport of that power which 
will shatter us all’.391 Nature’s malefic will could not 
be characterised more succinctly and perfectly than that. 
 
VI. NATURE’S TRUE COLOURS 
 
Having spoken a little of Schopenhauer’s doctrine, one 
can possibly begin to appreciate its divergence from 
Friedrich Schlegel’s totalising ‘theory’. Schopenhauer’s 
portrayal of nature and the subject’s affinity with it, 
was a far cry from Schlegel’s all too frothy and flowery 
vision. If one turns to page 101 of Michael Artzibashev’s 
novel, ‘Sanine’ (1907), one reads: ‘“Nature! Ha, ha!” 
Sanine laughed feebly, and waved his hand in derision. 
“It is customary, I know, to say that Nature is perfect. 
The truth is, that Nature is just as defective as 
mankind. Without any great effort of imagination any of 
us could present a world a hundred times better than this 
one. Why should we not have perpetual warmth and light, 
and a garden ever verdant and ever gay?’.392 And 
Schopenhauer’s ‘garden’ was certainly not nearly as 
‘verdant’ nor as ‘gay’ as Schlegel’s; an extremely nasty 
and unpleasant thing remained hidden in the dense 
391 Étienne Pivert de Sénancour, ‘Obermann’, Vol. II (1804 / 1910 p. 
254).  
392 Michael Artzibashev, ‘Sanine. A Russian Love Novel’ (1907 / 1932 
p. 101). Translated from the Russian by Percy Pinkerton. Three Sirens 
Press, NYC. 
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undergrowth. 
 
Nature had opened up to Schopenhauer in a way she had not 
been able to do with the all too selective Friedrich 
Schlegel. ‘Schopenhauer’, as Arthur Hübscher wrote in 
‘The Philosophy of Schopenhauer in its Intellectual 
Context’ (1989), ‘teaches us to know the world, and to 
look into its heart’.393 However, the sight no longer 
afforded Schopenhauer’s ‘knowing subject’ any particular 
form of joy. A ‘glance into the interior of nature is 
certainly granted to us’, Schopenhauer acknowledged, ‘in 
so far as this is nothing but our own inner being’.394 
Having upturned a large and weighty stone, Schopenhauer 
recognised  all sorts of unpleasant things crawling about 
in the moist soil. Most alarming of all, his own ‘inner 
being’; the sight proved to be a source of acute distress 
and alarm, and, in tune with the horrific discovery, 
Schopenhauer’s objectives changed dramatically.  
 
‘Look into the heart of nature? What pleasure can there 
be in that?’, as Pär Lagerkvist asked in his novel ‘The 
Dwarf’ (1944). It was a question that Schopenhauer would 
have been eager to direct, one imagines, to the likes of 
Friedrich Schlegel; he would certainly have welcomed 
Lagerkvist’s sentiments, as they expressed his own, when 
the novelist immediately added: ‘And if they really could 
do such a thing it would fill them with terror. They 
think that like everything else it is made for them, for 
their well-being and their happiness, so that their life 
shall be great and wonderful. What do they know about it? 
How do they know that any heed is paid to them and their 
393 Arthur Hübscher, ‘The Philosophy of Schopenhauer in its 
Intellectual Context: Thinker Against the Tide’ (19** / 1989 p. 426). 
394 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966  p. 352). 
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strange childish desires?’.395  
 
‘Mother nature’ had revealed her true colours to 
Schopenhauer and he did not like ‘her’ one bit and ‘she’, 
in return, could hardly be said to have been particularly 
attentive to his welfare or shown him very much in the 
way of consideration. His well-being was, in fact, of 
little consequence to her; she had far larger cares of 
her own and those primarily concerned the upkeep and 
perpetuation of the species rather than any one of its 
constituents. 
 
The ‘individual’, Schopenhauer wrote in the second volume 
of ‘The World as Will and Representation’ (1844), ‘has 
for nature only an indirect value, in so far as it is a 
means for maintaining the species. Apart from this, its 
existence is a matter of indifference to nature; in fact, 
nature herself leads it to destruction as soon as it 
ceases to be fit for that purpose.’396 The ‘individual’, 
as Schopenhauer said in an earlier work, ‘is nothing to 
her’.397 Nature’s dealings with Schopenhauer smacked of 
enmity and deceit; he appeared to be little more than her 
pliant fool. It was no longer, then, the happiest of 
unions.  
 
In certain respects, the relationship was now on a more 
honest and faithful footing. Schopenhauer saw a side to 
nature that Schlegel, given his squeamish and mawkish 
disposition, was loathed to admit or, for that matter, 
even acknowledge. It is one thing, as I said earlier, to 
395 Pär Lagerkvist, ‘The Dwarf’ (1944 / 1945 p. 29). 
396 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 351).  
397 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 330). 
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identify oneself, as Schlegel did, with all of the 
pleasant things nature had to offer, with powered bosoms 
and the like, but quite another to align oneself with its 
woe and want. To Schopenhauer’s credit, he did not shy 
away from the prospect, as the all too selective Schlegel 
had done, but acknowledged it as his own. Rilke 
faithfully expressed the philosopher’s horror when, in 
‘The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge’ (1910), he 
exclaimed, ‘My God it struck me with sudden vehemence, 
thus then art Thou!’.398 ‘Once we regard humanity in this 
way’, as Christopher Janaway added, ‘we have to attribute 
to ourselves some of the characteristics of the world at 
large’.399 
 
The dreadful realisation that one was complicit, in the 
most elemental sense, with all the most rotten things in 
life, past and present, accounted, in no small degree, 
for Schopenhauer’s ‘dramatic’ change of heart, as I 
described it at the beginning of the chapter. The 
subject’s ‘inner-being’ was still very much a universal 
entity, as indeed it had been with Schlegel, but its 
point of unity with nature had, in Schopenhauer’s 
doctrine, been widened; it not only encompassed its 
sublimity, at which point I ought to remind you 
Schlegel’s unitary idea, regardless of his insistence to 
the contrary, came to an abrupt halt, but it now 
encompassed all of its misery and suffering to boot. The 
fundamental difference between the universalism of 
398 Rainer Maria Rilke, ‘The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge’ (1910 
/ 2008 p. 198?). Translated from the German by Burton Pike. Dalkey 
Archive Press, London. Rilke’s expression echoed a phrase 
Schopenhauer derived from the Brahmans, ‘Tat tvam asi’ or ‘This art 
thou’. See Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and 
Representation’, Vol. I (1818 / 1966 p. 374). 
399 Christopher Janaway, ‘The real essence of human beings: 
Schopenhauer and the unconscious will’ collected in ‘Thinking the 
Unconscious. Nineteenth-Century German Thought’ (2010 p. 149). 
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Schlegel and Schopenhauer was that Schopenhauer no longer 
liked but actively loathed its basis.  
 
‘There can be ominous overtones’, as Peter McCormick 
warned, ‘to the search for the hidden self; the 
suggestion that the self is a problem, that it does not 
reveal itself simply and directly to the searcher whose 
self it is, but must instead be sought vigorously and 
interminably, raises the two possibilities, both rather 
terrifying: that one may not be able to find the self, or 
that the self one finds might be utterly horrible’.400 
Schopenhauer was not at a loss to locate his ‘hidden 
self’, as McCormick called it, but, in tune with the 
critic’s fears, the discovery filled the philosopher with 
terror.  
 
‘How frightful is this nature to which we belong!’, as we 
heard Schopenhauer exclaim in the introductory chapter.401 
His doctrine, describing as it did, the unnerving and 
thoroughly ghoulish machinations of nature’s omnipotent 
will was, in fact, was so unpleasant that even its author 
felt compelled to seek deliverance from it. ‘Human 
beings’, as J. P. Jacobsen wrote in ‘Niels Lyhne’ (1880), 
‘so often build up theories that they do not wish to 
reside in’.402 Jacobsen’s suspicion was certainly true of 
Schopenhauer’s relationship to his own theoretical 
scheme. Schlegel can be said to have been far more 
comfortable and relaxed with his ‘theory’ than the 
neurotic Schopenhauer could ever be said to have been 
with his. 
400 Peter McCormick, ‘The Concept of Self in Political Thought’ (1979 
p. 706). 
401 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 356).  
402 J. P. Jacobsen, ‘Niels Lyhne’ (1880 / 19** p. 167). Translated 
from the Danish by *****. 
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Schlegel’s ‘theory’ beckoned man to nature, implored his 
subject, the ‘romantic poet’, to feel at one with her 
infinite ‘riches’. In the circumstances, that was not so 
difficult as the affiliation, as we heard, paid certain 
dividends; Schlegel did not object in the least to 
submerging himself in nature’s communal pool as he kept 
the company of a beautiful, if inconversable array of 
companions. The association flattered his vanity in a way 
that Schopenhauer’s theory certainly did not. Having 
extended his embrace to nature, albeit rather fussily, 
Schlegel’s ‘romantic poet’ was, in the most vicarious 
way, universally glorious whereas Schopenhauer’s ‘knowing 
subject’ was rotten to the core. Having peered into the 
‘heart of nature’, Schopenhauer’s ‘subject’ also 
recognised his affiliation with nature; the sight, 
however, afforded the philosopher little more than a 
profound sense of disgust.  
 
The subject’s will, his ‘inner-nature’, was now far 
removed from the purely syrupy thing it was to Schlegel; 
it was a source of sober reflection as it had extended 
its reach to all that was execrable and rotten. 
Schopenhauer also plunged his subject into a communal 
pool but, unlike Schlegel’s, it was open to the public at 
large, not just a select few, and the water was not 
nearly so enticing. Schopenhauer implored his subject, as 
a consequence, to relinquish the grounds of the 
association; to contest rather than affirm, nature’s 
calling in a determined effort to distinguish himself 
from its degenerate filth. 
 
The prospect that faced Schopenhauer’s ‘subject’ was 
perfectly expressed by Hjalmar Söderberg, when, turning 
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to his novel ‘Doctor Glas’ for the third time, he wrote: 
‘For what you say cannot, must not, on any terms 
whatsoever, be the truth; if it is true, then I don’t 
want to have any more part in things’.403 Unlike 
Schlegel’s ‘romantic poet’, Schopenhauer’s subject had 
first to take on board and digest all sorts of unpleasant 
‘home truths’ before he could possibly identify himself 
with nature’s will. ‘This truth, which must be very 
serious and grave if not terrible to everyone’, as 
Schopenhauer implored, ‘is that a man also can say and 
must say: “The world is my will”’.404 Then and only then 
was Schopenhauer’s ‘subject’ fully fit to plan his 
escape. It was born, fundamentally, of a horrific 
realisation of one’s ‘true’ self. 
 
Nature’s will did afford Schopenhauer certain pleasures, 
but they were few and far between and largely acted to 
distract him, in spells of melodic repose, from the 
incessant and impossible demands she made of him. The 
immersive pleasure he found in Rossini’s music, for 
example, proved unsatisfactory in the long run as it 
always returned him, all too abruptly, to his former 
disconsolate state with a dull and rather mundane thud.  
 
Schopenhauer found what little pleasure he could by 
blotting out the world, miserable and frightening as it 
was, that surrounded him and, rather conveniently, his 
doctrine pandered to his peculiar escapist streak. ‘Under 
these circumstances’, as Wyndham Lewis said, 
‘Schopenhauer decided that, as there was nothing to be 
hoped from it but its eternal mechanical buffooneries, 
the best line to take was to remove yourself as far as 
403 Hjalmar Söderberg, ‘Doctor Glas’ (1905 / 1963 p. 87). 
404 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 4). 
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possible from enforced participation in its quite 
imbecile impulsiveness and fuss’.405  
 
Schopenhauer’s predilection for escape would eventually 
lead his ‘knowing subject’ into a slumberous, utterly 
vacant, if imperturbable sort of state one may well 
associate with an opiate induced stupor. ‘Life and its 
forms’, as an apparently addled Schopenhauer wrote, 
‘merely float before him as a fleeting phenomenon, as a 
light morning dream to one half-awake, through which 
reality already shines, and which can no longer deceive; 
and, like this morning dream, they too finally vanish 
without any violent transition’.406  
 
Having come to his senses, even if that meant losing them 
completely, Schopenhauer aspired to extricate himself 
from nature’s despotic company for good. Rather than 
blindly throw his lot in with hers, Schopenhauer aspired 
to ‘liberate’ himself and seek refuge from her advances. 
Schopenhauer objected to the insensible and utterly 
impossible influence of nature’s will and no longer 
wished, no matter how high the stakes, to be at its beck 
and call. ‘His will’, as Schopenhauer wrote, ‘turns 
about; it no longer affirms its own inner nature, 
mirrored in the phenomenon, but denies it’.407 All that 
was individual about man, his intellect and personality, 
now apparently stood up and contested the infinite and 
imbecilic force at play within him. But one rather large 
and notable problem remained.  
 
405 Wyndham Lewis, ‘Time and Western Man’ (1927 p. 333).  
406 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 391). 
407 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 380). 
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He was her.  
 
The association, as one may well imagine, was not so 
easily dissolved. Having identified an inimical will, the 
ghastliest of things, creeping about ‘within’ him, 
Schopenhauer was compelled to commit a certain degree of 
violence against himself if he wished to purge himself of 
its influence for good. The consequences were 
catastrophic for all concerned.  
 
The subject’s relationship to nature was now of the most 
acrimonious order and his thoughts had turned to escape. 
But his bid for freedom did not simply involve an escape 
from the clutches of nature’s will, it was far more 
perilous than that; it involved a desperate struggle from 
himself.  
 
Nature’s will constituted his own will and little in the 
way of a distinction could possibly be drawn between the 
two. What was in one was contained, in its entirety, 
within the other. ‘Nature’, as you may well remember 
Schopenhauer saying in an earlier chapter, ‘has her 
centre in every individual for each one is the entire 
will’.408 If Schopenhauer renounced the will in himself, 
he hoped to abolish the claims it had over him, if not, 
in a theoretical sense, the whole world. This particular 
matter, as we will eventually hear, remained sketchy to 
say the very least. 
 
Schopenhauer’s plan was far from perfect and had several 
flaws; one of which was a major drawback. The will in 
question was not, sadly, any old will but a will that 
408 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 599). 
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willed one thing and that one thing was life.  
 
Nature’s will was the will-to-live.  
 
If Schopenhauer wished to abolish the will, as he clearly 
seemed to have set his heart on, he faced the prospect of 
abolishing the very life force by whose grace, whether he 
appreciated it or not as the case may have been, he had 
been given his own. It was, one may imagine, something of 
a sticking point. Not apparently so. It did not appear to 
discourage Schopenhauer in the least; it had, in fact, 
quite the opposite effect on the philosopher: it 
galvanised him.  
 
Had Schopenhauer had it in him to see his doctrine 
through to its end and not resorted to the pretence and 
thoroughly disingenuous tones of the final phase of ‘The 
World as Will and Representation’, he imagined one 
experience, above all others, would present itself to 
him. He would finally be ‘delivered’, as he worded it, 
‘from the miserable self’ and that, in itself, would come 
as an enormous relief and unspeakable blessing. It had, 
on reflection, been the chief source of his torment.409 
And with that sentiment, Schopenhauer can be said to have 
revealed the true intent of his thoroughly nullifying 
scheme.  
 
VII. AT ODDS WITH ONESELF  
 
Schopenhauer’s subject was now on the run from nature’s 
will, but as nature’s will was his own he found himself, 
on what amounted to a treadmill, running away, if rooted 
409 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 199). 
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to the spot, from his own slobbering shadow. ‘Do we not 
with that’, as Max Stirner reasonably asked, ‘go back 
into the dreary misery of seeing ourselves banished out 
of ourselves?’.410 And, confirming Stirner’s worst fears, 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy worked its way to a no less 
‘miserable’ outcome. 
 
Schopenhauer’s desire to abolish the will came at an 
incredibly hefty cost. It did not simply spell the end of 
nature’s tyranny over him, but also heralded the end, to 
put it very simply indeed, of Schopenhauer’s imaginary 
subject. ‘The person who is involved in this perception’, 
as he imagined, ‘is no longer an individual, for in such 
perception the individual has lost himself; he is pure 
will-less, painless, timeless subject of knowledge’.411 
Not that Schopenhauer appeared to be the least bit 
concerned by the approach of the noxious, if deceptively 
friendly cumulose looking cloud. If anything, it appeared 
to spur him on towards the false dawn of his doctrine’s 
destructive and, theoretically speaking, unsatisfactory 
conclusion. 
 
‘Individuality’, as Schopenhauer wrote in the second 
volume of ‘Parerga and Paralipomena’ (1851), ‘is no 
perfection but a limitation, and to be rid of it is, 
therefore, no loss, but rather a gain’.412 If one turns 
one’s attention to an earlier work, the second volume of 
‘The World as Will and Representation’ (1844), one comes 
across a similar sentiment: ‘Every individuality is 
really only a special error, a false step, something that 
410 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 33 - 34). 
411 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 178 - 179). 
412 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘Parerga and Paralipomena’, Vol. II (1851 / 
1974 p. 281 - 282).  
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it would be better should not be, in fact something from 
which it is the real purpose of life to bring us back’.413 
Schopenhauer’s doctrine conspired not only against the 
will that was at play within the heart of nature, but 
also against that which resided in his own. ‘Free from 
individuality’, as Schopenhauer imagined, ‘and from 
servitude to the will’.414  
 
Schopenhauer’s doctrine was not without its touch of 
Stirner’s ‘Stirnerisms’ (his recalcitrant form of 
individualism), nor, could it be said to have been 
entirely free from Schlegel’s ‘Schlegelisms’ (his 
universalism, not his macrology in this instance). To put 
it rather less clumsily, Schopenhauer’s doctrine of a 
will that was no longer the least bit eager to will, that 
objected to the grounds of its willing as well as its own 
objectification of that volitient and insensate urge, 
can, in the most basic sense, be said to have entertained 
the two positions, but only in the sense that the 
bloodiest of battlefields also ‘entertains’ two warring 
factions.  
 
The relationship between the ‘universal’, the will, and 
the ‘particular’, the individual, was of the most 
fractious and perplexing order. Paul Gottfried, for one, 
sensed something of the conflicting tendencies at play in 
Schopenhauer’s doctrine. ‘Egotism and idealism’, 
Gottfried wrote, ‘were curiously mixed in his character, 
and this explains the peculiarly cantankerous tone of 
many of his polemics’.415 Schopenhauer’s ‘polemics’, as 
413 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 /  1966 p. 491 - 492). 
414 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 180). 
415 Paul Gottfried, ‘Arthur Schopenhauer and the Heritage of 
Pessimism’ (1975 p. 19). 
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Gottfried quite rightly called them, were indeed 
‘cantankerous’, but they had a far more alarming and 
combative quality to them than that. 
 
Schopenhauer’s doctrine may well have entertained the 
‘universal’ as well as the ‘particular’, but his role was 
far from a passive one; he did not simply entertain the 
two positions, but actively stirred and whipped up 
hostilities between them. But the two positions, that of 
will and its fractured image, made up the two constituent 
‘sides’ of the subject himself; the ‘universal’ was his 
eternal inner-nature (that which was ‘real’) while the 
‘particular’ denoted his outer, finite form (a ‘mere’ 
illusion). What the former desired, the latter now 
denied; it was a counterstroke between a ravenous, 
imbecilic will and an obstinate intellect that had grown 
sick and tired of its ways. If Schopenhauer intended to 
set one against the other, as indeed he appeared all too 
eager to do, he would embark, one fears, on the most 
wantonly destructive of civil wars. And that, I believe, 
was precisely what Schopenhauer was intent on doing. 
 
Schopenhauer made an arch enemy out of himself and it was 
an enemy whom he intended not only to confront, but 
silence once and for all. ‘For as a man’, Schopenhauer 
wrote, ‘it is natural to him to be at war with himself as 
long as he lives’.416 And in tune with those sentiments, 
the ‘top half’ of Schopenhauer declared war upon the rest 
of himself; it was a war primarily waged against the 
‘universal’ force at play ‘within’ him, but it came at an 
incredible cost to the percipient and intellectual powers 
that felt compelled to wage it.  
416 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘Essays from The Parerga and Paralipomena’ 
(18** / 19** p. 61). Parisian book. 
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Schopenhauer not only envisaged the subject as a 
character split in two but the two sides, the top and the 
bottom, were embroiled in a desperate struggle for the 
destruction of the entire figure. The ‘top half’ of 
Schopenhauer’s subject aspired to deny, by means of a 
stern and somewhat bewildering intellectual reproach, the 
vitalistic desires of his ‘bottom half’, while his 
‘bottom half’, the seat of the impersonal and insensate 
will, sought, unsurprisingly (given it also happened, if 
you remember, to be a pertinacious will that purely 
willed to live), to preserve itself. ‘Thus spoke and 
groaned within me’, as Alfred de Musset feared, ‘two 
voices, voices that were defiant and terrible’.417 And the 
two voices that rang in de Musset’s ears echoed those 
that reverberated loudly in Schopenhauer’s own.  
 
One voice, the more ‘virtuous’ of the two, we are 
encouraged to believe, defiantly schemed and conspired 
against the other, the universal life force of will, in a 
bid to drown it out; it implored Schopenhauer’s ‘subject’ 
to rebel against its desirous demands and commit a 
sacrificial act against it. While the other voice, the 
louder of the two one suspects, hardly had Schopenhauer’s 
best interests at heart. It was in league against him and 
clearly intent on beckoning him to his demise with a 
string of allurements and empty promises.  
 
The two voices, one ‘defiant’ the other ‘terrible’, vied 
for dominance in Schopenhauer’s scheme. But one is never 
quite sure, given the calamitous outcome of his doctrine, 
which of the two Schopenhauer’s subject would have been 
417 Alfred de Musset, ‘The Confession of a Child of the Century’ (1836 
/ 1910 p. 282). Translated by Robert Arnot, Current Literature 
Publishing Company, NYC. 
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best advised to follow. He came off as poorly heeding the 
call of one as he did listening to the other.  
 
Schopenhauer’s ‘knowing subject’ was left, as the saying 
goes, with a stark choice between the devil and deep blue 
sea. He may simply have preferred to walk the plank and 
‘jump out of himself’, so to speak, of his own accord 
rather than continue to be pushed and shoved about, 
against his better interests, by Schopenhauer’s devilish 
and endogenous idea, the will. Either way, Schopenhauer’s 
subject was not the least bit happy in the philosophical 
scheme and, consequently, sought his immediate exit. But 
if one wished to excuse oneself from a will that willed 
to live one wished to remove oneself not simply from a 
hellish philosophical creation but from life itself. ‘So 
vivid was his sense of the cruelty, violence and 
aimlessness of both animal and human worlds’, as Bryan 
Magee thought, ‘that it amounted to a horror of life as 
such’.418 It was an opinion seconded by David E. 
Cartwright. ‘To live’, as Cartwright wrote, ‘is to 
desire; to desire is to suffer. To suffer, however, is 
not worthwhile. This meant for Schopenhauer that our life 
was not worthwhile’.419  
 
Schopenhauer almost always adopted the most supercilious 
of tones when he talked of a person’s comparative value 
to his ‘inner-nature’, the will. The former was 
dependent, finite and limited to the phenomena while the 
latter, his will, was not only preeminent and diabolical 
but also universal and infinite in scope. It was a 
grotesquely disproportionate, lopsided association and it 
did an injustice to the subject’s finite state. His 
418 Bryan Magee, ‘The Philosophy of Schopenhauer’ (1983 p. 154).  
419 David E. Cartwright, ‘Schopenhauerian Optimism and an Alternative 
to Resignation’ (1985 p. 155 - 156).  
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temporal nature: his personality, his ego and body paled 
by comparison to that which resided, in the most menacing 
of ways, ‘within’ him. ‘To assert the primacy of being 
over becoming and the doctrine of man that goes with this 
assertion’, as Dennis Rasmussen wrote in ‘Immortality: 
Revolt Against Being’ (1975) ‘is to establish an image of 
man which cannot do justice to man’s full nature. An 
excessive emphasis on being and on man as contemplator 
neglects man’s temporal nature’.420  
 
If one turns to Schopenhauer’s appraisal of the subject’s 
finite state, his ‘temporal nature’ as Rasmussen 
described it, it was not taken, in most instances, with 
any degree of seriousness. His somatic form was an 
‘unreal’, expendable and evanescent image; little more 
than a brain-spun illusion of a feverish will. The 
decidedly fey philosopher spoke of the individual 
subject, to reiterate the point, as ‘that manufactured 
article of nature’.421 Elsewhere, Schopenhauer described 
him as ‘the determined phenomenon’.422 On another page, an 
individual person, one reads, was really nothing other 
than a ‘wavering and unstable phantom’.423 And so went, as 
indeed we have heard, Schopenhauer’s thoroughly 
condescending ontology of the subject’s finite state. He 
was an image of nature’s malevolent will and 
Schopenhauer’s ‘subject’ objected to the affiliation in 
the strongest of terms no matter how high the cost.   
 
‘Snobbishness and the romantic disposition’, as Wyndham 
420 Dennis Rasmussen, ‘Immortality: Revolt Against Being’ (1975 p. 67 
- 68). 
421 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 187). 
422 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 287). 
423 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 278). 
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Lewis believed, ‘are commutative: to be “romantic about 
something” is to be “snobbish about something”’.424 And 
that ‘something’ turned out, in Schopenhauer’s doctrine, 
to be nothing other than himself, his own finite and 
individual state. But the philosopher’s condescending 
attitude to individuality was purely an instrumental move 
on his part; it was provocative in the extreme and 
engendered a profound hostility towards one’s bodily 
person. ‘Schopenhauer’, as Rüdiger Safranski made a point 
of saying, ‘was far from loving that which dominates 
everyone, his own body’.425  
 
One had little if a thing to lose, if one was willing to 
contest the grounds of the will’s claim on life. One was 
‘merely’ a fleeting image of a diabolical will, after 
all. And Schopenhauer certainly capitalised on the 
subject’s inferiority to nature’s will; if one renounced 
one’s bodily self one sacrificed little (one’s ‘mere’ 
individuality and all frivolity that accompanied it) 
compared to that which one gained (the ‘glorious’ 
prospect of the will’s complete annulment). ‘He who has 
come to hold lightly his egoism and his ego... will’, as 
Eduard Von Hartmann wrote in ‘Philosophy of the 
Unconscious’ (1868), ‘less reluctantly accept the result 
of an investigation which exhibits the Ego as a mere 
phenomenon of a Being that for all individuals is one and 
the same’.426  
 
Any right minded person, Schopenhauer imagined, would no 
doubt have grown more than a little tired, sick to death 
424 Wyndham Lewis, ‘Time and Western Man’ (1927 p. 32).  
425 Rüdiger Safranski, ‘Schopenhauer and The Wild Years of Philosophy’ 
(1989 p. 225). 
426 Eduard Von Hartmann, ‘Philosophy of the Unconscious’, Book III 
(1868 / 1931 p. 98). 
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even, of his own ‘inner-being’ and, understandably, given 
the philosopher’s horrific account, started to entertain 
second thoughts about his subordinate relationship to it. 
In exceptional circumstances, he may have even developed 
a strong aversion to its fatuous demands and no longer 
wished to affirm them for any longer than was absolutely 
necessary. ‘In my head’, as Schopenhauer admitted, ‘there 
is a permanent opposition-party’.427  
 
And, ‘luckily’, if Schopenhauer was to be believed, the 
subject had one thing in his favour and it gave him a 
significant edge over nature’s will. It may well have 
been ‘universal’ and ‘eternal’ and dwarfed, in that 
respect, his ‘finite’ and ‘particular’ standing as an 
individual person, but the will did not, crucially, 
possess an intellect that it could call its very own. 
‘The will, which constitutes our being-in-itself, is’, as 
Schopenhauer said, ‘of a simple nature; it merely wills 
and does not know’.428 But, unlike the will, man did 
possess an intellect and it constituted its downfall as 
well, I should add, as his own.  
 
The will had, then, slipped up and made an extremely 
costly error; in granting one of its phenomenal forms, 
man in this instance, an intellect it clearly had not 
banked on the ‘advantage’ it had afforded him. The will 
had vastly, if not catastrophically underestimated one of 
its own objectifications. Only its ‘highest’ 
objectification, the individual subject, was able to 
boast of such a quality. And it was to that quality, as a 
measure of last resort, Schopenhauer’s subject turned. 
427 Arthur Schopenhauer, Studies in Pessimism. Further Psychological 
Observations’ Find ref.  
428 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 499). 
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The intellect and the intellect alone was able to 
penetrate the ‘principle of sufficient reason’ and, 
having seen through it, it ‘conceived a horror’.429 And 
that ‘horror’ was the very force that languished at the 
dead centre of Schopenhauer’s diabolical scheme: again, 
it was nature’s will-to-live.  
 
Schopenhauer described nature’s will in such loathsome 
and vile terms that it actively encouraged, if not 
provoked his ‘subject’ to take a extremely contemptuous 
and repellent view of it indeed. ‘Exaggerated’ and 
‘rather too thickly blackened’, as Frederick Copleston 
quite rightly described it.430 But Schopenhauer, agitator 
that he was, did not leave it at that; he ‘afforded’ the 
minority of his readers the ‘opportunity’, slim though it 
was, to avenge all of the offences and injuries inflicted 
on them by the guilty party, nature’s will. The 
‘particular’ did not have to put up with his one-sided 
and abusive relationship to the ‘universal’; an 
individual was not necessarily its underling at all but, 
by virtue of his intellect, its master. An individual 
had, in this respect, the upper hand over nature’s will.  
 
‘To be sure’, as Schopenhauer said, ‘the best thing he 
can do is to recognize which part of him smarts the most 
under defeat, and let it always gain the victory’.431 
Schopenhauer longed to escape the despotic and ruinous 
influence of the will; if, however, the escape was to 
prove a success it necessitated a personal and very 
‘particular’, if purely symbolic intervention. I say 
429 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 382). 
430 Frederick Copleston, ‘Arthur Schopenhauer. Philosopher of 
Pessimism’((1975 p. 94). 
431 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘Essays from The Parerga and Paralipomena’ 
(18** / 1951 Book 7, p. 62). 
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‘symbolic’ as the intervention in question meant 
destroying the very wick that fed the candle and, 
ultimately, extinguishing the light of the candle itself. 
‘For the battle of life cannot be waged free from all 
pain’, as Schopenhauer warned, ‘it cannot come to an end 
without bloodshed; and in any case a man must suffer 
pain, for he is the conquered as well as the 
conqueror’.432 And Schopenhauer’s ‘self conquest’, in tune 
with those sentiments, boded badly for nature’s will as 
well as the cornered intellect that conspired against it 
and defiantly plotted its downfall.  
 
The conflict in question was the most conspiratorial of 
conflicts and represented a reversal, a dramatic reversal 
of fortunes. To put it very simply indeed, Schopenhauer’s 
individual subject not only objected to the ‘universal’ 
entity ‘within’ him , but actively sought its 
dissolution, if not complete annihilation even if his own 
demise would, as indeed seemed likely, follow suit. The 
subject, only in the most extraordinary of cases, had it 
in him to see off and destroy the very power that had not 
only blighted his phenomenal experience, but had granted 
it to him in the first place. Taking into account all we 
have heard about the will’s sovereignty, the turn of 
events went completely against the grain.  
 
The will, one imagines, faced something of a highly 
peculiar anomaly; it was accustomed, after all, to 
calling all the shots, but in this particular instance 
the boots were apparently on the other foot. The will, 
unlikely as it seemed, was apparently being threatened by 
one of its own phantasmagorical forms. ‘Schopenhauer 
432 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘Essays from The Parerga and Paralipomena’ 
(18** / 1951 Book 7, p. 62). 
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himself is not without a panacea for the world’s evil’, 
as Francis Hueffer wrote in ‘The Literary Aspects of 
Schopenhauer’s Work’ (1874). ‘It is’, as Hueffer 
continued, ‘the Will, the unceasing desire of man, that 
causes the misery of the race; but the individual has the 
power of conquering this desire, or at least of 
paralyzing its baneful effects. When man ceases to wish 
for the goods of this world, when he passively 
contemplates external things instead of identifying 
himself with them, he may obtain freedom from suffering, 
if not positive happiness’.433  
 
Hueffer was, in one respect, absolutely correct; nature’s 
will was entirely to blame, as indeed Iulii Isaevich 
Eichenwald said, for all of man’s ills and woes. But 
Hueffer entertained a very funny idea of ‘positive 
happiness’. Schopenhauer’s doctrine did afford him a 
certain if obscure pleasure, but it was of the most 
expectant variety. It was certainly not one Schopenhauer 
could reasonably have expected to experience first hand 
and for himself. The ‘pleasure’ in question involved 
breaking the stranglehold of the will at large, but the 
will at large was Schopenhauer’s will-to-live. If one 
were to break that, one would, regardless of 
Schopenhauer’s insistence to the contrary, cut one’s 
throat and any talk of gaining anything that even 
remotely resembled ‘positive happiness’ would be more 
than just a little way off the mark. 
 
VIII. THE ENSUING CIVIL WAR 
 
Schopenhauer was particularly fond of anecdotes but he  
433 Francis Hueffer, ‘The Literary Aspects of Schopenhauer’s Work’ 
(1874 p. 376). 
 226 
                                                 
was only fond of those that either illustrated or 
corroborated his doctrine. If one turns, in this respect, 
to ‘The World as Will and Representation’ (1818), there 
are two cursory examples that can be said to stand out. 
Regardless of the brevity Schopenhauer accorded to them 
in his stupendously imaginative work, they present a 
vivid picture of the civil war the philosopher wished to 
wage against himself. The first anecdote described an 
unfortunate ant; the second, an impulsive and rather 
reckless member of the Spanish clergy. 
 
Let me bring your attention to page 147 of the work in 
question and, in turn, to the first of the anecdotes. It 
concerned a fiercely aggressive species of ant called the 
Australian Bulldog-ant.  
 
If one were to cut one of these insects in half, one 
would witness a thoroughly morbid spectacle. Having 
carefully cut the said insect in two, one would, 
according to Schopenhauer, see the head half, armed with 
a formidable and powerful set of mandibles, advance upon 
the lower half and attack it. The abdomen, however, was 
no push over; it had a large and venomous sting in its 
tail. The head half of the ant would seize the lower half 
in its jaws and, in retaliation, the lower half would 
repeatedly sting its advancing, if unseen foe in the head 
with its tail. The violent and absolutely senseless 
encounter would, according to Schopenhauer, last for a 
good half hour or so. In that time, the warring halves 
would either have dropped dead or have been dragged off 
by other ants.434 
 
434 See Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, 
Vol. I (1818 / 1966 p. 147). 
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Let us suppose, in an attempt to clarify the broader 
significance of the example, that the Bulldog-ant was 
representative of the individual subject. It is not, as 
it may appear, such an outlandish suggestion to 
entertain. ‘Like every other part of nature’, as indeed 
Schopenhauer wrote, ‘man is objectivity of the will: 
therefore all that we have said holds good of him 
also’.435  
 
If one continues in this vein and takes the two dissected 
halves of the insect to symbolise, respectively speaking, 
the subject’s intellect (the head half of the ant armed 
with its enormous mandibles) and his libidinal will (the 
lower half of the ant armed with a poisonous sting), one 
may well begin to appreciate, in bodily terms, the 
fundamental character of Schopenhauer’s calamitous 
dispute with himself. In other words, one may begin to 
appreciate the battle, confusing as it was, between the 
‘particular’ and ‘universal’, the intellect and will, in 
less abstracted, more familiar and immediate terms.  
 
With Schopenhauer’s doctrine, the individual subject 
found himself, metaphorically speaking, similarly 
dissected in two and, like the Bulldog-ant, his upper 
half, his intellect, was embroiled in a desperate 
struggle, to no less a catastrophic end I might add, with 
his blind and inimical lower half, the will. One can see, 
if one looks at Schopenhauer’s doctrine in a purely 
physical light, the same thoroughly crude divisions at 
play. The subject’s bodily form was also of the most 
polarised nature. The ‘top half’ of Schopenhauer’s 
subject objected to the insensate and, for the most part, 
435 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 287). 
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domineering life force that languished in its apparent 
stronghold, his testicles. ‘The genitals’, as 
Schopenhauer wrote, ‘are the real focus of the will, and 
are therefore the opposite pole to the brain’.436  
 
The conflict between the intellect and will, between the 
head and the genitals, was of the most moralistic order; 
it was the age old conflict between the intellectual 
powers of ‘good’ (so we are told) and the desirous, 
libidinal powers of ‘evil’. ‘For he tends to speak of the 
Will’, as Frederick Copleston wrote, ‘in terms which 
imply that it is evil in itself. In any case it is the 
source of all evil, and subservience or slavery to the 
Will is represented as the root of all phenomenal evil 
and suffering. In this case of course it follows that the 
desirable line of conduct is to turn away from the Will; 
and as the Will is described as the Will to live, this 
means turning away from life towards the absence of all 
striving and desire’. 437 The former, the intellect, no 
longer wished to affirm the desirous demands, 
disharmonious as they were, of the latter, the will, and 
sought an ‘ascetic’ if not completely disastrous end.  
 
The ‘particular’, then, wished to dispel and completely 
destroy the illusion of its particularity while the 
‘universal’ force of will wished to preserve itself (it 
was, as we well know by now, a procreative life force). 
But if one pits oneself against a will-to-live, one 
presumably pits oneself against life itself. And that 
would appear, one fears, to faithfully describe the 
intent of Arthur Schopenhauer’s perverse wishes. 
436 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 330). 
437 Frederick Copleston, ‘Arthur Schopenhauer. Philosopher of 
Pessimism’((1975 p. xv). 
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Let me turn your attention, firstly, to all that resided 
beneath Schopenhauer’s belt. 
 
The ‘organs of reproduction are’, as one recent critic 
established, ‘where the will to life is seen most plainly 
for what it is’.438 And the ‘lower half’ had something of 
a stranglehold, in most cases, over the whole man. ‘“The 
consciousness in the abdomen” removes’, as Wyndham Lewis 
said in ‘Paleface’ (1929), ‘the vital centre into the 
viscera, and takes the privilege of leadership away from 
the hated “mind” or “intellect”, established up above in 
the head’.439  
 
And with the advent of puberty, just as Lewis feared, the 
will steadily grew in influence. Having taken the 
testicles, the visceral life force steadily gained ground 
and worked its way up the body. For a greater part of the 
time, it met little in the way of opposition. It took 
control of the head, in nearly all instances, with ease 
and clouded it, in turn, with its resultant beliefs 
(individuality, for instance). These beliefs were not 
only delusional in basis, but extremely harmful in 
practice; they acted to distinguish and disconnect, often 
with the bloodiest results, one phenomenal form from 
another. ‘Affirmation of the will-to-live, the phenomenal 
world, diversity of all beings, individuality, egoism, 
hatred, wickedness, all spring from one root’, as 
Schopenhauer wrote.440  
438 Christopher Janaway, ‘The real essence of human beings: 
Schopenhauer and the unconscious will’ collected in ‘Thinking the 
Unconscious. Nineteenth-Century German Thought’ (2010 p. 148). 
439 Wyndham Lewis, ‘Paleface. The Philosophy of the “Melting-Pot”’ 
(1929 p. 177). 
440 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 610). 
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Everything that had fallen under its testicular influence 
was, if we turn to Schopenhauer, unsavoury and ‘bad’; it 
described all that had fallen under the will’s 
heterogeneous spell. In turn, one hears Schopenhauer talk 
of the ‘bad character’ (page 363), the ‘uncultured 
individual’ (page 352), and, of course, the ‘genitals’ 
themselves (page 330). ‘The eyes of the uncultured 
individual’, as Schopenhauer wrote, ‘are clouded, as the 
Indians say, by the veil of Maya. To him is revealed not 
the thing-in-itself, but only the phenomenon in time and 
space, in the principium individuationis, and in the 
remaining forms of the principle of sufficient reason. In 
this form of his limited knowledge he sees not the inner 
nature of things, which is one, but its phenomena as 
separated, detached, innumerable, very different, and 
indeed opposed’.441  
 
The will-to-live, as one might reasonably expect of a 
virulent life force, wished to look after its own 
interests and vigorously defended all that was 
‘particular’, individual and heterogeneous. The ‘lower 
half’ entertained, without question, the will’s apparent 
diversity and actively affirmed it. The will obviously 
wished to safeguard its universal illusion as its 
universal illusion was its manifest image of life. ‘Under 
this delusion’, as David Cartwright wrote, ‘bad 
characters view this world and everything in it as 
foreign and other, as non-ego’.442 These were the ends to 
which the generic, impersonal ‘lower half’ of all people 
worked and, in the great majority of cases, it worked 
441 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 352). 
442 David E. Cartwright, ‘Schopenhauerian Optimism and an Alternative 
to Resignation’ (1985 p. 159).  
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towards them very successfully indeed. 
 
If one turns one’s attention to all that was above 
Schopenhauer’s belt then one gets a very different story 
indeed. All that was above Schopenhauer’s waistline was 
‘good’, potentially speaking (presuming, of course, it 
had not already fallen under the baleful influence, as 
was more than often the case, of the will’s power base, 
the genitals); his top half ‘contained’, if one turns to 
the first volume of ‘The World as Will and 
Representation’, the ‘knowing individual’ (p. 332), the 
‘good conscience’ (p. 373), the ‘pure subject’ and all of 
the other ‘particular’ attributes that can be said to 
have emanated from one’s intellectual faculties, the 
brain (p. 330). And these attributes aspired to 
‘liberate’ man from the will’s delusional ways. ‘Morally 
good persons’, once again turning to David Cartwright, 
‘penetrate the veil of maya, the delusion of the 
principium individuationis, via an intuitive insight into 
the unity of being’.443 
 
Only the ‘top half’ had any hope of seeing through the 
individuating principle (also, you may remember, said to 
be objectified in one’s brain) that had chopped up the 
will into so many illusory forms and engendered the 
‘delusional’ belief in such things as ‘individuality’, 
‘egoism’, ‘patriotism’ and the like. All of which were 
not only exerted in the most violent, selfish and 
factious of ways but defended a wholly erroneous 
position. They were all founded on the superficial 
assumption, so Schopenhauer argued, that one 
manifestation of nature’s will was completely distinct 
443 David E. Cartwright, ‘Schopenhauerian Optimism and an Alternative 
to Resignation’ (1985 p. 159).  
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and unrelated to any other of its other manifest forms.  
 
It was purely a question of appearances and appearances, 
as we have established, were, in Schopenhauer’s opinion, 
of the most deceptive order. ‘They are all undoubtedly 
guided by a delusion’, as Schopenhauer wrote, ‘that 
conceals the service of the species under the mask of an 
egotistical end’.444 In the case of man’s individuality, 
to take the most topical example, it was ‘merely’ an 
affirmative expression of a universal, age old and, by 
all accounts, senile will that no longer recognised its 
own reflection. 
 
‘Schopenhauer maintains’, Christopher Janaway wrote, 
‘that the “will of species” (Wille der Gattung) directs 
the behavior of individuals whilst deluding them that 
they pursue by choice their own individual preferences 
and purposes’.445 To ‘exert’ one’s individuality, then, 
was not, as one might ordinarily expect, to exert oneself 
at all but to exert, in the most affirmative sense, one’s 
inborn enemy, the will. ‘Fundamentally’, as Schopenhauer 
said, ‘it is the will that is spoken of whenever “I” 
occurs in judgment. Therefore the will is the true and 
ultimate point of unity of consciousness, and the bond of 
all its functions and acts’.446 To affirm oneself, whether 
one knew it or not, was tantamount to an act of 
collusion; one gave one’s assent, not to oneself (if 
indeed one had anything that faintly resembled a ‘self’), 
but to the will’s autophagous illusion (of which one was 
444 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 541). 
445 Christopher Janaway, ‘The real essence of human beings: 
Schopenhauer and the unconscious will’ collected in ‘Thinking the 
Unconscious. Nineteenth-Century German Thought’ (2010 p. 154). 
446 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 140). 
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intrinsically a part). But, as Carl A. Raschke made a 
point of saying, ‘The immediate intuition of an infinite 
Will to Live which objectifies itself will-nilly in the 
velleities and drives of organisms struggling for 
existence undercuts all presumptions about human beings 
having independent claims on the resources of nature’.447 
‘Our rôle’, as the Russian novelist, Artzibashev, also 
suspected, ‘is a passive, and auxiliary one’.448 
 
If one wished to exert oneself one had better not express 
anything that resembled the will’s express and fervent 
desire to live. So one, presumably, expressed one’s 
desire not to live and Schopenhauer’s ‘Stirnerian twist’, 
as I called it in an earlier chapter, can be regarded, as 
we will see in the proceeding passages, as a decisive 
‘last stand’ against nothing other than one’s wretched 
self. ‘Instead, of affirmation of the will, we can also 
say’, as Schopenhauer wrote, ‘affirmation of the body’.449  
 
An individual arrived at this particular insight, if we 
turn to Schopenhauer, by ‘simply’, as he put it, ‘turning 
inward’. ‘By looking inwards’, the philosopher wrote, 
‘every individual recognises in his inner being, which is 
his will... that which alone is everywhere real’.450 There 
was, I should immediately add, nothing particularly 
‘simple’ about this whole question of ‘turning inward’. 
Schopenhauer was uncharacteristically vague on this 
matter: the ‘will arrives at self-knowledge through its 
447 Carl A. Raschke, ‘Schopenhauer on the Delusion of Progress’ (1977 
p. 81). 
448 Michael Artzibashev, ‘Sanine. A Russian Love Novel’ (1907 / 1932 
p. 101). Translated from the Russian by Percy Pinkerton. Three Sirens 
Press, NYC. 
449 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 327). 
450 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 600). 
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objectification, however this may come about, whereby its 
abolition, conversion, and salvation become possible’.451 
Turning a blind eye, for the time being, to his apparent 
uncertainty, if one did as Schopenhauer commanded and 
‘looked inwards’ one would come to recognise the ‘real’ 
universal basis of life and the ‘real’ basis of life was 
its inner-principle, the delitescent and repellent will-
to-live. 
 
Having turned his attention in upon himself, whatever 
that might have actually meant in practice, the subject 
would eventually come to regard himself, Schopenhauer 
believed, as indistinguishable from that which displayed 
itself in every other creature. If Schopenhauer’s subject 
continued in this vein, his attitude towards all 
phenomenal forms, even the most objectionable among them, 
may begin, albeit briefly, to soften; going one step 
further, he may even begin to ‘empathise’ with them as he 
would see in their struggle to keep their nostrils above 
the water a reflection of his own struggle to do just the 
same. In doing so, he was well on the way to recognise 
the fallacy of his former position; all the sharp 
distinctions he mistakenly assumed distinguished one 
thing from another were neither as sharp nor as pressing 
as he formerly thought. As a result, the illusion of his 
own individuality, his own bodily state would be made 
acutely clear to him. And with that sudden realisation, 
Schopenhauer’s subject would suddenly recognise that he 
was not an individual at all but an impostor, just 
another manifest affirmation of nature’s diabolical will-
to-live. ‘He is really worthy of reverence only when his 
glance has been raised’, as Schopenhauer wrote, ‘from the 
451 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 643). 
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particular to the universal, and when he regards his own 
suffering merely as an example of the whole’.452  
 
As a direct result of this ‘intuitive’ knowledge, the 
‘top half’ of Schopenhauer’s subject sought to deny all 
of the things the ‘lower half’ affirmed (most glaringly 
of all, by the procreative organs). ‘The will itself’, as 
Schopenhauer claimed, ‘cannot be abolished by anything 
except knowledge. Therefore the only path to salvation is 
that the will should appear freely and without hindrance, 
in order that it can recognize or know its own inner 
nature in the phenomenon’.453 One became aware, then, of 
the universality of things by virtue of one’s intellect, 
the particular. It was a mixed blessing. 
 
On the one hand, it represented a truly extraordinary 
intellectual achievement (one had, after all, apparently 
discerned the very nature of the world). More 
extraordinary still, were the means, ‘however this may 
come about’ as Schopenhauer described them, by which one 
was able to arrive at that point in the first place.454  
 
The intellect, as Schopenhauer had led us to believe, was 
a purely ‘secondary’ phenomenon. The intellect, as it had 
previously been portrayed, played second fiddle to the 
will; at one point, Schopenhauer even saw fit to describe 
‘knowledge’ as an ‘accident of matter’.455 It emanated, 
like everything else, from ‘its root, origin and 
452 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 396). 
453 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 400). 
454 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 643). 
455 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘On the Will in Nature’ (1836 / 1992 p. 88). 
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controller’, the will.456  
 
‘Schopenhauer sees the human mind and its capacities’, if 
one turns to Bryan Magee, ‘as pitifully limited, and as 
inherently both subsidiary and subservient’.457 ‘Neither 
rationality, nor intentional action, nor consciousness’, 
Christopher Janaway also pointed out, ‘is primary or 
foundational in human beings. The true core of the 
personality is not the self-conscious “I” or subject of 
knowledge, but rather the will, which is fundamentally 
blind and without knowledge, but which interacts with the 
intellect almost as an agent distinct from it’.458 But, 
rather bewilderingly, that was no longer the case. 
Suffice to say the most questionable point of 
Schopenhauer’s doctrine was its epistemology which can 
only be described as capricious at the best of times. The 
actual relationship between knowledge, a phenomenal 
manifestation, and the will was not the least bit certain 
or clear.  
 
Leaving that matter to one side for the time being, some 
critics, Francis Hueffer for example, might even have 
been tempted to believe that Schopenhauer valued, in the 
most supreme way, not only one’s fortitude but one’s 
intellectual faculties. Schopenhauer’s ‘subject’, one 
presumes, was compelled to draw on such ‘resources’ if he 
wished to expose the will for the fraudulent despot it 
was and ‘gain’, as a result, a bizarre notion of 
‘positive happiness’.459 But as Hjalmar Söderberg, turning 
456 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 140). 
457 Bryan Magee, ‘The Philosophy of Schopenhauer’ (1983 p. 157).  
458 Christopher Janaway, ‘The real essence of human beings: 
Schopenhauer and the unconscious will’ collected in ‘Thinking the 
Unconscious. Nineteenth-Century German Thought’ (2010 p. 140). 
459 Francis Hueffer, ‘The Literary Aspects of Schopenhauer’s Work’ 
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to his novel for the very last time, warned his readers: 
‘The dream of happiness does not exist that does not bite 
its own tail’.460 And with that warning firmly and quite 
literally in mind, let me now turn your attention to the 
consequences of Schopenhauer’s ‘triumphant’ self-
conquest. 
 
On the other hand, the ‘achievement’ in question exacted 
an enormous cost. The will may well have arrived, by 
whatever means, at ‘self-knowledge through its 
objectification’, but the knowledge it had to impart 
proved calamitous to the ‘objectification’ in whom it 
suddenly and unexpectedly appeared.  
 
Since an individual was ‘merely’ ‘an example of the 
whole’, Schopenhauer’s subject no longer wished to affirm 
himself as he did not wish to give his assent to the will 
at large. As his own bodily form, intellect, and ego were 
little more than a manifest image of the loathed thing 
itself, Schopenhauer’s ‘knowing subject’ actively sought 
to abolish them all in one foul swoop. But it was not 
simply a question of abolishing the will, one had first 
to abolish oneself in whom it appeared.   
 
If one conspired against oneself, one conspired against 
the will and had, within one’s sights, the prospect of 
one’s own ‘liberation’. But if one had successfully 
toppled the will, one had presumably toppled oneself and 
little, if a thing would remain to apprehend one’s 
‘triumph’ over it. Schopenhauer did not appear to value 
the very powers (neither one’s ‘fortitude’ nor 
‘intellect’) by which he arrived at his ‘revelatory’ 
(1874 p. 376). 
460 Hjalmar Söderberg, ‘Doctor Glas’ (1905 / 1963 p. 58). 
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insights. ‘So, as you proceed in your examination of 
these doctrines’, to remind you of Wyndham Lewis’ 
observation, ‘it becomes more and more evident that, 
although it is by no means clear that you gain anything 
(except a great many fine phrases and exalted, mystical 
assurances of “cosmic” advantages), it is very clear what 
you lose... you lose not only the clearness of outline, 
the static beauty, of the things you commonly 
apprehended; you lose also the clearness of outline of 
your own individuality which apprehends them’.461 
 
Schopenhauer aspired to ‘abolish individuality’ and, 
consequently, the intellectual powers that were 
responsible, in his opinion, for the dubious 
‘achievement’ at hand.462 But if one no longer willed to 
will, one no longer wished to live and conspired against 
oneself and actively sought one’s own end.  
 
‘The whole body is the visible expression of the will-to-
live’, as Schopenhauer wrote, ‘yet the motives 
corresponding to this will no longer act; indeed the 
dissolution of the body, the end of the individual, and 
thus the greatest suppression of the natural will, is 
welcomed and desired’.463 Schopenhauer desired to abolish 
‘the essential nature at the root of the phenomenon’ but 
if one had successfully abolished ‘the essential nature 
at the root of the phenomenon’ one had presumably, 
following a rapid chain of events abolished the 
phenomenon too.464 ‘No will: no representation, no world’, 
461 Wyndham Lewis, ‘Time and Western Man’ (1927 p. 175). 
462 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 169). 
463 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 403). 
464 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 288). 
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as Schopenhauer described them.465  
 
The ‘particular’, then, no longer wished to exert his 
particularity; in other words, Schopenhauer’s subject no 
longer wished to exert himself as he did not want to 
continue to pander to the affirmative desires of a 
grotesque will. If one did not wish to be strung along by 
the feverish entity and pander to its desires any more, 
one must not affirm it in any way whatsoever but 
vehemently deny it.  
 
‘True salvation, deliverance from life and suffering, 
cannot’, as Schopenhauer wrote, ‘even be imagined without 
complete denial of the will’.466 In exceptional 
circumstances, very exceptional circumstances indeed, the 
will was brought to one side and informed of its lunacy 
by a particularly sharp intellect that had the measure of 
the testicular force. It was the intellect and the 
intellect alone that had any ‘hope’ of silencing, if not 
completely destroying the will.  
 
The subject in whom knowledge had reached its ‘apogee’ 
refused to take life on the measly terms it was given to 
him and turned his back on it. The will had, at least in 
this uncommon manifestation, recognised the fool it had 
made of itself and saw, all too clearly, the fatuity of 
its desires and, consequently, no longer wished to affirm 
them. The phenomena, if Schopenhauer was to be believed, 
was no longer at the beck and call of its tormentor, the 
will, but had finally got the better of it and scored an 
unlikely and astonishing victory.  
465 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 411). 
466 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 397). 
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All that was finite, intelligent and virtuous about the 
individual subject, his definitive ‘top half’, had now 
started to plot and conspire, at considerable risk, one 
presumes, against the general, insensible and ‘unsavoury’ 
powers at play down below. Schopenhauer, needless to say, 
did not share that opinion.  
 
One could not possibly renounce the will by voicing one’s 
objections to it, intellectual or otherwise. ‘In order to 
see that a purely objective, and therefore correct, 
apprehension of things’, as Schopenhauer wrote, ‘is 
possible only when we consider them without any personal 
participation in them’.467 The knowledge Schopenhauer had 
to impart was, again, far more profound and lofty than 
that; it did not conform to customary rules and was 
certainly not motivated by personal ends. It was an 
extremely mysterious process. 
 
Nevertheless, having successfully reasoned with it, if 
indeed one can possibly begin to reason, let alone 
successfully reason with an insensate life force, the 
‘top half’, the intellect, gained an unlikely ‘victory’ 
over the ‘bottom half’ and, if one can bring oneself to 
believe Schopenhauer’s implausible account, the will 
removed itself, with its tail between its legs, entirely 
of its own accord. It withdrew not only from the head but 
also from its citadel, the testicles, into complete 
bodily exile. Having broken countless others, the will, 
we are led to believe, made one final promise. Having 
reached this ‘self-realisation’, the will promised to 
finally appease all of its desires by putting an end to 
467 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 373). 
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them for good. In turn, it flapped its wings and, as 
Schopenhauer rather hopefully imagined, flew away from 
itself for good.468 Having said that, it was something of 
a rarity in itself; the intellect seldom gained the upper 
hand of its adversary, the will.  
 
IX. THE AFTERMATH 
 
Allow me to turn your brief attention to one such example 
in an effort to consider the aftermath, the lifeless 
calm, of Schopenhauer’s ‘difficult and painful self-
conquest’.469 
 
Take Henri-Frédéric Amiel, for example. On the 16th of 
August, 1869, Amiel wrote the following entry in his 
‘Journal’: ‘I have been thinking over Schopenhauer. - It 
has struck me and almost terrified me to see how well I 
represent Schopenhauer’s typical man’.470 A couple of days 
earlier, on the 14th of August, Amiel gave us a clue not 
only as to what constituted, in his estimation, 
Schopenhauer’s ‘typical man’ but also the grounds of his 
alarm.  
 
Amiel’s contribution can be said, I believe, to perfectly 
illustrate the decidedly ambivalent and, for that matter, 
questionable nature of Schopenhauer’s ‘self-conquest’. 
‘My personality’, as Amiel admitted, ‘has the least 
possible admixture of individuality. I am to the great 
majority of men what the circle is to rectilinear 
figures; I am everywhere at home, because I have no 
468 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 606). 
469 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 334). 
470 Henri-Frédéric Amiel, ‘Amiel’s Journal. The Journal Intime of 
Henri-Frédéric Amiel’ (1882 / 1901 p. 159). 
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particular and nominative self. – Perhaps, on the whole, 
this defect has good in it. Though I am less of a man, I 
am perhaps nearer to the man; perhaps rather more man. 
There is less of the individual, but more of the species, 
in me’.471  
 
On the one hand, Amiel can be said to have scored 
something akin to Schopenhauer’s intellectual ‘triumph’; 
the ‘triumph’, in other words, of the enlightened, 
universally attuned subject, the ‘particular’ figure of 
Amiel in this case, over the fractured ‘universal’ life 
force that lurked about, according to Schopenhauer, 
somewhere in his trousers. Amiel certainly appeared to 
have developed an expansive, purely objective and 
detached view of the world and it was perfectly in 
keeping with Schopenhauer’s ‘heightened’ and somewhat 
inhuman ‘victory’.  
 
‘The man who sees through the principium individuationis, 
and recognises the true nature of things-in-themselves, 
and thus the whole... ’, as Schopenhauer wrote, ‘sees 
himself in all places simultaneously, and withdraws. His 
will turns about; it no longer affirms its own inner 
nature, mirrored in the phenomenon, but denies it... He 
therefore renounces precisely this inner nature, which 
appears in him and is expressed already by his body, and 
his actions gives lie to his phenomenon, and appears in 
open contradiction thereto. Essentially nothing but 
phenomenon of the will, he ceases to will anything, 
guards against attaching his will to anything, tries to 
establish firmly in himself the greatest indifference to 
471 Henri-Frédéric Amiel, ‘Amiel’s Journal. The Journal Intime of 
Henri-Frédéric Amiel’ (1882 / 1901 p. 158). 
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all things’.472 
 
Amiel certainly exemplified Schopenhauer’s ‘ideal’ and 
rather robotic subject, bereft as he was, in his 
estimation, of anything that constituted a ‘particular’ 
or ‘nominative self’, but one must question whether Amiel 
could truly count himself among Schopenhauer’s ‘typical’ 
run of men. In identifying himself, not with his own 
individuality, as one might ordinarily expect, but with 
that of the species as a whole - the eternal, ‘universal’ 
idea of man, Amiel proved to be something of an exception 
to the common rule. 
 
Amiel had taken, in this particular respect, a 
significant, if calamitous stride ‘out of himself’, as it 
were; he was ‘merely’ an example of the whole and as an 
example of the whole Amiel had left the definitive part 
of himself behind. But only in leaving the definitive 
part of himself behind had Amiel have any ‘hope’ of 
leaving behind the feverish will that apparently clung to 
that side of his personality. ‘It is through awareness of 
the effects of the Will’, as Carl A. Raschke wrote in an 
essay, ‘Schopenhauer on the Delusion of Progress’ (1977), 
‘in one’s own personality that the individual can deny 
the Will altogether by no longer affirming the self 
through which the Will operates’.473 However, if one no 
longer affirmed ‘the self through which the Will 
operates’, as Raschke worded it, what can be said to be 
left of ‘the self’ or ‘personality’ in question? The will 
was, as we have heard, the wellspring from which all 
things arose, including man’s ‘intellect’, ‘ego’, ‘body’ 
472 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 380). 
473 Carl A. Raschke, ‘Schopenhauer on the Delusion of Progress’ (1977 
p. 78). 
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and ‘personality’.  
 
Nonetheless, in shedding himself of himself, Amiel had 
also, Schopenhauer would doubtlessly have maintained, 
‘liberated’ himself, albeit in the costliest possible 
way, from the will’s delirious influence. ‘Every 
individual at once represents its species’, as 
Schopenhauer wrote. ‘Accordingly’, he added, ‘we now 
apprehend the universal in beings. What we know in such a 
way are the Ideas of things; but from these there now 
speaks a higher wisdom than that which knows of mere 
relations. We ourselves have also stepped put of 
relations, and have thereby become the pure subject of 
knowing... This state is conditioned from outside by our 
remaining wholly foreign to, and detached from, the scene 
to be contemplated, and not being at all actively 
involved in it’.474 Amiel’s reaction to Schopenhauer’s 
doctrine was hardly ‘typical’ as he was well on his way, 
as the philosopher would no doubt have thought, to 
absolving himself from nature’s will as well as his own.   
 
Amiel, to put it very simply indeed, had successfully 
hounded himself out of himself; he was no longer Henri-
Frédéric Amiel per se but, in Schopenhauer’s words, a 
‘pure subject of knowing’ and as a ‘pure subject of 
knowing’ he no longer, one imagines, had to endure the 
trials and tribulations, whatever they may have been, of 
being Henri-Frédéric Amiel.  
 
Having abolished one side of his personality, arguably 
the most definitive, and assumed another, the addled and 
deadened state of Schopenhauer’s ‘ideal’, Amiel had not 
474 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 372 - 373).  
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only abolished the falsehood of his own individuality, 
but liberated himself from that which tormented it, 
nature’s will-to-live. ‘He is free’, as Schopenhauer 
might have said of Amiel, ‘from the perversity with which 
the will-to-live, failing to recognize itself, here in 
one individual enjoys fleeting and delusive pleasures, 
and there in another individual suffers and starves in 
return for these’.475  
 
On the other hand, one must ask oneself whether Amiel 
could legitimately be said to have gained anything at 
all, least of all anything that was ‘good’, as he phrased 
it, from the somewhat, to put it mildly, ‘defective’ 
triumph in question. Amiel may well have gained a 
detached, sweeping, and wholly ‘presbyopic’ viewpoint, 
apparently ‘free’ of the will’s emotive influence 
(detached, as he appeared to be, from all its phenomenal 
‘delusions’) but, in gaining that state, he dramatically 
lost out on another, far more immediate front: he no 
longer had any apparent sense of himself, his own 
individuality. 
 
Amiel may well have been well on his way to the end point 
of Schopenhauer’s doctrine, but what he gained in scope, 
he rather lost out in actual bodily presence (his 
‘particular’ state, his ‘nominative self’). What he 
gained in quantity he sacrificed in quality. ‘It seems to 
me’, as Amiel wrote some years later, in the Autumn of 
1880, ‘that with the decline of my active force I am 
becoming more purely spirit; everything is growing 
transparent to me. I see the types, the foundations of 
475 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 373). 
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beings, the sense of things’.476  
 
Amiel, then, was now the most generalised and thoroughly 
whitewashed ‘idea’ of man, the universal ‘subject’, and 
having reached that point Amiel had, one fears, achieved 
Schopenhauer’s thoroughly dispersonating goal. Amiel was 
not Schopenhauer’s ‘typical’ man at all but 
Schopenhauer’s ‘ideal’ man, his robotic ‘subject of 
knowledge’. Amiel now resembled an automaton that 
registered everything and felt absolutely nothing.  
 
If one turns one’s attention to the immediate aftermath 
of Schopenhauer’s ‘civil war’ to see what would have been 
left of him (had he actually had the nerve to see his 
doctrine through to its logical conclusion), one would 
see that the two warring factions of his ‘personality’, 
the intellect and will, had as good as wiped each other 
out. Not so, if one listens to Schopenhauer.  
 
‘Only knowledge remains’, he enthused, ‘the will has 
vanished’.477 But the ‘knowledge’ of which he glowingly 
spoke was barren in the extreme; it certainly did not 
appear to possess a single attribute that was 
recognisably human or the least bit alive.  
 
‘My brain began to grow, my heart to shrink’, as Michael 
Artzibashef wrote in another of his novels, the 
gratuitously, if not comically pessimistic ‘Breaking-
Point’ (1915). ‘And now I have a large brain and no 
heart. I feel nothing...’.478 ‘Such behaviour’, if one 
476 Henri-Frédéric Amiel, ‘Amiel’s Journal. The Journal Intime of 
Henri-Frédéric Amiel’ (1882 / 1901 p. 279). 
477 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 411). 
478 Michael Artzibashef, ‘Breaking-Point’(1915 p. 262 – 263). B. W. 
Huebsch, NY.  
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turns to Barbara Hannan’s study, ‘is apparently self-
defeating. How does one extinguish suffering by making 
oneself suffer more?’.479 But Hannan need not have worried 
herself over such concerns; if one had successfully 
abolished one’s will-to-live one had surely put oneself 
out of one’s misery and completely beyond such cares. One 
surely felt, as Artzibashef said, ‘nothing’ at all.  
 
The ‘top half’ may well have inflicted a fatal wound upon 
the ‘bottom half’, but the ‘bottom half’ was the seat of 
life itself. The ‘mind’, as Lucretius might have warned 
Schopenhauer, ‘cannot arise alone without body or apart 
from sinews and blood’.480 ‘For the two’, as the Epicurean 
maintained, ‘are interlocked by common roots and cannot 
be torn apart without manifest disaster’.481  
 
Without wishing to suggest, even for a moment, that 
Schopenhauer was oblivious to that fact (quite the 
opposite, one fears), it still appeared to afford him an 
inordinate amount of masochistic pleasure. ‘For the most 
part’, as Schopenhauer said of the ‘individual 
consciousness’, ‘often in fact entirely, its content is 
nothing but a stream of paltry, earthly, poor ideas, and 
endless worries and anxieties; let these then be finally 
silenced!’.482 Schopenhauer’s reaction was telling in the 
extreme. It revealed, not only the true intent of his 
murderous ‘self-conquest’, but the derisory ‘value’ he 
accorded to the very powers by which he had secured it.  
 
479 Barbara Hannan, ‘The Riddle of the World: A Reconsideration of 
Schopenhauer’s Philosophy’ (2009 p. 139). 
480 Lucretius, ‘On the Nature of the Universe’ (55 BC / 1951 p. 86). 
Translated by R. E. Latham, Penguin Books. 
481 Lucretius, ‘On the Nature of the Universe’ (55 BC / 1951 p. 75). 
Translated by R. E. Latham, Penguin Books. 
482 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 492). 
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Schopenhauer’s tone was not only gleeful and 
dispassionate, but also betrayed a puerile delight in 
destruction. If one turns to the source of Schopenhauer’s 
‘delight’ it was nothing other than the morbid spectacle 
that confronted the myrmecologist who had taken it upon 
himself to dissect the rather unlucky Bulldog-Ant in two: 
it was man’s complete downfall and collapse.  
 
‘We are built’, as Michel de Montaigne wrote, echoing 
Lucretius’ warning, in ‘An Apology for Raymond Sebond’ 
(15**), ‘of two principle parts, which together form our 
being; to separate them is death and the collapse of our 
being’.483 And just as the two dissected halves of the 
Bulldog-Ant collapsed in a lifeless heap after their 
brief and violent skirmish, both sides of the ‘knowing 
subject’s’ personality had, as both Montaigne and 
Lucretius forewarned, collapsed in a similar heap after 
their own private and no less violent encounter.  
 
‘With this knowledge’, as Schopenhauer imagined, 
‘individuality, and therefore intelligence, as being 
merely a tool of individual nature, of animal nature, 
cease’.484 But, quite unlike the example of the Bulldog-
Ant, man’s collapse heralded an ‘achievement’; in 
collapsing in a lifeless heap, Schopenhauer’s ‘subject’ 
had finally reached his goal. If he was no longer alive, 
it was no longer possible to be tormented by the will-to-
live, by life itself, and that, we are asked to believe, 
was a ‘glorious’ accomplishment and, if one can bring 
oneself to believe it, came as an enormous relief, not 
necessarily to you or I, but to whatever remained of 
483 Michel de Montaigne, ‘An Apology for Raymond Sebond’ (15** / 19** 
, p. 90). 
484 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 610). 
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Schopenhauer’s ‘subject’. ‘Nothing can distress or alarm 
him any more’, Schopenhauer calmly reassured his readers, 
‘nothing can any longer move him’.485  
 
‘In mankind’, as Hans Fallada maintained in his novel, 
‘The Drinker’ (1950), ‘hope is indestructible, I believe 
the last thing that runs through the brain of a dying man 
is hope’.486 And, presumably, a dim sense of ‘hope’ was 
the very last thing to run through the brow beaten and, 
by now, completely addled brain of Schopenhauer’s 
subject. In abolishing himself, he had also, he hoped, 
abolished the will, but the enormous sigh of relief 
Schopenhauer’s subject exhaled may well have proved to be 
his very last. ‘I believe that, at the moment of dying’, 
as Schopenhauer imagined, ‘we become aware that a mere 
illusion has limited our existence to our person’.487  
 
The celebrations, then, were disappointingly cut short. 
Before it rolled lifelessly to one side, the ‘head half’ 
apparently had just enough time to admire, one imagines, 
the serene, if rather uncustomary ‘calm’ of its freshly 
detached state. ‘He now looks back calmly and with a 
smile on the phantasmagoria of this world’, as the 
felonious philosopher wrote, ‘which was once able to move 
and agonize even his mind, but now stands before him as 
indifferently as chess-men at the end of a game’.488  
 
Finally, Schopenhauer’s subject was happy!  
 
485 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 390). 
486 Hans Fallada, ‘The Drinker’ (1950 / 1952 p. 259). Translated from 
the German by Charlotte and A. L. Lloyd. Putnam & Co. Ltd. London. 
487 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 601). 
488 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 390). 
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He was free of will. But the smile did not grace the face 
of anyone in particular, but a crumpled and mutilated 
corpse. ‘Hence, as far as we can see’, as Frederick 
Copleston similarly observed, ‘liberation from the 
servitude to the Will can be achieved only through entry 
into nothingness, the total extinction of the 
personality’.489 
 
Schopenhauer’s ‘solution’, to say the very least, was 
extremely crude. He may well have talked, in heightened 
tones, of ‘salvation’ and the like but it was not man’s 
salvation he sought but his complete and utter 
annihilation. Schopenhauer may well have been quite 
intent upon waging a civil war with himself but, given 
its outcome, one is never quite sure who or what was 
fighting whom and to what end. Nor is it particularly 
clear where exactly Schopenhauer’s allegiance could be 
said to have resided. It was surely not, as he claimed, 
with the ‘top half’ (the intellect saw fit to annul 
itself, all too readily, to gain higher, if purely 
expectant rewards) and it was certainly not with the 
‘bottom half’ (that was the seat of the dreaded thing 
itself).  
 
One could very well be forgiven for asking who or what 
actually experienced the revered state of ‘salvation’ of 
which the philosopher spoke. It was surely not 
Schopenhauer’s subject; his individuality, after all, had 
been abolished in the procurement of the said ‘state’. 
‘With the disappearance of willing from consciousness’, 
as Schopenhauer affirmed, ‘the individual is really 
489 Frederick Copleston, ‘Arthur Schopenhauer. Philosopher of 
Pessimism’((1975 p. xv). 
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abolished also, and with it its suffering and sorrow’.490  
 
If Schopenhauer’s desolate ‘ideal’ could possibly be 
visualised, it would, I rather suspect, resemble a 
passage taken, once again, from Artzibashev’s, ‘Sanine’ 
(1907): ‘He saw an endless grey stripe that stretched 
aimlessly away into space, as though swept onward from 
one wave to another. All conception of colour, sound and 
emotion was blurred and dimmed, being merged and fused in 
one grey turbid stream that flowed on placidly, 
eternally. This was not life, but everlasting death. The 
thought of it horrified him’.491 The ‘turbid’ prospect did 
not, as it did Sanine, ‘horrify’ Schopenhauer at all; on 
the contrary, it appeared to galvanise the philosopher 
and encourage him to make his way to his doctrine’s 
catastrophic end.  
 
It could well be argued that Schopenhauer was so entirely 
caught up and swept away with the mêlée that he lost all 
sense of loyalty; he simply cheered both sides on, the 
‘top’ and the ‘bottom’, in the virulent hope that both 
sides fell lifelessly to the floor. Then, and only then, 
as Schopenhauer rather crudely imagined, was one able to 
‘boast’ (if, indeed, that was at all possible) of being 
entirely free from the will and rid of the burdensome 
business of life altogether. 
 
Schopenhauer’s ‘victory’ over the will came at such an 
enormous cost to the so called ‘victor’ that one must 
question the grounds of the victory itself. The 
490 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 371). 
491 Michael Artzibashev, ‘Sanine. A Russian Love Novel’ (1907 / 1932 
p. 100). Translated from the Russian by Percy Pinkerton. Three Sirens 
Press, NYC. 
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‘victorious’ subject may well have dealt a death blow to 
the will but, in administering it, he had clearly 
sustained something of a chronic, if not completely fatal 
head injury. ‘When the subject ceases to be will’, as 
Rüdiger Safranski thought, ‘it has the chance of seeing 
the patent secret of the world, the omnipresence of the 
will’.492 But that evidently was not true. One cannot 
reach the end of Schopenhauer’s doctrine, the point where 
one is able to ‘appreciate’, in the most detached, 
robotic manner the stark and abstruse spectacle of 
universal ‘forms’ and ‘ideas’ (the ‘species’ and the 
like) without having first inflicted a horrific, if not 
completely catastrophic degree of violence on one’s 
bodily person. It almost certainly discounted even the 
slimmest possibility of ‘seeing the patent secret of the 
world’. A secret of that sort would, one suspects, surely 
remain undisclosed. 
 
Schopenhauer’s intellectual ‘triumph’ was of the most 
destructive order (as the example, I hope, of the 
Bulldog-Ant illustrated) and, as Wyndham Lewis quite 
rightly observed: ‘The proceedings of these insects is a 
blow to the human personality as well as to their own’.493 
Having reached the end of the first anecdote, let me turn 
your attention to the second.  
 
X. A RECONCILIATORY INVITATION TO DINNER  
 
If one turns to the bottom of page 358 of Schopenhauer’s 
‘The World as Will and Representation’, one will find, in 
492 Rüdiger Safranski, ‘Schopenhauer and The Wild Years of Philosophy’ 
(1989 p. 268). 
493 Wyndham Lewis, ‘Time and Western Man’ (1927 p. 338). Lewis was not 
talking about, specifically, about the Australian Bulldog-Ant; he 
had, what can only be described, as a fetish for hard-shelled 
insects. They symbolised his fanaticism for the ‘outer’ rather than 
the ‘inner’. 
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the footnote, mention of the Spanish Bishop. The example 
was given even less prominence than that of the Bulldog-
ant but that is not to say it was any less illustrative 
of the philosopher’s destructive ‘self-conquest’. 
 
According to Schopenhauer, the Bishop in question -  we 
do not learn his name, invited an esteemed collection of 
French generals to dine with him. The two countries were 
at war at the time; the Bishop’s invitation, one 
presumes, represented something of an olive branch, a 
symbolic gesture, born of higher religious conviction, 
that anticipated reconciliation and peace between the two 
countries. It was, however, a particularly uncustomary 
sort of invitation as the Bishop was reluctant to 
entertain his guests for any longer than was strictly 
necessary.  
 
If truth be known, he did not wish to entertain them at 
all; the Bishop’s extended his hospitality to the 
collection of French generals for a rather different 
reason. It hardly proved to be the reconciliatory 
occasion the assemblage of dignitaries no doubt imagined 
it to be. Schopenhauer kept the details to himself, but 
if one jumped to the end of the evening one would find, 
possibly no longer to one’s astonishment, that all of the 
guests, including the host, had been poisoned. And the 
culprit in question was none other than the ornately 
dressed figure slumped at the head of the table: it was 
the Spanish Bishop himself. 
 
The Spanish Bishop’s example was something that appeared 
to strike a particularly resonant chord with 
Schopenhauer. The anecdote can also be said to reflect 
the ‘Stirnerian twist’, as I described it, that 
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Schopenhauer appeared to take towards the end of his 
doctrine. ‘Affirming this will’, as Schopenhauer wrote of 
the Bishop’s example, ‘he nevertheless desires that in 
the drama that presents its inner nature no such 
monstrous outrage shall ever appear again; and he wishes 
to frighten every future evildoer by the example of a 
revenge against which there is no wall of defence, as the 
fear of death does not deter the avenger. The will-to-
live, though it still affirms itself here, no longer 
depends on the individual phenomenon, on the individual 
person, but embraces the Idea of man. It desires to keep 
the phenomenon of this Idea pure from such a monstrous 
and revolting outrage. It is a rare, significant, and 
even sublime trait of character by which the individual 
sacrifices himself, in that he strives to make himself 
the arm of eternal justice, whose true inner nature he 
still fails to recognize’.494  
 
Schopenhauer had similarly set his sights on murder, but 
on a far grander scale than the Spanish Bishop (his 
‘merely’ concerned the abolition of bodily forms, not the 
universal force that lurked about beneath their 
uniforms). Even so, the Bishop’s example can be said to 
reflect, in spirit, the stance Schopenhauer took with 
nature’s will. If the Bishop wished to eliminate the 
chief source of his woe (the French, not the will in this 
instance), he was compelled to commit a wholly 
sacrificial act and it was a sacrificial act that was 
not, by too far a stretch of the imagination, dissimilar 
to the one Schopenhauer envisaged. 
 
Neither the Spanish Bishop nor Schopenhauer were the 
494 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 359). 
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least bit happy, to put it mildly, with the company they 
kept; it was, as I have said, the primary source of their 
respective woe and, not too unsurprisingly, both figures 
actively sought to put an end to it. In the Bishop’s 
case, the solution may well have been drastic, but not so 
very complicated. If he wished to poison his guests he 
first had to win their confidence even if it meant 
poisoning himself to secure it. 
 
The Bishop’s plan, radical as it was, did not, as 
Schopenhauer argued, touch let alone harm the real 
culprit in question, the will; the Bishop ‘merely’ 
poisoned a number of its phenomenal manifestations, a 
handful of French ‘illusions’. Schopenhauer may well have 
admired the Bishop’s ‘sublime trait of character’ but his 
actions, in Schopenhauer’s estimation, fell well short of 
the mark. ‘The suicide’, as Schopenhauer maintained, 
‘denies merely the individual, not the species’.495 
 
If one turns immediately to the source of Schopenhauer’s 
woe and the company he no longer wished to keep, the 
solution was not nearly as straightforward as the 
opportunity that presented itself to the Spanish Bishop.  
 
Arthur Schopenhauer, to put it very simply indeed, not 
only disliked his own company, but objected to it in the 
most vehement way; however, his own company was not 
strictly his own company at all but belonged, in equal 
measure, to the Spanish Bishop, the collection of French 
generals, to Amiel, the Bulldog-Ant, Patrick, Tom and 
Jerry, Friedrich Schlegel, Wyndham Lewis and, as I have 
said, every other phenomenal form one can possibly think 
495 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 399).  
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of. Schopenhauer’s ‘inner-being’ had become an anathema 
to him and he resorted to the most drastic and self-
destructive of measures to abolish it. And just as the 
Bishop’s vengeful desires got the better of his religious 
convictions, Schopenhauer’s empathy, limited as it was, 
had also run its course and reached an end. 
 
‘In other words’, as Schopenhauer explained, ‘it is no 
longer enough for him to love others like himself, and to 
do as much for them as for himself, but there arises in 
him a strong aversion to the inner nature whose 
expression is his own phenomenon, to the will-to-live, 
the kernel and essence of that world recognized as full 
of misery. He therefore renounces precisely this inner 
nature, which appears in him and is expressed already by 
his body, and his actions gives lie to his phenomenon, 
and appears in open contradiction thereto’.496 And 
perfectly in keeping with those highly charged 
sentiments, Schopenhauer, just as the Spanish Bishop had 
done, poisoned himself, so to speak, in order to poison 
his loathsome counterpart, the will-to-live. There was so 
little to lose, after all.  
 
Schopenhauer’s own bodily form was a manifestation of the 
abhorred thing in question. ‘Properly speaking’, as he 
explained, ‘the body is only the will itself spatially 
exhibiting itself in the perception of the intellect’.497 
But in this particular and rather recalcitrant, defiant 
manifestation, Schopenhauer’s ‘subject’, it was no longer 
a will-to-live but a self-loathing and antithetical will 
not to live. ‘Accordingly’, as Schopenhauer pointed out, 
496 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 380). 
497 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 500). 
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‘such a denial of one’s own body exhibits itself as a 
contradiction by the will of its own phenomenon’.498 And 
wishing to fly in the face of adversity, Schopenhauer 
aspired to rid himself of himself to free the world of 
his own inner-being, the universal will. It was an act of 
supreme negation that, on paper at least, could wipe out 
the will, the ‘root-point of existence’, in its 
entirety.499 It was a desire to end all desires. A 
symbolic act that sought to eliminate, in Schopenhauer’s 
words, ‘the delusion that holds us chained to the bonds 
of this world’ once and for all.500  
 
The conflict in question was not any old conflict, but a 
monumental conflict that could be said, in a theoretical 
sense, to put an end to all conflicts. If the will was 
present in its entirety ‘within’ each of its phenomenal 
forms, as indeed Schopenhauer maintained, then there was 
no absolutely reason why it could not be completely 
destroyed by Amiel, by the Spanish Bishop (if he was not 
so rash and had recognised his true enemy), by 
Schopenhauer’s ‘subject’, or, for that matter, any other 
figure who similarly sought its abolition. ‘The inner 
being itself’, as Schopenhauer said, ‘is present whole 
and undivided in everything in nature, in every living 
being’.501  
 
If Amiel, to take an earlier example, managed, by 
whatever means, to renounce the will in himself there was 
nothing to stop one from assuming that Amiel could not 
498 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 334). 
499 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 /  1966 p. 325). 
500 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 639). 
501 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 129). 
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also, as a result, have liberated the whole world from 
its stranglehold. Schopenhauer drew little distinction 
between its presence in the ‘microcosm’ (Amiel in this 
instance) and the ‘macrocosm’ (the world and its manifest 
forms). What was in one was entirely of the other. ‘Thus 
everyone in this twofold regard’, Schopenhauer said, ‘is 
the whole world itself, the microcosm; he finds its two 
sides whole and complete within himself. And what he thus 
recognizes as his own inner being also exhausts the inner 
being of the whole world, of the macrocosm’.502 Amiel’s 
attempt, evidently, fell way short of the mark. One need 
only turn on a television set, pick up a local newspaper 
or stare out of a window long enough to confirm that 
conclusion. But that is not to say that the subject did 
not have, if only on paper, a truly triumphant, if not 
majestic position in Schopenhauer’s doctrine, even if it 
came at an almighty cost to the anomalous figure at the 
dead centre of it. Given the purely theoretical nature of 
Schopenhauer’s ‘victory’ over the will, it cannot be said 
to have had a particularly sound theoretical basis. Let 
me now begin to turn your attention to a number of 
theoretical problems that arise from the concluding phase 
of Schopenhauer’s doctrine. 
 
XI. THE EAGERLY ANTICIPATED DEPARTURE 
 
One must entertain a number of serious reservations about 
the nature of Schopenhauer’s ‘denial’ and resultant 
‘abolition’ of nature’s will. It remained, whether 
Schopenhauer was willing to acknowledge it or not, an 
egocentric, emotive and, to use one of Max Stirner’s 
favourite words, ‘unique’ act of volition. It expressed 
502 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 162). 
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not only the desires of a rogue will that had 
unaccountably broken off from its wider cause (it was, as 
we had been led to believe an indivisible ‘united 
front’), but, at the ‘mere’ intervention of an 
individual’s command, opposed it. It now shared, with its 
aberrant, if instructive manifestation the expectant 
belief that it no longer had to affirm itself to gain 
complete satisfaction.  
 
It may well have been a ronunciative act, but it was a 
ronunciative act that sought the attainment of a 
previously inconceivable level of satiety. ‘Now it is in 
keeping with this that, when my teaching reaches its 
highest point’, as Schopenhauer wrote, ‘it assumes a 
negative character, and so ends with a negation’.503 
Without wishing to dispute the ‘negative character’ of 
his ronunciative philosophy, Schopenhauer still 
apparently harboured the rather opportunistic belief, if 
not hope, that he would be far ‘better served’ if he 
denied his will rather than continue to affirm it. ‘If he 
turned his gaze to his own life as he lived it from day 
to day’, as Hjalmar Söderberg wrote in another of his 
novels, ‘Martin Birck’s Youth’ (1901), ‘he could not 
escape the thought that in itself it was miserable and 
empty and that its only worth lay in the uncertain hope 
that it would not remain as it was’.504 By denying its 
basis, Schopenhauer hoped, as a measure of last resort, 
to transmogrify his relation to life’s will; it was by no 
means ‘certain’, but, in doing so, he aspired to liberate 
himself from its misery and monotony. It certainly 
brought him closer, perilously closer, to the realisation 
503 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 612). 
504 Hjalmar Söderberg, ‘Martin Birck’s Youth’ (1901 / 1930 p. 114). 
Translated from the Swedish by ***** 
 260 
                                                 
of his own private and calamitous ideal.  
 
It was certainly a schismatic and jeopardous plan to have 
hatched in the first place, but if one ignores, 
momentarily, the questionable logic that informed 
Schopenhauer’s coup de grâce, his gambit certainly 
appeared to afford him the belief that it constituted an 
advantageous means through which he hoped to gain 
‘higher’ rewards. If one turns to Schopenhauer one reads: 
‘We see him know himself and the world, change his whole 
nature, rise above himself and above all suffering, as if 
purified and sanctified by it, in inviolable peace, 
bliss, and sublimity, willingly renounce everything he 
formerly desired with the greatest vehemence, and gladly 
welcome death. It is the gleam of silver that suddenly 
appears from the purifying flame of suffering, the gleam 
of the denial of the will-to-live, of salvation’.505 If 
one turns a page or two of the same work, ‘The World as 
Will and Representation’, one comes across similar 
sentiments: ‘when this penetration occurs in all its 
force, it produces perfect sanctification and salvation, 
the phenomenon of which are the state of resignation 
previously described, the unshakeable peace accompanying 
this, and the highest joy and delight in death’.506  
 
The prospect may not be one I happen to readily share, 
but it certainly seemed to appeal to Schopenhauer. The 
glorious, if frustratingly brief moments of repose that 
only Rossini and Mozart had been able to provide would be 
meagre compared to the permanent state of ‘peace’, ‘joy’, 
and ‘bliss’, no less, that Schopenhauer hoped to gain by 
505 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 392 - 393). 
506 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 398). 
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‘denying’ nature’s pestilent life force. There was an 
unmistakable personal incentive at stake. If he no longer 
willed, Schopenhauer would no longer be tantalised by his 
own desires and little would remain to impede or disturb 
his indulgent and voluptuous ‘heavenly’ stupor.  
  
In ‘denying’ one’s will, one still aspired to fulfill a 
desire and took appropriate measures, contrary as they 
may been, to gratify what was, in all practical 
likelihood, one’s ultimate, if final wish. The ‘world’, 
if one turns to Francis Hueffer, was ‘destroyed not by 
the extinction of the intellect in which it is reflected, 
but by the free action of conscious will’.507 Overlooking 
the questionable end to which it worked, it remained, as 
Hueffer said, a deliberate and affirmative act of one’s 
will. It pursued a very definite, if quite literal end. 
Schopenhauer, however, regarded it as an auspicious end; 
it did not simply quell one of his desires, but promised 
to quell them all. Schopenhauer was motivated by the 
prospect of gaining, in his estimation, the most 
definitive and supreme form of personal satisfaction 
imaginable. ‘Yet we find here’, as Bertram M. Laing 
similarly observed, ‘really as definite an act of Will as 
in the satisfaction of hunger’.508  
 
Schopenhauer may well have aspired to ‘abolish’ the will, 
but he was motivated, quite contrary to his claims, by 
the anticipative prospect of his liberty and ‘salvation’. 
‘Still, one must ask whether Schopenhauer’s metaphysics 
of the Will to Live does not in itself constitute a 
metaphysical opinion, an ideology camouflaging brute 
507 Francis Hueffer, ‘The Literary Aspects of Schopenhauer’s Work’ 
(1874 p. 378). 
508 Bertram M. Laing, ‘Schopenhauer and Individuality’ (1917 p. 184). 
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self-interest’.509 I am in partial agreement with Raschke 
on this point. Schopenhauer certainly ‘camouflaged’ the 
will’s true intentions as, indeed, he ‘camouflaged’ his 
own, but Raschke failed to draw any sort of distinction 
between the two warring factions that comprised 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy. Consequently, it is not 
entirely clear whether Raschke was referring to the 
will’s affirmation or its denial. 
 
If Raschke was referring to the former, Schopenhauer’s 
doctrine did not camouflage ‘brute self-interest’ at all; 
it was rather a case that ‘brute self-interest’ was a 
surreptitious means through which nature’s will affirmed 
itself in its countless phenomenal forms. ‘They are all 
undoubtedly guided by a delusion’, as we heard 
Schopenhauer say earlier, ‘that conceals the service of 
the species under the mask of an egotistical end’.510  
 
If, on the other hand, Raschke was referring to the 
abnegation of nature’s will then I concur that it was a 
thoroughly furtive gesture on Schopenhauer’s part that 
acted to obscure his true interests. For all of its 
billing as a heightened, impassive, and ronunciative act, 
it remained an instrumental and self-serving affirmation 
of Schopenhauer’s egocentric desires.  
 
Schopenhauer’s ‘denial’ of the will not only represented 
a desire in itself, but it was also a desire that 
singularised the desiderative ‘subject’ in question. In 
willfully expressing a desire not to live (extricating 
oneself, in no uncertain terms, from the ‘misery’ of life 
509 Carl A. Raschke, ‘Schopenhauer on the Delusion of Progress’ (1977 
p. 81). 
510 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 541). 
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etc.), one proved oneself to be a notable exception to 
the common rule. His ‘subject’ was certainly not at one, 
as Schopenhauer imagined, with, a now ‘will-less’ world, 
but an anomaly running in sharp opposition to it. If one 
opposed the will, one opposed the ‘whole world’ and its 
‘phenomena’ and found oneself at odds with ‘the one’ and 
apparently ‘indivisible will’ itself.511 ‘To utter a 
comprehensive No in regard to reality’, if one turns to 
Frederick Copleston, ‘and to look on extinction and 
nothingness as constituting a desirable goal is a 
procedure which appeals to a much fewer number of 
people’.512 It was, given Schopenhauer’s ‘pure’ universal 
ideal - ‘free’, as he claimed it was, from all 
‘delusions’ of individuality, an extremely singular and 
antagonistic position for him not only to have envisaged 
but also to have coveted. ‘He was an expert on denial’, 
as Rüdiger Safranski legitimately suspected of 
Schopenhauer, ‘so long as it did not affect his own 
will’.513  
 
Be that as it may, Schopenhauer did not share that 
opinion at all. ‘This individuality’, he claimed, ‘is 
inherent in the will only in its affirmation, not in its 
denial’.514 ‘True salvation, deliverance from life and 
suffering, cannot’, as Schopenhauer wrote elsewhere, 
‘even be imagined without complete denial of the will’.515 
Not wishing to express anything that could be said to 
reflect an affirmative desire (for fear of appearing to 
511 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 158).  
512 Frederick Copleston, ‘Arthur Schopenhauer. Philosopher of 
Pessimism’((1975 p. xviii). 
513 Rüdiger Safranski, ‘Schopenhauer and The Wild Years of Philosophy’ 
(1989 p. 236). 
514 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 609). 
515 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 397). 
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acquiesce to the will), Schopenhauer did not express his 
own covetous will not to will in such optative tones; 
instead, he referred to his perverse desire, as a 
‘denial’. In turn, Schopenhauer distanced himself, rather 
craftily indeed, from the will’s desirous influence. It 
did not, in other words, express a desire at all, 
Schopenhauer argued, but an act of abnegation. ‘It may be 
asked’, Schopenhauer thought aloud, ‘how deeply in the 
being-it-self of the world do the roots of individuality 
go. In any case, the answer to this might be that they go 
as deeply as the affirmation of the will-to-live; where 
the denial of the will occurs, they cease, for with the 
affirmation they sprang into existence.’516 It was not, 
then, the least bit motivated by the gratification of 
one’s personal interests.  
 
However artfully it was put and no matter the angle from 
which it was viewed, it remained, I believe, a purposive, 
defiant and egocentric act born, in equal measure, of 
profound disgust and expectant desire. But if one wished 
to deny the will, one dare not allow oneself to be 
motivated by such invested interests. There was 
absolutely no room in the ronunciative process for those. 
They belonged, as we have heard, to one’s libidinal 
‘lower half’, to ‘bad characters’ and the like.517 Only 
those that had fallen under the will’s heterogeneous, 
life-affirming spell - the ‘principle of sufficient 
reason’ - sought to defend and affirm its delusional 
beliefs. ‘Affirmation of the will-to-live, the phenomenal 
world, diversity of all beings, individuality, egoism, 
hatred, wickedness’, as Schopenhauer had said, ‘all 
516 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 641). 
517 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 363). 
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spring from one root’.518 And that ‘one root’ was nature’s 
will that sought to affirm itself indiscriminately and at 
every given opportunity. 
 
As Schopenhauer’s ‘teachings’ reached their ‘heightened’ 
and disingenuous end, one was no longer allured by 
anything that might resemble egocentric desire.519 It was 
crude and bestial. ‘In the animal as in man this egoism 
is most intimately connected with their innermost core 
and essence; in fact, it is really identical with 
essence’.520 It was the most elemental expression of the 
will’s malefic influence. It ‘merely’ expressed 
individual desire and individual desire was an erroneous, 
divisive concept. ‘Egoism’ constituted, in Schopenhauer’s 
derogatory estimation, ‘the starting-point of all 
conflict’.521 But it had little to do, so one is led to 
believe, with the disastrous dispute Schopenhauer had 
with himself. He had apparently ‘risen’ above its 
influence. 
 
Having ‘turned inward’, the universality of one’s ‘inner-
nature’ had suddenly been made apparent. In turn, one had 
seen through the ‘principle of sufficient reason’ and was 
neither subordinated to it nor acted in accordance with 
it. Nature’s will was one’s own and it was no longer 
deemed appropriate to exert it. Consequently, one had 
shed, like Amiel, one’s personality and was not motivated 
to further its particular interests.522 The ‘person who is 
518 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 610). 
519 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 612). 
520 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘On the Basis of Morality’ (1840 / 1965 p. 
131). 
521 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 331). 
522 Henri-Frédéric Amiel, ‘Amiel’s Journal. The Journal Intime of 
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involved in this perception’, as Schopenhauer said, ‘is 
no longer an individual, for in such perception the 
individual has lost himself; he is pure will-less, 
painless, timeless subject of knowledge’.523 ‘Such a 
subject of knowledge’, he said, ‘no longer follows 
relations in accordance with the principle of sufficient 
reason’.524 As a ‘will-less subject of knowing’ one was 
neither an individual nor ‘blighted’ by anything so 
carnal as ‘emotion’ for that was nothing more than a 
fervid expression of nature’s will.  
 
Schopenhauer’s ‘subject’ now acted in defiance of his 
former drives; they no longer exerted an influence over 
him. ‘Raised up by the power of the mind’, Schopenhauer 
affirmed, ‘we relinquish the ordinary way of considering 
things, and cease to follow under the guidance of the 
forms of the principle of sufficient reason merely their 
relations to one another, whose final goal is always the 
relation to our own will’.525  
 
One, then, had miraculously ‘transformed’ oneself beyond 
all recognition. It was an extraordinary transformation. 
One was now a transcendent, impassive, and robotic ‘will-
less subject of knowledge’ resolutely detached from all 
earthly matters. They were no longer a cause for concern. 
The will had been vanquished and one no longer, we are 
told, felt the pangs of its incessant appetite. ‘He 
ceases to will anything’, as Schopenhauer said of the 
listless ‘subject’ in question, ‘guards against attaching 
Henri-Frédéric Amiel’ (1882 / 1901 p. 158). 
523 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 179). 
524 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 178). 
525 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 178). 
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his will to anything, tries to establish firmly in 
himself the greatest indifference to all things’.526  
 
Schopenhauer anticipated, with quite literal ‘breathless 
expectation’, the imminent descent of a glorious and 
imperturbable white cloud. And with that ‘blissful’ 
prospect in sight, Schopenhauer would be ‘liberated’ from 
himself. He would not, he imagined, be ruffled or 
disturbed by his own desires as he had abandoned the very 
thing, his individual person, that was prone to such 
disturbances. Schopenhauer had left, all too willingly, 
his bodily cares behind. As for the little that remained 
of him, that would be subsumed within an addled state of 
oblivion. 
 
Having gone through the mill of his own philosophical 
system, Schopenhauer had ‘successfully’ come out the 
other side. But, it must be said, there was considerably 
less of the philosopher on the last page of ‘The World 
and Will and Representation’ than there was on the first. 
He had lost, along the way, all sense of his ‘nominative 
self’ and personality. Nevertheless, the philosopher, 
rather whatever remained of him, had finally attained his 
supreme goal: ataraxia. ‘To those in whom’, as 
Schopenhauer concluded, ‘the will has turned and denied 
itself, this very real world of ours with all its suns 
and galaxies, is – nothing’.527 I need only remind you of 
Artzibashev’s earlier contribution for you to visualise 
the completely barren, lifeless nature of Schopenhauer’s 
‘imperturbable’ ideal.  
 
526 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 380). 
527 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 411 - 412). 
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It is possible to identify a number of fundamental 
characteristics concerning the ronunciative process 
according to Schopenhauer. Firstly, it did not further 
one’s ‘particular’ needs; the whole question of one’s 
individuality simply did not enter into the equation. 
Secondly, it was entirely free of emotive influence. 
Thirdly, it did not adhere, in any way, to the ‘principle 
of sufficient reason’. 
 
I am in complete disagreement on all three fronts.  
 
Having ‘disabused’ himself from the ‘delusion’ of his own 
individuality, Schopenhauer nevertheless worked towards 
an end that all too conveniently matched his ‘particular’ 
interests and ambitions.   
 
Schopenhauer’s disgust was directed primarily at nature’s 
will, but its focus centred entirely upon himself. ‘He 
addresses the single individual’, as Arthur Hübscher said 
of Schopenhauer’s doctrine.528 And one could well conclude 
that that was the ultimate end it served: the 
‘liberation’ of the ‘single individual’, namely himself. 
If Schopenhauer was to abolish, as indeed he hoped, the 
will at large he was compelled, first of all, to procure 
his own exclusive relief from that which had done little 
more than badger and torment him. If we turn to 
Schopenhauer we read: ‘he may more and more break down 
and kill the will that he recognises and abhors as the 
source of his own suffering existence and of the 
world’s’.529  
 
528 Arthur Hübscher, ‘The Philosophy of Schopenhauer in its 
Intellectual Context: Thinker Against the Tide’ (1989 p. i). 
529 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 382). 
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Schopenhauer aspired, principally, to abolish the will in 
his own manifest form and secure, as a matter of urgency, 
his own salvation. As for the far larger matter 
concerning the salvation of the world, it was entirely a 
secondary issue that would, presumably, follow in due 
course. ‘We are listening to the subject’, as Paul 
Gottfried said, ‘who gropingly unravels the enigma of 
existence – first, in himself and, then, in the world 
around him’.530 It was not, quite contrary to 
Schopenhauer’s claims, the least bit free from the 
incentive of personal ‘gain’. In denying the will, 
Schopenhauer worked towards a very particular and 
egocentric end: his own fetishistic, if rather bizarre 
conception of personal ‘liberty’. 
 
If one turns to ‘The Ego and its Own’, Max Stirner 
perfectly expressed the egocentric line Schopenhauer took 
with nature’s will when he wrote: ‘I am not this spirit: 
it is mine, not I its’.531 Stirner, I should add, arrived 
at that point by a completely different set of means; he 
affirmed rather than denied life’s calling. Nevertheless, 
Schopenhauer was no less eager to demonstrate the tables 
had similarly turned; he too had gained the upper hand of  
his ghoulish, inborn enemy. Nature’s will no longer had 
the claims it once had over him and was now, in a 
reversal of fortune, compelled to abide to Schopenhauer’s 
own particular wishes.  
 
The will-to-live certainly ‘paled’, if indeed 
Schopenhauer was to be believed, at the all too simple 
behest of his command. Schopenhauer was empowered to an 
unprecedented and, previously unimaginable degree. ‘In 
530 Paul Gottfried, ‘Arthur Schopenhauer and the Heritage of 
Pessimism’ (1975 p. 26). 
531 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 157). 
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Schopenhauer’s case’, as Carl A. Raschke wrote, ‘to be 
conscious of the impersonal Will to Live as the 
sufficient reason for all willing empowers the individual 
to root out the self that performs acts of volition and 
thus to cease being tormented by his own wants’.532  
 
‘The egoist’, if one turns to Schopenhauer, ‘feels 
himself surrounded by strange and hostile phenomena, and 
all his hope rests on his own well-being’.533 ‘Therefore’, 
he wrote in disparaging tones on an earlier page of the 
same work, ‘everyone wants everything for himself, wants 
to possess, or at least control, everything, and would 
like to destroy whatever opposes him’.534 But that was, if 
one is not completely mistaken, precisely what 
Schopenhauer desired to do! He wished to ‘destroy’, in no 
uncertain terms, the fundamentally ‘strange’, ‘hostile’ 
power that ‘opposed’ him and, having ‘destroyed’ it, 
Schopenhauer hoped to procure an end that complimented 
his notion, uncustomary as it may have been, of ‘well-
being’. 
 
It was, in any case, highly emotive and charged language 
for an apparently ‘indifferent’ subject to have used. 
Clearly, Schopenhauer was not the least bit ‘indifferent’ 
to nature’s will. ‘There arises in him’, as we have 
already heard him say, ‘a strong aversion to the inner 
nature whose expression is his own phenomenon’.535 
Schopenhauer was appalled by the will-to-live, by his own 
‘inner nature’, and sought to extricate himself, in no 
532 Carl A. Raschke, ‘Schopenhauer on the Delusion of Progress’ (1977 
p. 78). 
533 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 374). 
534 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 332). 
535 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 380). 
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uncertain terms, from its oppressive and imbecilic 
company. Schopenhauer’s denial of will was not, as he 
claimed, as motiveless, as ‘pure’, or free of emotion as 
he purported it to be. It was inspired, fundamentally, by 
disgust and, with its abolition, ended in ‘delight’; it 
encompassed the complete spectrum of invested emotion. 
 
‘Schopenhauer’, it has been said, ‘never wants to cut a 
figure: for he writes for himself and no one wants to be 
deceived, least of all a philosopher who has made it a 
rule for himself: deceive no one, not even yourself!’.536 
Again, I disagree. Schopenhauer was not the least bit 
honest, contrary to Nietzsche’s all too laudatory 
appraisal, about the nature of his motivations. They 
were, I firmly believe, far more egocentric than he dared 
or could possibly let on.  
 
Given the purely secondary and subordinate position he 
attributed to individuality, Schopenhauer could not be 
seen to openly acknowledge its fundamental role in the 
abolition of nature’s will. Had he done so, the 
philosopher would have run the very real risk of 
undermining his evaluation of the will and an 
individual’s submissive relation to it. In turn, the 
necessity to ‘liberate’ oneself from its despotic 
influence would not have presented itself as such. 
Furthermore, had Schopenhauer revealed his invested 
interest in the will’s abolition, he would have 
flagrantly contradicted his own estimation of the 
ronunciative process; a process that did not, as he 
claimed, seek the appeasement of individual desire as it 
did not act in accordance with the ‘principle of 
536 Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ collected in 
‘Untimely Meditations’ (1874 / 1983 p. 134). 
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sufficient reason’.  
 
As it remained, Schopenhauer was not the least bit honest 
with either himself or his readers as his doctrine 
reached its ‘heightened’ end. Ultimately, he found 
himself unable to satisfactorily account for a number of 
glaring inconsistencies associated with the will’s 
abolition. 
 
‘Like so many others’, if one, once again, turns to 
Schopenhauer, ‘this question rests on the confusion of 
the thing-in-itself with the phenomenon. The principle of 
sufficient reason, of which the law of motivation is also 
a form, extends only to the phenomenon, not the thing-in-
itself’.537 Schopenhauer was, in one sense, quite correct. 
The relationship between the ‘will’ and ‘phenomenon’ was 
certainly confusing, if not entirely unfathomable, but 
his assertion that the ‘law of motivation’ was restricted 
to the ‘phenomenon’ was evidently untrue.  
 
As he reached the end of his doctrine Schopenhauer may 
well have regarded himself as a ‘will-less subject of 
knowledge’, but he aspired, nevertheless, to ‘liberate’ 
the very thing he claimed to have shed (his beleaguered 
individual state). And if one turns to the means through 
which Schopenhauer aspired to destroy his inborn enemy it 
was nothing other than an entirely subordinate, illusory, 
and incidental phenomenal form, the intellect.  
 
Having identified the ‘root-point of existence’, the 
will, as the scourge of his own person and turned his 
attention to its abolition, Schopenhauer extended the 
537 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 163). 
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‘principle of sufficient reason’, an allegedly finite 
principle, well beyond the parameters of its jurisdiction 
to the ‘thing-in-itself’.538 ‘The will itself cannot be 
abolished’, as Schopenhauer claimed, ‘by anything except 
knowledge’.539 On another page of the same work, still a 
greater part of the way in, Schopenhauer again emphasised 
the domineering position of a formerly subordinate 
phenomenal form: ‘knowledge becomes for it a quieter, 
silencing and suppressing all willing’.540 But as he 
maintained on an earlier page of the same work: ‘No 
finite measure can exhaust that infinite source’.541 
 
It may well have suited Schopenhauer’s pretences as he 
reached the conclusion of his doctrine, but it remained 
far from clear how or, for that matter, why the will 
transformed itself from a will-to-live to, what in 
effect, was a will-to-die at the ‘mere’ behest of a 
purely derivative ‘function’, the intellect. ‘Knowledge’, 
as he previously maintained, ‘remains subordinate to the 
service of the will, as indeed it came into being for 
this service’.542 If one turns to another page of the same 
work, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, one reads a 
similar remark: ‘knowledge is completely the servant of 
the will’.543 Turning one’s attention to another work, 
Schopenhauer wrote: ‘But as a mere slave and bondman of 
the will, the intellect is not... active from its own 
538 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 /  1966 p. 325). 
539 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 400). 
540 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 308). 
541 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 184). 
542 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 177). 
543 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 176). 
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power and its own impulse. It is therefore easily pushed 
aside by the will, and brought to silence by a nod 
therefrom; whereas on its own part it is hardly able, 
even with the greatest effort, to bring the will even to 
a brief pause, in order to get a word in egdeways’.544  
 
XII. REASONING WITH AN IMBECILE 
 
Given the elaborate lengths the will had gone to to cover 
its tracks and conceal its true identity, it did not 
necessarily follow that the intellect was in any position 
at all, given its ‘apparitional’, submissive and ‘finite’ 
state, to disabuse the will of its delusions when it, no 
less, was counted among them. ‘My philosophy alone’, as 
Schopenhauer had said, ‘... puts man’s real inner nature 
not in consciousness, but in the will’.545 The ‘real 
self’, as he reiterated on another page of the same work, 
‘is the will-to-live’.546 Once again, one is compelled to 
ask how indeed it was possible for the subject’s ‘real 
inner nature’ to be renounced by something that was not 
simply, in Schopenhauer estimation, marginally less 
‘real’ but fundamentally ‘unreal’? If that indeed proved 
to be the case, as unlikely as it seemed, the will was 
not exempt from the ‘principle of sufficient reason’ at 
all but, ultimately, at its mercy.  
 
One could very well be forgiven for thinking more of the 
will-to-live; it had, after all, proved itself more than 
capable of pulling off the most deceitful and duplicitous 
of acts without ever stopping to think twice about its 
544 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 212). 
545 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 199). 
546 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 606). 
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conduct. If the will-to-live purely desired one thing and 
that one thing was to live at all costs it was not the 
least bit certain why it would have left any door 
unlocked, however small, that might have imperiled not 
simply its most pressing desire, but its only desire -  
least of all a door that might have jeopardised the very 
grounds of its existence not only in Schopenhauer’s 
‘knowing subject’ but in the world at large. As it stood, 
the will proved to be something of a wet blanket. 
 
Nor could one appeal, on moral grounds, to its ‘better 
nature’. One could not possibly demand that it come to 
its senses and see the error of its ways as the will was 
completely devoid of sense and reason; it was not, given 
its infra-mundane status, the least bit receptive to 
anything the intellect had to impart. One need only 
remember what Lewis had to say: ‘His god (or Will, as he 
prefers to call it) is a vast, undirected, purposeless 
impulse: not, like us, conscious: but blind, powerful, 
restless and unconscious’.547 The will was an unprincipled 
and amoral force and, if Schopenhauer was to be believed, 
inclined towards all that was evil. Quite why it should 
suddenly have regarded itself as something so vile that 
it was better for all concerned if it did not exist at 
all remained entirely inexplicable. ‘It is 
inconceivable’, as Bryan Magee also observed, ‘that a 
will which is inherently evil would choose, in the light 
of insight, to suppress itself’.548 Why? Because it was 
taken to one side, like a naughty child, and informed of 
its ‘bad’ behaviour by the virtuous and reflective voice 
of reason? An appeal of that sort would simply fall on 
deaf ears. ‘Against the mighty voice of nature’, as even 
547 Wyndham Lewis, ‘Time and Western Man’ (1927 p. 332).  
548 Bryan Magee, ‘The Philosophy of Schopenhauer’ (1983 p. 242).  
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Schopenhauer said, ‘reflection can do little’.549 Once 
again, the philosopher appeared to extend a purely 
phenomenal principle, that of morality, to the ‘thing-in-
itself’ which was not only facile but, by his own 
standards, completely untenable. 
 
Schopenhauer’s purported transfiguration from a ‘mere’ 
individual to an impassive ‘subject’ was the most nominal 
and spurious of transfigurations. The philosopher had 
clearly not relinquished any of the qualities associated 
with his ‘former’ state; instead, he attempted to pass 
them off as something they were not. Schopenhauer 
disavowed every trace of individuality that was 
fundamentally responsible for the will’s alleged 
‘abolition’. The ‘victorious’ figure slumped at the end 
of Schopenhauer’s doctrine was not, as he claimed, the 
‘will-less subject of knowledge’, but the egocentric and, 
by this point, washed up and mutilated individual 
subject. It may well have been an unheralded ‘victory’, 
but it was no less credible. 
 
The will-to-live would vehemently repel all efforts for 
it to be renounced and conjure up, in the process, some 
other means for it to continue existing, including the 
comparatively small matter of enticing Schopenhauer with 
a string of expectant and empty promises. One could well 
imagine that the will sensed, however dimly, a defective 
manifestation in its midst (Schopenhauer’s ‘knowing 
subject’) and, hoping to rid itself of an ineffectual, 
incompliant and unhealthy influence, afforded him the 
mistaken belief that his own demise would reap untold 
rewards. ‘Man’s essence’, as Dennis Rasmussen wrote in 
549 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 281). 
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‘Immortality: Revolt Against Being’ (1975), ‘consists in 
his insatiable desire or will which can never in time 
reach a final goal’.550 ‘Possession’, Rasmussen added, 
‘destroys the charm of the thing desired’.551 And given 
the purely anticipative nature of Schopenhauer’s 
imperturbable white cloud, free as it was from his 
individual presence, it was rather by the bye whether his 
ideal was realised or not. In either event, the 
philosopher would have been left none the wiser.  
 
Schopenhauer’s ultimate desire, to abolish nature’s will-
to-live, remained a desire that could never, in practice, 
be ‘possessed’; its attainment heralded the end of the 
percipient faculties that had been captivated by it. 
Schopenhauer’s ideal remained unblemished from the 
dissatisfaction that ordinarily accompanies the 
realisation of one’s goal. It perfectly suited the 
philosopher’s uncustomary tastes as its ‘charm’, as 
Rasmussen phrased it, was inextinguishable. But whether 
he had not, in fact, been duped, in the most stupendous 
way, remained a distinct and highly likely possibility. 
Given both the outcome of Schopenhauer’s philosophy and 
the apparent complicity of a, by now, unrecognisable 
will, I am inclined to believe that that was far more 
probable. 
 
Schopenhauer’s ideal was mutually beneficial; it afforded 
the philosopher a ‘heightened’ and rather pretentious 
pretext to take leave of life on his own terms rather 
than those dictated to him by the enormous oaf in tow, 
the will, and, at the same time, it relieved the will, 
550 Dennis Rasmussen, ‘Immortality: Revolt Against Being’ (1975 p. 
68). 
551 Dennis Rasmussen, ‘Immortality: Revolt Against Being’ (1975 p. 
68). 
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rather conveniently, of an unavailing and antagonistic 
manifestation.  
 
If one turns to page 398 of ‘The World as Will and 
Representation’, Schopenhauer expressed a similar 
opinion, but it was not directed at the ascetic but the 
suicide. ‘The will-to-live’, the philosopher said, ‘finds 
itself so hampered in this particular manifestation, that 
it cannot develop and display its efforts’.552 Of the two 
figures, the ascetic and the suicide, the former posed a 
far greater threat to the will, aspiring as he did to 
abolish it, than the latter. The ascetic certainly did 
not wish to ‘develop’ or ‘display its efforts’ as he 
claimed to have renounced them. But the knowing subject’s 
desire to abolish himself, his individual presence, 
played, rather more advantageously, into the hands of the 
will rather than his own.  
 
Given its enterprising nature, the will would actively 
encourage the ‘knowing subject’ to seek his immediate end 
in a determined effort to stop his unwelcome intrusion 
into its affairs. In seeking to impede its only desire, 
the will, not too unsurprisingly, turned all of its 
attention to the ‘knowing subject’s’ dissolution and 
demise. 
 
Schopenhauer referred to ‘knowledge’ as an ‘accident of 
matter’.553 And if one turns to another page of ‘On the 
Will in Nature’ one is told: ‘matter is the mere 
visibility of the will’.554 If knowledge, then, was merely 
an manifest image of nature’s will, then all that one 
552 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 398). 
553 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘On the Will in Nature’ (1836 / 1992 p. 88). 
554 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘On the Will in Nature’ (1836 / 1992 p. 65). 
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willed was surely nothing more than an expression of its 
raving desires. ‘So’, as Barbara Hannan asked, ‘how is it 
possible for the intellect of the genius to achieve 
“will-less knowing”? It would seem that intellect cannot 
detach itself from the will!’.555 One was not, as 
Schopenhauer led us to believe, an individual at all but 
a ‘phantom’ of a wholly delusional will and if one was 
little more than a second-string phantom of a wholly 
delusional will then one’s desires conformed, not to 
one’s own, but to those emanating from nature’s 
insuperable force of life. Not only did Schopenhauer’s 
desire to abolish the will hang far too heavily on the 
assent of the conniving entity he sought to abolish, but 
he utilised, to that end, the ‘lowly’ principle he 
claimed to have transcended.  
 
‘Our character’, as Schopenhauer wrote, ‘is to be 
regarded as the temporal unfolding of an extra-temporal, 
and so indivisible and unalterable, act of will’.556 ‘It 
is the will alone’, as Schopenhauer previously 
maintained, ‘that is permanent and unchangeable in 
consciousness. It is the will that holds all ideas and 
representations together as means to its ends, tinges 
them with the colour of its character, its mood, and its 
interest, commands the attention, and holds the thread of 
motives in hand’.557  
 
Taking into account its elemental presence, Schopenhauer 
was never likely, in spite of his desperate attempt to do 
so, to rid himself or the world of will when it 
555 Barbara Hannan, ‘The Riddle of the World: A Reconsideration of 
Schopenhauer’s Philosophy’ (2009 p. 13). 
556 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 301). 
557 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 140).  
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constituted its basis. Its desirous influence extended to 
Schopenhauer’s ascetic subject whose desire not to live 
was far more beneficial, given his matricidal intent, to 
the continued endurance of nature’s will rather than his 
own. The will had, quite feasibly, cajoled Schopenhauer 
into believing his desire to alleviate, first and 
foremost, his woe and want did not, in fact, serve its 
best interests. Given the actual outcome of 
Schopenhauer’s ‘painful self conquest’ it can hardly be 
said to have served his ‘knowing subject’ particularly 
well. 
 
There was absolutely nothing to stop one from assuming 
that the will was not simply expressing its own peculiar 
culinary habits. ‘At bottom’, as indeed we have heard, 
‘this springs from the fact that the will must live on 
itself, since nothing exists besides it, and it is a 
hungry will’.558 The will may not have been the brightest 
of life forces Schopenhauer could have come up with but 
it was, as I have said a number of times, an extremely 
mendacious one. Schopenhauer would have been better 
advised, one suspects, not to have put all of his faith 
and trust in a will that never once kept its word. There 
was ultimately and literally no knowing the extraordinary 
lengths it would go to preserve itself. ‘There is’, as 
Schopenhauer warned his readers, ‘no shape so grotesque 
that the will-to-live will not appear in order to attain 
its end’.559 And that, presumably, included going along 
with Schopenhauer’s hostile ‘subject of knowledge’, 
nodding in agreement to something it could not possibly 
understand, simply, for all we know, to make a gift of 
him to one of its hungrier and, for that matter, 
558 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 154). 
559 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘On the Will in Nature’ (1836 / 1992 p. 57). 
 281 
                                                 
considerably more grateful manifestations. ‘For only 
through these is the object interesting to the 
individual, in other words, has a relation to the will’, 
as Schopenhauer wrote.560 And in this rather sorry state 
of his, in this state of not willing to live, 
Schopenhauer’s ‘subject’ would have aroused little more 
than the will’s appetite. 
 
Schopenhauer’s account was barely credible and, in many 
ways, beggared belief; given, I should add, the 
inviolable nature he had attributed to the will and the 
subordinate position he gave to the intellect. The 
‘intellect’, as he had made clear, ‘does not penetrate 
into the secret workshop of the will’s decisions’.561 ‘Its 
inner character’, if one turns to Arthur Hübscher for a 
second opinion, ‘is inaccessible to the intellect’.562 It 
remained unclear how exactly the intellect, a ‘feeble’ 
and ‘paltry’ phenomenal form, could possibly begin to 
comprehend, let alone extricate itself from its origin 
and source, the will, whatever form it may have assumed. 
‘It is unable to determine the will itself’, Schopenhauer 
had said, ‘for the will is wholly inaccessible to it, 
and, as we have seen, is for it inscrutable and 
impenetrable’.563 Yet if one simply ‘looked inwards’ the 
individuating ‘principle of sufficient reason’ all too 
easily slipped away to reveal the ‘true’ unitary nature 
of things.  
 
The will appeared to reveal its secret, presumably its 
560 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 177). 
561 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 210). 
562 Arthur Hübscher, ‘The philosophy of Schopenhauer in its 
Intellectual Context’ (1989 p. 214). 
563 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 291). 
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most closely held secret, far too cheaply indeed. More 
especially, if one considers just how high the stakes 
were reputed to be for its very hold on life. All the 
same, Schopenhauer claimed to have successfully informed 
it of its gross misconduct and the fatuity of its ways 
and the will withdrew entirely of its own accord and in 
the most whimpering of ways. Schopenhauer had either 
betrayed himself as being extremely naive or unimaginably 
complacent. It was more a case that Schopenhauer had 
grossly underestimated the guile of the very power in 
whose affairs he not only meddled but aspired to subvert. 
 
On the one hand, Schopenhauer was at pains to point out 
that the will could not be known, and, on the other, he 
maintained that it could be known if one, all too 
mysteriously, ‘looked inwards’. Schopenhauer was keen to 
depict the will as the mightiest of powers yet, for all 
its might, it could be relinquished, if we consider his 
thoroughly condescending appraisal of the subject’s 
finite state, by the most ‘feeble’ of means, the 
intellect.  
 
Schopenhauer would appear to have wanted it both ways and 
only called upon the service of knowledge when it suited 
his particular theoretical needs. The intellect not only 
worked but triumphed in a place where it was not the 
least bit able to exert its influence. One must harbour 
grave doubts as to how it was possible for something that 
was not endowed with an intellect to suddenly and 
inexplicably be ruled by it. ‘Given the rest of his 
philosophy’, as Bryan Magee argued, ‘there is no way in 
which this could happen. First, his denial that any of 
our actions or choices are free means that it is not an 
option for us. Second, he is insistent throughout that 
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for all motivated action the medium of motives is the 
mind, whether conscious or unconscious, and that mind is 
the creature of will in the literal sense that is was 
brought into being by the will and exists to serve it. 
Admittedly, in his theory of art he asserts that there 
are brief periods when the mind frees itself from this 
servitude; but that is a far cry from any talk of the 
mind directing the will. That would run counter to his 
whole system.’564 If one turns to another critic, Arthur 
Hübscher, he even expressed doubts as to whether the 
will, if it was so easily comprehended, was actually the 
‘thing-in-itself’, the very thing that bungled about 
‘within’ the philosopher and nature itself. ‘If the will 
is the thing-in-itself, so people said, it cannot be the 
object of cognition. For knowledge is representing; the 
will, however, is outside the sphere of all 
representation... if the will can be known, it cannot 
possibly be the thing-in-itself’.565  
 
It was a question that also troubled Paul Gottfried. ‘Why 
does the will, however, acquiesce in its own 
nullification?, Gottfried asked. ‘It is’, he continued, 
‘because, lacking another content, it allows itself to be 
guided by human consciousness which is its own creation. 
What results is that man, moved by the pointlessness of 
his own yearning, incites the will to put an end to 
itself. The sovereignty of volition must yield to the 
rebellion of the intellect. Unfortunately, the 
philosopher cannot plot this redemptive process in its 
entirety’.566  
564 Bryan Magee, ‘The Philosophy of Schopenhauer’ (1983 p. 242).  
565 Arthur Hübscher, ‘The Philosophy of Schopenhauer in its 
Intellectual Context: Thinker Against the Tide’ (1989 p. 382). 
566 Paul Gottfried, ‘Arthur Schopenhauer and the Heritage of 
Pessimism’ (1975 p. 29). 
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If one turns to Schopenhauer in the hope of hearing a 
clear and straightforward answer, one reads, to one’s 
dismay: ‘the principle of the world’s existence is 
expressly a groundless one, namely a blind will-to-live, 
which, as thing in itself, cannot be subject to the 
principle of sufficient reason or ground; for this 
principle is merely the form of phenomena, and through it 
alone every why is justified’.567 On another page, 
Schopenhauer peddled out the same excuse: ‘where we are 
speaking of the will as thing-in-itself, the principle of 
sufficient reason, as the mere form of the phenomenon, no 
longer finds any application, but with this principle all 
why and whence vanish’.568 Having placed the will, 
ultimately, beyond one’s comprehension, Schopenhauer 
extricated himself, all too conveniently, from the 
necessity of having to satisfactorily explain its 
abolition; it allowed him to shrug his shoulders, beg the 
pardon of his own idea and ‘gracefully’ bow out of his 
doctrine under a completely false pretext. ‘Every why’, 
as he said, ‘is justified’.569  
 
If the ronunciative process happened to strike one as 
uncertain, if not completely mystifying it was because 
one was not privy to the will’s ways. Nor was one simply 
precluded from the manner of its abolition; its 
affirmation was no less unfathomable. The will was a law 
unto itself and its nature, having been established, 
somewhat opportunely, as ‘groundless’ from the very 
beginning, was ultimately beyond one’s ken. It was an 
567 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 579). 
568 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 530). 
569 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 579). 
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extremely shrewd move on Schopenhauer’s part. It 
permitted him to run into the shadowy embrace of the very 
thing he claimed to have abolished in his failure to 
sufficiently account for its abolition. ‘True, the 
individuality has its roots in the thing-in-itself’, but, 
as he added, ‘how deep these roots go, that is a 
question, which defies any answer’.570 That he was unable 
to provide an adequate account could not be helped. The 
fault was not with Schopenhauer but lay squarely with the 
will; its nature, all too conveniently, exceeded the 
customary rule of knowledge.  
 
And just as Schopenhauer called on the service of 
knowledge as and when he pleased, he also capitalised, 
when it suited him, on the will’s inherent 
unintelligibility. The all too flighty philosopher ran 
from one to the other to justify whatever turn his 
doctrine happened to take. The will was dominant here but 
subordinate there; the same was equally true of 
knowledge. The two vied for dominance and both gained, at 
various stages of his doctrine, a significant edge over 
the other, but neither the will nor intellect were able 
to claim total and absolute sovereignty over the other. 
Ending as it did in man’s complete downfall and collapse, 
one is left puzzled and perplexed, as I have said, by who 
or what did what to what. ‘Should I try to resolve this 
tension and somehow reveal Schopenhauer’s philosophy to 
be consistent?’, asked Barbara Hannan. ‘I cannot. 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy is not consistent’, as she 
astutely concluded.571  
570 Arthur Schopenhauer quoted by Arthur Hübscher, ‘The Philosophy of 
Schopenhauer in its Intellectual Context: Thinker Against the Tide’ 
(1989 p. 385).  
571 Barbara Hannan, ‘The Riddle of the World: A Reconsideration of 
Schopenhauer’s Philosophy’ (2009 p. 15). 
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XIII. DEPTHS, OBSCURITIES AND INTRICACIES 
 
What makes Schopenhauer’s doctrine so difficult to 
contest or dispute, so impossible to iron out, is the 
will, in the most fundamental sense, is unknowable. 
Schopenhauer’s doctrine had, at its centre, an indelible 
question mark, an insoluble riddle. ‘Whatever torch we 
kindle, and whatever space it may illuminate’, as he 
conceded, ‘our horizon will always remain encircled by 
the depth of night.572 The ‘actual, positive solution to 
the riddle of the world must’, as Schopenhauer said, ‘be 
something that the human intellect is wholly incapable of 
grasping and conceiving’.573 But if the will was 
unknowable then all things, given the thoroughly 
deterministic, if not predictable line of his philosophy, 
were also, at heart, unknowable. ‘For it is indeed’, as 
we have heard, ‘one and the same will that objectifies 
itself in the whole world’.574  
 
Turning to the question of individuality, Schopenhauer 
again found himself, not too unsurprisingly, at a similar 
loss. ‘Human nature has depths, obscurities, and 
intricacies’, as he wrote, ‘whose elucidation and 
unfolding are of the very greatest difficulty’.575 
Elsewhere, he said: ‘the “I” is an unknown quantity, in 
other words, it is itself a mystery and a secret’.576 
Schopenhauer was unable to account for it in its entirety 
572 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966  p. 185). 
573 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 185). 
574 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 159). 
575 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 402). 
576 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 139).  
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as man was, like everything else in nature, a manifest 
image of an insensate, enigmatic and wholly 
incomprehensible will.  
 
‘Schopenhauer’s philosophy, he repeatedly tells us’, 
turning once again to Barbara Hannan, ‘is a sustained 
attempt to communicate a “single thought”. When one 
finally understands Schopenhauer, one realizes that the 
“single thought” cannot be expressed’.577 If one turns to 
an essay written by Jerry S. Clegg one reads: ‘The 
knowledge it produces is therefore indemonstrable and 
uncommunicable. Its insights cannot be conveyed to 
others’.578 Everything, then, both big and small remained 
abstruse and unintelligible. And, with its emphasis on 
will, Schopenhauer’s doctrine was by no means an 
exception. It too was coloured and, ultimately, 
compromised by the will’s daunting and mystifying 
presence. In the end, all reservations, questions and 
doubts one may have regarding Schopenhauer’s doctrine are 
left, in the most frustrating way, hanging in the air 
without the remotest hope of an answer.  
 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy marked, as I said at the 
beginning of the chapter, a dramatic change of heart. 
Unlike Schlegel, the philosopher vehemently objected to 
his affiliation with nature; his wished to rid himself of 
its will and successfully, if only very briefly, stepped 
out of its shadow. Schopenhauer was loathed to admit it 
but his desire to abolish nature’s will was an extremely 
defiant and egocentric desire to liberate himself from 
577 Barbara Hannan, ‘The Riddle of the World: A Reconsideration of 
Schopenhauer’s Philosophy’ (2009 p. 141). 
578 Jerry S. Clegg, ‘Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein on Lonely Languages 
and Criterialess Claims’ collected in Eric von der Luft (ed), 
‘Schopenhauer. New Essays in Honor of His 200th Birthday’(1988 p. 
86). 
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its jurisdiction. He did not simply aspire to distance 
himself, but distinguish himself, in the most singular 
way, from its imbecilic influence. He was the exception 
to the rule: an unwilling participant in its scheming 
ways. That he resorted to the most dishonest of means to 
qualify his rebellion was nothing more than heightened 
bluster; it remained not only a ‘rebellion of the 
intellect’, as Gottfried described it, but a rebellion of 
one’s volition, ego, and independence.579  
 
It was certainly counterproductive, but the matter of 
one’s independence now lay entirely in the hands of 
Schopenhauer’s ‘knowing subject’. Given the will’s 
sovereignty, it was not the least bit certain whether he 
had any rightful claim to that state or was entitled to 
feel empowered to any degree whatsoever. Nor can one 
entirely discount the possibility, in light of the will’s 
reputed abolition, that he did indeed have a legitimate 
claim to both his volitional state and independence. As 
it stood, Schopenhauer’s doctrine was riddled with 
inconsistencies, largely of an epistemological variety, 
that ultimately defied comprehension. The ‘relationship 
between appearance and the thing-in-itself is’, as 
Hübscher concluded, ‘irresoluble’.580 
 
The value accorded to individuality in Schopenhauer’s 
doctrine ultimately rested on the symbolic act of 
exerting it even if, in exerting it, the ‘knowing 
subject’ brought his individuality to an abrupt end. 
Moving, as we have, from Schlegel’s ‘theory’ to 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy we finally see something, if 
579 Paul Gottfried, ‘Arthur Schopenhauer and the Heritage of 
Pessimism’ (1975 p. 29). 
580 Arthur Hübscher, ‘The Philosophy of Schopenhauer in its 
Intellectual Context: Thinker Against the Tide’ (1989 p. 383). 
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only a glimpse, of an individual’s desire to break free 
and liberate himself from a totalising, universal theory; 
something that was not the least bit apparent in 
Schlegel’s ‘romantic’ vision.  
 
Schopenhauer may well have remained hidden, albeit 
sheepishly, behind the heavy curtain of his doctrine, 
but, unlike Schlegel’s theory, the tips of the 
philosopher’s shoes were left, tellingly, poking out at 
the bottom. His doctrine was certainly condescending in 
its evaluation of the finite, somatic individual but, 
ultimately, it was at his hands that he managed to avail 
himself of himself, of his own ghoulish inner-nature. 
Schopenhauer’s egocentric desire to distinguish himself 
from nature’s will remained, contrary to the 
philosopher’s claims, clearly visible. He may well have 
plunged his ‘individual’ subject back to the murky and 
unfathomable depths of his own theory but, the fact 
remained  -  he came to light, if briefly, as a defiant, 
singular figure not wishing to pander to the imbecilic 
demands of a totalising theory.  
 
The subject triumphed but his triumph, admittedly, was 
not only unheralded but ultimately compromised by the 
enduring presence of an aphonic and insensate will.  
 
Schopenhauer’s ‘concerns’ were, as we will see in the 
following chapter, remarkably similar to Max Stirner’s. 
Both figures sought to secure, primarily, their own 
‘freedom’ from tyrannical concepts. But, quite unlike 
Stirner, Schopenhauer refused to openly acknowledge his 
egocentric motivations as they conflicted with his 
deterministic doctrine. One dare not affirm oneself as 
affirming oneself meant affirming the will, the very 
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thing that one aspired to abolish. One could not freely 
draw upon one’s phenomenal or individual qualities as 
they were determined by will itself. Schopenhauer, in 
turn, resorted to the most sophistic and dishonest of 
means to qualify his own instrumental and egocentric 
objectives. Max Stirner, on the other hand, sought to 
affirm his will, his will-to-live, and refute all 
intellectual constraints that impeded his egocentric 
desire.  
 
The conclusion of Schopenhauer’s doctrine spells the end 
of the subject’s affiliation with nature as far as the 
present thesis goes. It can be said to have been a 
problem that came to some sort of head with Schopenhauer. 
By the time one gets to Max Stirner it was apparently no 
longer an issue; he was not the least bit blighted by any 
such association. Stirner had cut the connection between 
himself and any sort of totalising theory and his 
subject, the ‘un-man’, emerged from the shadow of 
theoretical conjecture on something resembling his own 
two feet. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
REBELLING AGAINST THE HURRICANE: MAX STIRNER AND THE UNIVERSAL WILL. 
 
‘I saw myself like a grain of sand rebelling against the 
hurricane that carries it away. It was too funny: a grain 
of sand and a hurricane!... I had to find support within 
myself, to believe in the magnitude of my individuality 
so that I could oppose it to the whole universe, to the 
universal will’.581 
 
Michael Artzibashef, ‘Breaking-Point’ 
 
‘In contrast to the jelly-fish that floats in the centre 
of the subterranean stream of the “dark” Unconscious, I 
much prefer, for my part, the shield of the tortoise, or 
the rigid stylistic articulations of the grasshopper’.582  
 
Wyndham Lewis, ‘Satire and Fiction’ 
  
‘Incidentally, a count of the word “ich” in Stirner 
showed that nearly 25% of the text consists of “ich” (if 
you count all the derivatives). Keep that up, and the 
whole text will soon be one continuous “I”. Yet if one 
searches life: is there much “I” in it?’.583  
 
Sigizmund Krzhizhanovsky, ‘Autobiography of a Corpse’ 
 
I. A JOHN SMITH 
 
There are two biographical facts that stand out in the 
581 Michael Artzibashef, ‘Breaking-Point’(1915 p. 260 - 261). B. W. 
Huebsch, NY. 
582 Wyndham Lewis, ‘Satire and Fiction’ (1930 p. 47). 
583 Sigizmund Krzhizhanovsky (1887 – 1950), ‘Autobiography of a 
Corpse’ collected in ‘7 Stories’ (2006 p. 92). Translated by Joanne 
Turnbull. Glas New Russian Writing, Vol. 39. 
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relatively short life of Max Stirner (1806 / 1856). In 
the first place, one learns Max Stirner was not Max 
Stirner at all, but Johan Casper Schmidt. Secondly, the 
writer, who, in the course of his book, ‘The Ego and Its 
Own’, made a great deal of celebratory fuss, some of it 
extremely histrionic, about his individual ‘might’ met 
with a bitterly ironic end when, in the Spring of 1856, 
he was stung by an insect and learnt, in the costliest 
possible fashion, that his ‘might’ was not quite as 
mighty as he imagined it to be. Stirner failed to recover 
and, due to further complications, died some weeks later.  
 
Let me begin the present chapter by offering for 
consideration the symbolic significance of the first of 
these facts as the second rather speaks for itself.  
 
One can, in all likelihood, hazard any number of guesses 
as to why Max Stirner thought better of appearing before 
the reading public as Johann Schmidt, but one in 
particular was not, I dare say, the least bit lost on 
him. 
 
Schmidt’s pen name harked back to his childhood days. He 
came by the name, it is said, on account of his forehead; 
it was apparently so pronounced that his schoolmates saw 
fit to name him after it.584 What, then, compelled Johann 
Schmidt to reassume his childhood nickname? 
 
If one has any degree of familiarity with the ‘The Ego 
and Its Own’ (1844) one will, no doubt, be acutely aware 
that the book, of all books, is possibly among the least 
suited to be credited to a ‘John Smith’ whether he 
584 ‘Stirn’, it is worth mentioning at this point, is the German for 
forehead. An impression of which is certainly confirmed if one looks 
at the sketch Friedrich Engels drew of him. 
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happened to be a German John Smith or not.  
 
Stirner did his utmost to disassociate himself from all 
manner of common pools and groupish associations. The 
‘individual’, as we heard Stirner say, ‘is the 
irreconcilable enemy of generality, every tie, every 
fetter’.585 If we turn to a critic for a corroboration, we 
hear Lawrence Stepelevich say: ‘Stirner considered 
himself to be not only a Mann but also a unique man’.586  
 
We can only begin to imagine the deep dismay he must 
surely have felt in finding himself just another Schmidt 
among a countless number of other Schmidts.  
 
Given his hostility to common pots, Schmidt was hardly 
blessed from birth with the most favourable of surnames. 
He entertained ideas that were so utterly at odds with it 
that it hardly comes as much of a surprise that it proved 
impossible for him to continue using it. Something, quite 
clearly, had to be done about the Schmidt.  
 
In ‘de-Schmidting’ himself, as it were, Stirner found an 
appropriate means to express a little of the singularity 
he so keenly felt. ‘Stirners’ are far thinner on the 
ground, after all. 
 
Having, firstly, stepped out of the crowded shadow of his 
fellow Schmidts, Stirner went about the business of 
distancing himself from every imaginable ‘concern’ that 
was not solely his own. He wished, above all else, to be 
considered entirely on his own terms; to stand on his own 
585 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 192). 
586 Lawrence S. Stepelevich, ‘Ein Menschenleben. Hegel and Stirner’ 
collected in ‘The New Hegelians. Politics and Philosophy the Hegelian 
School’ (2006 p. 171). 
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two feet and, if necessary, topple over just so long as 
he toppled over of his own accord which, of course, he 
did, excusing the smallest of insectile nudges. 
 
II. THE CONTRIVED PERSONALITY 
 
‘The Case of the Individual against Authority’ is the 
subtitle of ‘The Ego and Its Own’. It has, if you happen 
to agree, a ring of youthful recalcitrance about it. 
There was something about Max Stirner, besides his name, 
that was, I hesitate to use the word ‘childish’, but 
certainly, as I suggested in the opening chapter, 
‘adolescent’. Eduard Von Hartmann described it, perhaps 
most appropriately of all (in light of Stirner’s 
macrocephalic appendage), as his ‘over-balanced 
egoism’587, while Peter McCormick, referred to it as 
Stirner’s ‘triumphal vigor’588, and David Leopold, a more 
recent critic, saw fit to attribute it to his 
‘characteristically provocative conceit’.589  
 
‘The Ego and Its Own’ is predominated by a vociferant and 
boisterous presence that brings to mind the most 
unmanageable of teenagers. If, by means of an example, we 
turn to page 63 of the said work we hear Stirner say: ‘It 
is possible that I can make very little out of myself; 
but this little is everything, and is better than what I 
allow to be made out of me by the might of others, by the 
training of custom, religion, the laws, the state. Better 
- if the talk is to be of better at all - better an 
587 Eduard Von Hartmann, ‘Philosophy of the Unconscious’, Book III 
(1868 / 1931 p. 98). 
588 Peter McCormick, ‘The Concept of the Self in Political Thought’ 
(1979 p. 707). 
589 David Leopold, ‘The State and I: Max Stirner’s Anarchism’ 
collected in ‘The New Hegelians. Politics and Philosophy the Hegelian 
School’ (2006 p. 184).  
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unmannerly child than old head on young shoulders, better 
a mulish man than a man compliant in everything. The 
unmannerly and mulish fellow is still on the way to form 
himself according to his own will’.590  
 
If, to substantiate the impression, we turn to another 
page, we hear Stirner tell us in no uncertain terms: ‘I 
am owner of my might and I am so when I know myself as 
unique. In the unique one the owner himself returns into 
his creative nothing, of which he is born. Every higher 
essence above me, be it God, be it man, weakens the 
feeling of my uniqueness, and pales only before the sun 
of this consciousness. If I concern myself for myself, 
the unique one, then my concern rests on its transitory, 
mortal creator, who consumes himself’.591 
 
The preceding excerpts are quite typical of ‘The Ego and 
Its Own’. It was certainly, as Leopold said, 
‘provocative’ in the extreme. After all, even God himself 
‘paled’ before the piercing light of Stirner’s singular 
‘consciousness’.  
 
There was no central principle in Stirner’s philosophy 
other than the ‘Stirner personality’ itself and it 
presided over his book, indeed all things, like a 
capricious youngster whom imagined himself an almighty 
and unruly king. ‘If it is right for me’, as Stirner 
decreed, ‘it is right’.592 ‘Stirner has in effect taken 
the omnipotence fantasy of the child’, as John Carroll 
astutely said, ‘who believes that he has unlimited power 
in choice and action, and made it accessible to the 
590 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 163 - 164). 
591 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 324). 
592 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 170). 
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adult, who is soberly conscious of the ideological traps 
inherent in ideals fantasies’.593  
 
Stirner did his utmost to encourage the impression, to 
put it very simply indeed, that he was far more 
authoritative and commandeering than necessarily proved 
the case in point. As for his ‘might’ it is tempting to 
picture it, thinking of the insect that ultimately got 
the better of him, as little more than a large, feathery 
pillow stuffed, somewhat unconvincingly, up his jumper. 
But that is not to say that Stirner’s pillowy bluster was 
entirely ineffectual or uncalled for; it was, in a 
certain sense, absolute necessary, as indeed I intend to 
explain.  
 
Firstly, one must remind oneself that ‘The Ego and Its 
Own’ was not the work of somebody who wished to appear to 
be at the mercy of a theoretical system, indeed any 
system; on the contrary, it was the work of an ‘arbitrary 
personality’ at pains to affirm his presence, not only in 
its pages but in the face of systematic thought in toto. 
Not that it was any old ‘personality’ but a ‘one off’, as 
it were. And the ‘unique one’, as Stirner brazenly 
referred to himself, was not the least bit obliged to 
adhere to the tenets of any system, even his own, if it 
got in the way of his immediate needs.594 
 
If, for example, a bright idea struck Stirner, out of the 
blue, on Sunday afternoon as being particularly 
expedient, but come the evening it proved less opportune 
then he was perfectly entitled, he believed, to 
593 John Carroll, ‘Break-Out from the Crystal Palace. The anarcho-
psychological critique: Stirner, Nietzsche, Dostoevsky’ ((1974 p. 
41). 
594 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 324). 
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repudiate, no less ardently, the very thing he championed 
earlier in the day. ‘Why should different ways of looking 
at a thing be more surprising in the same man at 
different ages - sometimes even at that the same moment - 
than in different men’.595 Stirner would have 
wholeheartedly agreed with Sénancour on this particular 
point. After all, he could not possibly be expected to 
anticipate his needs from one moment, let alone from one 
day to the next. And Stirner was certainly not willing 
nor duty bound to lug the same ‘bright idea’ around all 
week, let alone a lifetime, for fear of appearing 
skittish or contradictory. Quite the opposite, in fact. 
Schmidt went out of his way to create an extremely 
playful and unpredictable persona - the ‘Stirner role’ 
and the part called for a certain vivacious and, if needs 
be, erratic presence if he was to successfully convince 
the reader of his, rather its veracity. 
 
To blindly jump to the defence of an idea, let alone an 
entire theoretical system, come what may, is tantamount 
to undermining the grounds of one’s free choice not to 
mention the presence of one’s personality. And Stirner 
had absolutely no intention to undermine himself in any 
shape or form, least of all find himself at the sharp end 
of the stick and answerable to an inflexible idea. ‘What 
is it, then’, Stirner asked, ‘that is called a “fixed 
idea”? An idea that has subjected the man to itself’.596  
 
Stirner, in stark contrast, presided over ideas. They 
were his to entertain, not vice versa. He was at perfect 
liberty, so he liked to imagine, to do and say exactly as 
he pleased. ‘But I, as I, swallow up again what is mine, 
595 Étienne Pivert de Sénancour, ‘Obermann’, Vol. I. Translated by 
Barnes. (1803 / 1910 p. xxxv) 
596 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 43). 
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am its master’, Stirner crowed, ‘it is only my opinion, 
which I can at any moment change, annihilate, take back 
into myself, and consume’.597 Stirner did not suffer 
anything gladly if it impeded his apparently wanton 
‘self’. 
 
Taking Schlegel or Schopenhauer’s respective schemes to 
hand, the subject was little more to either of them than 
an elemental ‘essence’ of nature which found itself 
inhibited and frustrated by its ‘host’s’ somatic and 
individual form. The larger ‘essence’ inside them had to 
be appeased. Consequently, its needs took precedence over 
the subject in whom it was ‘confined’ and he, the 
subject, duly gave way to the ‘universal’ power ‘within’ 
him. And, just as Schopenhauer went to enormous lengths 
to illustrate, its desires were not necessarily in line 
with the ‘host’s’ best interests; if anything, they ran, 
more often than not, in stark contrast to them. ‘The will 
calls the tune’, as Janaway said, ‘never leaves us in 
peace’.598 
 
The general atmosphere of Schlegel and Schopenhauer’s 
schemes would have appalled Stirner. Neither of them were 
particularly interested in the subject per se, not in an 
individual sense at any rate; they were captivated, in 
stark contrast, by an atramental ‘principle’, universal 
in scope, which reputedly resided ‘within’ the individual 
person. It was the wellspring of all things. The person 
hardly mattered. “What does the loss of this 
individuality matter to me?’, as Schopenhauer asked 
himself, ‘for I carry within myself the possibility of 
597 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 300). 
598 Christopher Janaway, ‘The real essence of human beings: 
Schopenhauer and the unconscious will’ collected in ‘Thinking the 
Unconscious. Nineteenth-Century German Thought’ (2010 p. 155). 
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innumerable individualities”’.599  
 
While they talked, in heightened tones, of the subject’s 
‘inmost’ essence, Schlegel and Schopenhauer were rather 
less well disposed to his definitive, singular state. It 
was an all out ‘illusion’, if Schopenhauer was to be 
believed. But, in Stirner’s opinion, the so called 
‘illusion’ was nothing other than the subject himself -  
the central figure around which Schopenhauer’s scheme was 
said to revolve. Their ‘concern’ for man, as Stirner 
would have indubitably concluded, was nothing more than a 
general ‘theoretical’ concern for ‘man the idea’, not 
‘man the person’. 
 
True, Schopenhauer’s subject ‘intervened’ but his 
intervention, catastrophic as it was, worked to the 
further advantage of nature’s will, as indeed I argued, 
rather than his own (it all too conveniently, if you 
remember, purged the will of an antagonistic and 
dangerous influence). Whether Schopenhauer’s subject 
affirmed the will or refuted it, he found himself, either 
way, at a loss; he was, ultimately, subordinate to ‘it’. 
He lost out, as it were, on both counts. ‘The individual 
in humanist thought’, as John Welsh wrote, ‘is a mere 
vessel that carries the universal in a physical, 
particular form. The person, in his or her particularity, 
does not matter to humanism or modern thought. The 
individual, the particular, is subordinate to the 
essence’.600  
 
Stirner, on the other hand, was not the least bit 
599 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’ Vol. 
II  (1844 /  1966 p. 491). 
600 John F. Welsh, ‘Max Stirner’s Dialectical Egoism. A New 
Interpretation’ (2010 p. 65).  
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interested in, nor ‘subordinate’ to any sort of visceral 
‘essence’, elemental or not, as it pertained to the 
common stock of mankind, its root basis, rather than the 
man himself. Needless to say, Stirner did not consider 
himself, to paraphrase Welsh, a ‘mere vessel’ within whom 
a far greater force was at play. Rather it was the 
‘vessel’ itself which took precedence in ‘The Ego and Its 
Own’; it appertained, after all, to the subject’s 
intrinsic state rather than an extrinsic ‘idea’.  
 
Stirner took it upon himself, as a matter of necessity, 
to counteract the torpid ‘idea’ of the subject’s 
‘essence’ with a lively, if exaggerated depiction of the 
his multifaceted ‘personality’. The ‘un-man’, as Stirner 
declared, ‘rejects everything outside himself’.601 He 
‘recognizes nothing but himself’, Stirner said, and 
‘rates nothing higher, because, in short, he starts from 
himself’.602 And faithfully reflecting Stirner’s 
intentions, the reader is confronted with an obdurate, 
arbitrary and egocentric ‘personality’ whom one cannot 
simply ignore or, for that matter, put neatly and tidily 
into a pigeonhole. ‘To be a man’, as Stirner maintained, 
‘is not to realize the ideal of man, but to present 
oneself, the individual. It is not how I realize the 
generally human that needs to be my task, but how I 
satisfy myself. I am my species, am without norm, without 
law, without model, and the like’.603  
 
Granted, there may well have been a certain ‘staginess’ 
to ‘The Ego and its Own’, but given the focus of 
Stirner’s argument, talking, as condemningly as he did, 
601 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 149). 
602 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 149). 
603 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 163 - 164). 
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about the ‘dispersonating’ and dehumanising character of 
abstract thought, he no doubt felt obliged to make a 
conspicuous effort to prove to the reader he was not 
similarly culpable. It was absolutely necessary, given 
the point he wished to make, for Stirner to 
‘overcompensate’, as it were.  A certain amount of extra 
‘hot air’ was needed which Stirner more than duly 
supplied. That Stirner recognised the potential ‘pitfall’ 
and ‘moved in’ to his work to enliven it with his 
presence, for better or worse, was, to repeat the point, 
to his enormous credit.  
 
‘In Max Stirner’, as Nikolai Berdyaev wrote in ‘Slavery 
and Freedom’ (1939), ‘in spite of the falsity of his 
philosophy, true personalism is to be found, but in a 
distorted form’.604 Putting aside, for the mean time, 
Berdyaev’s opinion of his philosophy, the Russian critic 
was almost certainly correct in identifying a 
fundamentally important characteristic of Stirner’s work: 
its ‘distorted personalism’, as he astutely described it. 
‘One consequence of this anarchist indifference towards 
systematic theory’, if one turns once again to John 
Carroll, ‘is that Der Einzige gains from a gaiety and 
buoyancy of style, which in itself adds a dimension to 
its thesis’.605  
 
‘The Ego and Its Own’ does not, as a consequence, conform 
to all the customary rules or expectations of a standard 
theoretical work. It exceeds those bounds, if only in 
intention. The ‘Max Stirner personality’ was the 
quintessential idea itself. And it was, in two words, 
604 Nikolai Berdyaev, ‘Slavery and Freedom’ (1939 / 1943 p. 34). 
605 John Carroll, ‘Break-Out from the Crystal Palace. The anarcho-
psychological critique: Stirner, Nietzsche, Dostoevsky’ ((1974 p. 
27). 
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unclassifiable and ineffable. ‘No concept expresses me’, 
as Stirner argued, ‘nothing that is designated as my 
essence exhausts me; they are only names’.606 
 
Stirner’s chief ‘trick’, so to speak, consisted of 
softening up the sharp lines that, in some instances, 
seem to separate certain books from their authors. One 
need only remember the horribly disingenuous concluding 
passages of Schopenhauer’s doctrine; it was, as it 
staggered limply towards its end, simply bereft of 
Schopenhauer. In fact, it did away with him, quite 
literally, to reach its conclusion. The philosopher’s 
doctrine, to put it another way, took Schopenhauer 
roughly by the hand in order to reach its conclusion and, 
as a matter of due course, his ultimate end.  
 
Stirner, by contrast, was not the least bit inclined to 
follow suit and let the same thing happen to him. He did 
not wish to relinquish his grasp of himself so readily. 
Stirner was answerable, he firmly believed, to himself 
and himself alone. 
 
Stirner aspired to extend himself, for want of a better 
expression, to the pages of ‘The Ego and Its Own’ and, if 
nothing else, put himself beyond the sharp end of his own 
tongue. Whether Stirner, to put it bluntly, ‘pulled it 
off’ or not remains, for the time being, a matter for 
later consideration, but it was certainly a novel and 
comparatively inventive way of going about things. 
‘Stirner’, turning to Saul Newman, ‘gives us, then, a new 
way of thinking about the subject – the subject is no 
longer defined by essential properties and 
characteristics that are said to mirror broader humanity, 
606 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 324). 
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but rather should be thought of as a mode of 
subjectivation that is open, indefinable and freely 
determined by the egoist’.607 
 
Stirner capitalised on the greater number of 
opportunities that came his way to ‘reveal his 
personality’ and its manifold moods. The reader is 
constantly reminded that he or she has ‘living and 
breathing’ character on their hands rather than a rigid 
and formal set of theoretical ideas. Stirner was 
extremely eager, if not more than a little desperate at 
times, to ‘make an impression’. He had absolutely no 
shame.  
 
Stirner even saw it ‘fair game’ to say the most 
ridiculous of things purely and simply for the thrill of 
shocking the reader in a determined bid to appear awkward 
and contrary. ‘Even if I foresaw that these thoughts 
would deprive you of your rest and your peace’, as 
Stirner goaded us, ‘even if I saw the bloodiest wars and 
the fall of many generations springing up from this seed 
of thought - I would nevertheless scatter it. Do with it 
what you will and can, that is your affair and does not 
trouble me’.608  
 
Stirner’s intentions are transparently clear. He 
explicitly set out to unsettle the reader, to jar and 
knock them off balance and, apparently, took an enormous 
amount of pleasure in doing just that. Stirner aspired to 
soften, if not blur the boundaries between ‘the 
theoretical’ and ‘the ontological’ in a determined bid to 
elude classification. It made it a rather more difficult 
607 Saul Newman, ‘Introduction: Re-encountering Stirner’s Ghosts’ 
collected in ‘Max Stirner’ (2011 p. 8). 
608 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 263). 
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than it might otherwise have been to evaluate Stirner’s 
‘ideas’ along strictly theoretical lines. After all, the 
reader or would be critic is not confronted with a 
straightforward doctrine, but an aberrant and 
unpredictable ‘personality’. It is one thing, resorting 
to an extremely simplistic explanation, to criticise 
ideas as either being ‘right’ or ‘wrong’; in the most 
basic sense, they either conform to the theoretical 
system one has set out or not, but it is quite another to 
pass judgement on an apparent ‘personality’, more 
especially when it is said to be unprecedented and 
entirely ‘unique’ and not the least bit inclined to 
advocate anything but passing whims and fancies.  
 
One must be mindful of Stirner’s ‘intentions’ and take 
them, as I have already warned, with a healthy pinch of 
salt. He had an elaborate bag of tricks by his side and 
dipped in and out of it with such expertise that it is 
extremely difficult to appreciate the full extent of his 
trickery. One must first recognise the point Stirner 
wished to prove to the reader and the means by which he 
sought to achieve it. In other words, one must recognise 
the ‘personalism’ of Stirner’s ‘work’ and the great 
lengths he went to to convince the reader of his so 
called ‘reality’.  
 
At its very worst, the ‘Stirner personality’ bordered on 
the unbearable; so much so that one may even empathise, 
to an indescribable degree, with Arghol, a character in 
Wyndham Lewis’ play, ‘The Enemy of the Stars’ (1914), 
who, presumably out of sheer exasperation, hurled ‘The 
Ego and Its Own’ out of his bedroom window.609 That is not 
to say, by any means, that Stirner’s approach was not 
609 See Wyndham Lewis, ‘Blast’, No. 1 (1914 / 1981). 
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without it merits, but it did give ‘The Ego and Its Own’ 
a decidedly playful, if rather contrived and tiresome 
air. 
 
It is sorely tempting to level something D. H. Lawrence 
wrote in Stirner’s direction: ‘A good actor’, Lawrence 
said, ‘can assume a personality: he can never assume an 
individuality’.610 And Stirner’s effusive display did 
little more concoct a ‘personality’ but it fell well 
short of convincing the reader of his individuality.  
 
‘The Ego and Its Own’ is an extremely exhausting work. It 
is alluring as it is repelling and just as Arghol’s copy 
was immediately returned to him, having thrown it out of 
his window, the fundamental gist of ‘The Ego and Its Own’ 
is not so easily dismissed or forgotten. 
 
Stirner actively encouraged individuals to ‘find’ 
whatever they were looking for in themselves rather than 
an adventitious idea. It amounted, I believe, to 
Stirner’s greatest accomplishment. His affected manner 
was brash, even insufferable, but it served a noble aim. 
Stirner was determined to disabuse the intellectual world 
of its fanciful and outlandish ideas. Especially 
dualistic notions which, in his opinion, set an unearthly 
‘spirit’ against the person in whom it resided. The 
‘spirit as such can only be outside of men, beyond the 
human world, not earthly’, as Stirner complained.611 All 
of the turgid ideas bandied round regarding the subject’s 
very being were counterproductive, if not severely 
injurious, Stirner believed. Ultimately, they did little 
but undermine the person himself for the fulfillment of 
610 D. H. Lawrence, ‘Reflections of the Death of a Porcupine and Other 
Essays’ (1925 p. 75). 
611 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 33). 
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some ‘greater’ theoretical objective which had, in a 
personal capacity, little to do with him or anyone else 
in particular. The ‘earthly’ invariably gave way to the 
‘unearthly’. ‘Just recognize yourselves again’, as 
Stirner demanded of us, ‘just recognize what you really 
are, and let go your hypocritical endeavours, your 
foolish mania to be something else than you are’.612 
 
III. THE INVERTED SNOB 
 
We are, at this stage, more than familiar with the 
condescending air of both Schlegel and Schopenhauer’s 
schemes. ‘Only through the relationship to the infinite’, 
as we have heard Schlegel say on numerous occasions, ‘do 
content and utility arise; that which is not related to 
it is merely void and useless’.613 Schopenhauer’s tone was 
no less supercilious: ‘the will alone is real, while its 
objects, on the other hand, as conditioned by knowledge, 
are only phenomena, mere froth and vapour’.614 Given their 
shared predilection for the ‘universal’, the individual 
subject came a poor second best to his ‘inmost essence’. 
He was put alongside an infinite measure and Schlegel and 
Schopenhauer’s inherent bias towards all that was ‘big’ 
and ‘immutable’ worked to his further disadvantage.  
 
The logical conclusion of these upshot of events? The 
individual was obviously ‘insignificant’, but Schlegel 
and Schopenhauer’s assessment took nothing of the 
subject’s personal qualities into account. He was 
‘insignificant’ not because he happened to be a 
612 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 149). 
613 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 149). 
614 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘Parerga and Paralipomena’, Vol. II (1851 / 
1974 p. 270). ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. II (1844 / 
1966 p. 500). 
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particularly daft person, but, in the simplest of terms, 
he was infinitesimal compared to the far larger and more 
durable ‘essence’ within him. What he was like as a 
person did not even enter the fray, it hardly mattered. 
‘But, as he takes’, as Stirner wrote, ‘little heed of 
what you are privatim - indeed, in a strict following out 
of his principle sets no value at all on it - he sees in 
you only what you are generatim’.615  
 
‘Nothing is serious’, if you happen to remember something 
Sénancour said in an earlier chapter, ‘if it be not 
lasting’.616 ‘Let us value lightly’, he said, ‘that which 
perishes quickly’.617 This was exactly the sort of 
attitude that Stirner found so very objectionable. And, 
like Sénancour, neither Schlegel nor Schopenhauer  
displayed much in the way of patience for all that was 
singular, personal and earthly. Their shared enthusiasm 
for all that was ‘eternal’, ‘universal’ and ‘far 
reaching’ had neglected, in Stirner’s opinion, the very 
things that were, so to speak, ‘under their nose’. ‘This 
foreign standpoint’, as Stirner tried to explain, ‘is the 
world of mind, of ideas, thoughts, concepts, essences; it 
is heaven. Heaven is the “standpoint” from which the 
earth is moved, earthly doings surveyed and - 
despised’.618  
 
Stirner did not regard himself in spiritual terms, not 
that he disavowed his spiritual essence, but he was 
simply at a loss to explain why ‘it’, of all his 
qualities, should be singled out as his most definitive 
615 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 155). 
616 Étienne Pivert de Sénancour, ‘Obermann’, Vol. II (1804 / 1901 p. 
185). 
617 Étienne Pivert de Sénancour, ‘Obermann’, Vol. II (1804 / 1901 p. 
187). 
618 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 59). 
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when it reflected so very little of him. It was, by 
comparison, the least expressive of them all. ‘Stirner 
does not deny the existence of external causes’, as John 
Welsh also said. ‘He denies’, he continued to say, ‘their 
legitimacy. He rejects the claim that external causes are 
the absolute source of meaning and allegiance. He rejects 
the claim that external causes are everything and that 
the person is nothing’.619  
 
The ‘world spirit’ belonged as much to Schopenhauer as it 
did to you, me or anyone else for that matter. It hardly 
reflected Stirner’s standing as an individual figure. 
‘The spirit’, as Stirner made explicitly clear, ‘is 
something other than myself’.620 ‘“I” and “spirit”’, he 
wrote elsewhere, ‘are not names for one and the same 
thing, but different names for completely different 
things’.621 The ‘spirit’ was nothing more than a crude 
groupish notion and, as we know, Stirner abhorred all 
forms of collectivism. And the ‘spirit’, in Stirner’s 
opinion, was up there with the worst of them all.  
 
If one raised some objections and complained of the 
contempt Schlegel and Schopenhauer displayed towards 
their respective subjects they would have wholeheartedly 
agreed with Amiel when he wrote: ‘It is rather the sense 
of the absolute and the infinite reducing to their proper 
value and relegating to their proper place the finite and 
the relative’.622 While Amiel accurately describes the 
reasoning behind Schlegel and Schopenhauer’s lowly 
estimation of the subject’s ‘finite’ and ‘relative’ 
619 John F. Welsh, ‘Max Stirner’s Dialectical Egoism. A New 
Interpretation’ (2010 p. 48).  
620 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 35). 
621 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 33). 
622 Henri-Frédéric Amiel, ‘Amiel’s Journal. The Journal Intime of 
Henri-Frédéric Amiel’ (1882 / 1901 p. 159). 
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position compared to his inestimable ‘essence’, it hardly 
begins to reflect Stirner’s opinion. In his particular 
example, the very opposite was true. It was rather a 
case, if one rearranges a few of Amiel’s words, of the 
‘the finite and the relative reducing to their proper 
value and relegating to the proper place the absolute and 
the infinite’. A similar point was made by John P. Clark 
in his slim but no less observant study, ‘Max Stirner’s 
Egoism’ (1976). Clark wrote, ‘instead of the absorption 
of the individual into the Absolute, he proposes a total 
reabsorption of the Absolute (or Spirit in any form) into 
the individual ego, its original creator’.623  
 
In the preceding chapter, you may remember the language 
Schopenhauer employed when he spoke of the finite 
subject; it was extremely dismissive. It was littered 
with ‘merelys’ and ‘onlys’: the individual was ‘merely’ 
this or ‘only’ that. Schlegel was, as we know, no less 
condescending. ‘Everyone’s view of poetry is true and 
good as far as that view itself is poetry’, as Schlegel 
wrote. ‘But since one’s poetry’, as he went on to say, 
‘is limited, just because it is one’s own, so one’s view 
of poetry must of necessity be limited. The mind cannot 
bear this; no doubt because, without knowing it, it 
nevertheless does know that no man is merely man, but 
that at the same time he can and should be genuinely and 
truly all mankind’.624  
 
Not that Stirner was any less ‘guilty’, as it were, but 
his ‘snobbishness’ was of a completely different order. 
Stirner spoke of the ‘infinite’ and ‘universal’ in more 
or less the same supercilious, disdainful tones which 
623 John P. Clark, ‘Max Stirner’s Egoism’ (1976 p. 11). 
624 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms’ 
(1797 - 1800 / 1968 p. 54). 
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Schlegel and Schopenhauer had used to describe the 
subject’s singular state.  
 
We hear, for instance, Stirner complain: ‘“man” is only a 
thought, a generality’.625 Elsewhere we read: ‘Man is 
something only as my quality like masculinity or 
femininity’.626 Again, to cite another example, we come 
across: ‘Man with a capital M is only an ideal, the 
species only something thought of’.627 We read on another 
page: ‘The long and short of it is this: that we are men 
is the slightest thing about us, and has significance 
only in so far as it is one of our qualities, our 
property’.628 And, finally, to round off the rapid  
succession of quotations, we hear Stirner say: ‘I am the 
ego of this my mere quality’.629  
 
The case of the individual against his inimical ‘essence’ 
had to be made and a place for him firmly secured. Not on 
the terms dictated to him by a delitescent ‘power’, but, 
purely and simply, those of his own making. Stirner’s 
express intention was to bring the subject’s ‘essence’ 
down a peg or two; to evaluate ‘it’ in accordance with 
the egocentric needs and peculiarities of the individual 
subject. ‘It is’, as Stirner wrote, ‘egoistic to ascribe 
to no thing a value of its own, an “absolute” value, but 
to seek its value in me’.630 However grandiose his ‘inmost 
nature’ was said to be, Stirner refused to let it 
dominate him. ‘I am not this spirit: it is mine, not I 
its’, as we have heard him say.631  
625 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 275). 
626 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 163). 
627 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 163 - 164). 
628 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 156 - 157). 
629 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 159). 
630 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 152). 
631 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 157). 
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Stirner saw no better way to redress the balance than 
come up with a ‘counter man’ whom he called the ‘un-man’. 
He was, to jog your memory, the complete opposite of both 
Schlegel’s ‘poet’ and Schopenhauer’s ‘knowing subject’. 
‘To say in blunt words what an un-man is’, as Stirner 
explained, ‘is not particularly hard: it is a man who 
does not correspond to the concept man’.632 In stark 
contrast to Schlegel and Schopenhauer, Stirner extolled 
the very virtues they dismissed and belittled in a 
determined effort to square up the account. The subject’s 
ephemeral, singular bodily state was not so readily 
dismissed and his ‘essence’ not nearly as ‘monumental’ or 
definitive as one had been led to believe, not compared 
to the ‘might’ of Stirner’s ‘ego’. 
 
Stirner went on the offensive. He took immediate 
‘possession’ of whatever ‘universal’ essence that was 
said to lurk about inside him and relegated ‘it’ -  for 
it was nothing but an impersonal ‘it’, to its ‘proper’ 
place (even if he stood on an upturned and rather 
unsteady box to do so). Having gained a few ‘extra 
inches’, as it were, Stirner ‘peered down’ on the 
‘universal’ and the like just as Schlegel and 
Schopenhauer had done with the ‘finite’ and ‘singular’. 
 
‘But do I still remain an un-man’, as Stirner asked with 
his tongue firmly in his cheek, ‘even if I bring man (who 
towered above me and remained other-worldly to me only as 
my ideal, my task, my essence or concept) down to be my 
quality, my own and inherent in me; so that man is 
nothing else than my humanity, my human existence, and 
everything that I do is human precisely because I do it, 
632 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 159). 
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but not because it corresponds to the concept “man”?’.633 
The answer was, of course, in the affirmative. The ‘un-
man’ did not allow himself to be possessed by his 
‘essence’; instead, he brought ‘it’ down to his level - 
the ground floor, in order to ‘possess’ it and exert his 
dominance over it. 
 
The tables had turned.  
 
Stirner referred to himself, rather antagonistically, as 
‘the transitory, individual ego’; I say 
‘antagonistically’ as he knew full well it was not 
customary to prize the individual in and of himself, let 
alone go about the business of actively celebrating his 
singularity. More especially, when the ‘virtues’ of the 
‘eternal’ and ‘universal’ had not simply been ignored but 
considered and flatly rejected in favour of all that was 
egocentric, ephemeral and singular. It was an extremely 
antagonistic and contrary position to adopt.  
 
Schopenhauer, for one, would have taken the bait and 
retaliated. The individual was little more in the grand 
scheme of things, as the philosopher would have pointed 
out to Stirner, than ‘mere foam and froth’ as he put it. 
It was certainly no cause for celebration. Stirner would 
not have necessarily disagreed with Schopenhauer, but he 
took, as one might expect, quite another line of 
argument.634  
 
If Stirner amounted to little more than ‘foam and froth’ 
then so be it. It would, in that case, be his defining 
‘foam and froth’, just so long as Schopenhauer’s gibe 
633 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 159). 
634 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 163). 
 313 
                                                 
pertained solely to him. It would, at the very least, 
reflect his own ‘deficient might’, his own ‘impotence’ 
and not one ‘limited by the might outside’ of him.635 
Stirner made a great deal of his weaknesses and 
deficiencies; they were all good and well, but only on 
the strict proviso they faithfully reflected his own 
‘foibles’ and not those imposed on him by anything or 
anyone other than himself. ‘My human act’, as he said, 
‘is diverse from every other human act’, as Stirner 
affirmed, ‘and only by this diversity is it a real act 
belonging to me’. Stirner was certainly not going to be 
made to feel inadequate or diminutive by the sharp and 
unsavoury methods practiced by the likes of Schopenhauer, 
Schlegel and Amiel, all of whom employed, as we have 
heard, an ‘infinite measure’ to crudely assess an 
individual’s comparative worth.   
 
‘It is possible that I can make very little out of 
myself’, as Stirner admitted, ‘but this little is 
everything, and is better than what I allow to be made 
out of me by the might of others’.636 Even Stirner’s 
‘beggarly’ state was significantly greater than anything 
‘imparted’ to him by a third party. ‘What is imparted’, 
as Stirner made quite clear, ‘is alien to us, is not our 
own’.637 Even the ‘universal’ and the ‘infinite’ paled by 
comparison. They did not, after all, appertain to the 
subject’s determinate, individual person but his 
‘essence’ which was something else entirely. ‘For me’, as 
Stirner maintained, ‘there is no truth, for nothing is 
more than I! Not even my essence, not even the essence of 
man, is more than I, above me, this “drop in the bucket”, 
635 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 189). 
636 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 163 - 164). 
637 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 62). 
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this “insignificant man”!’.638 If Stirner was 
‘insignificant’, he would be ‘insignificant’ on his own 
terms; he would ‘form himself according to his own will’ 
not one prescribed to him by a hospitable or inhospitable 
force of nature as Schlegel and Schopenhauer had done.639  
 
IV. THE MISCONSTRUED PERFORMANCE 
 
Stirner’s uncustomary ‘technique’ has received, as one 
might expect, a mixed reception. In certain instances, it 
has been unfair, whilst in others, it has been extremely 
unkind. Stirner’s ‘performance’ has almost certainly been 
misunderstood. 
 
Take R. W. K. Paterson’s ‘The Nihilistic Egoist’ (1971), 
for example. ‘Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum is 
arguably’, as Peterson imagined, ‘the most complete and 
uncompromising of all nihilist manifestos. Seldom if ever 
have the world-view of nihilism and the existential 
posture of the nihilistic individual been depicted in 
such convincing detail and with such disturbing 
candour’.640 Paterson argued that ‘The Ego and Its Own’ 
was a ‘private play’, a work of ‘autobiographical 
fiction’.641 Stirner was playing a ‘role’, Paterson 
suggested, namely that of the ‘nihilistic egoist’ and 
largely invalidated any claims to validity ‘The Ego and 
Its Own’ might otherwise have had.  
 
It was an entirely indulgent and ‘nihilistic’ project, 
Patterson continued. ‘Perhaps indeed the answer’, as he 
pontificated, ‘is that we are not intended to take 
638 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 313). 
639 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 163 - 164). 
640 R. W. K. Paterson, ‘The Nihilistic Egoist’ (1971 p. 252). 
641 R. W. K. Paterson, ‘The Nihilistic Egoist’ (1971 p. 302). 
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Stirner’s philosophy “seriously”. In Der Einzige Stirner 
celebrates frivolity, irresponsibility, scepticism, and 
irreverence towards all things, and he does not seek to 
exempt himself from the eruption of absurdity over which 
he presides. Perhaps The Unique One implicitly 
acknowledges that, since all things are absurd, his own 
philosophy of the Absurd is equally an absurdity’.642  
 
Paterson was by no means an unobservant critic. He was 
astute enough to recognise ‘The Ego and Its Own’ as a 
‘private play’, as he called it, but he was clearly left 
more than a little confused by Stirner’s ‘performance’. 
Not that Paterson was alone. Stirner was evidently 
playing some sort of a ‘role’, but certainly not the one 
Patterson earmarked for him. Needless to say, I do not 
share his assessment of Max Stirner as a ‘nihilist’, 
‘absurd’ or otherwise. Nothing could be further from the 
truth, as I intend to explain.  
 
Paterson was the not only critic who held a derogatory 
opinion of ‘The Ego and Its Own’. If we turn to Stephen 
Lukes, his estimation of Stirner’s work was no less 
disparaging and, again, it hinged, to some extent, on a 
misinterpretation of Stirner’s ‘performance’. ‘The German 
idea of individuality’, Lukes wrote, ‘has had a 
remarkable history. Having begun as a cult of individual 
genius and originality, especially as applied to the 
artist, stressing the conflict between individual and 
society and the supreme value of subjectivity, solitude, 
and introspection, it developed along various lines. In 
one direction, it led to an uninhibited quest for 
eccentricity and to the purest egoism and social 
nihilism. This development found perhaps its most extreme 
642 R. W. K. Paterson, ‘The Nihilistic Egoist’ (1971 p. 298). 
 316 
                                                 
expression in the thought of Max Stirner, whose 
“individualism” amounted to an amoral and anti-
intellectualistic vision’.643  
 
Lukes was, in certain respects, quite correct. Stirner’s 
‘ego’ was, if nothing else, unquestionably ‘uninhibited’;  
it knew no bounds and transgressed all conventions, as 
Stirner was keen to remind us, but rather than address it 
here, I prefer to cut myself short and return to the 
troublesome matter of Stirner’s ‘ego’ at a subsequent 
stage of the chapter.  
 
Stirner’s ‘quest’, to return your attention to Lukes’ 
contribution, was, in all likelihood, an ‘eccentric’ one 
(even if his ‘eccentricity’ was somewhat forced). Not 
that it was entirely unwarranted, as I previously 
explained. A point, nonetheless, apparently lost on both 
Lukes and Paterson, neither of whom, I believe, fully 
appreciated, indeed misconstrued the very point of 
Stirner’s vagarious ‘display’. Lukes was no less 
justified than Paterson to think of Stirner as an ‘anti-
intellectual’ who advocated, of all things, ‘social 
nihilism’. Once again, nothing could be further from the 
truth.  
 
Stirner was neither a ‘nihilist’ nor an ‘anti-
intellectual’. These were, I believe, the very tendencies 
Stirner sought to extirpate in ‘The Ego and Its Own’. Let 
me begin by addressing the first point of contention: 
Stirner’s so called ‘nihilism’. 
 
Rather than being a ‘nihilist’ as Paterson, in 
particular, seemed at pains to point out, among other 
643 Steven Lukes, ‘The Meanings of “Individualism”’ (1971 p. 55). 
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outrageous things, in his decidedly prejudicial study, 
Stirner strikes me as being anything but ‘nihilistic’. 
The opposite, seems to me, to have been much closer to 
the truth. ‘The dark pessimism, the hesitancy of Will, 
and the disaffection with life symptomatic of the 
nihilist are not’, as John Carroll quite rightly said, 
‘to be found in Stirner – rather the contrary’.644 ‘The 
Ego and Its Own’ was characterised by a spirit of 
affirmation rather than anything else.  
 
Schopenhauer’s scheme, if truth be told, had a far more 
‘nihilistic’ feel to it. After all, the philosopher 
vehemently objected to nothing other than the very 
grounds of life itself, the will-to-live and, as we know, 
saw better, regardless of the capital drawback, not to 
affirm it but extricate himself from its despotic 
influence once and for all. 
 
Schopenhauer’s ronunciative doctrine constitutes a 
perfect foil to the affirmative tones of ‘The Ego and Its 
Own’. In the most fundamental sense, Schopenhauer was 
inimical to life whereas Stirner was its advocate and 
staunchly rebuked all that opposed it. Stirner would not 
have been the least bit sympathetic to the measures, 
fatal as they were, Schopenhauer took to ‘liberate’ 
himself, theoretically speaking, from nature’s will. It 
was tantamount to submission and, regardless of the 
philosopher’s insistence to the contrary, his doctrine 
eventually got the better of him. Schopenhauer’s idea 
triumphed, not the ‘subject of knowledge’; he forsook, 
after all, his very hold on life, to gain his reputed 
‘triumph’. What, then, was left of Schopenhauer’s 
644 John Carroll, ‘Break-Out from the Crystal Palace. The anarcho-
psychological critique: Stirner, Nietzsche, Dostoevsky’ ((1974 p. 
108). 
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subject? A naught, a plain and stark zero. 
 
That Schopenhauer found no other solution than deny his 
very existence to escape his own theoretical system was 
not a method Stirner would have even considered, let 
alone advocated. Schopenhauer’s example illustrated 
precisely the sort of perversion of values – ‘nihilism’ 
if you will, of which Stirner reproved. The fact that 
Schopenhauer brought it all on himself would have 
provoked Stirner’s further castigation and ridicule. 
  
We are faced with something of an odd position. 
Schopenhauer objected to nature’s will just as Stirner 
would indubitably have done, but the two objected to it 
for an entirely different set of reasons. Schopenhauer 
saw the world as a seething, deterministic expression of 
will. It was an incontestable truth. The resultant turn 
of events meant the philosopher dismissed all that was 
palpable, demonstrable and earthly as an insubstantial, 
nightmarish illusion. It was all the doing of an 
invisible, malevolent and incomprehensible force of 
nature, but a great deal of damage had been done along 
the way.  
 
The senses had been warped, standard values amounted to 
nothing, as did one’s volition and the world had been 
turned upside down and inside out. The ‘real’ was 
transformed into the ‘unreal’ and vice versa. It 
heralded, as I believe Stirner would have said of 
Schopenhauer’s doctrine, a ‘reversing and deranging of 
the world, a busying with the essence of the world, 
therefore a madness’.645 One was not even sure of oneself 
in the ensuing ‘madness’. In fact, if Schopenhauer was to 
645 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 299 - 300). 
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be believed, one was nothing more than one’s own inborn 
enemy. Given the situation, one was best advised to hatch 
one’s escape and take evasive action as quickly as 
possible. To vacate, in other words, the contested 
grounds of self for the ‘safe haven’ of non-self where 
one would assuredly feel ‘nothing’.  
 
Stirner, on the other hand, would have objected to 
Schopenhauer’s doctrine of will on the grounds that it 
was little more than a suppositious idea and a decidedly 
pernicious one at that. Stirner, as I previously 
explained, recognised the folly of defending ideas if 
they did not suit or reflect his immediate needs. 
‘Stirner begins’, as Welsh said, ‘with the assertion that 
the person’s values, perspectives, and interests are more 
important than the assertions and demands by the external 
agents or “causes”. He vows to fight external demands and 
redefine his life as his own cause’.646 And Stirner could 
have easily done without a world will on his shoulders, 
rather down below, plaguing him with the sum total of its 
desires if they were not strictly attuned to his own. 
 
Stirner implored people to think for themselves; it was, 
by far, the most pressing demand he made of them, as I 
have maintained. It may well have been, I readily admit, 
of the ‘make what you will with it’ variety but, like 
almost anything, Stirner’s advice could and can be put to 
destructive as well as constructive ends. It all depends, 
of course, on one’s particular egocentric wishes - the 
very thing Stirner encouraged the reader to prioritise in 
the first place. ‘This radical denial, the final demonic 
Nay-saying’, as Stepelevich similarly observed, ‘can 
646 John F. Welsh, ‘Max Stirner’s Dialectical Egoism. A New 
Interpretation’ (2010 p. 46).  
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stand as either a beginning or an end’.647 I certainly 
prefer to regard Stirner’s ‘nay-saying’ in a positive 
light, as a ‘beginning’ in other words, rather than 
representing anything so gloomy or ‘nihilistic’, for want 
of a better expression, as an ‘end’.  
 
Stirner attempted to confront the ‘nihilistic’ tendencies 
that appeared to characterise his times. None more so, I 
believe, than those promoted by the likes of Arthur 
Schopenhauer. 
 
Let us, for example, compare the beginning of ‘The Ego 
and Its Own’ with the very last words of Arthur 
Schopenhauer’s definitive work, ‘The World as Will and 
Representation’.  
 
1). Stirner begins: ‘all things are nothing to me’.648 His 
opening words were, by the way, taken from the first line 
of Goethe’s poem, ‘Vanitas! Vanitatum vanitas!’.  
 
2). Schopenhauer ends: ‘to those in whom the will has 
turned and denied itself, this very real world of ours 
with all it suns and galaxies, is – nothing’.649 
 
Both writers, it seems, had a ‘nothing’ on their hands, 
so to speak. But Stirner’s ‘nothing’ was considerably 
more affirmative than Schopenhauer’s ‘nothing’. Stirner 
started off with a ‘nothing’ and ended up with a 
‘something’, himself. Whereas Schopenhauer started off 
with a ‘something’, himself, and ended up with a 
647 Lawrence S. Stepelevich, ‘The Revival of Max Stirner’ (1974 p. 
328). 
648 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 5). 
649 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 412).  
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‘nothing’ at all.  
 
Stirner immediately came to his ‘nothing’ by adjudging 
the world, from the very beginning, according to his own 
sensibilities and ended up affirming them in spite of 
every trial and tribulation that conspired to thwart him. 
Schopenhauer, in stark contrast, eventually arrived at 
his ‘nothing’, on the four hundred and twelfth page of  
his philosophical work, by giving in to all that impeded 
his needs, futile as they were, for the sake of peace and 
quiet -  a release, in other words, from nothing other 
than life and, ultimately, himself.  
 
The fruition of the later, compared to that of former, 
was considerably more affirmative. Rather than provoking 
a fight with himself and sacrificing his own head to 
reach his objective, as Schopenhauer was clearly intent 
on doing, Stirner came to the same conclusion by openly 
affirming, rather than claiming to ‘deny’ himself, his 
bodily self. Stirner wished to embrace life as well as 
himself whereas Schopenhauer longed to rid himself of the 
dratted two, baneful as they were. ‘Stirner’s reference 
to Goethe’s poem is not’, as John Welsh corroborated, ‘a 
capitulation to nihilistic despair, but an affirmation 
that individual fulfillment cannot be found in external 
causes where meaning, values, and ideals are imposed on 
the person’.650 
 
‘Well, the world is “empty”, is “naught”’, as Stirner 
complained, ‘is only dazzling “semblance”’.651 But rather 
than celebrate the grim state of affairs, Stirner 
fiercely opposed it. The ‘naught’, on this occasion, was 
650 John F. Welsh, ‘Max Stirner’s Dialectical Egoism. A New 
Interpretation’ (2010 p. 47).  
651 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 36). 
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not worthy of celebration; it described the wholly 
reductive influence of the world spirit (nature’s will) 
on nothing other than the world itself. The spirit or 
will, whatever one prefers to call ‘it’, had ‘degraded’ 
the world to little more than a manifest image of 
something infinitely more important, namely itself (just 
as Schopenhauer had done). And its needs inexplicably 
supplanted people’s own; they were ‘trivial’ by 
comparison and not to be encouraged, let alone pursued in 
and of themselves. The advantage lay with the universal 
concept. 
 
‘The outer world of things’, referring to a particularly 
perceptive passage by Bertram M. Laing, ‘is degraded by 
comparing it with the inner real world of will. Why the 
will should have this superior significance attached to 
it is left unjustified... The fact that the will is one 
and undivided or that unity alone is applicable to it 
while multiplicity is found in the world of things does 
not testify to any superiority of the will... And, 
further, if the relation between the thing-in-itself and 
the external world is what is expressed as 
objectification, the difficulty is to see why the “inner” 
should be real and its objectification an illusion’.652 
 
This, I believe, was precisely the point Stirner wished 
to make. Why, as Laing asked, should the world’s essence, 
the ‘inner’ as he called it, be ‘real’ while its 
‘objectification’, life itself, written off as a mere 
‘illusion’? If the world was nothing but a reflection of 
will why was it any less veracious? On what grounds? What 
actual credence did the world spirit have in any case? 
Why should it take precedence over him? Everything about 
652 Bertram M. Laing, ‘Schopenhauer and Individuality’ (1917 p. 182). 
 323 
                                                 
it, after all, was counterintuitive and, ultimately, did 
untold harm. Was it really worth ‘deranging’ the world, 
emptying it of all its apparent value, to suit its needs? 
Ultimately, it was a ruinous way to think, Stirner 
believed. ‘By bringing the essence into prominence’, as 
Stirner warned, ‘one degrades the hitherto misapprehended 
appearance to a bare semblance, a deception’.653 And 
Stirner, quite rightly, rebuked such notions for they did 
little more than reduce the individual, indeed 
everything, to an ‘illusion’. Man, in turn, had been 
transformed into little more than a ‘spook’.654  
 
Stirner’s attempt to liberate ‘man the person’ from ‘man 
the generic concept’ runs quite contrary to anything 
remotely resembling, to use Paterson’s expression, a 
‘nihilist manifesto’.655 Stirner aspired to deliver his 
subject, the ‘un-man’, from ‘all wrappings’ and all 
‘cramping shells’ by encouraging him to think for himself 
and value things according to his own sensibilities 
rather those imposed on him by a largely suppositious 
power that was said to menace about ‘within’ him. It was, 
to reiterate the point, the most insistent drive of ‘The 
Ego and Its Own’. ‘Therefore’, as Stirner implored, ‘turn 
to yourselves rather than to your gods or idols. Bring 
out from yourselves what is in you, bring it to the 
light, bring yourselves to revelation’.656 It can hardly 
be described, by any stretch of the imagination, as being 
the least bit ‘nihilistic’. ‘Der Einzige und Sein 
Eigentum’, as Scott Klein corroborated, ‘asserts the 
truth of the self, and attempts to establish its 
653 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 40). 
654 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 247). 
655 R. W. K. Paterson, ‘The Nihilistic Egoist: Max Stirner’ (1971 p. 
252). 
656 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 146). 
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independence from society’s falsehoods and the 
limitations of the real by declaring that the self is 
all-sufficient, its own master and owner’.657  
 
Let us now turn to the second point of contention, 
Stirner’s reputed ‘anti-intellectualism’.  
 
True, Stirner objected to the ‘world of mind’, as he 
derisively referred to it, but his antipathy towards the 
said ‘world’ was not that of the willful idiot or 
unprincipled degenerate, far from it. 658 The ‘world of 
mind’ had, in Stirner’s eyes, been transmogrified. It no 
longer pertained to that which was ‘real’ or meaningful 
but that which was ‘unreal’ and meaningless.  
 
The intellectual world exerted a pernicious influence 
over life itself; so much so, it ran in stark opposition 
to it. ‘Only this inverted world, the world of essences, 
truly exists now’, as Stirner complained.659 Had Stirner 
been familiar with ‘The World as Will and 
Representation’, he would, without question I believe, 
have considered Schopenhauer’s doctrine among the most 
demeaning of them all. ‘Everything that appears to you is 
only the phantasm of an indwelling spirit, is a ghostly 
“apparition”’, Stirner may well have said, ‘the world is 
to you only a “world of appearances”, behind which the 
spirit walks’.660  
 
It comes as little surprise that Stirner lampooned the 
notion of ‘essences’, wills and ‘what-ever-nots’ to the 
657 Scott Klein, ‘The Experiment of Vorticist Drama: Wyndham Lewis and 
“Enemy of the Stars”’ (1991 p. 230). 
658 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 59). 
659 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 41). 
660 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 36). 
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extent he did; the very suggestion that he was little 
more, with Schopenhauer in mind, than a spectral image of 
nature’s will ran in absolute contradiction to 
intellectual sensibilities, senses and egocentric 
instincts. It demeaned that which was terrene, singular 
and demonstrable - everything Stirner considered his 
‘own’ in favour of all that was ghoulish, invisible, 
mysterious and, ultimately, unknowable. ‘We are surface-
creatures’, as Wyndham Lewis might have consoled Stirner, 
‘and the “truths” from beneath the surface contradict our 
values’.661  
 
And in tune with Lewis’ sentiments, Stirner actively set 
out to ‘displace the authority of essences and stress the 
primacy of the I’.662 He exposed, as best he could, the 
‘world of mind’ for the thoroughly fraudulent, specious 
and deprivative ‘world’ it was, in the hope that 
something more personal, meaningful and celebratory might 
arise out of ‘its’ inky black shadow. ‘“Egoism”’, as 
Stirner affirmed, ‘calls you to joy over yourselves, to 
self-enjoyment’.663 And Stirner set out to undermine all 
that inhibited an individual’s ability to do just that.  
 
‘The Ego and Its Own’ was certainly not the project, as 
Paterson and Lukes maintained, of a ‘nihilistic’ or 
‘anti-intellectual’ figure; it was, rather, a tirade 
against the misappropriation of ideas. Stirner objected, 
not without good reason, to the grave dangers of 
philosophising. He was not inimical to the ‘intellect’ 
but sharply attuned to the destructive ends to which, if 
661 Wyndham Lewis, ‘Time and Western Man’ (1927 p. 402). 
662 John Carroll, ‘Break-Out from the Crystal Palace. The anarcho-
psychological critique: Stirner, Nietzsche, Dostoevsky’ ((1974 p. 
39). 
663 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 148). 
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one was not careful, it could be directed. 
 
The intellectual world, Stirner feared, was in the grip 
of abstract thought and it had done little but distort 
and falsify everything. With, above all else, the 
immediate effect of estranging himself from himself, as 
it were. His essence presided over his presence. That was 
what he had been asked to believe. Stirner, for one, was 
certainly not willing to entertain the prospect for a 
single second. It undermined his person to the advantage 
of an idea. 
 
Stirner led by example. He had liberated himself, so he 
claimed, from theoretical conjecture – ‘exorcised the so 
called spook’ and implored others to follow suit, in the 
hope that ideas, once again, served people rather than 
plot and conspire against them. Only when individuals, 
fellow ‘egoists’, followed his example and realised for 
themselves the ‘alien’ nature of the ends they served as 
well as the sheer hostility and contempt with which they 
were treated in return, would they be able to say, along 
with him, that all of these derisory and meagerly ‘ideas’ 
were ‘nothing to them’.  
 
I would like, returning your attention to ‘The Nihilistic 
Egoist’, to take the opportunity to bring Paterson to 
task on another issue. He said, as we will hear on the 
following page or so, some very unkind and unwarranted 
things about Max Stirner. His grounds for doing so were 
entirely unjustified as he failed to appreciate, 
completely misunderstood even, Stirner’s basic 
intentions. Paterson made Stirner something of a 
scapegoat to cover up his own shortcomings.  
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‘It might well seem’, Paterson said of Stirner, ‘that, in 
his perverse insistence on utter privacy, his explicit 
repudiation of objective rational procedures, and his 
arrogant indifference to the standard meanings of the 
concepts he employs, he has in effect destroyed any 
claims to general validity, or even to general interest, 
which his metaphysical system might otherwise have 
enjoyed’.  
 
Paterson repeatedly missed the point on several counts. 
In the first place, I doubt very much whether one can 
consider ‘The Ego and Its Own’ as representing anything 
as cohesive as a ‘system’. It is far more insightful to 
regard Stirner’s work as a playful and provocatively 
individualistic critique of ‘systematic’ constructs. 
After all, Stirner went to an enormous lengths to present 
himself to the reader rather than a rigid theoretical 
scheme. Stirner’s ‘performance’ obviously confused and 
alarmed Paterson in equal measure.  
 
As for Stirner’s ‘arrogant indifference’, as Paterson 
described it, to ‘standard meanings’ it was not, as I 
have explained, entirely unjustified. Not that I would 
have chosen to describe Stirner’s attitude as apathetic; 
it was, in contrast, antipathetic. Stirner objected, by 
means of an example, to one ‘standard’ term in popular 
currency in his times, ‘man’. Why? For the following 
reason: ‘man’, of all things, should not be regarded as a 
uniform term; it had no ‘standard’ meaning, after all. 
People were not an immutable whole but a collection of 
conflicting individual egos; the term not only failed to 
reflect what it purported to represent, but turned 
against the very individuals who constituted it. It 
engendered ‘a theoretical interest, namely, an interest 
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not for an individual or individuals (‘all’), but for the 
idea, for man!’.664 ‘Standard’ terms, then, had to be 
questioned, contested if necessary, if they were to 
remain meaningful. It accounts for Stirner’s ‘unmanning 
of man’, as I described it elsewhere.  
 
‘The Ego and Its Own’ certainly was not the work of a 
metaphysician. Stirner’s impatience with all that was 
abstracted, lofty and spiritual, not to mention the 
emphatic importance he placed on his own determinate 
bodily state would suggest otherwise.665 ‘‘Does not the 
spirit thirst for freedom?’”, as Stirner asked. ‘Alas, 
not my spirit alone’, he replied, ‘but my body too 
thirsts for it hourly’. ‘The Ego and Its Own’ was 
anything but a ‘metaphysical system’. Although he wished 
to make an entirely different point, John Carroll made a 
similar observation. ‘Stirner anticipates existentialist 
philosophy’, Carroll said, ‘in the emphasis he places on 
concrete, lived and living, experience, in his sustained 
critique of religious, moral and metaphysical ideals, and 
above all in the stress he places upon the self’.666  
 
In the same breath, I doubt the very last thing Stirner 
would have been eager to endorse was any sort of claim to 
‘general validity’. That was precisely the sort of 
insipid and erroneous ‘half-measure’ Stirner implored the 
reader to reject. ‘General laws...’, if one turns to page 
95 of ‘The Ego and Its Own’, ‘puts the individual man in 
irons by the thought of humanity’.667 Elsewhere, he 
664 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 113).  
665 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 141). 
666 John Carroll, ‘Break-Out from the Crystal Palace. The anarcho-
psychological critique: Stirner, Nietzsche, Dostoevsky’ ((1974 p. 
43). 
667 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 95). 
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complained: ‘Man is man in general’.668 ‘The state’, as 
Stirner wrote on another page, ‘always has the sole 
purpose to limit, tame, subordinate, the individual - to 
make him subject to some generality or other; it lasts 
only so long as the individual is not all in all, and it 
is only the clearly-marked restriction of me, my 
limitation, my slavery’.669 To think in ‘general terms’ 
was no doubt a convenient thing to do but it did untold 
harm to all that was anomalous and defied categorisation, 
namely the Stirner ‘personality’ itself. It was a lumpish 
way to think. Stirner’s was not a ‘general interest’, but 
a very specific interest and he was not the least bit 
willing to receive conventional ‘wisdom’ if it conflicted 
with his own. 
 
‘The Ego and Its Own’ was a critique of all generic 
notions by a writer who sought to singularise himself 
first in name (the ‘de-Schmidting’ of Schmidt), then in 
deed (the ebullient Stirner ‘performance’). He was not 
the least bit concerned with ‘common pools’, but the 
‘unique’ individual. The ‘Stirner role’ may well have 
overblown, contrived, even ‘arrogant’ as Paterson said, 
but it was intended, I believe, to serve an admirable and 
constructive purpose. Stirner’s objective was not, to 
belabour the point, the least bit ‘nihilistic’ nor, for 
that matter, was he dead set against ‘the intellect’; he 
actively encouraged one to use nothing but one’s 
intellectual faculties to counteract the deadening 
generalisations abound in philosophical circles.  
 
It is not necessarily ‘essential’ but certainly helpful, 
in this respect, to consider ‘The Ego and Its Own’ in a 
668 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 162). 
669 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 201). 
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comparative sense. To familiarise oneself with the likes 
of Schopenhauer, Schlegel, Amiel et al brings out certain 
qualities in Stirner’s work that might otherwise be lost, 
misconstrued or unappreciated. Those acquainted with the 
work of the aforementioned figures may well be better 
placed to appreciate the reasoning behind Stirner’s 
‘performance’ and more sympathetic to the point he wished 
to make. 
 
The ‘Stirner personality’ was an intentional counterpoint 
to all theoretical schemes which betrayed an alarming 
absence of their ‘masters’ (the vacant ‘The Dialogue on 
Poetry’, to name one). ‘The Ego and Its Own’ depicted the 
presence of the ‘Stirner personality’ in all its 
vicissitudes and it flew in the face of all the 
dispersonating, immutable and lifeless schemes which 
preceded his own. ‘I write’, Stirner declared, ‘because I 
want to procure for my thoughts an existence in the 
world’.670 And ‘The Ego and Its Own’ was a means by which 
Stirner did just that. He was extant and present between 
its covers, at least, it was the impression Stirner was 
eager to create.  
 
One need only cast one’s mind back to Friedrich Schlegel 
to appreciate Stirner’s divergence from, for want of a 
better expression, the ‘romantic norm’. Schlegel saw 
better of ‘presence’, as it were; his ‘gestatory’ vision 
placed unparalleled importance on that which had yet to 
come into existence. Absence, in Schlegel’s opinion, 
intimated something far grander, incalculably more 
profound than anything that was immediately present.  
 
All this was, I believe, lost on Paterson, but he had, as 
670 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 263). 
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it turns out, quite another agenda on his hands. ‘A case 
might well be made, then’, as he imagined, ‘that the 
self-absorption, the destructiveness, and the negativism 
advocated and practiced in Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum 
represent the conceptual expression of the paranoid 
schizophrenia suffered by the philosopher who was at once 
the book’s author and its subject’.671 Wyndham Lewis made 
a similar, if more general point in ‘Paleface’ (1929) 
that may well have appealed to the suppositious clinical 
practices favoured by Paterson: ‘Yet there are still a 
great number of just the same sort of physical romantics, 
as they might be classified. But usually we find them a 
little apologetic and uneasy or full of an epileptic 
movement and borrowing more and more from madness to 
substantiate their dream’.672  
 
Stirner obviously intended, paraphrasing Lewis, to 
‘substantiate’ something, but it was not, in his mind, a 
‘dream’ but a palpable ‘reality’. Whether Stirner 
‘borrowed’ anything from ‘madness’ is anyone’s guess and, 
frankly, barely worthy of speculation. Whether Stirner 
was ‘mad’ or not is irrelevant and of absolutely no 
consequence; it fails to contribute a single insightful 
or constructive point to the debate concerning ‘The Ego 
and Its Own’ other than highlight Paterson‘s desperation 
to undermine Stirner by any means. That its author was 
its subject hardly warrants such severe and mean 
criticism. If one were to take Paterson’s lead, the 
entire history of European and Russian literature would, 
in all likelihood, be nothing but a lengthy case study in 
schizophrenia. One need only think of Dostoevsky’s ‘The 
Double’ (18**), Lagerkvist’s ‘The Dwarf’ (194*) or Knut 
671 R. W. K. Paterson, ‘The Nihilistic Egoist’ (1971 p. 18). 
672 Wyndham Lewis, ‘Paleface. The Philosophy of the “Melting-Pot”’ 
(1929 p. 151). 
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Hamsun’s ‘Mysteries’ (189*), all of which ‘tackle’ the 
theme of duplicity and ‘doubledom’ but that is not to say 
that any of the authors were necessarily ‘schizophrenic’.  
 
‘His study’, as John Welsh said of Paterson’s, ‘is 
founded on a judgment of Stirner’s insanity, but seeks to 
establish the psychological character of Stirner through 
an analysis of his writings’.673 But even if one turns to 
‘The Ego and Its Own’ in search of evidence of Stirner’s 
so called ‘schizophrenia’ one will derive scant return.  
 
Stirner cared little for dualism. His intention was to 
bring the ‘whole man’ to light, not set one half of 
himself (the ‘essence’) against the other (the bodily 
person). ‘Can we put up with this’, turning to Stirner 
for corroboration, ‘that “our essence” is brought into 
opposition to us, that we are split into an essential and 
un-essential self? Do we not with that go back into the 
dreary misery of seeing ourselves banished out of 
ourselves?’.674 And, ‘it is only when a man hears his 
flesh along with the rest of him’, as Stirner maintained 
on another page, ‘that he hears himself wholly, and it is 
only when he wholly hears himself that he is a hearing or 
rational being’.675 Again, Paterson missed the point 
Stirner intended to demonstrate.   
 
Stirner vehemently objected to the ‘splitting in two’ of 
the subject, more especially when the definitive side of 
him, his ‘personality’ and the like, lost out to an 
impersonal idea. The subject had been envisaged in an 
wholly disproportional way, Stirner believed. The subject 
673 John F. Welsh, ‘Max Stirner’s Dialectical Egoism. A New 
Interpretation’ (2010 p. 34).  
674 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 33 - 34). 
675 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 60). 
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was at odds with himself – his ‘inmost’ nature, 
monumental as it was, overshadowed the individual in whom 
it resided and he, the subject, duly gave way to it, the 
essence, on account of its universalism at a detrimental 
cost to himself. The essence, as I have argued, had taken 
precedence over the man.  
 
Stirner wished to reevaluate the whole question of 
‘subjecthood’ in the hope of bringing the wayward essence 
back in line with the person. It no longer opposed him, 
but took its rightful lead from him, not the other way 
round. Stirner wished to reconcile the two sides of the 
subject, his ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ self, in the optimistic 
hope the two could ‘get along’ and reach a more 
harmonious agreement to the benefit of the entire person. 
Stirner may well have been solipsistic - a far stronger 
case may well be made on that front, but if one searches 
‘The Ego and Its Own’ for further proof of psychiatric 
disorder, namely that of a ‘schizophrenic’ nature, one 
will come up short. Stirner did not care in the least for 
the ‘fragmentary subject’, he staunchly opposed such 
notions; he wished to reconvene the man with the essence, 
but only on the condition that the man, not the essence, 
had the ultimate say in his affairs. 
 
And in any case, to jump to Stirner’s defence as I feel 
obliged to do, one thing is almost certainly true: ‘The 
Ego and Its Own’ is not nearly as outlandish as some of 
claims made in the course of ‘The World as Will and 
Representation’ or ‘The Dialogue on Poetry’. If I 
happened to be in the business of ‘quackery’, I would 
certainly be far more dubious of Schopenhauer and 
Schlegel’s pathological state. Observations of the two, 
bearing in mind what we have heard in previous chapters, 
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would certainly suggest they were prone to fantastical 
beliefs and displayed, from a ‘clinical perspective’, a  
number of significant delusional tendencies. The latter, 
Schopenhauer, believed everything around him was an all 
out illusion of an elemental force of nature which was 
out to get him while the former, Schlegel, believed it 
was simply a reflection his own inestimable beauty. 
 
If one takes Paterson’s line of argument one could 
surmise that Schopenhauer had a pronounced inferiority 
complex and displayed, along the way, many more schizoid 
tendencies than Stirner. Schopenhauer had not only 
‘doubled’ but his ‘top half’ (his brain) battled it out 
with his occupied ‘bottom half’ (his blasted testicles) 
to gain supremacy over the entire war torn philosopher. 
As for Schlegel, he was nothing more, on the same 
grounds, than an alarming narcissist.  
 
Without wishing, for a single second, to cast any cheap 
and nasty aspersions about the state of Stirner’s ‘mental 
health’, least of all ‘diagnose’ his ‘condition’, 
somewhat miraculously from afar, as Paterson did, his 
presence in ‘The Ego and Its Own’, whether you like it or 
not, is unavoidable.  
 
Paterson would have been better advised not to resort to 
a purely conjectural form of ‘clinical psychiatry’, if it 
merits the term, to substantiate his suspicions, fears 
and prejudices, more especially when he had evidently 
misunderstood the basic premise of ‘The Ego and Its Own’ 
and Stirner’s chief ‘role’ in the performance piece. It 
is not possible, if at all prudent or, for that matter, 
intellectually sound to say something to the effect that 
Stirner was ‘ill’, ‘illogical’ or, more specifically 
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still, a ‘paranoid schizophrenic’ simply because one is 
not in tune with what he had to say or the uncustomary 
way Stirner went about saying it. Paterson’s reaction is, 
if anything, a testament to the enduring power of ‘The 
Ego and Its Own’ to unsettle its readers.  
 
That is not to say, by any stretch of the imagination, 
that Stirner’s ‘performance’ was entirely glitch free, 
far from it. Stirner was certainly a fiery critic, but he 
was prone to lapses of concentration that made him a 
rather careless thinker. He may well have gone to 
tremendous lengths to present himself as the ‘leading 
light’ of his egocentric ‘display’, but it did not 
necessarily work to his ultimate advantage. For all its 
affirmative and meritorious aims, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ 
was marked by one significant flaw: Stirner was far too 
engrossed in his own ‘performance’ to adequately explain 
the basis of his empowerment. ‘I am of myself empowered’, 
as Stirner declared, ‘and need no other empowering or 
entitling’.676  
 
Having claimed to have liberated himself from all manner 
of adventitious and murky conceptual powers ‘within’, 
Stirner found himself at an equal loss to account for his 
own ‘ego’. Could Stirner’s ‘ego’ be little more than an 
idea, not so very far removed from all the elemental 
‘essences’ he so vehemently rebuked? Let us now turn to 
consider the troublesome matter of Stirner’s very own 
autogeneous riddle, his ‘ego’. 
 
V. THE AUTOGENEOUS RIDDLE 
 
The bright pool of light that encircled Stirner’s 
676 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 187). 
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‘performance’ did not extend to an explanatory account of 
his ‘ego’ with the same degree of strength; the light 
that shone on this particular aspect of his work was 
considerably weaker. To be fair to Stirner, he did 
explain what it was not and, admittedly, one has a far 
clearer idea of that. It was neither an ‘abstraction’, a 
mere ‘idea’ nor a monistic ‘essence’; it opposed ‘general 
notions’, exceeded all conceptual categories and Stirner, 
for one, was not at its mercy. Nonetheless, for something 
that was not said to resemble an oppressive ‘idea’, it 
certainly exerted a domineering influence over him.  
 
If one was asked to explain what exactly constituted 
Stirner’s ‘ego’ it would be quite a different story. The 
answer would not be so forthcoming. One would simply find 
oneself back at square one with little choice but to 
peddle out the same ‘what it’s nots’. It was neither an 
‘abstraction’ nor a ‘concept’, it exceeded those 
reductive categories and was ‘something’ else entirely. 
Yet, if one was pressed further, one would have little 
option, but openly admit that one had little idea what 
exactly constituted this ‘something else entirely’ other 
than it defied explanation, could not be generalised, and 
Stirner was not acting in favour of a ‘mere’ idea. It 
was, as you may well imagine, an extremely tautological 
explanation. It is all beginning to sound horribly 
familiar. 
 
The reader is, once again, left completely in the dark.  
 
Stirner’s ‘ego’ was very much open to question; he 
largely failed to account for it in any significant or 
meaningful way. All one learns, in an instructive sense, 
is that it was ‘real’, all determining and entirely his 
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own business. Evidently, it was not without some serious 
issues of its own; Stirner’s ‘ego’ was beset by a series 
of persistent hiccups and ticks. 
 
If we turn to two critics in hope of hearing something 
that resembles a clearer explanation we are told much the 
same thing: ‘All that the individual can say with certain 
knowledge’, as, the first of the two, John Carroll said, 
‘is that he exists and is present, that he exists because 
he feels or senses the presence of himself’.677 ‘But when 
it comes to discussing more specifically’, as the 
perceptive Peter McCormick added, ‘this unique self, this 
ego, that is to be set free, the silence is deafening. 
The most concrete utterance Stirner gives us is the 
dictum “Realize thyself” and an assertion that the self 
is not to be acquired but rather to be realized in being 
squandered, enjoyed, spent, lived out – that is, the self 
is to reveal itself in action – but this culminates in 
the rather hollow epigram “What one can become he does 
become”. It is difficult to imagine what this means when 
it is put into practice; given the details of Stirner’s 
own biography, we might even suggest that this self 
displays its triumphal vigor in an entirely inner world, 
a realm of pure subjective freedom – a man who writes 
daring and shocking books under a pen name while he 
teaches at a girls school’.678 Carroll and McCormick hit 
the nail squarely on the head.  
 
The ‘ego’ was, it would appear, little more than an 
expression Stirner used to describe his own willful and 
677 John Carroll, ‘Break-Out from the Crystal Palace. The anarcho-
psychological critique: Stirner, Nietzsche, Dostoevsky’ ((1974 p. 
41). 
678 Peter McCormick, ‘The Concept of the Self in Political Thought’ 
(1979 p. 707). 
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obstreperous ‘personality’. That he did and said as 
pleased, we are asked to believe, was explanation enough. 
If you happen to be familiar with ‘Obermann’, you will 
have heard Sénancour express much the same thing forty 
odd years before Stirner: ‘“I am willing what I ought, 
and doing what I will”’.679 If not, you are more likely to 
remember Amiel’s contribution from the introductory 
chapter; I said something to the effect that it 
faithfully characterised the autogeneous and autonomous 
character of, as it were, Stirner’s particular ‘cottage 
industry’: ‘He is himself principle, motive, and end of 
his own destiny; he is himself, and that is enough for 
him’.680 Stirner’s ‘explanatory’ account had little basis 
other than that; his ‘ego’ simply described his 
unpredictable whims - his efficacious, volitient state 
and that was more than ample evidence of his, rather its 
veracity.  
 
Stirner appeared to wind himself up by some little known 
mechanism that simply belonged to him and him alone. The 
basis of his autogeneous power was, at best, highly 
uncertain and, at its very worst, a complete and 
unfathomable riddle. One notable question is left begging 
to be answered: by what means did Stirner imagine himself 
‘empowered’? ‘I am the powerful one and owner of power’, 
as Stirner claimed.681 ‘Owness...’, as Stirner surmised, 
‘is my whole being and existence, it is I myself.682 ‘I 
too cannot get out of my skin’, as he declared elsewhere, 
‘but have my law in my whole nature, in myself’.683  
679  Étienne Pivert de Sénancour, ‘Obermann’, Vol. II (1804 / 1910 p. 
265). 
680 Henri-Frédéric Amiel, ‘Amiel’s Journal. The Journal Intime of 
Henri-Frédéric Amiel’ (1882 / 1901 p. 17). 
681 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 187). 
682 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 143). 
683 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 146). 
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Had Stirner made any sort of effort to consider the basis 
of the ‘law’ in his ‘whole nature’, his ‘performance’ may 
well have had a far sounder philosophical footing than it 
did.684 As it stands, the reader is left at a complete 
loss to account for it. Stirner’s egocentric ‘might’ 
simply rested on his say so alone and, ultimately, in a 
biographical, if rather petulant sense, at the mercy of 
an unidentified dipteran. 
 
Let us, in this respect, consider the meaning of the 
following passage. It was, I should warn you, written in 
the tongue-tripping sort of way that Stirner far too 
frequently employed. ‘We are’, as Stirner maintained, 
‘equal only in thoughts, only when “we” are thought, not 
as we really and bodily are. I am ego, and you are ego: 
but I am not this thought-of ego; this ego in which we 
are all equal is only my thought. I am man, and you are 
man: but “man” is only a thought, a generality; neither 
you and I are speakable, we are unutterable, because only 
thoughts are speakable and consist in speaking’.685  
 
How might one be able to account for Stirner’s 
uncharacteristic loss of words? His momentary ‘aphasia’? 
Stirner’s inability to account for his ‘ego’ in an 
explanatory way? Why did words happen to fail the 
otherwise effusive critic on this particular occasion?  
 
Stirner talked himself, in a turn of phrase, into an 
impossible position. His antipathy for all general 
notions extended well beyond conceptual categories to the 
generally agreed use of language itself. ‘But if this is 
684 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 179). 
685 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 275). 
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true about doctrines’, as Isaiah Berlin said with Stirner 
in mind, ‘it will be equally true of all general 
propositions; and if it is true of all general 
propositions, then - and this is the last step of all, 
which some romantics certainly took - it is true of all 
words, because all words are general, they all 
classify’.686 Explanations, after all, merely relate to 
words and all words do is elucidate ‘thoughts’, but as 
the ‘un-man’, as Stirner constantly reminded us, was 
anything but a generally agreed ‘thought’ words no longer 
counted, they were of no further use to him.  
 
The penny, then, finally drops: Stirner’s innate nature, 
his ‘ego’, was simply ‘unutterable’. It defied 
explanation. The ‘Stirner personality’ was, in a word, 
ineffable.  
 
The little one can say about Stirner’s ‘ego’ with any 
degree of certainty was that it was immeasurable and 
exceeded definitive bounds. Stirner hardly differed, in 
that respect, from his ‘first cousins’, the romantics. 
‘Athirst for infiniteness, or for unbridled freedom’, as 
Henri Peyre said of them, ‘romantic temperaments unfurled 
wings to break away from their cells’.687 One need only 
turn to Stirner to recognise the same resounding desire 
to transgress all limitations: ‘I, therefore, am the 
kernel that is to be delivered from all wrappings and - 
freed from all cramping shells’.688 ‘Stirner’, if one 
turns to an observant remark made by R. B. Fowler, 
‘wanted a place for his egoism to roam unfettered’.689 And 
686 Isaiah Berlin, ‘The Roots of Romanticism’ (1965 / 1999 p. 144). 
687 Henri Peyre, ‘Literature and Sincerity’ (1963 p. 120). 
688 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 148). 
689 R. B. Fowler, ‘The Anarchist Tradition of Political Thought’ (1972 
p. 748). 
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that is all one can say, in an explanatory sense, of 
Stirner’s ‘ego’: that it was, as Fowler said, 
‘unfettered’.  
 
Stirner may well have considered it an entirely exclusive 
possession, but his ‘ego’ was comparable to the arcane 
and delitescent powers which informed the universalism of 
Schlegel and Schopenhauer’s schemes. It was no less 
grandiose or expansive in intent and scope, nor was it 
any more explicable. Take something Hans Eichner said of 
Friedrich Schlegel, for instance. ‘It was sufficient for 
his theory’, Eichner wrote, ‘that there should be the 
semblance of limitations being violated, of untrammeled 
caprice, and of confusion’.690 For all intent and 
purposes, Eichner may well have been mistaken for talking 
of Stirner. The reader may well be able to detect the 
very same desires at play in ‘The Ego and Its Own’. 
Stirner also appeared to violate all limitations and 
obstacles that impeded his wanton ‘ego’; words also 
failed to account for it and Stirner’s wildly erratic and 
impulsive mood swings similarly set out to befuddle, 
unsettle and confuse the reader in an effort to convince 
them of his idiosyncratic ‘reality’. Stirner’s 
‘performance’ was, to repeat something of a common 
assessment, little more than an elaborate ruse.  
 
That Stirner chose to enact the tremendous sense of 
empowerment he felt rather than satisfactorily explain it 
hardly substantiates its ‘reality’. Stirner certainly did 
not attempt to account for it beyond his purely 
tautological and staggeringly crude ‘“I am willing what I 
ought, and doing what I will”’ line of argument.691 
690 Hans Eichner, ‘Friedrich Schlegel’ (1970 p. 63). 
691  Étienne Pivert de Sénancour, ‘Obermann’, Vol. II (1804 / 1910 p. 
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Stirner clearly did not possess an adequate understanding 
of his ‘ego’ and it hardly comes as much of a surprise 
that he was unable to successfully explain its basis. 
 
Having possibly sensed something of his grave 
shortcomings in that particular department Stirner tried, 
as best he could, to make up for it, if not completely 
overcompensate for it, in another. Stirner’s 
‘explanation’, if indeed it amounted to an explanation, 
veered off, far too readily, into something that more 
closely resembled a theatrical performance. Stirner’s 
exuberant, if somewhat contrived ‘display’, to put it 
more simply, glossed over a number of unanswered 
questions surrounding his ‘ego’ in an extremely 
confrontational way. 
 
Stirner’s effort to embody and personify his own ideas 
exceeded, rather, attempted to exceed the customary 
bounds of a written work, if not of language itself. 
Stirner was not simply presenting the case of the ‘unique 
one’ or the ‘un-man’, he took it several steps further 
down the line: he was the ‘un-man’, he was the ‘unique 
one’. But if one fails to see little more than the 
animation of an idea in Stirner’s caricature of the ‘un-
man’, he asks us rather brazenly: ‘What am I now to 
you?’. ‘Perhaps’, as he immediately suggested, ‘this 
bodily I as I walk and stand?’.692 ‘Anything but that’, he 
answered on our behalf. But, frankly, it was, just as 
Stirner said, ‘anything but that’. Having just asked us 
two absolutely rhetorical questions: ‘What am I now to 
you? Perhaps this bodily I as I walk and stand?’ and 
answering them, anticipating our doubts, in the negative, 
265). 
692 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 156). 
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Stirner attempted to gloss over the weakest point of his 
‘performance’ in a highly confrontational and pompous 
fashion, in a desperate attempt, I believe, to distract 
the reader’s attention away from the most inflamed sore 
point of ‘The Ego and Its Own’, namely the fallacy of the 
‘un-man’s’ so called ‘reality’.693  
 
The reader is not faced with a ‘bodily I’ at all, but an 
approximate ‘cardboard cut out’, so to speak, of 
Stirner’s ‘bodily I’. His aggressive attempt to pass off 
his stagy persona as a ‘reality’ was little more than a 
convoluted act of reification. The ‘un-man’, this ‘bodily 
I’ that purportedly ‘stands’ in front of us, is nothing 
more than a conceptual ‘ghoul’ even if it was a ‘ghoul’ 
of Stirner’s own evocation. That Stirner had the nerve to 
ask the reader to fall for his no less ghoulish concept, 
the ‘un-man’, and accept it as a palpable fact spoke 
volumes about the extent to which he had fallen under the 
spell of his own self-spun concept.694  
 
Stirner knew very well indeed why one could not possibly 
accept ‘him’, the ‘un-man’, at face value. After all, he 
spent the greater part of ‘The Ego and Its Own’ fiercely 
contesting the spectral nature of abstractions and ideas. 
Stirner was quick enough to denounce the rest of the 
intellectual world for acting in favour of doctrines, 
‘general’ ideas and the like but, ultimately, little 
distinguished Stirner’s ontological ‘scheme’ from those 
he castigated. ‘“Our celebration of the unique 
individual’, referring to Peter McCormick, ‘contrasts 
with “their” ant-like masses and drab-grey uniformity; 
“our” advocacy of the self-realization of the individual 
693 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 156). 
694 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 156). 
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proudly refutes “their” goose-stepping regimentation. But 
this is caricature, not analysis, and it obscures more 
than it clarifies’.695 Knowing this only too well, Stirner 
set about berating the reader to divert his or her 
attention from the ghoulish nature of his own contrived 
and histrionic persona, the ‘un-man’. That Stirner had 
the nerve to ask us such questions in the first place is 
one thing, but for him to carry on and subject us to the 
cheapest form of ridicule in an effort to extricate 
himself from an extremely sticky position is almost too 
much to bear.  
 
What makes it all the more annoying, an ‘Arghol moment’ 
in fact, is that Stirner made an unrealistic demand of 
the reader and considering his sensitivity to other 
falsehoods, ought really to have known better than to ask 
us to blindly fall for another. There are, as I have 
repeatedly maintained, many trying moments in ‘The Ego 
and Its Own’ that ‘even the most patient critic’, to 
repeat a fitting line written by Wyndham Lewis, ‘is in 
revolt’.696 The nearest window is not, in this particular 
instance, nearly close enough. 
 
Stirner was eager to present himself, his ‘ego’, as a 
‘reality’, as an unquestionable reality, and, as a 
result, he could very well be accused of pandering to a 
weakness that he was so quick to identify and attack in 
the intellectual world at large. ‘With so many a man’, as 
695 Peter McCormick, ‘The Concept of Self in Political Thought’ (1979 
p. 690).   
696 I am referring to Wyndham Lewis’ ‘The Writer and the Absolute’ 
(1952 p. 178). Lewis is talking of George Orwell’s novel - his 
‘worst’ in his opinion, ‘Coming up for Air’. ‘There is no more I can 
say about this book’, Lewis adds on the following page, ‘except that 
I heartily sympathize with any future student of contemporary 
literature who has to read it’ (1952 p. 179). Lewis describes a very 
familiar feeling to those acquainted with ‘The Ego and Its Own’. 
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Stirner wrote, ‘a thought becomes a “maxim”, whereby he 
himself is made prisoner to it, so that it is not he that 
has the maxim, but rather it that has him’.697  
 
One could very well hold Stirner to account by simply 
repeating back to him the very criticisms he made of 
other ideas and abstractions. We might refer him to page 
247 of ‘The Ego and Its Own’ and remind him of ‘the spook 
that has become so intimate is taken for our true ego’.698 
We might even recommend he turn to page 43 of his own 
work: ‘Man, your head is haunted; you have wheels in your 
head!’.699 Stirner was similarly at the mercy of a 
theoretical fancy which he mistook for an absolute 
‘reality’. He was as culpable as the ‘intellectual world’ 
he attacked. Stirner’s abstraction just so happened to be 
a rather more exclusive abstraction and little more than 
that.  
 
I would like, at this particular point, to bring your 
attention to a passage taken from Eduard Von Hartmann’s 
‘Philosophy of the Unconscious’ (1868). It is a rather 
lengthy passage but I am keen to repeat it to you in its 
entirety as it brings to light some perceptive 
observations concerning Stirner’s philosophy and its 
relationship to romanticism, particularly the philosophy 
of Arthur Schopenhauer.  
 
Speaking of ‘The Ego and Its Own’, Von Hartmann wrote: 
‘This book subjects all ideals having an influence on 
practice to a destructive criticism, and shows them to be 
idols that only possess power over the Ego so far as the 
697 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 59). 
698 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 247). 
699 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 43). 
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latter concedes such to them in its self-mistaking 
weakness. It cleverly and piquantly demolishes with 
forcible reasons the ideal aims of political, social, and 
humanitarian Liberalism; and shows how the Ego alone can 
be the smiling heir of all these ideals thus reduced to 
impotent nothings. If these considerations only had the 
purpose of confirming the theoretical position that I can 
as little step out of the frame of my self-hood as out of 
my skin, nothing need be added; but as Stirner professes 
to have found in the Idea of the Ego the absolute 
standpoint for action, he either falls into the same 
error that he had combated in the case of the other 
ideals, such as Honour, Freedom, Right, &c., and places 
himself at the mercy of another enthralling idea, whose 
absolute sovereignty he recognises, not however for this 
or that reason, but blindly and instinctively, or he 
conceives the Ego not as idea but as reality, and with no 
other result than the perfectly empty and meaningless 
tautology that I can will only my own will, think only my 
own thoughts, and that only my own thoughts can become 
motives of my willing – a fact as undeniable by his 
opponents as by himself. If, however, and only in that 
case has his conclusions any sense, he means that we 
ought to acknowledge the IDEA of the Ego as the only 
governing one, and to admit all other ideals only so far 
as they have a value for the former, he should first have 
examined the idea of the Ego’.700  
 
On the following page, Von Hartmann added ‘had Stirner 
approached the direct philosophical investigation of the 
Idea of the Ego, he would have seen that this idea is 
just as unsubstantial and brain-created a phantom... as, 
700 Eduard Von Hartmann, ‘Philosophy of the Unconscious’, Book III 
(1868 / 1931 p. 97). 
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for instance, the Idea of honour or of right, and that 
the only being which answers to the idea of the inner 
cause of my activity is something non-individual, the 
Only Unconscious, which therefore answers just as well to 
Peter’s idea of his ego as Paul’s idea of his ego’.701  
 
Von Hartmann brings our attention to something I have 
already alluded to – namely, the alarming crack that 
appears in Stirner’s ‘performance’ when one begins to 
inspect it a little more closely. If we trace our fingers 
along the line of this crack, we will eventually come 
back to the mysterious ‘autogeneous power’ at play at the 
heart of his display, something Von Hartmann described as 
Stirner’s ‘absolute standpoint for action’, his ‘ego’ in 
other words.702 It is exactly at this point that the 
stresses and weaknesses at play behind Stirner’s 
performance are felt most keenly.  
 
Stirner would appear to have fallen under the spell of an 
idea, ‘an enthralling idea’ as Von Hartmann put it, 
‘whose absolute sovereignty he recognises, not however 
for this or that reason, but blindly and 
instinctively’.703 Regardless of the enormous amount of 
energy Stirner expended in his attempt to convince the 
reader otherwise - that he was not merely ‘an unreal 
thing’, a ‘concept’ but a ‘bodily man’ that actually 
‘stood’ before us, the horribly sober fact remains: ‘The 
Ego and Its Own’ was not a performance piece but a 
conceptual, if highly stylised written work.  
 
701 Eduard Von Hartmann, ‘Philosophy of the Unconscious’, Book III 
(1868 / 1931 p. 98 - 99). 
702 Eduard Von Hartmann, ‘Philosophy of the Unconscious’, Book III 
(1868 / 1931 p. 98 - 99). 
703 Eduard Von Hartmann, ‘Philosophy of the Unconscious’, Book III 
(1868 / 1931 p. 97). 
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Stirner attempted to absolve himself from a range of 
criticisms that might have been leveled against his work 
had it been presented as a straightforward theoretical 
piece, but ‘The Ego and Its Own’ was a work into which 
many more livelier colours had run. By presenting his 
ideas in such a way that they were largely 
indistinguishable from himself, Stirner was keen to 
foster the impression that his ideas were not ideas at 
all, but an ontological state and, as an ontological 
state, they were not, opportunely, subject to the same 
rules that govern concepts. Granted, Stirner’s ‘ego’ was 
not reputed to be an extraneous ‘idea’, it expressed, 
instead, an entirely personal state, but for all the 
differences and subtleties between the two, Stirner’s 
idea of ‘ego’ was just as abstruse and enigmatic as the 
‘primordial powers’ which Schlegel said were at work 
within ‘mankind’ and Schopenhauer’s odious conception of 
nature’s collective will.  
 
‘The Ego and Its Own’, unlike a number of works which 
preceded it, emphasised the illimitable scope of the 
individual subject on his terms alone. In stark contrast 
to Schlegel and Schopenhauer, Stirner made a compelling 
case on behalf of the somatic and ‘transitory’ subject; 
the ‘un-man’ was certainly, comparatively speaking, a 
more readily identifiable figure than Schlegel’s ‘poet’ 
or Schopenhauer’s ‘subject of knowledge’. Stirner’s 
subject may well have brimmed with ‘personality’, exuded 
physical presence and the like, but, nonetheless, his 
innate nature - his ‘ego’, remained, for all its 
colourful ‘personalism’, an unknown quantity: an 
inexpressible riddle.  
 
Stirner may well have manufactured, as best he could, an 
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impression of ‘presence’ in an effort to persuade the 
reader of his ‘reality’, but in the process, he talked 
himself into an extremely vulnerable position. Stirner 
was left open to attack from all sides; not least of all 
from the force of his own invective. Stirner’s ‘ego’ was 
not the least bit free from exactly the sort of 
‘nocturnal spookery’ he claimed to have shed ‘daylight’ 
on.704 Stirner resorted, if in spite of himself, to more 
or less the same cloudy scapegoats as Schopenhauer and 
Schlegel had done in his failure to account for his own 
‘immeasurable’ state. Stirner’s ‘ego’ may well have been 
entirely his own affair, but like all the ghoulish 
notions he lampooned and rebuked, it was inexpressible, 
indefinable and thoroughly incomprehensible. Stirner’s 
‘ego’ was no less a mystery. 
 
The ‘un-man’, the ‘unique one’ and even ‘Max Stirner’ 
himself – what were all of these imaginary things if they 
were not, as Von Hartmann said, ‘brain-created’ phantoms? 
They were little more than ideas parading about, under 
false pretences, as purportedly ‘real’ figures. Stirner 
objections were, I believe, simply limited to the form 
the subject’s ghoulishness assumed. Stirner just so 
happened to prefer his ‘spooks’ to be of the more 
traditional ‘sheet-draped’ sort rather than the invisible 
poltergeist variety.  
 
Stirner ended up in a shadowy corner that was not so very 
far away from the one inhabited by the likes of Schlegel 
and Schopenhauer. Having taken off in a completely 
different direction, Stirner was plunged back into the 
very cloud from which he hoped to escape. ‘My heart must 
have illusions, for it is too great not to yearn for 
704 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 263). 
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them, and too weak to dispense with them’, as Sénancour 
confessed in ‘Obermann’.705 And Stirner, similarly, could 
not bring himself to ‘dispense’ with any of the 
totalising, all encompassing ‘illusions’ one associates 
with the ontology of Schlegel or Schopenhauer; instead, 
he tossed a colourful, initialed sheet over the 
universalising force of nature and claimed it his ‘own’. 
It failed, however, to cover what Stirner wished to 
conceal, namely, its unfathomable basis. His feet also 
poked out at the feet of the curtain. Stirner’s ‘ego’ 
was, one suspects, yet another name for yet another murky 
delitescent concept which aggrandised the subject’s 
standing to an equally incalculable and indefinable 
degree. But, unlike Schlegel or Schopenhauer, it belonged 
solely to him. 
 
VI. HIS MASTER’S MASTER 
 
Stirner’s explanatory account of his ‘ego’, 
unsatisfactory as it was, leaves one with little choice 
but to seek an answer elsewhere. Schlegel’s inceptive 
‘theory’ certainly does not provide one. His ontology of 
the romantic subject was willfully abstruse and perfectly 
reflected, to some degree, Schlegel’s wider theoretical 
objectives. Nonetheless, the critic did extend his 
expansive ‘theory’, if not nature itself (certainly not 
in its gory entirety), to the individual subject. 
Schlegel’s poet was, if he was nothing else, infinite in 
scope. The seeds of Stirner’s own illimitable ‘ego’ had 
been planted, so to speak. That leaves us, then, with 
Schopenhauer’s doctrine of will. 
 
705 Étienne Pivert de Sénancour, ‘Obermann’ Vol, II. Translated by 
Barnes. (1804 / 1910 p. 173).  
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The ‘ego’ may well have found an ideal ‘expressive 
platform’, an upturned if unsteady box, in Stirner’s 
playful work, but Schopenhauer was the only one of three 
who gave it due consideration. Stirner, after all, did 
little more than vocalise his egocentric ‘might’ and 
demonstrate, along the way, the compelling sway it had 
over him. 
 
Arthur Schopenhauer would have regarded Max Stirner with 
a mixture of curiosity and alarm in equal measure and, 
had he been familiar with ‘The Ego and Its Own’, a great 
deal of censure. Stirner would certainly have 
reciprocated Schopenhauer’s reservations had he similarly 
been acquainted with the philosopher’s doctrine. 
Nonetheless, the respective figures would have regarded 
each other’s work, I believe, with more than a fair 
amount of interest and, at certain points, even been in 
agreement. 
 
‘Egoism’, Schopenhauer maintained, ‘is colossal; it 
towers above the world’.706 On another page of ‘On the 
Basis of Morality’, the philosopher wrote: ‘Everyone 
makes himself the center of the world, and refers 
everything to himself’.707 ‘The chief and fundamental 
incentive in man’, turning to another page of the same 
work, ‘as in the animal is egoism, that is, the craving 
for existence and well-being’.708 ‘Egoism really consists 
in man’s restricting all reality to his own person’, as 
Schopenhauer wrote in the second volume of ‘The World as 
Will and Representation’, ‘in that he imagines he lives 
706 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘On the Basis of Morality’ (1840 / 1965 p. 
132). 
707 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘On the Basis of Morality’ (1840 / 1965 p. 
132).  
708 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘On the Basis of Morality’ (1840 / 1965 p. 
131). 
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in this alone, and not in others’.709  
 
Stirner would have whole heartedly agreed with 
Schopenhauer. ‘The unbridled ego - and this we originally 
are’, as Stirner similarly affirmed.710 ‘I am not an ego 
along with other egos, but the sole ego’, as Stirner 
maintained, ‘I am unique. Hence my wants too are unique, 
and my deeds; in short, everything about me is unique. 
And it is only as this unique I that I take everything 
for my own, as I set myself to work, and develop myself, 
only as this. I do not develop men, nor as man, but, as 
I, I develop - myself’.711  
 
Stirner’s ‘ego’ and Schopenhauer’s ‘will’ have a great 
many more things in common than might ordinarily be 
supposed. They both identified the ‘ego’ as a primary 
incentive force but one question, namely that of its 
origination, left them, ultimately, at loggerheads.  
 
Alarm bells, to illustrate the point, would have rung 
very loudly in Max Stirner’s ears had he heard 
Schopenhauer say: ‘Fundamentally it is the will that is 
spoken of whenever “I” occurs in judgement. Therefore the 
will is the true and ultimate point of unity of 
consciousness, and the bond of all its functions and 
acts. It does not, however, itself belong to the 
intellect, but is only its root, origin, and 
controller’.712 And Stirner would have objected in the 
strongest possible terms had Schopenhauer suggested to 
him: ‘In the animal as in man this egoism is most 
709 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 507).  
710 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 179). 
711 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 318 - 319). 
712 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 140).  
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intimately connected with their innermost core and 
essence; in fact, it is really identical with essence’.713  
 
Stirner’s ‘ego’ was anything but an ‘innermost essence’; 
his ‘I’ did not belong to anyone or anything other than 
himself. Stirner’s egocentric ‘might’ was something 
peculiar to him; he alone was accountable for its 
manifestation, not vice versa. Stirner was certainly not 
‘controlled’ by an elemental, collective force of nature. 
He was no ventriloquist’s dummy. 
 
That may well be true, but all the same, Stirner’s ‘ego’ 
and Schopenhauer’s ‘will’ empowered them both to an 
remarkably similar degree through, one is somewhat 
loathed to admit, precisely the same means. The 
difference lay largely in their receptivity of the said 
‘means’. Stirner’s ‘ego’ came to an immediate halt with 
himself whereas Schopenhauer saw it as extending well 
beyond his or any one person. The philosopher regarded it 
as a force at play within him (as well as nature itself) 
over which Stirner had little say. He was the will’s 
subordinate dummy. 
 
Schopenhauer would have warmly welcomed, in one respect, 
Stirner’s ‘performance’ as it perfectly demonstrated the 
persuasive pull of one half of his doctrine, namely the 
world as ‘representation’. ‘Every man’, as Schopenhauer 
explained, ‘can be considered from two opposite points of 
view; from the one, he is an individual, beginning and 
ending in time, fleeting and transitory, the dream of a 
shadow’.714 ‘From the other’, as Schopenhauer continued, 
713 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘On the Basis of Morality’ (1840 / 1965 p. 
131). 
714 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘Parerga and Paralipomena’, Vol. II (1851 / 
1974 p. 278). 
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‘he is the indestructible primary being that objectifies 
itself in every existing thing’.715 Needless to say, 
Stirner considered himself along the lines of the former 
rather than the latter. Stirner, just so happened to have 
a particular gift that was confined to the egocentric 
‘phenomenon’ rather than the collective will, the ‘thing-
in-itself’. Schopenhauer’s interest, on the other hand, 
extended to both its appearance and that which determined 
it, nature’s will.  
 
A Schopenhauerian take on Stirner’s ‘philosophical 
performance’, if indeed one is willing, however 
reluctantly, to take an interpretive liberty with ‘The 
Ego and Its Own’, brings Stirner back a full 360 degree 
circle. His account of his ‘ego’ was not so very far 
removed from the ‘John Smithish’ philosophies - the 
collective ideas of man, from which Stirner went to such 
lengths to distance himself. The one and only point of 
contention was that, unlike Schlegel or Schopenhauer, 
Stirner was not the least bit willing to surrender the 
seat of his autocratic regime. 
 
To consider Stirner’s philosophical ‘display’ as the 
affirmation of Schopenhauer’s doctrine certainly explains 
a number of things about his ‘ego’ that his own 
theatrical account largely failed to do. Schopenhauer’s 
doctrine provides an explanation of Stirner’s ‘ego’ on 
two specific fronts.  
 
Firstly, Schopenhauer explained something about the ‘ego’ 
that Stirner was simply at a loss to do. Schopenhauer did 
not consider the ‘ego’, as Stirner had done, as the sole 
715 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘Parerga and Paralipomena’, Vol. II (1851 / 
1974 p. 278). 
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possession of any one person. To affirm one’s ‘ego’ was 
not to affirm oneself, as Stirner believed, but to affirm 
the will’s wider interests. Not that it was common 
knowledge; one, ordinarily, knew little about it. Egoism 
was the will’s ace in the pack - its chief delusional 
ploy. Schopenhauer talked of egoism as representing, what 
he called, ‘the form of the will-to-live’.716 Elsewhere, 
the philosopher described nature’s will as being 
‘absolutely egotistic’.717 The will, conniving as it was, 
capitalised on the immediacy of the ‘ego’ to pass off its 
interests as one’s own. Schopenhauer would have certainly 
leveled this criticism directly at Stirner. 
 
‘Egoism’, as Schopenhauer explained, ‘is so deep-rooted a 
quality of all individuality in general that, in order to 
rouse the activity of an individual being, egotistical 
ends are the only ones on which we can count with 
certainty... Therefore in such a case, nature can attain 
her end only by implanting in the individual a certain 
delusion, and by virtue of this, that which in truth is 
merely a good thing for the species seems to be a good 
thing for himself, so that he serves the species, whereas 
he is under the delusion that he is serving himself... 
Thus it imagines it is pursuing individual ends, whereas 
in truth it is pursuing merely general ends’.718  
 
The will pandered, in this sense, to Stirner’s ‘Achilles’ 
heel’. Stirner was so completely assured that his desires 
were his own that he did not stop to think twice, remote 
as it was, about any other possibility. Stirner clearly 
716 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 320).  
717 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 215).  
718 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 538).  
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felt the desirous influence of nature’s will, but did 
not, given his grounded standpoint, recognise the source 
from which it sprang. The prospect, understandably, did 
not even warrant contemplation. It was absolutely 
inconceivable.  
 
Secondly, Schopenhauer’s doctrine also accounts for the 
wild objections Stirner would indubitably have expressed 
if one suggested to him that what, in fact, he felt 
surging through him was not his ‘ego’ at all but the 
elemental spirit of nature which constituted the basis, 
not just of his, but all egos which sought, in every 
instance, to be affirmed. Stirner would have vehemently 
disagreed. ‘How you ever seen a spirit?’, Stirner asked 
with his tongue firmly planted in the side of his cheek, 
‘“No, not I, but my grandmother.” Now, you see, it’s just 
so with me too; I myself haven’t seen any, but my 
grandmother had them running between her feet all sorts 
of ways, and out of confidence in our grandmothers’ 
honesty we believe in the existence of spirits’.719  
 
Stirner evidently inherited little from his grandmother 
and, unlike her, he did not believe in anything he could 
not see or touch. His dogged belief in the somatic 
individual, the egocentric personality, the ‘here and 
now’ and the like were all absolutely incontrovertible 
and Schopenhauer would have agreed, up to a point. Had 
Stirner taken his customary line of argument – the 
evidence in front of his eyes, he would have failed to 
say a single thing about nature’s will that Schopenhauer 
did not already know.  
 
Schopenhauer’s doctrine of will would have been 
719 Max Stirner, ‘The Ego and Its Own’ (1844 / 1995 p. 35). 
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absolutely impervious to all of Stirner’s criticisms and, 
if anything, openly encouraged and exploited his 
incredulity for its own ends. Nature’s will absolutely 
relied on the gut reaction of say a Max Stirner to 
maintain itself. In flatly rejecting the will, as Stirner 
would no doubt have done, he would have simply betrayed, 
the philosopher would have thought, his limited knowledge 
of it, not to mention the extent to which he had been 
deceived by its ‘duplicitous’ influence.  
 
Stirner was obviously incapable of appreciating the true 
basis of his ‘might’ as his interest did not extend 
beyond the tightly bound circle of his own phenomenal 
form, itself a manifestation of nature’s will. Stirner 
would have appealed to little more than the veracity of 
an illusion to substantiate his argument against the very 
thing which had evoked it in the first place. 
 
Stirner’s ‘performance’ was thoroughly conditioned, 
Schopenhauer would have concluded, by the ‘principle of 
individuation’. The said principle was, as we know, 
transmutative; nature’s will did not appear as will but 
an unquantifiable number of images dispersed through time 
and space, each one of whom, whatever their form and 
allotted temporal frame, sought to assert and defend 
themselves along egocentric lines. But nature’s will saw 
better of divulging its ‘secret’ and, in something akin 
to a concessionary measure, indulged each one of them 
with an incontestable belief in their own determinate, 
singular and volitient state.  
 
Nature’s will, the philosopher believed, actively 
encouraged people to hold an unshakeable belief in their 
own ‘sovereignty’; it led prying eyes and unwelcome 
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attention away from will’s clandestine operations which 
it could not afford, for its own sake, to disclose. The 
ego, to take the example at hand, was of paramount 
importance to will as it secured its dominion. ‘It 
seems’, as Schopenhauer wrote in the second volume of 
‘The World as Will and Representation’ (1844), ‘that the 
required penetration of the principium individuationis 
would be present in everyone, if his will were not 
opposed to it. By virtue of the will’s immediate, 
mysterious, and despotic influence over the intellect, it 
prevents this penetration from arising’.720 ‘Therefore’, 
as Schopenhauer might well have said with Stirner firmly 
in mind, ‘everyone wants everything for himself, wants to 
possess, or at least control, everything, and would like 
to destroy whatever opposes him’.721 Stirner was clearly 
under the spell of the nature’s will and the delusional 
sense of grandeur it engendered. 
 
Stirner was not empowered by his ‘ego’ not, that is, in 
the way he imagined. The enormous power at his disposal 
did not emanate from himself, as he believed, but 
nature’s will. Stirner was not, as he liked to think, 
placed at the head of the table but sat, as Schopenhauer 
would have confirmed, in a rather lowly place and, 
indeed, among many more guests than he dared imagine.  
 
Stirner’s ‘ego’ was a very narrow outlet through which 
unquantifiable gallons of water were channeled. ‘The Ego 
and Its Own’ got no further, in an explanatory sense, 
than the scaturient spout and did not venture to consider 
the source which supplied it. Stirner was not able to see 
720 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 601). 
721 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
I (1818 / 1966 p. 332). 
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beyond his representational form, beyond the spumescent 
jet of water, as it were, and was incapable of 
contemplating anything that resembled its wellspring. It 
is not so much a criticism of Stirner per se; it is 
rather a reflection of the extremely persuasive and 
beguiling entity that presented Stirner’s ‘ego’ as 
incontestably his ‘own’ when, arguably, it was no such 
thing at all. The tremendous power Stirner felt at his 
finger tips was not solely his own, Schopenhauer would 
have pointed out to him, but that of nature itself. 
 
Ordinarily, Stirner did not have to be told twice about 
the delusory nature of things. He exposed, to his 
tremendous credit, a great number of seemingly ‘decent’ 
and ‘noble’ ideas (the ‘general’ concern for man, for 
example) as bereft of meaning and, ultimately, of the 
most fraudulent nature. If Stirner had been tricked or 
‘deluded’ then it would have taken an incredibly 
compelling thing to do so. And with nature’s will, his 
master’s master, Stirner had finally met his match.  
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CHAPTER 5. THE FEET AT THE FOOT OF THE CURTAIN 
 
I. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
What, then, can one gather from the present thesis? What 
can one ascertain about the subject’s passage through the 
work of Friedrich Schlegel, Arthur Schopenhauer and Max 
Stirner? It would appear the subject’s ‘definitive’ 
nature, whether it was viewed from ‘the inside’ or ‘out’, 
from a ‘universal’ or ‘particular’ standpoint ended up in 
the same atramental, inexpressible state. One could well 
conclude that Stirner did little more than mystify the 
subject’s finite, singular standing just as Schlegel and 
Schopenhauer had mystified his universal ‘inmost being’. 
 
The whole person was now an absolute riddle. 
 
‘The Ego and Its Own’, to reiterate the point, was not so 
very far removed from ‘The World as Will and 
Representation’ or Schlegel’s ‘Dialogue on Poetry’; 
Stirner simply wished to convey the subject’s own 
immeasurable potential rather than one derived from 
nature. But Stirner was no more able to explain its 
illimitable scope or basis than either Schopenhauer or 
Schlegel.  
 
Stirner felt the same desire for ‘infinity’, for 
boundless ‘freedom’, but unlike Schopenhauer or Schlegel, 
he obstinately refused to stray into the realms of 
metaphysics, pantheism or any other form of monistic 
thought, religious, mystical or otherwise, to explain it. 
Not to say, that the ‘presbyopic’ romantics, with the 
possible exception of Schopenhauer, had a particularly 
clear or consistent idea themselves when it came to 
explaining their boundless nature. Even Schopenhauer 
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stumbled on this particular front; his conception of will 
was, ultimately, an unfathomable mystery. If, for 
instance, one turns to page 206 of ‘On the Basis of 
Morality’ (1844), we hear Schopenhauer say: ‘We see only 
outward; within it is dark and obscure’.722 And we have 
already heard, on an previous page, Schopenhauer admit: 
‘the “I” is an unknown quantity, in other words, it is 
itself a mystery and a secret’.723  
 
‘We cannot know things as they exist’, turning your 
attention to a particularly insightful passage taken from 
the second volume of ‘Obermann’. ‘We see relationships’, 
as Sénancour continued, ‘not essences; we deal not with 
things, but with their images. And this nature, which we 
strive to see outside of us, and which is inscrutable 
within us, is everywhere shrouded in darkness. “I feel” 
is the only reality left to the man in search of truth. 
And that which makes the certainty of my being is also 
its torment. I feel, I exist, merely to be consumed with 
ungovernable desires, satiated with the seductions of a 
fantastic world, and oppressed by its captivating 
illusions....’.724 Sénancour, once again, perfectly 
expressed Stirner’s position.  
 
Stirner’s account of his own ‘nature’, his ‘ego’, was 
barely an ‘account’ at all, but a demonstrative display 
of the tremendous sense of empowerment he felt. Stirner 
did not ‘deal’ with ‘essences’ but tangible things; he 
was captivated by his own ‘image’, but he was no less 
able to account for it. For all his bold efforts, ‘The 
722 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘On the Basis of Morality’ (1840 / 1965 p. 
206). 
723 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 139).  
724 Étienne Pivert de Sénancour, ‘Obermann’, Vol. II (1804 / 1901 p. 
74). 
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Ego and Its Own’ illuminated little more than Stirner’s 
energetic ‘performance’. His account may well have 
differed in emphasis from the likes of Schlegel and 
Schopenhauer but certainly not in its conclusion. ‘“I 
feel” is the only reality left to the man in search of 
truth’, as Sénancour said.725 And Stirner’s account of his 
‘ego’ was purely emotive; words simply failed to 
satisfactorily explain it. Stirner’s ‘being’, to use 
Sénancour’s expression, remained ‘inscrutable’. It lay 
beyond the expressive capacity and generally agreed use 
of language to adequately explain. 
 
‘The will everywhere retains its identical nature’, as 
Schopenhauer wrote in the second volume of ‘The World as 
Will and Representation’, ‘and shows itself as a great 
attachment to life, care for the individual and for the 
species, egoism and lack of consideration for all others, 
together with the emotions springing therefrom’.726 And, 
following the philosopher’s lead, Stirner was certainly 
in the grip of the ‘emotions springing therefrom’.727  
 
Stirner’s emotive depiction of the ‘un-man’ portrayed a 
‘personality’ rather than an immutable essence, but, 
nonetheless, he felt the equal force of an immeasurable 
power at play ‘within’ him – his egocentric ‘might’ as he 
called it, but at the same time, he found himself at a 
complete loss to account for its basis. Regardless of 
Stirner’s admirable effort to distinguish himself from 
the likes of Schlegel and Schopenhauer he ended in very 
much the same position. A position where nothing, in 
725 Étienne Pivert de Sénancour, ‘Obermann’, Vol. II (1804 / 1901 p. 
74). 
726 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 206).  
727 Arthur Schopenhauer, ‘The World as Will and Representation’, Vol. 
II (1844 / 1966 p. 206).  
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spite of Stirner’s best efforts to clear the clouds, was 
particularly lucid or sharply drawn; least of all, the 
ontological state of the individual subject, the ‘un-
man’.   
 
All three writers found themselves at a loss to 
articulate, with any degree of clarity or certitude, the 
basis of their innate nature. It was, regardless of their 
emphasis, fundamentally inexpressible. The subject’s 
nature remained, in spite of Stirner’s best efforts, a 
complete and unfathomable mystery. ‘The anguish of the 
problem of the hidden self cannot’, as Peter McCormick 
maintained, ‘be avoided or answered any more than can the 
claim of the solipsist; there is no logical point at 
which the self-critical probe can be stopped, no 
suggested formulation of the self that might not require 
further analysis and penetration to a deeper truth. Nor 
is the question an empty one; if one is to attach 
importance to the individual, one is committed to making 
statements about the connected notion of the self, and if 
the self remains inscrutable or tentative even to its 
owner, then the premise of individualism simply hangs 
suspended’. 728 
 
All three figures expressed a wish to transgress 
restrictive bounds, to elude categorisation and, 
ultimately, mystify whatever source of empowerment they 
derived, in an ontological sense, from their respective 
theories. But none of them – neither Schlegel, 
Schopenhauer nor, indeed, Stirner truly relinquished the 
very things they claimed to have cast aside.  
 
728 Peter McCormick, ‘The Concept of Self in Political Thought’ (1979 
p. 705 - 706).   
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Schlegel thought better of promulgating a theory on the 
grounds that theories were restrictive and wholly 
confining; it did not, however, discourage him from 
concocting a ‘theory’ and putting in place his own set of 
discerning restrictions. Schopenhauer claimed to have 
liberated himself from ‘egoism’, ‘individuality’ and 
similarly delusory ‘notions’, but it did not stop him 
from refuting the will in accordance, all too 
coincidentally, with his own invested interests. And 
Stirner had absolutely no inclination to express the 
universalism of the subject’s ‘inmost’ essence, but, 
nevertheless, went about extolling the ‘un-man’s’ 
illimitable scope as an egocentric ‘personality’ without, 
apparently, any further obligation to account for its 
basis. 
 
‘Most to be pitied’, turning your immediate attention to 
Maurice de Guérin’s ‘Journal’, ‘are those who, thrown 
between these two contraries, stretch out their arms to 
both’.729 Schlegel, Schopenhauer and Stirner were not 
necessarily worthy of pity, but they all found 
themselves, at one point or another, in a vacillatory 
position. All three writers wanted the best of both 
worlds; to express, in other words, a sense of 
illimitability, but, at the same time, retain a 
determinate basis. As for the subject, whose ‘progress’ 
we have charted in the course of the three schemes, he 
was no more apparent than a pair of feet at the foot of a 
curtain. 
 
 
 
729 Maurice de Guérin, ‘The Journal of Maurice de Guérin’ (1842 / 1891 
p. 192). 
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